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The Relationship Between the End of the Cold War, Globalization, and the Responsibility to Protect
Josh Major, 6/1/2012

Introduction

The end of the Cold War altered the balance of power in international relations. With the fall of the USSR, the world went from bipolar to unipolar with the United States initially acting as a near, if not total, hegemonic power. One of the effects of this shift in influence was a change in the dynamics of international affairs. As countries no longer had to cater to the interests or follow the directions from one of the major powers in a previously bipolar world, they could suddenly act in very different ways.[1] A reflection of this phenomenon was the large number of international crises shortly following the end of the Cold War, be they interstate conflicts, such as the first Gulf War, or intrastate conflicts, such as in Yugoslavia, Liberia and Somalia. This period also coincidentally reflected a tremendous expansion of globalization, as information technology began improving at an exponential rate in the early to mid-1990s. The rapid expansion of globalization generated an unprecedented level of interconnectedness throughout the world. One of the outcomes of this expansion was a surge in the availability of news and current events through the media to influential western countries. It also provided a medium through which repressed populations could expose events and tell their story despite efforts by the ruling power to censure state run media outlets.

As the world changed following the end of the Cold War and the number of intrastate conflicts spiked with associated increasing violence, awareness of terms such as “ethnic cleansing” and “genocide,” through the deaths and displacement of millions of people, steadily grew. These dynamics led to increasing questions as to the constitution and intricacies of global security, as well as the factors leading to its potential achievement. As incidents increased and the security paradigm shifted, the international community began to feel a greater obligation to do something to curb the violence inside of countries as their awareness of that violence increased. Although initial responses lacked coherence and focus, the United Nations (UN) reacted strongly with a tremendous increase in activity in the years following the end of the Cold War. As the perceived nature of conflict continued to evolve, the international community sought to come to terms with how to deal with the new security environment. The concept of “Responsibility to Protect,” or R2P[2], developed over time as a response to deal with cases where a state cannot, or will not, protect its citizens from avoidable catastrophes.[3]

This paper will attempt to establish a relationship between globalization and the development of the concept of R2P within the context of the conditions created by the end of the Cold War. It will specifically examine the transformation in the world system after the Cold War and how this new system contributed to an initial augmentation in intrastate conflicts, how globalization created an atmosphere of increased awareness of these events that eventually led to R2P, and some of the challenges that face both globalization and R2P in today’s world. Specific examples of intrastate conflicts since the end of the Cold War will highlight certain elements that reflect the key themes of the paper.

To help in the visualization of this theory, a diagram of complimenting ideas is included that attempts to graphically depict some of the linkages between a variety of primary and secondary concepts (figure 1). It is not necessarily meant to portray the relationship between the end of the Cold War, globalization and R2P as a sequential phenomenon (although there is some truth to this), but as a variety of reinforcing themes that complement each other. Ultimately, the intent of the diagram is to serve as a reference guide throughout the reading of this paper to help follow the logic of the arguments, as well to serve as a source of debate for the readers in future discussions.[4]

 

Although there are significant bodies of scholarly work concerning the end of the Cold War, globalization and R2P, there appears to be a void in any type of research that attempts to establish a relationship between these phenomena. It is arguable that without the end of the Cold War, the geopolitical situation would not have led to a change in the global security paradigm. It also would not have permitted many countries to push for their independence, as they would have remained trapped in the East-West conflict. Perhaps most importantly, it would not have exposed the already large number of intrastate conflicts that had been steadily growing since the end of World War II.

Although the focus of globalization in this paper revolves around technological and information innovations and developments, economic globalization also had a tremendous effect upon the world after the fall of the Berlin Wall. The full effect of globalization in the world is outside the scope of this paper, however it could certainly form the basis for a continuation or branch of this paper’s principal argument, as globalization may have been a major contributor to the end of the Cold War. This paper will focus on, to use Thomas Friedman’s terms, the technological innovations from the period marking the end of Globalization 2.0 to the period marking the beginning and continuation of Globalization 3.0.[5] It will attempt to establish some type of linkage between technological innovations leading to the propagation of various types of mass, 24/7 media sources that brought the realities of conflict zones ever closer to western homes by physically or technologically linking disparate populations throughout the world. Technological interconnectedness arguably enabled the development of R2P by increasing global awareness of atrocities occurring throughout the world within foreign governments and their domestic populations.

The author acknowledges that this theory is tremendously difficult to measure empirically. The sheer number of variables and their relationships are all subject to a myriad of factors that lead to covariation, as well large number of potential confounding variables. However, an attempt will be made to establish some base relationships (as depicted in figure 1) between the three main themes of the essay (being the end of the Cold War, globalization and the development of R2P) using cross-sectional and time-series data concerning specific incidents in the international community since the end of the Cold War. Specific incidents such as the collapse of Yugoslavia, as well as conflicts in Somalia, Rwanda, Kosovo and Libya will serve to highlight certain key aspects of the progress towards the development of R2P. They represent varying circumstances, over different timeframes, with differing levels of international response, as well as highlighting a particular aspect of the key themes identified in figure 1.

These concepts may be precursors to a fundamental shift, at least conceptually, in the types of conflicts that garner the attention of the international community, but particularly within western nations. It may also help explain why there has been some movement in regards to what constitutes legitimate and legal action both between and within states. It may also help to explain why certain countries and IGOs (such as NATO and the AU) decide to act during certain crises and not during others. As legality and legitimacy are arguably the most contentious and important issues relating to R2P, they deserve a certain amount of explanation to help frame how and why they are important. Domestic opinion, and how it may affect foreign policy in light of increased globalization, is also extremely important to give context to why the international community intervened in some cases and did not in others. In conjunction with the diagram at figure 1, this will hopefully lead to increased clarity in defining the relationships between a country’s national interests, what a country sees as legal and legitimate actions, and the effect of domestic opinion upon national policies.

