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1. **NPS Goes Online: The Good and Bad of Crash Distance Learning**
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   *(Center for International Maritime Security 17 July 20)* … Ben DiDonato
   As the U.S. Navy moves into the unmanned age and implements Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO), there is a need for small, lightly manned warships to streamline that transition and fill roles which require a human crew. Congress has expressed concerns about unmanned vessels on a number of fronts and highlighted the need for a class of ships to bridge the gap. The Naval Postgraduate School’s Lightly Manned Autonomous Combat Capability program (LMACC) has designed a warship to meet this need.

FACULTY:
4. **To Secure the Election: Tame the Russian Bear in Cyberspace**
   *(Council on Foreign Relations 13 July 20)* … Dr. Scott Jasper, Naval Postgraduate School Lecturer
   On June 14, Russian President Vladimir Putin described the United States as a country gripped by a “deep internal crisis” due to the refusal by opponents of President Trump to accept his “obvious” 2016 election victory and his legitimacy as leader.
5. **Four Years On, a Cloud of Mystery Still Surrounds Turkey’s July 15 Coup**  
(Ahvalnews.com 14 July 20) … Hot Pursuit

Four years have passed since the military coup attempt of July 15, 2016, in Turkey, but there is still a lot of controversy and discussion over the events that occurred that day, said Ryan Gingeras, a professor at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California and an expert on Turkish, Balkan and Middle East history, in a podcast with Ahval's Editor-in-Chief Yavuz Baydar and its English Editor İlhan Tanır.

6. **Greta Marlatt Wins Librarian of the Year Award**  
(Center for Homeland Defense and Security 14 July 20)

Greta Marlatt is widely known for her work with the Homeland Security Digital Library (HSDL) and Dudley Knox Library at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS). Around campus, she’s also known as the definitive source for delicious chocolate treats—which she often has displayed in a bowl in her office to share with the many guests who frequently visit her. But now, she has a new title: 2019 Federal Librarian of the Year.

7. **Military Expert Sees Rise of Pandemics and Climate Change**  
(Livermore Independent 16 July 20) … Jeff Garberson

In an online talk scheduled for next Wednesday evening, nationally known defense expert John Arquilla, a distinguished professor of defense analysis at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, will discuss the rise of pandemics and climate change among issues that now must be considered in a rapidly evolving U.S. national security picture.

8. **Listen: How the Oil Wars Myth Continues to Shape US Foreign Policy**  
(S&P Global 20 July 20) … Meghan Gordon

US President Donald Trump has used the phrase "take the oil" many times, both as a candidate to criticize previous administrations' strategies in Iraq and while in the White House when discussing Syria… Emily Meierding, an assistant professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, analyzed more than 600 international military disputes between 1912 and 2010, and determined that classic oil wars are a myth.

(The Cypher Brief 20 July 20) … Dr. Leo Blanken, Naval Postgraduate School Associate Professor of Defense Analysis

The COVID19 crisis comes at a time when the existing structure of the Globalized Liberal system is under extreme stress. What do conflicting messaging strategies around the origins of the pandemic tell us about the trajectory of the international order?

ALUMNI:

10. **Dr. Allen Harper Joins T-Rex Solutions as Executive Vice President of Cybersecurity**  
(Security Magazine 14 July 20)

T-Rex Solutions, LLC announced Marine Corps veteran, entrepreneur and cybersecurity executive Dr. Allen Harper, an NPS alumnus, joined the organization as Executive Vice President of Cybersecurity. Dr. Harper will lead the company’s delivery of secure cloud services to the Federal government.

11. **Candidate Q&A: Andrew Miller, Skagit PUD Board of Commissioners**  
(goSkagit.com 15 July 20) … Richard Walker

Andrew Miller, an NPS alumnus, is seeking election to Position 1 on the Skagit Public Utility District Board of Commissioners.

12. **Tearing Down Racism or Erasing Our History?**  
(Coronado Times 16 July 20) … Edward Anthony Moore III

There has been a lot of debate about whether or not we should be tearing down statues of Confederate leaders or renaming government institutions and facilities named after historic segregationists. Are we destroying monuments
to racism or are we erasing important parts of our history? Let me tell you a short story and then I’ll let you decide…

This began the storied career of Vice Admiral Edward Moore Jr., an NPS alumnus.

UPCOMING NEWS & EVENTS:
July 21: V-SGL with HOF Grads Army Gen (ret) Keith Alexander and Vice Adm (ret) Jan Tighe
August 25: V-SGL with Dr. Kathryn Sullivan
EDUCATION:

NPS Goes Online: The Good and Bad of Crash Distance Learning

(USNI 15 July 20) … James J. Wirtz, Dean of the NPS School of International Graduate Studies

The shelter-in-place order hit Monterey County, California, about a week before the end of winter term classes at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS). This turn of events was taken in stride. Students were a class or two away from their finals and, for the most part, could complete their remaining assignments from home. The pressing challenge was the looming need to deliver all of the spring term in-residence courses in an online format with less than three weeks’ notice. Although NPS has experience delivering content in a variety of venues, formats, and mediums, many faculty had to scramble to familiarize themselves with various “go-to meeting programs” and modify course content to fit these delivery modalities. No one had ever tried doing this before. In fact, no one had even suggested that it should even be attempted.

Glitches were common during the first couple of days. Nevertheless, by the end of the second week of classes, it was evident that the faculty and students had risen to the challenge and that NPS had several advantages that made the rapid shift to online learning possible. One advantage was an information technology infrastructure that could support thousands of “streaming” users simultaneously. Another was a tech-savvy student body with access to good internet connectivity and high-quality home computing. Winter graduates stuck in Monterey because of “stop-movement” orders also helped technologically challenged professors and coached new students by serving as informal teaching assistants in online classes. The oft-repeated concern that neo-Luddite faculty constituted the primary obstacle “to going online” also proved to be grossly inaccurate. The faculty never complained about the shift to online delivery, worked hard to master the new technology, and went to great lengths to ensure that the students stayed on track.

What was lost and what was gained in this quick shift to distance learning? There are a host of surveys being undertaken and metrics being created to answer that question and it will take time before the results are received and analyzed. Nevertheless, it is possible to offer a few observations about the crash distance-learning program launched by NPS and a new initiative that emerged from this experience—developments that would never have occurred in the absence of the challenge created by a national emergency.

In-Residence Graduate Education is Best

Learning is occurring despite the fact that classroom interaction is transpiring across an electronic medium. What is missing, however, are the second-, third-, and fourth-order opportunities for learning that take place naturally in the in-residence classroom setting. These opportunities occur as students discuss their lessons outside of class—going over difficult concepts, clearing up misperceptions, and identifying mistakes. The faculty recognized this lacuna and quickly arranged for chat rooms, “water cooler” events, and extra office hours. Nevertheless, the general assessment is that this kind of interaction is difficult to undertake online, and this assessment was supported by student and faculty opinion surveys administered during the spring quarter.

By contrast, in-resident student-to-student learning occurs naturally over lunch conversations, during walks across campus, or at the local watering hole. In addition, access to laboratories and secure facilities cannot be provided online. To allow laboratory research and the use of classified materials to continue, NPS went to extraordinary lengths to provide individual faculty and students with access to critical laboratories and secure spaces while maintaining social-distancing protocols.

Learning that is not part of the formal curricula also is lost. Is that important? Well, a student once told me that he was happy he attended NPS because it gave him an opportunity to learn about the Navy. The student was not talking about the latest strategy pronouncement or a new naval technology or operational scheme. Instead, he was talking about the very essence of the Navy itself—the chance to rub shoulders with Navy officers from different communities provided insight that was hard to come by in an
operational setting. One also can expand that observation by noting that when your classmates also include Marines, Army, and Air Force officers, and students from allied and partner countries, opportunities abound to learn about “the force,” the whole-of-government and coalition team that usually swings into action during a crisis or conflict. This sort of learning opportunity is not only invaluable, it is relatively unique.

The successful transition to distance learning for the curricula at NPS raised immediate questions about making the transition permanent. Why not simply enroll officers at their duty stations and skip the rigmarole, to say nothing of the cost, of moving them for a year or two of study at NPS? Some observers might believe that the time has arrived to forego the “nice to have” experiences provided by in-resident graduate education. In asking this question, however, observers fail to realize that the emergency transition to distance learning at NPS involved synchronous classes to full-time students—students were in a position to devote at least 16 hours each week to online classes and at least another 40 hours to reading and study. Of course, one could deliver the same material in an asynchronous mode, but that would do little to ameliorate time requirements. If a student spent 25 percent of his or her time doing schoolwork, it would take approximately four years to complete a one-year in-residence course of study. Classified or laboratory work also would be problematic if not impossible, a real shortcoming at a time when Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) is highlighting the need for students and faculty to tackle the key operational problems facing the Navy and to integrate new technologies into the fleet. Online learning can save some costs—permanent change of station (PCS) to Monterey—but it will take about the same time online to cover the same course content.

It Boils Down to Time and Money

This recent foray into distance learning also highlighted the observation that educational debates in naval circles often boil down to issues of time and money. Admittedly, scholars and practitioners like to discuss curricula with an eye toward designing exciting learning experiences that will serve both the strategic needs of the Navy and the professional development of officers and enlisted personnel. The renowned strategist Colin Gray, for example, often waxed poetically about the contents of strategic and scientific education for officers and the best way to develop capable strategists. Nevertheless, Gray failed to realize that most officers lack the opportunity to get any relevant education at all. Virtually all due-course officers lack the time in their operationally oriented careers for in-residence graduate education, and even if they did, the Navy lacks the resources to send more than a small percentage of them to school at any one time. The “time-money” constraint limits the number of officers who can benefit from the tailored in-resident education available at NPS.

Distance Learning is an Untapped Resource

The Navy’s recently promulgated Education for Seapower Strategy highlights the need to bring more education to the fleet, enabling the Navy to incorporate waves of emerging technologies faster into the fight than potential opponents. Courses in cyber warfare, artificial intelligence, robotics, or even more traditional engineering subjects are the order of the day. Nevertheless, the Navy simply lacks the resources to provide every officer with an 18-month in-residence experience in Monterey to earn a master’s degree. Under these circumstances, distance learning is the only way to provide this education to thousands of officers and senior enlisted personnel.

