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The Power to Distribute, Adapt, and Prevail

2 December 2015

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The Power to Distribute (suggestion)

“For more power in more places, the Navy should increase the offensive might of the surface force and employ ships in dispersed formations known as ‘hunter-killer surface action groups.’”*

suggestion:

“For more power in more places, the Navy should increase the offensive might of the surface *and subsurface* force and employ ships in dispersed formations known as ‘hunter-killer ~~surface~~ action groups.’”

* Rowden, Thomas, VADM, Gumataotao, Peter, RADM, and Fanta, Peter, RADM, U.S. Navy,
Distributed Lethality, Proceedings Magazine, January 2015, Vol 141/1/1,343

#1

Constant Targets

In Near-Coast Areas, Surface Ships Are Like An Old West Sheriff Walking Down The Middle Of Main Street, Fully Exposed To The Riflemen On The Roofs

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VOA Screen Shot of ISIS Missile Attack on Egyptian Frigate, July 2015



#2

“Submarines are difficult to find and hard to destroy. *Even fairly crude submarine forces can attack surface ships or other targets with a great deal of stealth, making them perfect for countries with limited resources.* The threat of such an attack is a powerful deterrent in Asia, where coastal defenses are vital.”

Battle for control of Asia's Seas Goes Underwater
By Eric Talmadge, Associated Press, 19 January 2012

“We should always remember that survivability is a characteristic incorporated to gain time for offense.”

Wayne P. Hughes, Jr., Captain, USN, Ret
Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat, Second Edition, USNI Press, Page 192

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The Power to Adapt

Our People are Our Edge

“But let no one forget that one and only one element will finally sway the balance, when a country must defend the things for which it stands. That element is people, people who believe, people who will act, people who can think, people who have what it takes to outfight the enemy.”

Andrews, Frank. Tactical Development, Naval Tactics.
USNI Press, 2015. Page 61

People Adapt Easier than Machines

“Algorithms are brittle and often don’t work well in the shadows, whereas skilled decision makers are more resilient and sensitive to context and nuance. Therefore we may not want to rely on statistical methods if there is a reasonable chance that conditions may change. We need to be confident that the algorithm takes into account all relevant variables. We also depend on having a relatively large body of similar cases from which to extract the rules. ***Algorithms aren’t used where flexibility is demanded, because they are carefully tailored to narrow conditions.***
[emphasis added]

Klein, Gary. Streetlights And Shadows,

Searching For The Keys To Adaptive Decision Making, The MIT Press, 2009. Pages 118-119

No Halfway House at Sea

“At sea there is no halfway house between victory and defeat, because there is no difference between what is needed for defense and what for attack. One side only can gain security at the cost of the other—or neither.”

Rosinski, Herbert, *The Development of Naval Thought: Essays by Herbert Rosinski*,
Naval War College Press, 1977, page 4

The Power to Prevail

The aim of war is some measure of control over the enemy.

The ultimate determinate in war is the man on the scene with the gun.

Wiley, J.C., RADM, USN, Ret.
Military Strategy. US Naval Institute Press, 1989, Pages 66-72

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To Prevail, Presence is Essential

“presence”

“it means being there.”

CAPT Barney Rubel, USN, Ret., Former Dean US Naval War College,
quoted by Beasley, Jr., William M., Closing the Presence Gap,
Proceedings Magazine, November 2015, Vol 141/11/1353

Takeaway

A low cost, manned highly capable submersible craft that can be bought in numbers, to achieve a distributable, adaptable and credible presence that can dramatically change warfare in the littorals.