Concepts of Legitimacy and Legality

Despite many acts to the contrary, almost every country (even the most powerful) attempts to have its actions seen as legitimate and legal by the international community. For this reason, figure 1 has the evolving concept of international legitimacy and legality stretching from the end of the Cold War up to the development of R2P (and realistically beyond). The end of the Cold War has essentially changed the equation in international relations and has resulted in heated debate concerning when a country may have its sovereignty violated in the name of the greater good. The problem is the definition of that greater good and who should decide what that good entails. Although not synonymous with one another, actions are judged by their perceived levels of legitimacy and legality. Suzanne Nossel defines legitimacy as “…a measure of the acceptability and justifiability of s state’s actions in the eyes of other states and their citizens.”[6] The importance of international legitimacy has certainly increased since the end of the Cold War with the transition from a bipolar, to a unipolar and then to a multipolar world. A number of sources such as rules, rectitude[7], or a combination thereof can provide international legitimacy. The generally accepted judgment of legitimacy, not legality, is through ratification by multilateral institutions, such as the UN Security Council, regional IGOs such as NATO, individual states, and/or by the public at large.[8] The correlation between these factors can certainly affect how independent governments choose to support, or not support, the proposed actions of an actor on the world stage. When an organization such as the UN Security Council judges actions are legitimate and legal through a resolution, it generally (though not universally) affects world opinion in a positive way as the action has been sanctioned. In certain circumstances, the UN General Assembly can give a measure of legitimacy to a proposed intervention through a non-binding vote by two thirds of its members in an emergency session under a “Uniting for Peace”[9] procedure.[10] Some countries use regional organizations, such as NATO or the AU, to support a particular action, although some other countries would not consider this endorsement legitimate or legal if the UN did not endorse it. However, if a country’s population overwhelmingly judges a proposed action as legitimate, this can influence a government’s decision to act or not to act. Nossel advocates that countries should act alone if necessary; however, if broad international reservations exist, a prudent course would be to examine why the action is not supported and whether measures other than force should be considered.[11]

International legitimacy is not synonymous with the concept of legality or international law. In order for an international action that violates a country’s borders to be legal, it needs official sanctioning by the UN Security Council. Article 2(7) of the UN Charter states that,

Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.[12]

In theory, this would preclude any intrusion into a non-willing country without a UN Security Council resolution in order to help stabilize an internal problem. This was the norm during the Cold War and the tension between the US and the USSR generally precluded any action that contradicted any one power’s national interests. It also would have been a detriment to the execution of proxy wars since internal disorder was a key element in their prosecution.

Although legality forms the basis for legitimacy, there are issues with international law theory as it fails to explain why some states obey international law while others choose to ignore it altogether. Guzman argues that compliance to international law is a result of states wishing to maintain their reputations or because of the threat of sanctions.[13] He further postulates that international law is most likely to be successful when it involves repeated interactions involving relatively small stakes. Therefore, important issues in international law such as the laws of war, arms control, etc… are the issues in which international laws are less likely to have an effect.[14] They are also less likely to affect very strong countries that can influence the application of international law in terms of sanctions. This becomes a fundamental issue when strong states such as the US, Russia, France, Great Britain and China (all permanent members of the UN Security Council) engage in questionable activities, as the possibility of applying any sanctions by weaker countries is severely restricted. As a result, the issue of legitimacy becomes extremely important for smaller states as it can have an effect upon a more powerful state’s reputation in the world. The concept of legitimacy is of even greater importance when applied to the legitimate vs. the illegitimate use of force.

Robert Kagan does an excellent job of taking the concepts of legality and legitimacy and viewing them through the lens of the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Although a singular point in time, it does offer insight into how a near Hegemonic power sees the world in a potentially different way than other nations in the western world since the end of the Cold War. Although his arguments involve mostly European nations, Canada could easily be part of this group. He provides an excellent account of how the world has changed since the end of the Cold War, and with it, the concept of legitimacy (mostly in regards to the US). This is an important fact as he describes the three pillars that gave the US legitimacy (and as such, set the standard for the western world) rested upon the existence of the Soviet Union as a strategic and ideological threat. This, in turn, provided “structural legitimacy”[15] to the US as a natural counter to the threat and established a process of interaction that was very predictable to all western nations. However, this well understood concept of legitimacy crashed along with the Berlin Wall.[16] This critical event allowed a divergence of the perception of legitimacy. The concept becomes even more problematic as we look at what the accepted criteria are for a legitimate military operation. While there was rampant criticism of the US by many countries, including Canada, for not using the UN as the authority to invade Iraq, Kagan highlights that several countries, including Canada, have conducted operations without UN approval such as the Kosovo air campaign in the defense of human rights.[17] How then can one determine the definition and meaning of legitimacy if it seems in constant change? Kagan brings this out when stating, “…legitimacy has proved conveniently flexible in recent years, it is because legitimacy is a truly malleable concept…the search for legitimacy creates a fundamental dilemma for liberalism and liberal internationalism.”[18] One of the reasons that legitimacy is so important may be how the public perceives the use of force in foreign policy. In an age of increasing interconnectedness and availability of media, domestic reaction to any international crisis may affect the foreign policy decisions of a state. The relationship between public perception and opinion and foreign policy decisions also needs consideration.

Effects of Public Opinion on Foreign Policy

There are a few concepts that most social scientists agree upon in the relationship between public opinion and public policy in democratic countries. They are that public opinion does influence policy and the more salient the issue is to the public, the greater the effect on policy. The diagram at figure 1 attempts to display the importance of public opinion on decision makers within governments. One of the key aspects of figure 1 is the effect of the evolution of technological interconnectedness. As technology continues to develop and become more available, the public’s ability to access information (although not always factual or accurate) also continues to increase. This in turn enables NGOs, interest groups, as well as other organizations to use the venues of mass and social media to influence public opinion. In his research, Paul Burstein asks the question “…how much impact does public opinion have on public policy?”[19] This is an important question as it relates to international relations and foreign policy decisions. One of the most important factors in determining whether public opinion will affect a foreign policy decisions depends on how much a subject interests the public.

The issue of saliency therefore becomes particularly imperative, as this is one of the key factors in measuring how important the public perceives an issue. If the public is strongly interested in a particular issue, then they will most likely put stronger pressure on their government. Conversely, if the public is ill informed about an issue due to a lack of information or simply not caring, then they will not be particularly effective in influencing any decisions.[20] As globalization continues to expand and people, specifically in the more developed parts of the world, become more interconnected, improvements in media access, communications and transportation mean that the issues, as well as elected officials, are more within the public’s reach.[21] Burstein has concluded that public opinion affects policy three quarters of the time, that saliency is of particular importance in this outcome and it is possible that government responsiveness to public pressure can change over time (although this conclusion requires more extensive research).[22]

Extrapolating the work of Soderlund can lead one to conclude that increased access to information can augment saliency and therefore result in greater influence of the public on government decisions.[23] This is an important concept as it can help explain, in part, why national governments and IGOs (as their participating countries influence them) decide to intervene in some conflicts and not others. It is feasible to assume that increases in technology and access to information through media and social media can influence public opinion. The degree to which this motivates the public may therefore influence national policies (certainly in democratically elected countries) and this may result in actions that are not necessarily in line with their established national interests.