Although our experience suggests that it is not possible to replicate the in-residence experience online, with luck and hard work full-time students can complete similar online and in-resident programs at about the same pace. Therein lies the rub. Distance learning can eliminate the time and expense involved in PCS moves, but cannot address the need for time to actually complete a curriculum. Instead of focusing on offering graduate degrees online, Navy leaders should consider using new distance-learning technologies to reach officers who would benefit from a broadening education, but who lack the time to devote to full-time study. Lectures tailored to Navy requirements can be recorded and packaged with appropriate readings and study questions, not as an attempt to replicate the in-resident graduate experience, but as an effort to deliver information about critical subjects in an efficient manner. Asynchronous delivery can further reduce the burden on students, allowing them to review the materials
when their work schedule permits. Obtaining a graduate degree online might be the holy grail of distance learning, but there are less ambitious goals that can be quickly reached with the expenditure of realistic amounts of time and money.

NPS is about to conduct a beta test of just this type of initiative within OPNAV and some Department of Defense agencies. The test is a course comprised of 18 40-minute lectures that introduce students to the rise of great power competition in the world today. Originally part of the in-resident curriculum, the course has moved entirely online—in-resident students at NPS who are still sheltering in place also will have the opportunity to take this asynchronous course online and receive one graduate credit for their participation. Once the results of the beta test have been assimilated, the course should be ready for the fleet by early 2021. The course might then be continually refreshed at about 18 month intervals—an interval typical of the refresh rate of college textbooks.

The Way Forward

Too much time is spent attempting to replicate the in-resident experience online. Instead, Navy leaders should think about distance learning as a way to bring knowledge to the fleet when it is impossible to meet educational demands through in-residence education. In other words, virtually everyone in the Navy would benefit from a “short-course” introduction to the topic of great power competition, but it is impossible to bring everyone in the Navy to NPS to take that course in residence. This is the niche where distance learning can really contribute.

Luckily, the Education for Seapower Strategy has positioned the Navy to take advantage of the distance-learning experience gained during the emergency shut-down caused by COVID-19. It now possesses a Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Warfighting Development (N7) who is in a position to sponsor specific asynchronous short courses and more advanced graduate certificates for the fleet. These courses would not replace the in-resident experience, which should be expanded to the maximum extent possible. Nevertheless, distance learning can provide “subject-matter awareness” to thousands of officers and sailors who lack the time to devote to full-time graduate study.


Fleet Focus: Agility Summit Seeks Creative Solutions to Naval Challenges

(DVIDS 16 July 20) … Warren Duffie

Improving how emerging technologies are identified to meet urgent warfighter needs, and accelerating technology transition to the fleet. Identifying military and civilian personnel in the naval workforce and Naval Research and Development Establishment (NR&DE), who are taking unique and successful approaches to innovation.

These are some of the issues the NavalX Agility Cell, or NavalX, will tackle during its Agility Summit on Sept. 21-25 in Alexandria, Virginia. The event will be hosted by NavalX and supported by multiple partners, including the Office of Naval Research (ONR).

“The purpose of the Agility Summit is to foster meaningful discussions and collaboration that will have a lasting impact on the Navy and Marine Corps,” said the Hon. James Geurts, assistant secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition, who created NavalX. “It will give us a greater understanding of the tools and talent we have to identify performance gaps and opportunities for greater efficiency.”

NavalX enables collaboration; accelerates the pace of discovery, learning and experimentation; and fosters the naval workforce’s capacity for innovation and agility. It gives Sailors, Marines and Department of the Navy (DoN) civilians valuable tools for solving problems and translating ideas into actionable solutions.
This enables naval organizations like ONR to better serve warfighter needs by connecting individuals promoting innovative ideas with experts who can experiment with those ideas, invest in them or help turn them into something tangible for the Navy and Marine Corps.

The upcoming Agility Summit is designed to build partnerships in the DoN on matters of innovation, acquisition and transition—to share best practices and discuss problems facing the fleet. It will highlight innovation success stories and discuss future efforts through presentations and workshops.

The centerpiece of the Agility Summit will be an educational “agility challenge” involving 10 student teams invited from the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), Naval War College (NWC) and Marine Corps University (MCU). The teams will work to solve pressing naval problems.

“An event like the Agility Summit enables those in the NR&DE to benefit from the creativity and dynamic thinking of the next generation of Navy and Marine Corps leaders,” said Dr. Rich Carlin, ONR’s director of technology-acceleration programs. “The students participating in the challenge will demonstrate the vision and ideas required to keep our nation ahead of its adversaries in the great power competition we currently face.”

NPS, NWC and MCU student teams should visit https://www.eventbrite.com/e/agility-summit-2020-student-challenge-application-registration-113117134394. There, they can learn about fleet issues and challenges, choose one to address and apply to compete at the Agility Summit. For more information, email agility@navy.mil.

The closing date for student submissions and applications is July 31, and the final 10 teams will be chosen during the week of Aug. 7. Selected teams will receive funding to travel to the NavalX facility in Alexandria, Virginia.

People can attend the summit both physically and virtually. In-person attendees will wear masks and practice social distancing.

During the Agility Summit, the student teams will receive detailed briefs about their respective naval problems, brainstorm solutions and pitch their ideas to a panel of judges to include Geurts and Chief of Naval Research Rear Adm. Lorin C. Selby.

The winning teams will receive 10 weeks of follow-on support and access to requirement holders, end users and subject matter experts at warfare centers and naval labs to develop their ideas. Afterward, the teams will present their prototypes or proofs of concept to Geurts, Selby and other naval stakeholders.


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RESEARCH:

Lifting the Veil on the Lightly Manned Surface Combatant
(Center for International Maritime Security 17 July 20) … Ben DiDonato

As the U.S. Navy moves into the unmanned age and implements Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO), there is a need for small, lightly manned warships to streamline that transition and fill roles which require a human crew. Congress has expressed concerns about unmanned vessels on a number of fronts and highlighted the need for a class of ships to bridge the gap. The Naval Postgraduate School’s Lightly Manned Autonomous Combat Capability program (LMACC) has designed a warship to meet this need.

The need for these small, heavily armed warships has also been well established, and is based on extensive analysis and wargaming across the Navy’s innovation centers. These ships will provide distributed forward forces capable of conducting surface warfare and striking missile sites from within the weapons engagement zone of a hostile A2/AD system. They will be commanded by human tactical experts and operate in packs with supporting unmanned vessels, like the Sea Hunter MDUSV, to distribute capabilities and minimize the impact of combat losses.

Our intent with this article is to publicly lay out the engineering dimension of the LMACC program. Since the United States does not have a small warship to use as a baseline, it is necessary to first establish what our requirements should be based on our unique needs. Fortunately, this can be accomplished in a relatively straightforward manner by broadly analyzing how foreign ships are designed to meet their nation’s needs, and using that understanding to establish our own requirements. As such, we will start by examining the choices faced by other nations, use that to develop a core of minimum requirements for an American warship, examine its shortcomings when compared with other budget options, and finally discuss how to affordably expand on that to deliver a capability set the Navy will be happy with. Once we have established our requirements and overall configuration, we will conclude with a discussion of our approach to automation, manning, concepts of operations, future special mission variants, and current status.

(The scope of this article has been deliberately limited to the engineering side of the LMACC program. Our acquisition approach will be discussed in an upcoming issue of the Naval Engineers Journal. Fleet and budget integration was discussed in a previous article on USNI blog, “Beyond High-Low: The Lethal and Affordable Three-Tier Fleet.”)

Examination of Foreign Designs

Due to our relative lack of practical domestic experience in the field of small warship development, we will start with an examination of foreign designs to build a transferable understanding of their capabilities, limitations, and design tradeoffs. Since there are many ship classes used worldwide, it is impractical to discuss every example individually. We will instead discuss mission areas and compromises in generic terms and leave it to the reader to consider how specific foreign designs were built to meet their nation’s needs. Areas of design interest include anti-ship missiles, survivability, anti-submarine warfare (ASW), and launch facilities. The first three subsections divide the discussion between large and small nations, while the final subsection is split by type of launch facility. Each subsection then concludes with a discussion of how this translates to the United States’ unique situation. This will then set us up for the subsequent discussion of the basic preliminary requirements for a generic small American warship.

Anti-Ship Missiles

Small warships are frequently given labels like “missile boat” or “corvette” based on their primary armament of anti-ship missiles with little further thought. However, not all missiles are created equal. The choice of missile is driven by the platform’s intended use.

Small nations (e.g. Norway) attempting to defend themselves on a limited budget typically prioritize lethality with a highly capable missile designed for sinking major warships. However, because they often face limitations in offboard sensors, strategic depth, and force structure to absorb combat losses, they tend to sacrifice range and networking capability to control missile cost and weight.

Large nations prioritizing coastal defense against a more powerful opponent (e.g. Russia and China’s A2/AD systems) tend to view their small warships as part of a larger system. These ships are intended as much to complicate enemy targeting and defensive formations as they are to sink ships. As a consequence of this, they are more likely to invest in range and networking since they can reasonably expect to take advantage of it, but may be willing to save money by arming these ships with less expensive, and therefore typically less lethal, weapons.

Due to the nature of the U.S. Navy’s highly networked, forward deployed forces, we cannot accept these compromises and must arm our small warships with highly lethal, long-range, networked weapons.

Survivability

A major concern with all warships is survivability. One of the key distinguishing features of small warships is how they address this problem. Rather than rely on a large, expensive missile system to destroy threats at long range, these small warships instead rely primarily on avoiding attack and feature only limited point defense weapons. This is achieved through a combination of small size, signature reduction, electronic warfare, and tactics.
It is important to remember other nations are frequently focused primarily on pre-launch survivability rather than a counterattack based on the missiles’ signature. This lack of focus on post-launch survivability is generally based on the assumption that the cost ratio of the exchange will generally be in their favor even if they lose the ship. Another important consideration, especially for smaller nations, is that their ports are usually very vulnerable to a standoff strike, so surviving ships may not be able to rearm or refuel and are therefore effectively out of action even if they do survive. For large nations with sophisticated A2/AD systems, protecting these ships is usually primarily the responsibility of other platforms, allowing significant savings by reducing survivability-related costs.

Smaller nations usually invest more in survivability features and trade endurance for extremely high speed to improve their odds of getting into attack position before they are sunk. They also commonly employ tactics to make their ships difficult to track in peacetime by exploiting maritime geography and blending into commercial traffic to avoid a preemptive strike.

