

Summary of the Afghan National Police (ANP)

Background

The process of reconstituting the national Afghan police force began with a conference in Berlin in February 2002. Donor nations settled on the need to create “a multiethnic, sustainable, and countrywide 62,000-member professional police service.”¹ Germany, the lead nation in the training of Afghan National Police (ANP), had built a force of more than 61,000 police by 2007 with training based at the Kabul Police Academy. Between 2002 and 2005, U.S. involvement in the creation of the ANP was under the auspices of the State Department and included more than \$4.1 billion in funding.² Since 2005, however, the U.S. responsibility for the ANP has shifted to the Department of Defense and since 2007 Germany’s primary role is being taken over by the European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL). The 2005 handover of responsibility between the U.S. Departments of State and Defense resulted in an additional \$2 billion of funding for equipment and increased pay for police. Currently, the U.S. military is involved in an extensive reform effort to retrain the ANP and increase its end size from 62,000 to 72,000 with \$2.5 billion allocated for the effort.³

As the primary national law enforcement agency, the roles and responsibilities of the ANP are set forth in law. According to Article 5 of the Police Law, the roles of the ANP include:

- “Ensuring and maintaining public order and security;

¹ United States Government Accountability Office, Report to the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, *Afghanistan Security: Efforts to Establish Army and Police Have Made Progress, but Future Plans Need to Be Better Defined*, (June 2005): 8.

² *Ibid.*, 8.

³ David Rohde, “Overhaul of Afghan Police is a New Priority,” *The New York Times*, October 18, 2007, at <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/18/world/asia/18afghan.html?ex=1193371200&en=5bca83ca4771693d&ei=5070&emc=eta1>, accessed on 19 October 2007. See also JCMB Task Force on Afghan National Police Target Strength, (March 2007), at <http://www.and.s.gov.af/ands/jcmb/src/jcmb5/5B.%20Task%20Force%20on%20Police%20Ceillings.pdf>, accessed on 22 October 2007.

- Ensuring and protecting the security and legal rights and freedoms of individuals and society;
- Preventing crime, discovering crimes and arresting suspects;
- Protecting public and private property;
- Fighting against the cultivation of poppies and marijuana, and the production and trafficking of illegal drugs;
- Fighting against organized crime and terrorism;
- Regulating road traffic;
- Responding to and assisting victims of natural disasters; and
- Safeguarding borders, preventing smuggling, and controlling check posts at borders and international airports.”⁴

Organization

The Afghan National Police falls under the authority of the Ministry of the Interior (MoI) and extends down to the district level, with a chief of police assigned to “each of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces and approximately 400 districts.”⁵ Prior to 2006, the majority of provincial police chiefs reported directly to the MoI. In an effort to streamline the coordination of security and to diminish the influence of governors resistant to the authority of the central government, the ANP chain of command was changed. Five regional ANP commands, equivalent to the regional command structure of the Afghan National Army (ANA), were established in Kabul, Gardez, Kandahar, Herat, and Mazar-e Sharif. The chain of command now runs from “1) the Minister of Interior, to 2) the Deputy Minister for Security Affairs, to 3) Regional Commanders, to 4) provincial Police Chief, to 5) district Chiefs of Police” and governors are specifically excluded from the ANP command structure.⁶

Currently the ANP is composed of five formal divisions and one that is temporary. First, the **Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP)** is the largest branch and is responsible for the day-to-day law enforcement throughout Afghanistan. Under the revised strength figures, the total number of AUP will increase from 31,000 to 45,000. Responsibility for border security to include the prevention of border crossing by insurgents, drug

⁴ Andrew Wilder, *Cops or Robbers? The Struggle to Reform the Afghan National Police*, (Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, July 2007): 4, at <http://www.areu.org.af/>, accessed on 22 October 2007.

⁵ Wilder, 4.