The End of the Cold War and Setting Conditions for Globalization and R2P

The end of the Cold War was conceivably the greatest single event that set the conditions for the eventual establishment of R2P. Although enhanced technological globalization will later play a key role in the further development of the conditions necessary for R2P, this process may have been hampered or even non-existent without the end of the Cold War. The diagram at figure 1 attempts to illustrate its importance by having it laid out as the initial building block upon which all other factors are developed. It illustrates the relationship between the desire for sovereignty and some of the potential associated problems with the process towards independence. The end of the Cold War exacerbated resource scarcity, economic inequality and ethnic tensions, thus contributing to the failure of many states. These conditions were important in the eventual development of the concept of human security, a central tenet of R2P.

The end of the Cold War signified the termination of a world system that had dominated international relations since the early 1950s. The fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union gave a sense that democracy and capitalism had prevailed, and there was finally hope for a lasting world peace. However, a more pessimistic viewpoint saw this period as a potential reemergence of contested ideologies and ideas that were no longer constrained by the great powers.[24] This timeframe saw an increase in the desire of many states, now free from the Soviet sphere of influence, to pursue their individual agendas, mostly consisting of democratic reforms. While this process went relatively well for some countries, such as Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, other countries such as Yugoslavia descended into brutal civil wars and resulted in a number of failed states. Success of different countries has been, in part, determined by their ability to transition to a working democracy, or conversely, to an autocracy. Countries not able to transition into one of these types of governance become an anocracy[25]. A country’s type of governance is a reflection of its Polity[26] score. Scores go from a perfect democracy of +10 to a perfect autocracy of -10. Democracies generally score between +6 and +10, while autocracies score from -6 to -10. Therefore, anocracies fall between +5 to -5 on the scale. There may be numerous reasons why countries become anocracies. However, the main reason in the post-Cold War period has been from incomplete transitions to democracy. Figure 2 highlights a sharp increase in the number of anocracies just prior to and during the end of the Cold War. This is an important fact, as anocracies are generally unstable and vulnerable to outbreaks of internal armed conflict, as well as being more likely to experience a coup with resulting instability.[27]

 


The new global political environment also affected how the international community reacted to these crises. Bipolarity, generally speaking, greatly hampered the ability of the United Nations to act during the Cold War. However, this was not the case in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War. In fact, between 1990 and 1994, the United Nations Security Council passed roughly twice the number of resolutions as it had during its entire history. This authorized 20 new operations, which in turn raised the number of peacekeepers throughout the world from 11,000 to 75,000 troops.[28] This reflected the changing notion of what constituted a threat to international peace and security by now including humanitarian concerns, as well as traditional state-centric conflicts. UNSCR authorizing interventions in Somalia, Liberia, Rwanda and Kosovo[29] (amongst others) led to a perception of a new challenge to the previously unchallenged notion of the inviolability of state sovereignty.[30]

As the world order changed, the relative importance given to Third World countries backing either side in the Cold War disappeared, resulting in a dramatic decrease in support in many cases. The US began significantly cutting aid to a number of countries that they had previously supported against communist incursions such as Angola, Somalia, Afghanistan, Cambodia and El Salvador. With the end of the Cold War, Congress set tight restrictions and conditions on US loans to Third World countries such as Kenya, Pakistan and Zaire[31]. Aid packages to Sub-Saharan African countries became increasingly dependent upon pro-democratic reforms. The USSR also dramatically cut its aid and arms packages to the Third World countries it supported such as Nicaragua, Ethiopia, Angola and Mozambique.[32] While the US cut aid because of shifting priorities in world security and an emphasis upon democratic reform, the USSR did so because of their own economic collapse at the end of the Cold War. With the disappearance of the geopolitical threat of the USSR, Western governments could threaten to withdraw aid much more effectively, without consequence, than they could have during the Cold War. The countries that decided to conform to Western pressure such as Benin, Ethiopia and Angola received aid that enhanced the democratic process, while those that did not such as Sudan and Somalia had their aid cut or suspended.[33] For example, Somalia, once seen as a key US ally in the region to counter the Soviet threat, became increasingly ostracized because of repressive government practices. As a result, the US provided no new economic funds or military assistance in 1989 and 1990.[34] These countries lacked, generally speaking, adequate resources and institutions to maintain their economies once the bipolar world system that supported their economies collapsed. Resource scarcity led to many internal conflicts as suppressed ethnic majorities began battling with elitist minorities for control of several countries and territories, especially on the African continent.[35] Countries that possessed abundant natural resources faced a different problem, as authoritarian governments reaped the benefits to the detriment of their population. Many of these authoritarian regimes had maintained their power, buoyed by one superpower or the other, as long as they supported the geopolitical objectives of their benefactor. The US and Soviet meddling in domestic affairs in a number of Third World countries created economic inequality, impeded future democratic development and set in place conditions for the violation of human rights.[36] Current intrastate conflicts that also support the theory of increased probability of violence related to economic instability and inequality are the Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Nigeria. The Gini Index[37] scores for these countries are well above the mean average of 45, with Sudan having a Human Capital Gini Index of 79, Nigeria 65 and the Congo 65.[38] The combination of economic inequality and the vestiges of superpower involvement in Third World countries had a much more damaging effect upon weak states than stronger ones at the end of the Cold War. Countries with frail political and representative structures exacerbated ethnic and religious divides and set the conditions for mass atrocities that were to capture international community’s attention.[39]

Two excellent and related examples of the repercussions of Cold War politics and their legacy on future international interventions are Somalia and Rwanda. Somalia was the first truly large-scale African crisis since the end of the Cold War. It highlighted the change in dynamics from interstate conflicts to intrastate conflicts as various armed factions vied for power within the country that had imploded. The chaotic security situation in Somalia was a direct byproduct of the geopolitical struggle waged by the US and the USSR in the horn of Africa during the Cold War.[40] At the time of the initial UN intervention in 1992, there were already hundreds of thousands dead and many more were threatened and millions faced starvation.[41] Use of force in Somalia was first authorized with UNSCR 794 in order to provide a secure environment for the shipment of humanitarian aid. UNSCR 814 authorized a larger armed intervention into Somalia as a reaction to an increasingly difficult security situation to provide a safe and secure environment for humanitarian aid. The case of Somalia highlights a number of very important dynamics of the post-Cold War environment. First was the desire of the international community to do something in response to the new concept of human security. As the situation in Somalia became progressively worse, the international community committed more and more resources in the form of aid and UN peacekeepers. The US also dispatched its own forces to Somalia as part of the UN force and they became embroiled in the battle of Mogadishu, resulting in the deaths of 18 Americans and the subsequent withdrawal of US forces from the UN force. Second was the effect of the media coverage of the incident. The growth in the capability of the media meant that the story of the American deaths received an incredible amount of negative coverage, especially in the US. The third effect of this incident was that it seriously undermined US domestic support to any future military operation that was not in direct support of US interests.[42] Thus, we can see the potential effect of media upon public opinion. A short time later, the situation in Rwanda further highlighted how public opinion could affect national policies.