The United States can count on having a safe port to rearm somewhere, even if it requires withdrawing all the way to CONUS, so we would need to further emphasize evasion since these ships would have to persist within hostile A2/AD networks even after launching missiles. This means it would be essential for a small American warship to use a stealthy, networked missile capable of flying deceptive routes to mask the launch point, as well as the best electronic warfare equipment, passive sensors, and acoustic signature reduction we can afford. Other forms of signature reduction are an interesting question because there is a risk of standing out from civilian traffic if the warship’s signature is significantly different from those around it. After all, a Chinese maritime patrol aircraft could easily recognize that a “buoy” making an open-ocean transit is actually a small warship. On the flipside, we have no need for the high speed favored by many foreign nations, especially since blending in with slow-moving civilian traffic will be a critical aspect of survivability. Therefore, we should trade speed for range to control cost and project power from our generally safe but distant ports.

One final U.S.-specific feature which could greatly enhance survivability inside A2/AD networks, reduce range requirements, and reduce the logistical burden is the exclusion of gas turbines in favor of diesel engines. This will allow these ships to stop at any commercial port to take on diesel fuel, and possibly food, while further enhancing the illusion that they are small commercial vessels. With some imaginative leadership, this will provide virtually unlimited in-theater range and loiter time with minimal logistical support, simplifying our operations and complicating the situation for the enemy.

**ASW**

While many small warships include ASW capability, they are usually intended to operate as coastal area denial platforms rather than oceangoing escorts or sub-hunters. For nations worried about hostile submarines, this area denial provides essential protection to ports and other coastal facilities which would otherwise be extremely vulnerable. In contrast, performing the latter high-end missions requires the large aviation facilities and expensive sonars of a frigate or destroyer.

Thanks to our large nuclear-powered attack submarine fleet and the remoteness of hostile submarine forces, we don’t need a small surface ship to defend our ports from submarines, so this ASW equipment is generally best omitted. The U.S. only needs the ship to have a reasonable chance of surviving in a theater with hostile submarines, and this can be most economically provided by acoustic signature reduction and appropriate tactics. In fact, the active sonar systems used for area denial by other nations would be detrimental in American service since they let hostile submarines detect the ship from much further away.

**Launch Facilities**

Many small warships include launch facilities of some form for boats, helicopters, small unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), and underwater vehicles (UUV).

A boat launch facility is very important for a variety of maritime security operations and general utility tasks including allowing access to unimproved coastlines. Thanks to this utility and their modest space and weight impact, they are found on many small warships. It is also important to note that a boat
launch facility can generally launch USVs of similar size if desired to perform a variety of functions including acting as offboard sensors and decoys.

While the utility of naval helicopters is well established, they are relatively uncommon on small warships. Adding full aviation facilities requires a major increase in ship size, crew, and cost. Even a simple helipad for vertical replenishment has a major impact on topside configuration. Furthermore, helicopters are relatively visible and can thus make it much easier for an adversary to distinguish the warship from civilian traffic.

A much more common way of providing aerial surveillance for small warships is small UAVs. Because they can easily be added to existing ships, they have become common additions to small military and coast guard vessels worldwide. These aircraft provide many of the benefits of a helicopter with a much lower signature and little to no design impact on the ship. Furthermore, considering their proliferation in the civil sector, launching a small UAV is no longer a recognizably military activity. It is reasonable to assume all future designs will at least consider the operation of hand-launched drones, and it is highly likely many will also integrate launch systems for larger assets as well.

While UUV launch facilities are currently relatively rare outside dedicated MCM platforms, the maturation of this technology makes it worthy of more general consideration. UUVs could perform a range of other missions including undersea search and interacting with undersea cables without the need to specialize the ship itself. Furthermore, the launch facilities could also be used to transport additional MCM UUVs for use by other ships. As such, it seems likely this capability will proliferate since the launch facilities aren’t especially large, although it is still too early to say for certain exactly how useful it will actually be.

For the U.S. Navy, the only truly critical launch capability is small UAVs to enable over-the-horizon surveillance and targeting. Our enduring presence requirement means we will almost certainly want some form of boat launch capability to support those missions. We may want UUV launch capability as well, but it likely does not meet the bar to be a minimum requirement.

**Minimum Requirements for a Small American Warship**

Based on the above discussion and a few common practices, the list below provides a reasonable set of approximate minimum requirements for any small American warship. Note that this is not our final design, but a simplified interpretation using current technology and standard design practices:

- Eight LRASMs
- SeaRAM
- Latest generation full-sized AN/SLQ-32 electronic warfare suite
- Standard decoy launchers
- Excellent optical sensor suite:
  - Visible Distributed Aperture System (DAS)
  - IR DAS
  - Visible/IR camera turret
- Maximum affordable acoustic signature reduction
- Appropriate reduction of other signatures to blend into civilian traffic
  - COTS navigation radar
- Low probability of detection/intercept datalinks
- 30-knot speed (approx.)
- 7500+ nautical mile range
- One 7m RHIB
- Small UAV storage and launch accommodations
- Traditional light gun armament
  - One 30mm autocannon
  - Two M2 Browning heavy machine guns

It has been assumed that the likely boat launch facility is included while the more tentative UUV launch facility has been omitted. The range was selected to allow the ship to sortie from one island chain to the next and back (e.g. Guam to the Philippines) on internal fuel, and it also makes it relatively easy to
operate over even longer distances using extra fuel bladders and/or limited refueling. Speed is not exact since small changes wouldn’t have a major impact, and no attempt was made to identify a displacement or crew complement because it is not immediately relevant to this example.

While the above requirements are obviously distinct from any current design, they should be immediately recognizable as the rough outline for a fairly conventional small warship tailored to the needs of the United States Navy. More work would obviously need to be done to refine this into a finalized set of requirements, but it is close enough to analyze how this conventional design compares to other hypothetical budget priorities and show why we did not simply settle for this minimum configuration.

‘Adequate’ is Not Enough

In any discussion of hypothetical designs, it is critical to keep key alternatives and counterarguments in mind. In the case of small warships, the most relevant argument that might be presented is that aircraft can do the job better. This can take many forms of varying strength, but attacking a weaker form undermines the discussion. Thus, a hypothetical, purpose-built, bomber-like anti-ship aircraft will be considered here. The comparison with the aircraft described in this section will be used to demonstrate the shortcomings of the ‘adequate’ warship described above and set up a discussion of how to make it worthwhile.

This hypothetical aircraft would be a large, stealthy flying wing built using technology from the F-35. Using these electronics eliminates much of the cost of new development and eases maintenance by sharing logistics between this hypothetical anti-ship aircraft and the F-35. In addition, the new low-maintenance stealth coatings will eliminate the headaches of older designs like the B-2, and the design would be further simplified since its mission doesn’t require extreme stealth. It only needs to be able to attack hostile warships before they can detect it, which is not particularly challenging given the range of LRASM and the sensor performance inherited from the F-35. Thus, the cost should be relatively low.

For the sake of argument, it will be assumed this aircraft costs $300 million and carries 24 LRASMs, although better numbers may be possible. This compares cleanly with the small warship which would cost a little under $100 million and carry 8 LRASMs, so the cost per missile carried is approximately the same and we can focus on other performance parameters.

The ship has three key advantages: persistence, presence, and attritability. The first two stem from the obvious fact that a ship can loiter much longer than an aircraft, which makes it better for keeping weapons on-station in wartime or demonstrating American interest by performing a variety of low-end missions in peacetime. The third stems from the fact that we can afford three ships for the price of one aircraft, so an equal investment will provide more ships and losing one costs less, assuming the crew is recovered. While attritability is a benefit in a high-end war, the peacetime flexibility provided by the enhanced persistence and presence is less of a concern in the current geopolitical environment. Finally, this ship may be able to provide some amphibious lift for small USMC units operating under their Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO) concept, although its inability to provide meaningful fire support will limit its utility if an island is contested.

In contrast, the aircraft has numerous wartime advantages. The obvious speed advantage means the aircraft can respond to a developing situation and rearm much faster than ships. This further combines with its altitude to allow a single aircraft to survey a much wider area than the three ships can in spite of their persistence advantage. Furthermore, its combination of long detection range and stealthy airframe means the aircraft is more likely to see hostile warships before they see it, providing a major advantage over ships with respect to survivability and firing effectively first. Finally, thanks to its F-35 architecture, the aircraft will be compatible with a wide range of standard ordinance like the AGM-158 JASSM, AIM-120 AMRAAM, AGM-88 HARM, GBU-39 SDB, and so on, allowing it to perform other missions.

From this comparison, it is clear that those deciding which program to fund will not choose the ‘adequate’ small warship because other programs like the aircraft described above offer a greater return on investment. More capability is clearly needed to make the ship worthwhile.

Going From Viable to Worthwhile
The challenge with solving this problem is that it must be done without compromising the cost and size of these ships. The addition of desirable features led to the size and cost growth of LCS out of the original Streetfighter concept. Subsequent additions to fit into the traditional concept of a frigate with the FFG(X) program have produced a vessel with capabilities, and by extension costs, approaching that of the Arleigh Burke-class destroyer.

To retain the advantages of a small warship and keep it from growing into another Burke, two fundamental options are available: enhanced launch/support facilities, and secondary armament reconfigurations.

This section will explain how the LMACC program addresses this problem and provide the full design details for our baseline configuration. We have made significant enhancements to our launch and support facilities to improve overall utility, and have detailed plans for providing sealift support to the USMC during distributed operations. For the secondary armament, we took advantage of the interactions between technologies to provide much greater lethality against smaller surface threats and to restore the ability to provide robust fire support for Marines ashore at comparable cost.

**Launch and Support Facilities**

Before diving into how this ship will integrate with the Marines’ EABO concept, we will briefly circle back to the previously discussed launch facilities. UAV launch facilities, while not essential, have been included to provide additional flexibility at low cost, and are designed to benefit from the stern launch ramp required to support EABO. Furthermore, thanks to the small crew and wide beam, we were also able to fit an 11m RHIB to provide additional utility and transport capacity. Helicopter accommodations on the other hand have a major design impact even for a relatively minimal landing pad, especially in terms of manning for maintenance and support, so it has been omitted in favor of a topside UAV locker.

While the Marines are correct to pursue dedicated transports to implement EABO, the surface combatant fleet can also provide limited sealift support. A DDG-51 destroyer would have to provide this support on a not-to-interfere basis, but our ship will be an integral part of the mission. The normal wartime employment of these ships will see pairs sortie into the same contested littorals the Marines intend to operate in, so they will supplement the dedicated transport fleet by carrying light units and supplies. LMACC has two empty six-person cabins, plus four extra beds in the crew cabins, so a tactical pair can easily carry a Marine platoon between them with hot racking. These cabins will also provide space for detachments, and one will be equipped to serve as a brig in support of peacetime patrol and partnership missions.