⁶ Wilder, 5.

trafficking and other forms of smuggling falls to the **Afghan Border Police (ABP)**. The ABP is divided into eight brigades, but it is currently being restructured into five zones that correspond to the ANA/ANP Regional Commands. The ABP man 13 border checkpoints and patrol the border. At only 65 percent of its original authorized personnel strength, the ABP is facing serious manning problems especially due to the recent increase of total end strength from 12,000 to 18,000. Under the new figures, the ABP is only 44 percent manned. Created in 2006, the **Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP)** is responsible for “maintain[ing] civil order in Afghanistan’s seven largest cities, to provide a robust and mobile police presence in remote high-threat areas, and to serve as a rapid-reaction force to support other police in an emergency.”⁷ The **Afghanistan Highway Police (AHP)** were responsible for maintaining order and security along the country’s primary highways. While the AHP officially were phased out and ordered to integrate into the AUP, due in part to their “corruption and ineffectiveness”, many refused to follow the redeployment orders.⁸ Counter-narcotics enforcement and investigation is the responsibility of the fifth formal branch or division of the ANP, the **Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA)**.⁹

In an attempt to deal with elevated security risks and increased insurgent and criminal activity, the **Afghanistan National Auxiliary Police (ANAP)** were formed. Officially, the ANAP are separate from the ANP and were designed as a “quick fix” solution. Recruitment for the ANA was aimed at existing militias in local areas with some degree of loyalty to the government in Kabul. Members of the ANAP receive condensed training, but wear the same uniform as the ANP (with their own designation patch), receive the same monthly salary of US470 and sign a contract for one year. Presently, the ANAP is viewed as a temporary force, but it is likely that the members will be integrated into the regular ANP after their initial contract year.¹⁰

⁷ Wilder, 12.

⁸ Wilder, 13.

⁹ Wilder, 11-13.

¹⁰ Wilder, 13.

Progress and Obstacles

Despite achieving its original manning goals of 62,000, the ANP is beset by serious problems. First, the ANP has been described as ineffective, ill-trained and ill-equipped. This is due to a number of factors. The commitment to the ANP from the international community has been insufficient to meet institution's stated mission. Creating a national police force from the ground up in a country devastated by war with competing loyalties between warlords, militias, and the central government has proven challenging. Second, the ANP, which has been insufficiently trained and equipped as a police force, is often used by the central government and Coalition/ISAF forces as a fighting force, a role outside of its intended scope of law enforcement.¹¹ The ineffectiveness, ill-training and misuse of the ANP is perhaps best evidenced by its casualty rate compared to that of the ANA. In 2007, the ANP has suffered approximately 1,540 total casualties (930 killed, 560, wounded and over 40 kidnapped) compared to 620 total casualties for the ANA (385 killed, 230 wounded and 5 kidnapped). During the first nine months of 2007, the ANP has suffered 234 percent more casualties than the ANA.¹² Third, the ANP is under-manned in critical areas, such as the ABP, and over-manned with senior officers at the MoI. Fourth, the high-level of corruption and criminal activity within the ANP has contributed to its ineffectiveness in increasing the level of security. For instance, a recent survey "found only 1,200 officers at work in an area where Afghan commanders claimed 3,300 officers were serving." It is common practice for police commanders to collect the salary for missing or non-existent officers.¹³

¹¹ International Crisis Group, "Reforming Afghanistan's Police," *Asia Report* No. 138, (30 August 2007): 15, at http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/asia/south_asia/138_reforming_afghanistan_s_police.pdf, accessed on 19 October 2007.

¹² Based on BBC Monitoring Reports from Open Source at <https://www.opensource.gov>.

¹³ Rohde.

Recent and current attempts at reform are aimed at dealing with at least some of these problems. Under the guidance of the U.S. military, the ANP are being retrained. While this may not reduce their role in terms of war fighting, it might at least better prepare them for the reality on the ground. In an effort to deal with corruption and retaining trained members of the ANP, there are plans to increase pay and require that paychecks automatically be deposited into the members' bank accounts.¹⁴ Finally, there is an ongoing effort to reduce the size of the senior officer corps in the MoI which will free up greater resources for increased manning where it is needed most.

¹⁴ Please see Corruption Appendix to ANP Summary attached as PDF Here.