The failure of the mission in Somalia was one of a number of factors that led the international community to stand idle during the slaughter of 800,000 Rwandans over a 100-day period. Although there was a UN mission in place (UNAMIR), they were not equipped to deal with the scale of the conflict. The realities of the new security situation, as well as the Somali experience and its impact upon national public opinion in the US, restricted any action that may have stopped the killing.[43] The subsequent UN inquiry into the Rwandan tragedy blamed the overriding failure to stop the genocide as a lack of resources, but more importantly a lack of will by the international community. The restrictions imposed by some influential countries for a smaller force for UNAMIR, as well as the hesitancy to support new peacekeeping operations after the Somalia debacle reflect this reality.[44] There was also a reluctance to term the killings a “genocide,” since this would have automatically forced the UNSC to react. Concurrently, President Clinton invoked PDD25 just as genocide in Rwanda began, effectively limiting what the US was willing to do in support of peacekeeping operations by imposing a comprehensive series of conditions that were unlikely to be met by the UN. The public announcement of the policy, by National Security Advisor Tony Lake, emphasized the notion that,

“…peacekeeping is a part of our national security policy, but it is not the centerpiece…the directive prescribes a number of specific steps; to improve U.S. and UN management of UN peace operations in order to ensure that use of such operations is selective and more effective.”[45]

The shadow of the events in Somali, and their broadcast to the American public, played a huge part in the development of US policy towards peacekeeping operations and certainly towards any potential intervention in Rwanda.

Conflicts that originate from perceived economic injustices often coincide with elements of nationalism that have flourished since the removal of the constraints of the Cold War. Nationalism, linked to ethnicity or religion, became an important factor in the sharp rise in intrastate conflicts immediately following the end of the Cold War. This was particularly the case in conflicts in the former Yugoslavia.[46] Following the Cold War, Yugoslavia’s once promising economy suffered and steadily degraded into an economic crisis that promoted increasing strain between the different republics because of their level of wealth. This resulted in a shift in politics that saw each republic (especially Slovenia and Croatia) become more protective of its economic interests and rights from encroachment by the other republics or the central federal government.[47] The link of ethnicity and nationalism to politics and economics became inseparable. It is evident that many of the factors that contribute to armed conflict – enduring internal rivalry, perceived economic relative deprivation, geographical factors, type of government and increasingly extreme nationalism – were present and building.

The conflicts in Yugoslavia had nationalist, ethnic and religious undertones to varying degrees and were a contributing factor for why there were so brutal. Yugoslavia became the first case after the end of the Cold War where the need to do something to protect civilians from mass atrocities clashed with the desire to protect the institution of state sovereignty.

Societal change brought about by migrations of populations after the Cold War and the associated demographic and environmental stresses was also a determining element in many conflicts. Ruling governments can use migrant societies to exploit ethnic and religious divisions. This was the case in Rwanda in the 1990s and a contributing factor to the bloodshed between the Hutus and Tutsis.[48] Another feature of the post-Cold War period has been the rise of religious fundamentalism, often linked to culture or ethnicity, which is also challenging aspiring governments in under-developed countries such as Afghanistan, Pakistan and the Philippines.[49] Religious fundamentalism has added another aspect to conflicts as it can, and has, been instrumental in rallying a population to commit significantly violent acts against another segment of the population. Fundamentalism within, as well as between, religious and ethnic lines can serve as a catalyst to disrupt peaceful methods of conflict resolution. It is essential to note that religious fundamentalism is not a purely Islamic occurrence. One of the most sinister and brutal groups in Africa, the Lord’s Resistance Army, is essentially a Christian fundamentalist group that brutalized Christians within its own ethnic group. Joseph Kony, the group’s leader, uses religion and mysticism as powerful tools to motivate his fighters to commit incredible acts of violence.[50] These conflicts, regardless of originating circumstances saw the state carry out, or support, atrocities against a segment of its own population, generally within its borders. The humanitarian crises resulting from several intrastate conflicts became present in the global (and certainly western) conscious with the disintegration of the former Republic of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s.[51]

It is important to highlight that the end of the Cold War in itself did not suddenly create a new type of conflict. In fact, the number of intrastate wars had been steadily rising since the end of World War II, as the United States and the Soviet Union fought many proxy wars throughout the world in countries such as Angola, Guatemala and El Salvador.[52] Although the number of intrastate conflicts peaked in the immediate years following the end of the Cold War, their numbers have significantly reduced over the past twenty years. The end of the Cold War helped create the conditions for this decline. Although economic collapse resulting from elimination of funding from the US or the Soviet Union created the conditions for many brutal internal struggles, this same lack of resources also ended a number of insurgencies throughout the world. The end of the Cold War also freed the UN, at least initially, from the stasis created by the East-West divide and facilitated a much greater level of international security activism.[53] Figure 3 graphically depicts the peak of 20th century conflict immediately following the end of the Cold War, but then sharply declining over the next 15 years. The difference, however, is that the rapid expansion of globalization has meant that the conditions for increased knowledge of what is happening in these conflicts by all of the world’s actors has significantly increased.

 
Globalization and the Development of R2P

For the purposes of this paper, the definition of globalization is the development of augmented interconnectedness that has occurred from exponentially increasing levels of technology since the mid-1990s. This period has seen the most rapid and expansive developments of technology that have allowed for an ever-increasing level of interconnectedness, be it personal, physical, emotional or virtual. The progress of technology and its accessibility to the average person means a level of connectivity in the world like no other time in history. This has been a steadily growing phenomenon since the end of the Cold War and has certainly contributed to the conditions that have led to the concept of R2P. The increased level of interconnectedness also coincides with an explosion in the number of NGOs[54]operating throughout the world. Their work, as well as their ability to serve as an alternative source of information and influence in international affairs, greatly contributed to shaping the world after the end of the Cold War.