The other half of providing sealift support is delivering the embarked Marines ashore. Features such as shallow draft, pumpjet propulsion, and COTS navigation sonars will allow these ships to get very close to shore to facilitate rapid transfer, possibly even including swimming. Readily accessible stowage spaces at the forward end of the launch bay support rapid transfer of equipment and support use of the inflatable Combat Rubber Raiding Craft (CRRC), while oversized lower-deck cargo bays provide ample storage space. Finally, small boat operations have been greatly enhanced by combining a fully enclosed bay with a stern launch ramp to facilitate rapid Marine deployment, especially in inclement weather or at night.

It should also be noted that the attributes which make it well-suited to supporting the Marines also make it well-suited to supporting Special Forces.

**Rethinking the Secondary Armament**

For secondary armament, we took the overall configuration back to its fundamental requirements: short-range small boat defense, long-range small boat defense, area land attack, precision land attack, and limited air defense. This allowed us to rethink our approach to those requirements and take advantage of the interactions between modern weapon systems to get better results than a traditional deck gun.

The key technology that enables our layout is the unassuming Javelin Launch Tray. This adds a Javelin missile launcher to a standard pintle mounted weapon, and allows a loader/gunner team to outperform a 30mm autocannon with greater range and comparable engagement rate at greatly reduced weight and installation cost. While this is a useful supplementary defense on existing ships, the large
number of installations makes LMACC an excellent escort against small swarming threats and, more importantly, amply satisfies the short-range small boat defense requirement without a deck gun. This may seem less important at first glance since these types of threats are typically associated with Iran, but China has already developed a small USV to perform a similar mission, making this threat relevant to the high-end fight. Javelin also provides a limited anti-aircraft capability since it was designed to destroy helicopters as well as tanks.

Since there is no need for a traditional multi-million dollar deck gun, LMACC instead mounts a 105mm howitzer. The cased ammunition of this weapon makes it suitable for sea service, unlike the larger, separately-loaded 155mm version. As a traditionally towed artillery piece, it is a lightweight, low cost weapon ideally suited to land attack. This of course addresses longstanding concerns about naval gunfire, and is directly relevant to supporting the Marines.

These two weapons fill the short-range small boat defense, area land attack, and limited air defense requirements, leaving long-range small boat defense and precision land attack. These two remaining requirements are both addressed through the addition of Spike NLOS missiles. This allows small surface threats to be safely engaged from over the horizon, and allows armored vehicles and other point targets to be precisely eliminated as well. This complements the howitzer and Javelin to provide excellent anti-boat capabilities and robust fire support for Marines ashore.

The final weapon system is the Miniature Hit-To-Kill (MHTK) missile, which provides additional defense against low-end aerial threats like small UAVs and rockets. This further improves survivability, especially against swarming threats, and ensures the air defense capabilities of a deck gun are fully replicated.

The result of this is a much more flexible and lethal armament with relatively low installation weight and cost. This makes our armament unequivocally superior to the conventional autocannon configuration established previously without significant design growth, and even provides major advantages over a larger deck gun.

The LMACC Design

Now that we have walked through the requirements and logic of our design, we will take a moment to provide a design summary of our baseline configuration:

- **Name:** USS *Shrike*
- **Type:** Patrol Ship, Guided missile (PCG)
- **Cost:** $96.6 million
- **Displacement:** 600 tons
- **Length:** 214 feet
- **Beam:** 29 feet (waterline)
- **Draft:** 6.5 feet
- **Range:** 7500+ nautical miles
- **Speed:** 30 knots
  - two steerable, reversible pumpjets with intake screen
  - Integrated electric propulsion
  - Diesel engines
- **Crew:** 15 (31 beds)
- **Armament:**
  - Eight LRASMs
  - SeaRAM
  - Seven Javelin pintle mounts
    - One Javelin launch tray per mount
    - Ten stored missiles per mount
    - Either a M2 Browning or Mk 47 AGL per mount
  - 105mm howitzer
  - 36 Spike NLOS missiles
  - 64 Miniature Hit-To-Kill Missiles
• COMBATSS-21 combat management system
• Latest generation full-sized AN/SLQ-32 electronic warfare suite
• Standard decoy launchers
• Excellent optical sensor suite:
  • Visible Distributed Aperture System (DAS)
  • IR DAS
  • Visible/IR camera turret
• COTS navigation sonar
• Maximum affordable acoustic signature reduction
• Appropriate reduction of other signatures to blend into civilian traffic
• COTS navigation radar
• L3Harris Falcon III® RF-7800W non-line of sight radio
• Multifunction Advanced Datalink (MADL)
• Aft launch bay
  • One 11m RHIB
  • One 11m long UUV slot (multiple UUV transportation possible)
  • Bay door doubles as launch ramp
• Small topside UAV storage and launch accommodations
  This maintains the previously established minimum requirements while integrating the additional features discussed.

Circling back to the comparison with the hypothetical anti-ship aircraft, these low cost enhancements have added numerous advantages over the ‘adequate’ design. In addition to the previous advantages of persistence, presence, and attritability, it can now operate UUVs, transport Marines, provide surface fire support, and destroy small boat swarms. This makes the ship a much more useful platform with the flexibility to adapt to an uncertain future, and gives procurement officials a good reason to select it over the aircraft. This clear utility and economic viability is the hallmark of well-thought-out requirements, and makes this design, in our opinion, viable for American service.

It should be remembered that this information is only applicable to the baseline configuration. The other variants add a ten-foot hull segment to add special mission capabilities and will have increased costs as a result.

Automation and Manning

From a systems perspective, the core concept for this ship is that it will be built like a large USV. Since the automated systems can notify the crew when action is needed, traditional watches are unnecessary and significant crew reductions are possible. Furthermore, since the ship’s systems will be designed to operate with minimal intervention as expected of a USV, there will, in theory, be very little need for maintenance. However, there will be people on hand to correct any problems that do occur, unlike a full USV. Thus, from a systems perspective, this will allow LMACC to bridge the gap to autonomy because it keeps people on board while operating like an autonomous vessel. As such, a fleet of these ships will allow us to safely build a large body of operational knowledge and inform our approach to future USVs and human-machine teaming.

We intend to man these ships with a 15-person crew lead by a Warfare Tactics Instructor (WTI). These tactical experts will be ideally suited to lead their ships and attendant packs of unmanned vessels to victory in the most challenging circumstances, and take the initiative when cut off from external command. They will lay traps, strike targets ashore, and hunt down hostile warships while confounding the enemy’s ability to respond by vanishing into civilian traffic.

While our work indicates a crew of 15 is appropriate to manage the weapons, sensors, and drones, we are acutely aware of the uncertainty associated with this novel manning concept and the need to bring aboard additional personnel for special missions. As such, the ship has been designed with five, six-person cabins, plus a single cabin for the commanding officer, to provide ample berthing. Two of those cabins are notionally intended to be used for non-crew personnel such as Marines conducting EABO deployments, Coast Guard law enforcement detachments, or brig space. That leaves free beds for four
more crewmembers with no meaningful impact, and the crew could be further enlarged by using one or both of those cabins if needed. Even in the worst-case scenario, 31 beds allow for three more crew than the existing Cyclone-class patrol ship, without hot racking. This effectively eliminates the risks associated with a smaller crew by allowing the ship to comfortably carry a traditional full complement if required.

**Concepts of Operation**

These ships are intended to fight forward to defend or retake island chains. The design emphasizes fighting in complex environments by disappearing into civilian traffic and littoral clutter. These ships will rely on passive sensors to complicate the enemy’s target identification problem and maximize the chance of achieving tactical surprise. The basic wartime operational unit will be a tactical pair, consisting of either two of the basic short-hull ships, or one basic design and one specialized variant. These pairs will work closely with unmanned vessels and Marines ashore to deny the area to the enemy, degrade hostile defenses, and clear the way for heavier units. They will also provide light sealift and logistics support to small, lightly equipped Marine units. Note that while we have done extensive work on tactics, deployment strategies, and cooperation with the existing leviathan navy, much of that material is not publicly releasable and will not be further discussed here. That said, much of this is built on the work of our colleague, the late Capt. Wayne Hughes, so members of the public interested in learning more are encouraged to read his work.

In peacetime, these ships will provide a cost effective asset for patrol, partnership, and deterrence missions. Since these ships are much cheaper than even frigates, they will be a better choice for countering piracy, smuggling, human trafficking, illegal fishing, and other illicit activity, allowing more expensive ships to focus on missions and training which fully exploit their capabilities. They will also enable more effective joint training with our smaller partners whose fleets are closely matched to these ships. This is particularly relevant in the South China Sea and Western Pacific where there is a need to carry foreign coast guard detachments for joint patrols and visit many small, primitive ports to reassure our friends and deter China. This will also substantially improve the readiness and performance of our fleet by reducing the workload on high-end assets, and offering early command billets to help develop young officers.

Finally, fleet integration is greatly simplified by the operational similarity of this PCG to the Cyclone-class PC. LMACC can serve as a drop-in replacement for the Cyclone at similar cost, so there is no operational risk. We could hand one of these ships to the fleet today and they’d be able to put it to work immediately by treating it like a Cyclone while the Surface Development Squadron refines the more advanced tactics developed by the Naval Postgraduate School. This makes it possible to jump immediately to serial production if desired, although building a prototype first would reduce risk at the cost of delaying its entry into service.

**Ship Variants**

We have plans for several special mission variants. In keeping with the Navy’s historical tradition of naming small ships after birds, they have all been given bird names. The baseline LMACC variant, the Shrike, has already been discussed, and two additional variants have been fleshed out, the anti-aircraft Falcon and the anti-submarine Osprey, both of which add new capabilities with a ten-foot hull extension.

It is difficult to discuss the details of the Falcon’s operation publicly, but it adds a new sensor and a tactical-length Mk 41 VLS module to destroy hostile maritime patrol aircraft before they can distinguish it from civilian traffic. This will protect these ships from the single greatest threat to them, hostile aircraft, and substantially improve their ability to operate within hostile A2/AD systems.