The rise of continuously present global media has been one of the developments resulting from the advancement of technological globalization. While the media has been reporting on war for a long time, their ability to bring the images right into the average person’s living room has exponentially grown. This has been a steadily progressing capacity, with media communication going from strictly print, to wired broadcasts through telegraph, to wireless broadcasts through radios and television over the past 100 years. The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, signifying the beginning of the end of the Cold War, was one of the first international events that could be seen live on television in real time because of CNN. Television brought images of Germans scaling the Berlin wall to a global audience, thus shrinking the world by the global reach of television.[55] A phenomenon commonly referred to as the “CNN effect.” The theory, proposed by Piers Robinson, essentially states that compelling images of a humanitarian crisis on the television will influence policy decision makers to intervene in a situation when it is not normally in the interest of that country (particularly the US) to do so.[56] In the period after the Cold War, this has exploded into 24/7 news services, either through radio or television, as well as instantly accessible news through the internet. This has compressed time and space in relation to an event occurring and when the average person becomes aware of its occurrence. The Gulf War in 1991 was the first armed conflict broadcasted to the entire world through cable television.[57] It was a defining moment that marked the beginning of news that could instantly captivate an audience with slightly delayed, but near continuous reporting. It also meant that news was accessible to anyone who has a radio or television and in recent years a computer or mobile device.[58] This improved access, in increasingly real time, to acts of extreme violence and atrocities being committed in foreign conflicts resulted in paradigm shift in the mindset of western populations and their leaders. The realization that some governments were conducting or abetting acts of extreme violence against their own people brought the requirement of humanitarian intervention to the international agenda (although this did not necessarily result in action). This was an important development in the evolution of R2P, as it established the concept of human security[59] that addresses the protection of the population and the individual, rather than that of the state apparatus.[60] Because of globalization and technological innovation over the past twenty years, individuals now have a significantly greater ability to leverage these capabilities to promote their messages.

However, the effect of media reporting has not been without controversy or effects upon international conflicts. The cases of the war in Yugoslavia, specifically Bosnia, and Rwanda highlight the impact that media had upon intervention as well as public opinion. The internal conflicts in Bosnia and Rwanda share many characteristics, such as ethnic characteristics, duration of fighting as well as an extreme level of brutality.[61] The term “ethnic cleansing[62]” has been used to describe the incidents in Bosnia, while the term “genocide[63]” describes what occurred over the period of 100 days in Rwanda. However, they differ tremendously in international response as well as in media coverage prior to and during their respective conflicts. One study discovered that six major US newspapers, reporting on both countries between October 1990 and April 1994, ran a significantly disproportional number of articles within the timeframe. In total, the papers ran 560 referencing Rwanda, while they ran 14,114 articles referring to Bosnia which equates to a ratio of about 25 times the coverage. While this ratio fluctuated throughout the timeframe, with a high point of about 90 times the coverage in April1993 to a roughly equal percentage in April 1994 (which was just before the genocide began).[64] The level of international intervention in both of these countries is also extremely different. There have been significant numbers of troops within the former Republic of Yugoslavia since 1992 with the introduction of UNPROFOR, followed by the NATO missions of IFOR and SFOR. At its height, UNPROFOR has 38,599 military personnel while the mission in Rwanda, UNAMIR, possessed only 5,500 at its height (during the genocide, there were only 2548 soldiers).[65] Going back to the diagram at figure 1, this issue essentially highlights the potentially troublesome relationship between national interests, public opinion and the influence of media in the decision-making processes towards national policies. According to former US National Security Advisor Tony Lake, there was no domestic appetite for any type of intervention in Rwanda, because of Somalia, and that Congress would never have authorized funds to send American troops to stop the genocide. The lack of understanding about what was happening in Rwanda reflects a lack of media coverage about what was happening at that time. In turn, this meant that the public, policy makers and senior leaders were not aware of the seriousness of the conflict. In fact, during the genocide, senior American officials (Secretary Level and the President) did not give Rwanda much attention at all.[66] Despite the failure of the states within international community to prevent the genocide in Rwanda, another element of the community, NGOs, were continuing to carry out their tasks to assist the population. This is a reflection of the development in the numbers and types of NGOs since the end of the Cold War.

NGOs have become particularly prevalent in the years following the end of the Cold War. Although their numbers have steadily increased since the end of the Second World War, the total number of NGOs has grown from about 5,000 to an estimated 44,000 since the end of the Cold War (although this number is debatable).[67] Figure 4 illustrates the dramatic increase in both NGOs and IGOs since the end of the Cold War.

In an era when national governments have foreign policies driven by their national interests, NGOs have provided aid and support to populations threatened with a variety of catastrophic issues derived from economic, political, social or environmental origins. This is particularly the case where countries have chosen not to become involved because of their national policies. Countries, however, sometimes use NGOs as an alternative to direct intervention in a variety of threatened areas.[68] The end of the Cold War has physically opened areas of the world that were once restricted and this has permitted NGOs access to new areas of conflict. Technological innovation, much in the same way it has done for the media, has permitted NGO to broadcast their operations and their messages, to the entirety of the world. This, in turn, has had an effect upon many western populations and their governments. The political power of NGOs has also greatly increased since the end of the Cold War with over 2800 accredited and functioning as part of the UN. NGOs were able to encourage the adoption of R2P, as they were able to influence many UN members throughout the implementation talks at the International Commission on Intervention and International Sovereignty in 2001, as well as official adoption of the concept during the UN World Summit in 2005.[69] Because of their operations, NGOs have developed levels of influence that were unthinkable prior to the end of the Cold War. Figure 1 attempts to illustrate this dynamic by tying the conditions created by the end of the Cold War with a dramatic increase in the number of NGOs; who are (generally speaking) advocates of the concept of human security; who work in many of the failed or failing states throughout the world; and who can affect national policies directly or through the use of public opinion influenced by mass or social media. Although not universally a force for good, NGOs have become a powerful force in the world and have a tremendous effect upon countries, governments and international organizations.

The end of the Cold War, as well as the rapid expansion of globalization, has enabled the power of the media and NGOs to shape world perception. This interconnectedness, however, is not simply linking the media with more of the world. It has allowed people to have instant access to a wide variety of platforms that allow them to communicate with anyone in the world. Today, people can wake in one country and go to bed in another at the other end of the world. Improvements in communications allow people to speak, sometimes face to face if they have access to the technology, in real time at a relatively inexpensive price. The number of people connected to the internet in the world has increased dramatically over the past 20 years. Figure 5 illustrates internet penetration densities for select “western” countries depicting the enormous growth in internet connectivity. The selected countries have seen internet connections per 100 people increase from a very low number in 1991 to approximately 80 per 100 having an internet connection in 2010.

 


Information Source: The World Bank (http://data.worldbank.org/)

This interconnectedness has been a contributor to R2P through the exposition of violence and atrocities committed half a world away. While on the surface, this seems like a breakthrough for humanity and the beginning of a better world, there are significant issues that relate to globalization and R2P.

The Challenges of Globalization and R2P

The end of the Cold War and the exponential development of globalization have led to an increasingly complex security environment. In the years immediately following the end of the Cold War, the international community responded to escalating intrastate violence with various humanitarian missions.[70] Despite the reaction of the international community, these interventions were often disjointed and lacking of any real ability to stop belligerent actions. The UN missions in Bosnia and Croatia are notable examples of the dilemma of trying to do something while lacking the will to do what is required to actually stop the violence. The UN actions (or lack thereof) in Somalia and Rwanda in the mid-1990s illustrated the inability of the international community to reconcile catastrophic events with national policy. Action only occurred once popular opinion became so intense that it forced governments to act, often too late to stop violent acts. This in known as the prevention gap and highlights the tension between national policies and domestic opinion.[71] Current crises such as the Congo, the Sudan and Syria continue to highlight that national interests can prevent effective international responses to intrastate conflict.[72] This is an interesting counterpoint to the concept that globalization is eroding the relevance or power of countries in international affairs.

One of the fundamental issues at the heart of globalization and the debate concerning R2P is the idea that they attack the sovereignty of the state. The increased interconnectedness and growing influence from NGOs and IGOs, as part of globalization, is challenging traditional state power and affecting national domestic and foreign policies.[73] Globalization can also act as a destabilizing force on national sovereignty in the developing world, as NGOs and multinational corporations have seen their influence greatly increased in those locations in recent years. The combination of interconnectedness and presence of other actors within a state means that states can no longer effectively shut their populations off from the outside world. If a population feels that their government is not providing for their welfare, they can petition to the international community.[74] The effect of globalization, in concert with the end of the Cold War, has changed the interaction in international affairs and has brought sovereignty to the fore.

Sovereignty is an important issue in R2P as violation of state sovereignty can be part of an action relating to R2P. The concept of is a much cherished one in the established world order since its establishment at Westphalia in 1648. It has helped maintain order in the world by separating domestic issues from international ones. It has, and still does in many cases, provide a “firewall” from outside interference in the domestic affairs of a country.[75] One of the reasons why R2P is a difficult sell is because many nations, such as China and Russia, still have many internal problems that could fall under the conditions required to implement R2P. These “Westphalian” nations are concerned that R2P could be used as a legal pretext to legitimize interventions by the west.[76] From a global south perspective, R2P is seen as a possible disguise for intervening in a country for the purposes of exploitation. These “Trojans” feared that R2P was a Trojan Horse that was a carry-over from the divisive humanitarian interventions of the early 1990s that would be driven by neo-colonial interests.[77] These concepts illustrate one of the many divides that challenge both globalization and R2P and continues the debate on the international scene between east and west, as well as north and south.

Although outside the bounds of this paper, the only formal implementation of R2P to date, the Libyan intervention authorized by UNSCR 1973[78], has highlighted a number of issues with the concept. While Libya now enjoys freedom from a tyrannical dictator, regime change was not and should have been the focus of the intervention. This has potentially created obstacles for future use of R2P to help protect a population by rendering its implementation impossible by differing opinions in the United Nations Security Council. While China and Russia did not support the Libyan intervention, they did not veto its implementation. This may not be the case in the future, as Chinese and Russian national interests may not support such a course of action. This is evident in places such as Syria and the Sudan where all the conditions for R2P implementation exist, yet no concrete action has taken place.

Conclusion

The issues presented in this paper are only a fraction of the challenges that affect globalization and R2P. Walking through the diagram presented at figure 1, the conditions were set with the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the end to the Cold War as the world became physically more accessible. This accessibility allowed NGOs to better access and operate in formerly restricted areas of the world. The change in the international environment enabled many new states to attempt democratization, but it also ended in many failed states. Some of these failed states became centers of atrocities committed or abetted by the government on their population. They also became areas that promoted violent religious fundamentalism that greatly increased violence within an intrastate conflict. The resulting international paradigm shift from conflicts centered between states to conflicts centered within states resulted in the development of the concept of human security.

Although initially not a well-defined phenomenon, the concept of R2P was developed to establish some kind of standard to identify when the international community should become involved in an internal crisis. The development of R2P came from the dramatic increase in international interventions that lacked coherence and focus, not to mention success. This also coincided with an evolving concept of international legality and legitimacy that overlaps and influences international relations. Many countries see R2P as a threat to the established Westphalian order and R2P does raise significant issues in regards to state sovereignty. The perception is that it is not as a universally accepted concept that benefits everyone. As such, R2P can also conflict with a country’s national interests. Although a country may feel morally obligated to act, they may not do so as a certain crisis if not deemed important to their interests. Only when a significant influencer changes this opinion, be it IGO, NGOs or public opinion, may a state change its national policies. As the international community struggled with this new reality, globalization dramatically changed how the world was connected and, in many cases, compounded the issues between human security and state sovereignty.

The rapid expansion of globalization made the world more accessible from an emotional and psychological perspective as technology has enabled instant communication to almost every corner of the world. Although only briefly touched upon because of its relative recent nature, the impact of social media has significantly contributed to this effect. Social media sites such as Facebook and Twitter allowed people who could not access traditional media mediums to get their message out to the world. This extremely powerful tool potentially helped sustain changes in Egypt and Libya. This interconnectedness helped transform public opinion through instantly accessible and continuous media coverage. This altered the security environment in such a way as to first promote humanitarian interventions and later the concept of R2P. Arguably, the increase in technological globalization has directly contributed to R2P in much of the same way as the end of the Cold War.

Will R2P become the new security paradigm under which future interventions will be justified by the international community? It is difficult to predict at this time as the international community sits at a crossroads between doing what it should for human security, doing what it must for national interests and doing what it can with available resources. What is clear is that the world is still in the process of evolving from the end of the Cold War. What appears to be clearer is that R2P would never have occurred without the end of the Cold War and the rapid development of globalization. The former has set the physical, as well as geopolitical, conditions that were necessary to the transition from humanitarian intervention to R2P while the latter has increased awareness of the world and empowered more people to effect change. They are complimentary phenomenon that have come together to drive the evolution of international relations from a purely nationally based one to one that is beginning to emphasize the importance of every human being. Time will tell if the new security paradigm of human security and R2P is viable and sustainable, or whether the Westphalian system will prove to be resistant enough to reestablish dominance in an increasingly interconnected world.

Notes

1. Patrick F. White, “Normative Considerations Bearing on the Responsibility to Protect – Prospects and Implications in a Fracturing International System,” Canadian Military Journal 9, no. 2 (2008), http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vo9/no2/04-white-eng.asp (accessed 27 February, 2012).

2. “The Responsibility to Protect”, the idea that sovereign states have a responsibility to protect their own citizens from avoidable catastrophe – from mass murder and rape, from starvation – but that when they are unwilling or unable to do so, that responsibility must be borne by the broader community of states. (Source: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (Dec 2001)).

3. Maureen O’Neil, “Managing Globalization: Human Rights, National Policy and Multilateral Action,” (comments presented at the Progressive Governance Conference, Surrey, UK, July 12, 2003).