The Osprey variant, on the other hand, is relatively simple and is built to maximize the impact of USV-mounted sensors. The primary addition is eight new angled launch cells for Tomahawk cruise missiles modified to carry a lightweight torpedo. This allows a very small number of these ships to greatly improve our ability to deter and defeat submarines, since they can quickly strike targets detected by offboard sensors from hundreds of miles away. Furthermore, since Tomahawk is a well-established weapon fielded across the fleet, this will allow us to add this capability across our surface combatant fleet,
and provide a way to recycle obsolete Tomahawks when we inevitably move on to other weapons. Finally, this variant is rounded out by a hull-mounted passive sonar and four fixed torpedo tubes for self-defense, since it is expected to operate in areas with elevated submarine risk.

Two additional variants have been considered. The first is a drone mothership which adds a UUV handling module to field large numbers of UUVs, and may also modify the aft launch bay to carry two boats or USVs. The second is a coast guard variant which replaces most of the missiles with a dedicated sickbay, brig, and secure contraband storage to turn it into a bigger, more capable version of the Sentinel-class cutter, although these capabilities could also be added in a hull segment if an export customer wants to retain the missiles.

Program Status

Our requirements and top-level engineering are complete. The only major task remaining is to finalize our hullform, and we can do that in parallel with shipyard and supplier selection. Almost all the technology we have selected is fielded. The remaining technologies are closely based on fielded systems, and the baseline Shrike will still be combat effective if delays force it to deploy before these technologies are ready. Since the Naval Postgraduate School is outside the traditional shipbuilding bureaucracy, we have significant flexibility in our path forward to production. We could do anything from traditional acquisition to building this under the umbrella of a research project outside all existing acquisition structures, as was done with TACPOD, so we can take whatever approach is most acceptable to Congress and the Navy.

http://cimsec.org/lifting-the-veil-on-the-lightly-manned-surface-combatant/44650

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FACULTY:

To Secure the Election: Tame the Russian Bear in Cyberspace
(Council on Foreign Relations 13 July 20) … Dr. Scott Jasper, Naval Postgraduate School Lecturer

On June 14, Russian President Vladimir Putin described the United States as a country gripped by a “deep internal crisis” due to the refusal by opponents of President Trump to accept his “obvious” 2016 election victory and his legitimacy as leader. Meanwhile, Russian English language outlets pushed a common theme that protests and fires in the United States over racial injustice were a coup or uprising staged by the “Deep State” against the Trump administration. These public messages, combined with Russia’s aggressive social media influence campaigns and targeted cyber operations, aim to sow division in American society and affect the upcoming presidential election.

While Chinese and Iranian state hackers have recently been caught targeting the presidential campaigns of both major U.S. political parties, U.S. intelligence officials have singled out Russian efforts in particular. For example, in January, security experts revealed the Russian military’s efforts to hack into the Ukrainian gas company Burisma to find information on Hunter Biden in order to smear former Vice President Joe Biden, the Democratic candidate for president. Russian cyber actors have also been renewing their efforts from the 2016 presidential election to hack voter databases and election infrastructure, and should be expected to target mail-in ballot systems. Despite investments in security, IT departments in election offices are no match for professional Russian hackers. Facebook has also admitted that the Internet Research Agency, a Russian company that carries out online influence operations, is improving its methods to bypass the platform’s disinformation filters.

U.S. agencies have previously attempted to respond to Russian election interference after it has occurred. Following the hacking of the Democratic National Committee’s (DNC) servers during the 2016 U.S. presidential election, the investigation led by Special Counsel Robert Mueller yielded criminal indictments for Russian military operatives. In addition, the U.S. Department of the Treasury has sanctioned Russian cyber operatives, and even Russian oligarchs, along with their companies.
Nonetheless, indicting Russian hackers has not deterred Russian election interference, and sanctions have even backfired after producing unexpected consequences, like causing the global price of aluminum to soar.

The United States has also broadly responded to malicious Russian cyber activity with a name and shame strategy, exemplified by its condemnation of Russia for cyberattacks targeting Georgia in October. This strategy tries to enforce and build international consensus for rules for responsible state behavior but falls short of imposing costs that change Russia’s strategic calculus. Alternatively, the U.S. military is capable of achieving this by targeting the sources of Russian cyber operations in Russia’s cyber territory; General Paul Nakasone, commander of U.S. Cyber Command, recently hinted at this prospect when he told Congress that “My top priority is a safe and secure election that is free from foreign influence.”

Cyber Command has been empowered by relaxed rules and new authorities, which have enabled it to conduct persistent engagement in cyberspace against foreign adversaries, including Russia. The strategy leverages a defend forward approach, which uses network exploitation, cyber-enabled influence operations, and degrading cyberattacks in day-to-day efforts to disrupt and deter foreign cyber operations. The command tested this strategy during the 2018 U.S. midterm election. Using emails, pop-ups, text, and direct messages, U.S. operatives told Russian social media trolls spreading disinformation that they had been identified. They also messaged hackers working for Russian military intelligence. The trolls persisted, and on Election Day, and for a few days during the vote count, Cyber Command took Internet Research Agency servers offline by blocking their internet access. U.S. senators from both political parties praised the operation, but the Russian Federal News Agency said the attack “did not stop work entirely.”

During this time, the command also sent teams to several European countries to find and expose Russian hacking tools on their networks. Moreover, as part of its malware inoculation initiative, it uploaded Russian military-grade malware to VirusTotal, a private website for crowdsourcing threat analysis. These efforts to confront Russian cyber activity before the election appear to have been successful, as the Department of Homeland Security reported that there were no indications of compromise in election infrastructure and minimal disinformation was spotted around Election Day.

As the 2020 election approaches, the National Security Agency, also led by General Nakasone, has continued to disclose Russian threat information publicly to defend U.S. networks. For example, a recent advisory detailed innovative email exploitation tactics of Sandworm, a Russian military cyber unit blamed for cyberattacks targeting energy companies in Ukraine.

Nonetheless, given the range of possible Russian tactics to interfere in this year’s election, Cyber Command will have to consider tougher methods to impose costs that change Russian behavior. Open source reports indicate that the command has contemplated its own form of information warfare. This could include targeting senior Russian officials and business elites with limited cyber operations that show access to sensitive personal accounts and the capability to inflict cost if election interference continues.

As it weighs its options, Cyber Command will undoubtedly conduct thorough planning and risk assessments that consider the possibility of Russian retaliation and discovery or reuse of exploits that the command uses against it. That said, it will continue its strategy of persistent engagement and even explore new, more punishing measures to undermine Russian interference in the upcoming U.S. election. This will send a clear warning to Moscow that it will pay a price for attempting to disrupt the democratic process.

https://www.cfr.org/blog/secure-election-tame-russian-bear-cyberspace

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Four Years On, a Cloud of Mystery Still Surrounds Turkey’s July 15 Coup

(Atualnews.com 14 July 20) … Hot Pursuit

Four years have passed since the military coup attempt of July 15, 2016, in Turkey, but there is still a lot of controversy and discussion over the events that occurred that day, said Ryan Gingeras, an expert on Turkish, Balkan and Middle East history, in a podcast with Ahval’s Editor-in-Chief Yavuz Baydar and its English Editor Ilhan Tanrı.

Gingeras, a professor at the Department of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, recalls how he was stunned by the news of the Turkish military taking over the Bosphorus Bridge in Istanbul on a Friday evening – the busiest time of the week – using mostly army cadets.

At the same time, the putschists commandeered and began flying more than two dozen F-16 fighter jets and other military aircraft, according to the main legal indictment against alleged coup plotters based at Ankara’s Akıncı airbase. Planes screamed over the capital’s skyline, giving millions of its residents a taste of what it might be subject to a full-scale war.

Gingeras characterized the coup attempt as "bewildering" as it appeared to be aimed at forcing "the civilian authorities to cede control while terrorizing large numbers of people".

More than 130,000 public workers were dismissed in the aftermath of the failed putsch. Thousands were arrested and jailed. Most were accused of links to the Fethullah Gülen movement, which the government immediately blamed for masterminding the coup.

Gingeras said that the failed putsch appeared to underscore and amplify already existing trends in Turkish politics and society.

"It is very clear that there is a great deal of continuity in terms of events, before and after the coup attempt, mostly defined by upward trajectory by the intensification of different trends," he said.

The parliamentary elections of June 7, 2015 were a defining moment that preceded the failed coup, according to Baydar. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) lost its legislative majority at the polls, while the predominantly Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) passed the electoral threshold required to enter parliament, winning 80 seats.

"At that point, I think Erdoğan realized that he is on his way to losing his power if it goes on," Baydar said.

"There was also quite a discontent among the generals in the aftermath of that election. We know this from various analysis and reports," he said.

Public discontent and authoritarianism in Turkey had already increased sharply during the 2013 Gezi protests, which erupted after a group of environmentalists sought to protect a tiny park from being bulldozed in Taksim, in the heart of Istanbul. The protests quickly spread to all major cities and towns across Turkey and turned into a nationwide demonstration against Erdoğan and the pressure he was imposing on people's lifestyles. A subsequent crackdown by police, directly ordered by the president, was brutal and still reverberates in much of society today.

Erdoğan became embroiled in a battle against the Gülen movement the same year, following allegations of corruption against the president’s family, friends and allies. Erdoğan and Fethullah Gülen, the leader of the movement, were allies themselves up until late 2013 against a common enemy; Turkey's elites in the bureaucracy, military and other institutions who were loyal to a Kemalist doctrine inspired by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Turkey’s secular founder and first president. But once victory was declared over Turkey ‘old elite’, the two powerful Islamist groups began fighting each other over the spoils.

Ahval’s Baydar said that nobody knows much more about the details of the failed coup today than they did four years ago.

A parliamentary commission had suspended its work on a report about the coup attempt abruptly in 2017 when Erdoğan expressed his disapproval for the deepening investigations.

Many questions were lingering around the events that occurred during the night of the coup, including what happened at the Akıncı air base in Ankara – later renamed Mürted, or “the Apostle” in Turkish, from where the attempt was allegedly directed. Then-Chief of General Staff Hulusi Akar and the head of national intelligence, Hakan Fidan, never testified to the commission to shed more light on what happened that night.
Opposition parties opposed the findings of the parliamentary report, which were announced in May 2017 but never released publicly.

The committee’s chairman, a deputy from Erdoğan’s ruling party, announced that the report found that the Gülen movement was to blame for the coup. But additions by the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP), which reportedly included further details and questions surrounding the events and links between Gülen and the government, were not accepted. There were still questions over the report’s whereabouts today, Baydar said.

Gingeras said he did not have a strong opinion about what motivated the coup plotters, but it was clear that the public was required to go along with the official narrative, which has been preserved ever since.

"Subsequent events clearly in terms of investigations, purges enacted and politicization of the event to this day made it fit to the original conclusions," Gingeras said.

Gingeras disagreed with Baydar that the government may have had prior knowledge of the coup plot and that Erdoğan could have exploited it for his own political purposes. Gingeras said he had not seen sufficient evidence to support this claim, though there were some possible indications that a coup was occurring earlier that day.

The prevailing narrative about the Gülenists’ involvement in the coup appears to be accurate, Gingeras said. But it was still open to question whether the group organized and carried out the entire coup themselves, he said.

There could have been a lot of different actors involved, Gingeras said.

Baydar said there were still question marks over whether the Gülenists masterminded the coup or whether the government had prior knowledge of the attempt, which then enabled them to engineer the outcome.

It would not have been difficult for the intelligence services to infiltrate and spy on the Gülenists, who were a conservative Muslim group in Turkey, Baydar said. He said that several commentaries written by pro-government columnists in the run-up to the failed putsch suggested that the government may have had prior knowledge of the plans.

Baydar said that the scale of the coup attempt and its alleged composition did not fully convince him that it was authentic.

High-ranking military officials were not involved in the plot - it was mostly orchestrated by colonels, lieutenants and a small group of one-star generals - and only between 5 percent and 7 percent of the army participated, Baydar said.

The government’s subsequent response, when it immediately purged almost half of the one- to four-star generals in the Turkish army, was "baffling", Baydar said.

Gingeras said that the purge focused on officers who received training at U.S. military institutions. A new echelon of military officers more aligned with senior civilian officials rose to replace them, he said. Gingeras said Akar, who is now defense minister, had sought to rebuild the military by placing people in positions of authority according to personal preference and loyalty, rather than qualification alone.

Baydar said Erdoğan managed the military extremely skilfully in the aftermath of the coup attempt. He also pushed his political opponents into a corner by organizing the Yenikapi Unity Rally, a mass gathering in Istanbul, just weeks afterward, which lay the foundation for the purges to come, Baydar said.


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Greta Marlatt Wins Librarian of the Year Award
(Center for Homeland Defense and Security 14 July 20)

Greta Marlatt is widely known for her work with the Homeland Security Digital Library (HSDL) and Dudley Knox Library at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS). Around campus, she’s also known as the definitive source for delicious chocolate treats—which she often has displayed in a bowl in her office to
share with the many guests who frequently visit her. But now, she has a new title: 2019 Federal Librarian of the Year.

Marlatt was notified of the prestigious award from the Library of Congress Federal Library and Information Network (FEDLINK) in late June 2020. The FEDLINK awards are established to recognize the many innovative ways that federal libraries, librarians, and library technicians fulfill the information demands of the government, business, and scholarly communities. Federal libraries and staff throughout the United States and abroad compete for the annual awards. The award affirms her dedication to helping Center for Homeland Defense and Security (CHDS) students, alumni, faculty, and staff solve complex research issues. But the award also recognizes her contributions as the Outreach & Academic Support Manager at the NPS Dudley Knox Library. Predictably humble, Marlatt was surprised to receive the award. “I am honored to receive this award over my federal peers who all do an outstanding job on a daily basis,” she said. “I am also the third NPS librarian to receive it, so am especially grateful that the Dudley Knox Library is able to continue the tradition.” Past winners include Eleanor Uhlinger (2009) and Lillian Woon-Gassie (2003).

FEDLINK specifically cited her instruction to Defense Analysis, National Security, CHDS, the Institute for Global Security, and the delivery of courses in citation management and bibliographic instruction as factors that improve data science research and education in support of the combat effectiveness of the Naval service. In 2019, Marlatt headed an important library renovation and collection relocation space-planning effort to remove barriers to resources while creating learner-centered physical and virtual spaces. She managed $2 million in library acquisitions, curated more than 30 LibGuides in the areas of congressional information, area studies, military information and conflict, and security studies, and responded to 750 off-desk reference questions.

Marlatt began working at NPS in September 1994 and has been a part of CHDS-HSDL since its inception in 2002. “I was there from the beginning, at the discussions regarding creating the Center,” she added. “I was in some of the initial meetings with Lacy Suiter, Darrell Darnell, Vince Cable, Paul Stockton, and others. Paul felt the Center needed to have what is now the Homeland Security Digital Library.” While that may seem like a long time, time flies when you love what you do. The award honors her contributions in 2019, which admittedly feels like a long time ago—due to the effects of the COVID-10 pandemic on everyday life. “I am one of three library staff designated as essential and so I work in the library every day. As well as doing my regular work, we are providing scanning, printing, and check-out services since the building isn’t open as well as doing a lot of building-related functions,” she said.

So far in 2020, Marlatt has contributed to a handful of COVID-19 projects, in addition to her regular work with faculty and students. “At the request of an FDNY task force, I also prepared a bibliography of NPS theses and research related to pandemics, epidemic, and influenza,” she shared. “I also responded to a congressional request asking for information about economic recovery related to pandemics.” Two of the HSDL projects have already been published and are gaining traction: the COVID-19 Special Collection and the Resource Archive. The HSDL Special Collection contains over 5,500 resources related to issues associated with the coronavirus disease and pandemics. The HSDL Resource Archive brings together documents from agencies and organizations that capture the environment, debates, and hard realities affecting governmental and public health policy decisions in preparedness, response, and recovery. Users can browse by categories in an easily accessible interface or do an advanced search on the HSDL website for specific topics, publishers, or other criteria.

Marlatt also runs a personal blog—aptly named Greta’s Gouge. She updates it regularly with timely information on security studies, homeland security, intelligence, and special operations.

This is not the first time Marlatt has received recognition for her amazing work. She has left an undeniable mark on the field, authoring numerous academic articles and gleaning honors ranging from a 2012 New York Times “I Love My Librarian” award to the Navy’s Meritorious and Superior Civilian Service Awards. In 2016, she was honored with the NPS Lieutenant Commander David L. Williams Outstanding Instructor Award—which is named after an NPS alumnus who was killed in the September 11 attack on the Pentagon in 2001. “The I Love My Librarian award and the FEDLINK award both mean a lot since they are awarded at a national level and are related to my peer groups,” she revealed. “But I also had the honor of receiving the student Cohort Impact award and that means even more to me because
supporting our students is my primary goal and what I love doing the most. It’s about teaching them how to research and find quality information because as they write their theses, they are writing about important topics, not just checking a box. They are writing about real-world issues and trying to make a difference.”

Speaking of loving her job and making an impact on CHDS programs, Marlatt often gets to participate in specialized events and training that involve students and alumni. When discussing an FDNY Academy event, she mentioned “I had the chance to attend their alumni events and both times we had the opportunity to go to ‘the Rock,’ their training facility. We got to participate in the same kind of training they go through and experience it first-hand. Those types of events are a lot of fun and also very educational.” It’s another example of her unmatched ability to guide CHDS students through the maze of research and writing demands required by the master’s degree program. And further proof that she is the perfect candidate to hold the title of Librarian of the Year.


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Military Expert Sees Rise of Pandemics and Climate Change
(Livermore Independent 16 July 20) … Jeff Garberston

In an online talk scheduled for next Wednesday evening, nationally known defense expert John Arquilla will discuss the rise of pandemics and climate change among issues that now must be considered in a rapidly evolving U.S. national security picture.

Arquilla, a distinguished professor of defense analysis at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, will give his talk against a backdrop of increasing military challenges to the U.S. from China and Russia. The event was originally scheduled to take place before a live audience in March as part of the Rae Dorough Speaker Series at Livermore’s Bankhead Theater.

For years, he argued that the American military should move away from large, expensive defense platforms, like aircraft carriers, to focus on smaller, more nimble forces.

That is one of the themes he will pursue in his talk next week, he said in an interview last week. He also believes “we have to take a broader view of national security” given the current impact of the coronavirus pandemic and long-term changes generated by a warming climate.

Today’s pandemic is only one of several to occur in recent decades as “major diseases moved from the animal world to human beings,” he said.

As examples, he cited AIDS and two other coronavirus epidemics, MERS (middle eastern respiratory syndrome) and SARS (severe acquired respiratory syndrome.)

“Securing the country against pandemic spread needs to be taken far more seriously,” he said.

As for climate change, he indicated the warming of the earth is having a significant impact on international rivalries. Above the Arctic Circle, for example, oceans whose ice cover has melted are now navigable, “creating a new competition for sovereignty and resources. That has strategic implications as well.”

At the same time, his talk will also consider “traditional issues” of national security.

“We are spending $2 billion every day on American defense,” Arquilla said. “How do we know we are spending it well?”

He questions the value of investing $1 trillion on development and operation of a new, piloted fighter plane at a time when it can be outperformed by robotic and remotely piloted aircraft.

Similarly, he has been critical of spending tens of billions of dollars on new aircraft carriers when “hypersonic missiles are holding aircraft carriers at tremendous risk.”

He notes Dwight Eisenhower’s 1961 caution about a “military-industrial complex,” an informal alliance between the military and its industrial suppliers that Eisenhower foresaw as a vested interest influencing public policy.
Arquilla worries that military spending today may be directed toward “a small number of defense contractors who are highly dependent on these old systems that they want to keep making … fighter aircraft for pilots and aircraft carriers (and) main battle tanks at a time when these systems may be becoming obsolete.”

At the strategic level, he questions some of the U.S. decisions to intervene in other countries. “That has proved over the past two decades to be exceptionally costly and largely ruinous for the countries in which we have intervened,” he continued.

He cites Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya and Yemen as examples.

In Yemen, he said, “We supported Saudi intervention … which has turned that very sad land into the world’s charnel house.”

He further stated that the U.S. needs to exercise “much greater prudence” in overseas commitments. “We need to take a strategic appetite suppressant when it comes to interventions,” Arquilla said.

Arquilla is the author of several books including “From Troy to Entebbe: Special Operations in Ancient and Modern Times”; “Worst Enemy”; and “Insurgents, Raiders, and Bandits.” His latest book is “Why the Axis Lost; An Analysis of Strategic Errors.

He was a consultant to senior military commanders during Operation Desert Storm and the Kosovo War. In 2011, he served on a small team working directly for President Obama whose task was to find “new directions for American defense.”