4. The blue portions of the map depict some of the central concepts that will be discussed in this paper. The hexagon shapes are primary themes that attempt to establish a relationship between the end of the Cold War, globalization and R2P. These are sovereignty, technological interconnectedness and the concept of human security and will be the main themes examined throughout the paper using various incidents of intervention within a state since the end of the Cold War. The orange ovals represent some thoughts that complement either primary or secondary themes or are examples of something relating to them. These are also discussed in more detail throughout the paper. Anything that is red is a negative theme as they relate to the relationship between the main themes and the relationship between the end of the Cold War, globalization and R2P. Yellow and green ovals are contributors and enablers of the relationship and their particular influences are explained throughout the paper. Finally, one of the most important concepts has been the evolving concept of international legality and legitimacy from the end of the Cold War up to, and through, the development of R2P as depicted by the light yellow arrow.

5. Thomas L. Friedman, The World is Flat (New York: Picador, 2007), 9-10, 51-59.

6. Suzanne Nossel, “Going Legit,” Democracy Journal 3 (Winter 2007), 30.

7. Rectitude revolves around the perception that a policy or action is justified and is not easy to come by as following a set of prescribed rules (Nossel, Winter 2007, p. 34)

8. Ibid, 35.

9. To be clear, any decision made in this forum would not legally authorize intervention, however it would lend a significant amount of legitimacy to a proposed intervention. This action could be undertaken if the UN Security Council did not formally authorize an intervention or is deadlocked in discussion.

10. Rebecca J. Hamilton, “The Responsibility to Protect: From Document to Doctrine – But What of Implementation?” Recent Developments ,Harvard Human Rights Journal19 (Spring 2006) 291, http://www.law.harvard.edu/students/orgs/hrj/iss19/hamilton.shtml#fnB1 (accessed 1 Mar, 2012).

11. Nossel, 35.

12. United Nations, “Charter of the United Nations,” 24 October 1945, 1 UNTS XVI, http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/CTC/uncharter.pdf (accessed 1 March, 2012).

13. Andrew T. Guzman, "A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law," California Law Review 90 (2002): 1828-1829.

14. Ibid, 1830.

15. The concept of “structural legitimacy” was a result of a bipolar world where the US and the Soviet Union opposed on another and kept each other in check. It allowed the US to adopt many policies that, although not especially popular, were accepted by most western nations (Kagan, 2004, p. 67).

16. Robert Kagan, “America’s Crisis of Legitimacy,” Foreign Affairs 82 (2), (March/April 2004), 67.

17. Ibid, 69.

18. Ibid, 70.

19. Paul Burstein, “The Impact of Public Opinion on Public Policy,” Political Research Quarterly 56 (1), (March 2003), 29.

20. Ibid, 30.

21. Ibid, 31.

22. Ibid, 36.

23. W.C. Soderlund and M.F. Lee, “International Reporting in Canadian Newspapers: Results of a Survey of Daily Newspaper Editors,” Canadian Journal of Communications 24 (2), (Spring 1999).

24. Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Shannon L. Blanton, World Politics: Trends and Transformations 12th ed (Boston: Wadsworth, 2010), 111.

25. Anocracies are a middling category rather than a distinct form of governance. They are countries whose governments are neither fully democratic nor fully autocratic but, rather, combine an, often, incoherent mix of democratic and autocratic traits and practices.

26. The Polity conceptual scheme is unique in that it examines concomitant qualities of democratic and autocratic authority in governing institutions, rather than discreet and mutually exclusive forms of governance. (Source: http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm)

27. Monty G. Marshall and Benjamin R. Cole, “Global Report 2011: Conflict, Governance, and State Fragility,” Center for Systemic Peace (December 1, 2011), 8-12.

28. History of Peacekeeping – Post Cold-War Surge. United Nations Peacekeeping, United Nations, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/surge.shtml (accessed 1 Mar, 2012).

29. Although included in this list because it greatly represents the dynamics involved in intrastate conflict, Kosovo is somewhat disputed as a legitimate and legal intervention as the air campaign, Operation ALLIED FORCE, actually began 79 days before the passing of UNSCR 1244 which authorized the intervention of ground forces in Kosovo (while still a part of Serbia).

30. Hamilton, 289.

31. Zaire is currently recognized as the Democratic Republic of Congo.

32. Artemy M. Kalinovsky and Sergey Radchenko, “Introduction: the end of the Cold War in the Third World,” in The End of the Cold War and the Third World, ed. Artemy M. Kalinovsky and Sergey Radchenko (New York: Routledge, 2011), 14-15.

33. Thad Dunning, “Conditioning the Effects of Aid: Cold War Politics, Donor Credibility, and Democracy in Africa,” International Organization 58 (Spring 2004), 419-422.

34. Human Rights Watch, “Human Rights Watch World Report 1990 – Somalia,” 1 January, 1999, at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/467fca2b13.html (accessed 8 April, 2012).

35. Earl Conteth-Morgan, “International Intervention: Conflict, Economic Dislocation, and the Hegemonic Role of Dominant Actors,” The International Journal of Peace Studies 6, no. 2 (Autumn/Winter 2001), http://www.gmu.edu/programs/icar/ijps/vol6_2/cover6_2.htm (accessed 1 Feb, 2012).

36. S. Neil MacFarlane, “The Third World and the End of the Cold War,” in The Third World Beyond the Cold War: Continuity and Change (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 25.

37. Gini index measures the extent to which the distribution of income (or, in some cases, consumption expenditure) among individuals or households within an economy deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. A Lorenz curve plots the cumulative percentages of total income received against the cumulative number of recipients, starting with the poorest individual or household. The Gini index measures the area between the Lorenz curve and a hypothetical line of absolute equality, expressed as a percentage of the maximum area under the line. Thus, a Gini index of 0 represents perfect equality, while an index of 100 implies perfect inequality. (Source: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI)

38. Marie L. Besanço, “Inequality in Ethnic Wars, Revolutions, and Genocides,” The Journal of Peace Research 42, no. 4 (Special Issue July, 2005), 409, http://www.jstor.org/stable/30042333 (accessed 1 Feb, 2012).

39. MacFarlane, 34-35.

40. Christopher O’Sullivan, “The United Nations, Decolonization, and Self-determination in Cold War Sub-Saharan Africa, 1960-1994,” Journal of Third World Studies 22, no. 2 (October 1, 2005), 114. http://www.proquest.com/ (accessed April 10, 2012).

41. United Nations, “United Nations Operation in Somalia,” at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unosom1backgr2.html (accessed 6 April, 2012).