He is the author of more than 100 articles dealing with a wide range of topics in military and security affairs, appearing in academic journals and in general publications like The New York Times, Foreign Policy Magazine and Atlantic Monthly.

His talk is scheduled to begin at 7:30 p.m. on Wednesday, July 22. It is sponsored by Quest Science Center 2.0, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and Sandia National Laboratories, Towne Center Books and other local organizations.


Listen: How the Oil Wars Myth Continues to Shape US Foreign Policy
(S&P Global 20 July 20) … Meghan Gordon

US President Donald Trump has used the phrase "take the oil" many times, both as a candidate to criticize previous administrations' strategies in Iraq and while in the White House when discussing Syria. The idea is rooted in the belief that countries have gone to war in the past to grab natural resources, especially oil.

This week's guest scrutinized that idea in her new book, "The Oil Wars Myth."

Emily Meierding, an assistant professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, analyzed more than 600 international military disputes between 1912 and 2010, and determined that classic oil wars are a myth.

She argues this myth creates a collective intellectual blind spot that continues to shape contemporary foreign policy choices.

We talk about how the idea of oil wars shapes US foreign policy, how the global shift toward oil supply abundance changes this debate, and how current low oil revenues could pose security risks and increase regional aggression.


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COVID-19, Information and the Deep Structure of the International System  
(The Cypher Brief 20 July 20) … Dr. Leo Blanken, Naval Postgraduate School Associate Professor of Defense Analysis

The COVID19 crisis comes at a time when the existing structure of the Globalized Liberal system is under extreme stress. What do conflicting messaging strategies around the origins of the pandemic tell us about the trajectory of the international order?

It seems as if the world is moving from a place of cooperation to one of competition and mutual recrimination: from security, to economics, to the environment. The fact that this is even occurring in the realm of global health in the midst of the greatest medical crisis of the last 100 years is particularly ominous. Another way to succinctly capture this inflection point is to ask whether the international system is changing from a place best described by Liberalism, to a place best described by Realism? As the COVID19 crisis continues to unfold, will it serve to rally the global community back towards a place of integration and collective action? Or will it serve as a midwife for further conflict and mistrust? Currently, it seems to be heading towards the latter as state actors are mobilizing their instruments of power to strategically shape the narrative of COVID19’s origin and spread. As actors subordinate “truth” (as problematic a term as that may be) about the pandemic under their grand strategies, the response to this crisis may be a harbinger of the nature of the international system to come.

The essay proceeds as follows. First, we must understand how Liberalism and Realism differ: the core distinction being how they see states as valuing relative or absolute gains. This concept is crucial for understanding the likelihood of cooperation or conflict across multiple domains of international interaction. We then turn to the issue of information – how the weaponization of information reflects the trajectory of the deeper structure of the international system. Finally, if it is true that COVID19 is becoming fodder for states’ information operations, what is to be done?

Liberalism and Realism are the two foundational constructs for explaining the functioning of the international system. These theories – particularly in their modern articulations – are differences in degree rather than in kind. Both recognize the anarchic nature of the international system and assume the self-interested nature of nation states. Where the two schools of thought diverge is in the question of what types of gains are valued by these actors: absolute or relative? For Liberals, states focus on absolute gains. In other words, they consider options and choose the ones in which they achieve the greatest gains (regardless of how other actors do). For Realists, however, actors focus on relative gains. When they consider options, they are chiefly concerned with how each option would benefit them in relation to how it would benefit rivals. In fact, under Realism, an attractive option may even make one worse off (in an absolute sense), as long as it leaves a rival in an even poorer position – a truly “beggar thy neighbor” approach to foreign policy. A world in which actors value absolute gains creates wide-ranging space for cooperation in which consumers, producers and market mechanisms take precedence. A world in which actors value relative gains sets the stage for bitter competition, in which all aspects of a nation’s activity – military, economic, and informational – become subordinated to the needs of the state.

The latest globalization enterprise was a child of Liberal thinking. The rising tide of unfettered global economic activity was intended to raise all boats, with little thought for national machinations that states might weave into it. The desired end-state was to have all factors of production used as efficiently as possible to create the greatest amount of goods and services to which all consumers around the world would have access at the cheapest possible prices. Despite the intentions of its champions to create a planet-spanning “level playing field”, globalization instead seems to have created rich opportunities for states to gain advantage through strategic manipulation. China has been notably successful at turning previously cooperative realms into competitive spaces for its wide-ranging grand strategy. The architects of globalization had hoped that the enterprise would eventually acculturate recalcitrant states to the Liberal worldview, but operating in that space seems to have allowed such actors to perfect the tools for furthering their strategic aims.

Information has become the latest realm in which revisionist states have turned previously cooperative spaces – characterized as spaces where absolute gains could be enjoyed by all actors – into realms of competition. One important enabler for this has been the rise of social media. As those media sources that have traditionally provided responsible journalism – such as respected print newspapers –
get squeezed by changing technology, we have seen the rise of partisan, unregulated, and often disturbing outlets flooding the new information space. Many of these sources tend to prey on preexisting anxieties, prejudice, and social divisions to turn the collective understanding of the world from a single “research field” that is based on logic and supporting evidence, to a fragmentation of irreconcilable “belief fields” that are based on emotion, prejudice, or appeal to arbitrary values. In 1974, Ronald Coase noted this vulnerability within Liberalism. Framed as a paradox, he questioned as to why the “marketplace of ideas” remains a highly unregulated market, while the markets for goods and services are highly regulated. Within the United States, for example, the Food and Drug Administration carefully protects you from being poisoned by unsafe food, but there are few regulatory mechanisms to protect you from pernicious information sources. At the international level? All bets are off. COVID-19 provides the perfect petri dish for the marriage of unregulated, global information sources and state strategies to distort the truth.

The point here is not to argue for a loosening or tightening of First Amendment rights, but rather to point out that a barely-regulated “marketplace of ideas” within the United States, as opposed to the highly-regulated information-space of an authoritarian state such as the PRC creates the perfect battlefield for the type of asymmetric warfare we see emerging around COVID-19 information. In other words, if there is heterogeneity among unit-level actors in regards to vulnerability to the manipulation of information, then a domain for competition (and asymmetric advantages to be had within that domain) arises. In fact, if one assumes that operations in this space are characterized by varying cost, then it opens the door for competitive strategies – the wearing down of an opponent who is on the wrong side of the cost equation. Have the Chinese designed such a competitive strategy for shaping narratives? Does it cost less for them to generate a mistruth than for the United States to counter it? If so, this is a problem.

What is to be done? If the “truth” regarding the culpability for COVID-19’s origin and spread is becoming weaponized by states, what does it mean for the international system and how should the US respond? In terms of the international system, this may serve as another nail in the coffin for the global Liberal enterprise of the last three decades. If states cannot rally to collaboratively combat the global pandemic itself, it seems that we are heading towards a more “nasty and brutish” era of international affairs. For the United States to revive the globalist agenda it had spearheaded for so long, it would have to double down on investing in international institutions and buttressing international norms regarding transparency and shared empathy. Given recent US policy choices, this does not seem to be in the cards. What remains then, would be state-level remedies to the problem. These could include regulation of private-sector information platforms, policy changes, and more robust strategies for US government information operations entities. Crafting these instruments for global competition in the information space may help to solve the immediate challenges posed by the COVID-19 propaganda war but is also a signal of the continuing dissolution of the Liberal system.


ALUMNI:

Dr. Allen Harper Joins T-Rex Solutions as Executive Vice President of Cybersecurity
(Security Magazine 14 July 20)

T-Rex Solutions, LLC announced Marine Corps veteran, entrepreneur and cybersecurity executive Dr. Allen Harper joined the organization as Executive Vice President of Cybersecurity. Dr. Harper will lead the company’s delivery of secure cloud services to the Federal government.

“We’re thrilled Dr. Harper is joining our team to help us continue to modernize government’s largest systems and protect its most valuable data.” said T-Rex CEO Seth Moore. “As we work to build, secure, and integrate mission-critical systems, we will look to Allen’s leadership and commitment to the mission to relentlessly drive innovation.”
Dr. Harper joins T-Rex after a career serving in the military and leading in industry and academia. As an officer in the Marine Corps, Dr. Harper led IT and cybersecurity in Western Iraq before retirement. He began a cybersecurity consulting business which was acquired in six years, where he specialized in ethical hacking, offensive security, penetration testing and reverse engineering. He most recently served as the department chair and cyber program director at Liberty University.

“I look forward to building on T-Rex’s success with the 2020 Decennial Census to expand our offerings and enhance Federal agencies’ cybersecurity posture,” said Harper. “I bring an attacker’s mindset and a proactive cybersecurity approach to inform how we help agencies move critical services and assets to the cloud securely.”

Dr. Harper authored six best-selling books and is the lead author of the Gray Hat Hacking series, now in 5th edition. Dr. Harper graduated with a bachelor’s degree in science in computer engineering from North Carolina State University, a master’s degree of science in computer science and information assurance from the Naval Post Graduate School, and earned his Ph.D. in business and IT from Capella University.


Candidate Q&A: Andrew Miller, Skagit PUD Board of Commissioners

(goSkagit.com 15 July 20) … Richard Walker

Name: Andrew Miller
Party Preference: None stated
Age: 44
Residence: Mount Vernon
Occupation: Farmer, CEO
Education: Juris Doctorate, Seattle University School of Law; MBA, Pacific Lutheran University; MA in Organizational Leadership, Gonzaga University; MA in Strategic Studies, Naval Postgraduate School; BS, Excelsior College.

Elected offices held: None
Community involvement: Viva Farms Board vice president; Anacortes Economic Development Committee; Anacortes Marine Trades Committee; Skagit Innovation Partnership Zone Committee Member; former Scoutmaster and Skagit District Training Committee chair, Boy Scouts of America.

Campaign website: millerforskagitpud.com

Why are you running for office? Water is at the heart of what makes the quality of life in Skagit County so remarkable. It drives nearly every aspect of the environmental, ecological, and economic benefits that we enjoy and we need to make sure that we’ve got the absolute best team on the field at the PUD. Our community needs elected officials that are committed to creatively and constructively tackling the challenges facing households and businesses in Skagit County. I have spent my career serving our country and community and solving problems at the highest levels of industry and I look forward to bringing that experience to the PUD.

What are the five biggest issues facing the candidate who is elected to this position? The single biggest issue is the PUD Commission itself, as the PUD will have to grapple with the internal challenges of two brand new members of the commission and the effects of that uncertainty will have on the PUD leadership and staff.

As a military veteran and now entrepreneur and business owner, I have a lifetime of experiences joining and leading teams during times of crisis. Setting clear expectations and ensuring everyone knows what’s going on, what they need to do, and that they have the resources to do it is the paramount task in leading teams during times of uncertainty.
Second, the external challenges of a global pandemic on the economy and the uncertainty of potential disruptions to the existing operational plans need to be shored up to ensure continuity of services is uninterrupted — addressed in the same way as in No. 1, but with a focus on revenue generation and the loss of potential grants or other funding and understanding quickly how that might throw off established plans.

Third, the PUD needs to bring its “A” game to the countywide fiber conversation. It’s one thing to be a partner and it’s another to be driving the changes with the focus, energy, resources and capabilities it’s going to take to get fiber across and throughout Skagit County. I will address this by putting the energy and focus on the relationships and opportunities that can fast-track the changes we need. By identifying existing projects and technologies that could be folded into the current strategy, we could shave years and millions of dollars of time it might take to do this “at the speed of government.”

Fourth, the PUD needs to be an active partner with agriculture and environmental initiatives and prioritize stable and affordable water access during droughts in order to maintain a viable agricultural industry remains in Skagit Valley. Healthy fields drive jobs and food security, as well as soil quality and ultimately water quality that improves the viability of salmon and our ocean environments as well. I will address this by insisting that the PUD be at the table early and often in support of agricultural use and environmental partnerships. Establishing plans and partnerships that get the water where it needs to be when it needs to be there is imperative and I’m a planner with experience working across diverse stakeholder sets.

Fifth, the PUD needs to make sure it has the best talent on the field. Making sure the leadership team and staff at the PUD is organized, trained, equipped and oriented for success is a critical role of the commission. I have extensive experience hiring, maintaining, motivating and evaluating executives, senior staff and outcomes of enterprise-level initiatives.

**How will you address them?** Answered above.

**Why should voters choose you?** I am the candidate that can best represent all of Skagit County. I have solved problems and built world-class teams in government and the private sector and I have spent a lifetime developing the leadership skills to make sure the PUD continues to deliver on its mission and is ready for whatever comes next. I understand what makes Skagit County different and how to use those cultural strengths to keep it special.

**What sets you apart from your opponents?** As a Skagit County native and current business owner with school-age kids at home, I have a depth and breadth of connection to the entire Skagit County community that my opponents do not. I farm here and have started and run three other businesses in Skagit County, so I’m working with a diversity of neighbors, policymakers, customers, clients, and other stakeholders in and around PUD decisions every day in ways my opponents are not. My experience at the Economic Development Alliance of Skagit County (EDASC) gave me a countywide perspective of the policy and practical complexities and opportunities for both environmental conservation and economic development specific to Skagit County.

**How are you campaigning and engaging with voters during the pandemic?** I’m relying on social media and email messaging and will be rolling out signage and newspaper messaging throughout the campaign. As a digital native, I find Facebook, Instagram and YouTube as channels that help to efficiently connect and engage with voters. I have also secured the endorsements of key influencers in the community (for instance, I’ve secured the endorsement and/or votes of half of the Anacortes City Council).

Tearing Down Racism or Erasing Our History?
*(Coronado Times 16 July 20)* … Edward Anthony Moore III

There has been a lot of debate about whether or not we should be tearing down statues of Confederate leaders or renaming government institutions and facilities named after historic segregationists. Are we destroying monuments to racism or are we erasing important parts of our history? Let me tell you a short story and then I’ll let you decide.

Carl Vinson served in the U.S. House of Representatives, representing Georgia’s 10th congressional district, from 1914 to 1965. He is sometimes referred to as the “Patriarch of the Armed Forces,” though he never served in the military, due to his role on various Armed Forces committees in the House and the logistical innovations that occurred during his service.

Vinson was a staunch segregationist. He signed “The Southern Manifesto” in 1956, with a slew of other Southern politicians, in resistance to the Supreme Court ruling on “Brown v. Board of Education” that deemed segregated public schools unconstitutional. He retired from Congress in 1965, declining to seek reelection in 1964, the same year the Civil Rights Act was passed.

In 1980, the United States Navy commissioned its third Nimitz-class Aircraft Carrier, no less than a floating city, the pinnacle of our military might. They named it the USS CARL VINSON (CVN-70).

In 1956, as Congressman Vinson was applying his John Hancock to the “The Southern Manifesto,” an ambitious 11-year-old Black boy was attending Dunbar Junior High School in Little Rock, Arkansas. The next year, the Little Rock Nine would be the first black students to enroll at the formerly all-white Central High School, beginning the long and arduous road of desegregation, much to Vinson’s chagrin.

This young boy, still in junior high school, was friends with the younger siblings of much of the Little Rock Nine and was able to hear first-hand accounts of the tribulations they were facing as they walked those whitewashed hallways. Tales of needing an elite armed guard, military jeeps, and helicopters to go to and from school. Tales of being openly abused and defamed while the abusers faced no consequences or retribution. Tales of receiving C grades for A papers, despite putting in twice as much time and producing higher quality work than white students who received better marks.

In the next few years, this young boy would face a difficult decision. Either enter the fray of being one of those select few Black students permitted to enter a higher quality school on a limited basis and immerse himself in a hotbed of blatant racism and violent tension while being forced to constantly exercise restraint of tongue and fist, not retaliate and likely accept grades below the marks he’d earned, or attend the separate but not equal Horace Mann High School with a Black teaching staff who was invested in his future, supportive of his goals and would grade his work on merit. He chose the latter. He had a goal and C’s just would not cut it.

He would graduate from Horace Mann in 1963 with stellar grades and submit his first application to the U.S. Naval Academy. It was denied. He pressed on, attending Southern Illinois University and applied to the Naval Academy again after his freshman year there. Once more he was denied. The young man confronted the realization that both his State Senators and the congressional representative from his home district were unlikely to appoint a young Black man to the prestigious academic institution meant to train and groom future Officers. There had been progress, but not that much. He had already enlisted in the U.S. Naval Reserve, so he would make his way as an enlisted man. A young, Black enlisted man in the good-ole-boys Navy of the time.

This began the storied career of Vice Admiral Edward Moore Jr.

Admiral Moore would go on to serve his country in the Vietnam War, serve as Gunnery Officer, Communications Officer, Operations Officer, Navigator and earn a Master’s degree in Business Administration from U.S. Naval Postgraduate School. He would become a Junior Assignment Officer and Shore Assignments Coordinator at the Bureau of Naval Personnel. He was then assigned to the USS BUCHANAN (DDG-14) as Executive Officer in 1979 and served as the second Commanding Officer of the USS LEWIS B. PULLER (FFG-23) before being promoted to Captain and first Commanding Officer of the Ticonderoga-class guided-missile cruiser the USS COWPENS (CG-63). As the first Black Captain of an Aegis Class Cruiser, he led a successful Tomahawk missile strike against a sensitive target in Iraq.

Admiral Moore would end his 38-year career as the highest-ranking Black officer in the Navy, a 3-Star Admiral retiring as Commander, U.S. Naval Surface Forces, Pacific.
During those 38 years he was awarded the Navy Distinguished Service Medal, Legion of Merit Medal with four gold stars, the Defense Meritorious Service Medal, the Meritorious Service Medal, the Navy Achievement Medal, and many other service and campaign awards. He also made significant contributions in pioneering systems integration aboard ships as the Navy ushered in a new era of technological advancement. Moore pioneered many things, not the least of which was an unprecedented avenue to the Flag Officer rank from enlisted service. Where the progress of society lagged behind his vision, he made his own path and cleared the way for those who came after him.

In 1995 when he assumed command of Cruiser-Destroyer Group Three, his flagship was the USS CARL VINSON. He defied the odds and rose the ranks through the barriers of discrimination and then, as Task Force Commander, stood aboard a floating fortress named in commemoration of the man who had so adamantly opposed his equality; a monument to someone who fought tooth and nail to try to prevent him -and anyone who looked like him- from ever assuming such a command, or going to a decent school, from ever riding in the front of the bus, or eating in the same restaurants as white people. Carl Vinson spent his 51 years of service devoted to the belief, in word and action, that Vice Admiral Edward Moore Jr. was a second class citizen.

Vice Admiral Edward Moore Jr. is my father.

I have stood on the CARL VINSON as my father stepped aboard and hundreds of men and women jumped to attention and saluted to the announcement, “Admiral on deck!” I have walked the passageways of that ship with him as young, Black sailors stepped out on a limb and broke rank to take the opportunity to thank him from the bottom of their hearts for paving the way ahead of them, with joyous smiles and reverent souls. I’ve watched thousands of brave men and women of every color and creed who have served this country at the highest level, offer this man the utmost respect for his service and devotion to this Nation and for leadership that changed their lives.

I didn’t really know who Carl Vinson was until last week. My father never mentioned it. I walked the passageways, climbed the ladders, and stood on the deck of that ship as a child in awe of his father — without ever really knowing the poetry of the triumph written by determination and fate as he assumed command and stepped aboard. A story, that upon closer examination, seems to be written by the hand of Justice itself.

So you tell me, who should the ship be named after? Who deserves a monument? Whose stories and ideals should we enshrine in our statues, our ships, our military bases, and our Capitol buildings? The great men and women of this country who defied the odds and triumphed over evil, doing so in service to all Americans? Or those who strove to preserve the evil of racism at the expense of so many of those heroes?

My father cried when he retired. My father loves the Navy. He loves this country as too few do, in action and above his own life. Is it not time his country, at minimum, respect him and the 13% of the population with black skin enough to remove the state-sponsored glorification of those who fought to try and ensure we could never be truly free?

Trust me, we will not forget our history because 10-foot statues of bigots do not loom in public squares. We will not forget slavery because traitors to the Union don’t have bases and war vessels in their names. We will not forget segregation because those who fought to preserve it are no longer celebrated as icons of the country they strove to divide.

My Father never brought up Vinson’s history. When I realized what I had missed, I called him to talk about it. I sheepishly asked if he knew Carl Vinson’s history, knowing it was a silly question. Do you know what he said? “Yea, Carl Vinson certainly turned over in his grave when that ship became my Flagship.” He always knew and he never mentioned it. His life and his career said every word there was to say on the matter.

So you tell me, who should that ship be named after?

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