42. O’Sullivan, 115.

43. Although the US is singled out in this particular instance, it is important to note that it was not the only country that did nothing. However, as perhaps the only country that could have intervened in a rapid and decisive manner, I decided to use the US as an example to highlight the relationship between an international crisis, national policies, domestic opinion and the media.

44. United Nations, “Report of the Independent Inquiry into the actions of the United Nations during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda,” s/1999/1257 (15 December, 1999), http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/395/47/IMG/N9939547.pdf?OpenElement (accessed 6 April, 2012).

45. Tom Ross, “Statement by the Press Secretary, President Clinton Signs New Peacekeeping Policy,” (White House: Office of the Press Secretary, 5 May 1994).

46. Suay Nilhan Acikalin, “Intra-State Conflicts as Security Threats in a Globalized World with Case Study of Cyprus,” Humanity and Social Sciences Journal 6, no. 1 (2011), 25.

47. David Chandler, “Western Intervention and the Disintegration of Yugoslavia, 1989-1999,” in E.S. Herman and P. Hammond (eds) Degraded Capability: the Media and the Kosovo Crisis (London: Pluto Press, 2000), 22-23.

48. Colin Kahl, “Demographic Change, Natural Resources and Violence: The Current Debate,” Journal of International Affairs 56, no. 1, (Fall 2002), 265.

49. Edward Demenchonok and Richard Peterson, “Globalisation and violence: the challenge to ethics,” The American Journal of Economics and Sociology 68, no. 1 (January, 2009), http://go.galegroup.com.lumen.cgsccarl.com/ps/i.do?id=GALE%7CA195672663&v=2.1&u=97mwrlib&it=r&p=AONE&sw=w (accessed 1 February, 2012).

50. Fabius Okumu-Alya, “The Regional Dimensions of the War in Northern Uganda,” Institute for Security Studies, dspace.cigilibrary.org/jspui/.../1/CPRDNORTHERNUGANDA.pdf (accessed 21 April, 2012), 4-5.

51. Otto F. von Feigenblatt, “International Policymaking. The Case of the Norm of the Responsibility to Protect,” Entelequia. Revista Interdisciplinar, no. 11 (Spring 2010), www.eumed.net/entelequia (accessed 1 February, 2012).

52. Halvard Buhaug, Scott Gates, Havard Hegre and Havard Strand, “Global Trends in Armed Conflict,” Centre for the Study of Civil War, International Peace Research Institute, Oslo, http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/ud/kampanjer/refleks/innspill/engasjement/prio.html?id=492941 (accessed 12 Feb, 2012).

53. Andrew Mack, “A More Secure World?” CATO Unbound. http://www.cato-unbound.org/2011/02/07/andrew-mack/a-more-secure-world/ (accessed 7 April, 2012).

54. The UN defines an NGO as follows: Any non-profit, voluntary citizens’ group that is organized on a local, national or international level. Task oriented and driven by people with a common interest, NGOs perform a variety of service and humanitarian functions, bring citizen concerns to governments, advocate and monitor policies and encourage political participation through provision of information. Some are organized around the specific issues, such as human rights, environment and health. They provide analysis and expertise, serve as early warning mechanisms and help monitor and implement international agreements.

55. Andrew White, “From the Living Room to the World: The Globalization of Television News,” Globalization and Media. http://homepage.newschool.edu/~chakravs/andrew.html (accessed 1 March, 2012).

56. Piers Robinson, “The CNN effect: Can the news media drive foreign policy?” Review of International Studies 25 (1999), 301-309.

57. Ibid.

58. Terhi Rantanen, Media and Globalization (London: Sage Publications, 2004), 26, 27, 50.

59. Human security, as defined by Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs Minister Lloyd Axworthy in the mid-90s, is that individuals must be front and center in policy. Human security is more than the absence of military threats, but security against economic, environmental, physical and social threats while guaranteeing fundamental human rights.

60. Feigenblatt.

61. Garth Myers, Thomas Klak and Timothy Koehl, “The inscription of difference: news coverage of the conflicts in Rwanda and Bosnia,” Political Geography 15, no. 4 (1996), 21-22.

62. Ethnic cleansing has been defined by an expert panel commissioned by the UN through UNSCR 780 (1992) as “rendering an area ethnically homogenous by using force or intimidation to remove persons of given groups from the area.”

63. Genocide is defined in Article 2 of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948) as "any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical racial or religious group, as such: killing members of the group; causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part1; imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; [and]forcibly transferring children of the group to another group."

64. Ibid, 31-32.

65. United Nations, “United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, past operations ,” at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/past.shtml (accessed 6 April, 2012).

66. Frontline, “Interview with Anthony Lake,” PBS (15 Dec 2003), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ghosts/interviews/lake.html (accessed 22 April, 2012).

67. Jane Nelson, “The Operation of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in a World of Corporate and Other Codes of Conduct,” Corporate Social Responsibility Initiative, Working Paper No. 34 (Cambridge, MA: John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University), http://www.hks.harvard.edu/m-rcbg/CSRI/publications/workingpaper_34_nelson.pdf (accessed 2 February, 2012).

68. Cahit Bagci, “Historical Evolution of NGOs: NGO Profileration in the Post-Cold War Era,” The Journal of Turkish Weekly, no. 4 (2003) pp. 299-326, http://www.turkishweekly.net/article/222/historical-evolution-of-ngos-ngo-proliferation-in-the-post-cold-war-era-.html (accessed 2 Feb, 2012).

69. Marc Saxer, “The Politics of Responsibility to Protect,” FES Briefing Paper 2 (April 2008), 2.

70. Between 1989 and 1994 there was a rapid increase in the number of peacekeeping operations. The UN Security Council authorized 20 new operations with the number of peacekeepers increasing from 11,000 to 75,000. However, the failures of the missions in Yugoslavia, Somalia and Rwanda resulted in a limit in the number of missions and peacekeepers starting in the mid-1990s. (Source: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/surge.shtm).

71. Ibid, 4.

72. Rajan Menon, “Pious Words, Puny Deeds: The ‘International Community’ and Mass Atrocities,” Ethics and International Affairs 23, no. 3 (Fall 2009)

73. O’Neil.

74. Noel M. Morada, “R2P Roadmap in Southeast Asia: Challenges and Prospects,” UNISCI Discussion Papers, no. 11 (May 2006), 60.

75. Saxer, 5.

76. Ibid, 3.

77. Ibid, 3.

78. Extract from UNSCR 1973 “Reiterating the responsibility of the Libyan authorities to protect the Libyan population and reaffirming that parties to armed conflicts bear the primary responsibility to take all feasible steps to ensure the protection of civilians”. (Source: UNSCR Press Release, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/sc10200.doc.htm#Resolution)