THE CHALLENGE

Today’s security environment is unpredictable. Threats originate from state and non-state aggressors, as well as catastrophic natural and man-made disasters. Terrorism, cyber-attacks and other threats chronically stress many nations’ defense institutions, making them increasingly vulnerable to shocks that can have outsized effects. No nation can effectively protect itself when degraded by disruptive influences like a loss of critical infrastructure, supply chain interruptions, disinformation campaigns, and other threats that have the potential to divide and weaken a society.

Resilience is the key to a country’s ability to deter, resist and recover from shocks. In a defense and security context, resilience is an essential component of defense planning, bringing together military capacity and civil preparedness. For example, defense and security forces depend upon reliable networks of private and public sector services and products. Therefore, national security requires robust civil-military capabilities that sustain governance and build and maintain operational readiness in the face of national emergencies, crises or conflicts. Security cooperation requirements must account for the protection, and continuous functionality of these essential components that support international defense readiness. This includes the ability to share information and intelligence, effectively contribute to coalition operations, conduct sustained operations, and protect access to critical infrastructure such as ports and lines of communication.

Assisting a partner nation with building resilience can be fraught with challenges, to include:

♦ Lack of cohesion at the national level to build resilience systematically, i.e. lack of relevant legislation, clear leadership and whole-of-society cooperation mechanisms to foster unity of effort
♦ Lack of national risk management practices and implementation measures to reduce vulnerability to attack and disruption on critical infrastructure and state services
♦ Uncoordinated and reactive planning frameworks focused on historical threats and hazards

ABOUT ISG

The Institute for Security Governance — situated within the Defense Security Cooperation University’s (DSCU) International School of Education and Advising (ISEA) — is the Department of Defense’s Center of Excellence for Institutional Capacity Building (ICB). As a component of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), and one of its primary international Security Cooperation schoolhouses, ISG is charged with building partner institutional capacity and capability through tailored advising, education, and professional development programs grounded in American values and approaches.

This document is intended to frame the challenges, possibilities, and best practices associated with building resilience for national defense, and to highlight ISG’s role as integrator, implementer, and partner within DoD’s security cooperation community.
THE CHALLENGE (CONT.)

- Lack of unified crisis management arrangements and public-private partnerships to enable interoperability
- Insufficient national investment in stockpiles of strategic resources: surge capacity (including mass casualty care and mass population displacements), redundancy, distribution, and restorative measures for critical networks and services
- Over-dependence on strategic competitors for sources of essential commodities
- Inadequate investments in and mechanisms for civil defense and civil-military cooperation, including civilian enablement of military operations
- Weak infrastructure protection, fragile supply lines, no public alert and warning system, unclear Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear Emergency (CBRNE) response plans, and confused mechanisms for managing emergency response volunteers and
- Societal divisions that tear the social fabric and undermines a comprehensive, whole-of-nation approach to addressing crisis situations

STATE OF THE FIELD

Today, most nations grapple with how to transition from reactive, government-centric security planning that focuses on traditional defense towards a more agile and effective resilience-based approach that frontloads a robust capacity to repel, resist, and absorb shock from a range of threats and hazards across all sectors of society.

NATO is a global thought leader on resilience in defense and security contexts and has established baseline requirements for national resilience against which nations can measure their level of preparedness. These requirements are globally applicable and reflect the core functions of continuity of government, essential services to the population, and civil support to the military.

Additionally, a few countries have successfully developed a whole-of-society approach to national security. Nordic and Baltic states adopt a ‘total defense’ posture, which is focused on countering foreign aggression, and several countries have developed effective mechanisms to mobilize civil society to respond to disasters, and in support of state security.

In the civilian domain, the United Nations’ Sendai Framework provides a globally relevant resilience capacity building model. Although focused primarily on disaster risk reduction, the Sendai Framework, like the NATO approach and Nordic emphasis on total defense, emphasize a nationally led, whole-of-society template for strengthening resilience that includes community organizations, civil society, as well as whole-of-government coordination. This framework can be applied in concert with other guidelines and models to address defense and security resilience priorities.

“In order to more effectively achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.”

- The North Atlantic Treaty, 1949, Article 3

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WHY ICB MATTERS FOR PARTNER RESILIENCE IN DEFENSE

In a defense and security context, resilience is focused on whole-of-society mitigation of, response to, and recovery from national emergencies, especially those sparked by hostile actions from adversaries or competitors. Threats range from catastrophic disasters, disinformation campaigns that stoke civil unrest and destabilize governance, economic or resource coercion, disruptive exploitation of information networks or critical infrastructure systems, and outright kinetic attacks or incursions.

To counter these threats, it is imperative that partner governments develop and improve whole-of-government capacity to: identify and reduce national vulnerabilities and identify potential threats; share information; coordinate actions; pool resources; and demonstrate credible will and capability to dissuade or deter threats by increasing the cost of aggression. Finally, governments should be able to communicate the existence of potential threats and hazards to their populations, along with plans for executing a “whole-of-government” or “whole-of-society” approach to counter or mitigate threats through preparedness and training, supported by institutional and legal structures and policies.

ICB BEST PRACTICES FOR RESILIENCE

The U.S. security cooperation community serves a critical role in facilitating national resilience capacity building among our global network of collective security stakeholders. ICB best practices for building resilience are based on a set of universally applicable resilience guidelines, international lessons learned, and common principles. Examples of these practices include:

♦ Ensuring national legislation and policy processes are in place to facilitate and resource national resilience building and foster unity of effort
♦ Implementing a systematic approach to building resilience that is all-hazards, whole-of-society, risk-driven, and capability-based
♦ Unifying national efforts for planning, crisis management arrangements, and interoperable capabilities
♦ Developing capabilities and capacity in priority areas such as: planning, risk management, continuity of government, infrastructure resilience, supply chain security, mass casualty management, cybersecurity, and strategic communications
♦ Developing and advancing reliable and mutually accountable public-private partnerships and
♦ Establishing national training, education, and exercise programs to build and maintain communities of practice and expertise, validate capabilities, assess progress, and refine approaches

Although national resilience may include many other elements, these requirements reflect essential defense planning considerations that directly impact national security. Resilience capacity building efforts should focus on affordable, feasible, and relevant solutions to the range of challenges that can dramatically impact both civilian populations and military forces. A comprehensive resilience capacity building approach must also include an appreciation of the interdependencies and shared responsibilities between the public and private sector to protect and sustain critical infrastructure and services.

ISG works closely with national interagency partners as well as with relevant regional, international, and non-governmental organizations to assist partners in developing tailored national resilience frameworks. Resilience-focused ICB applies a comprehensive, systematic, and all-hazards approach that is driven by risk, based on capabilities and includes all of society. U.S. security cooperation in this area strengthens the critical link between national resilience and defense while bolstering the overall security and stability of the partner nation, region, and the international community.
Institutional Capacity Building programs, overseen by DSCA, encompass Security Cooperation activities that directly support U.S. ally and partner nation efforts to improve security sector governance and core management competencies necessary to effectively and responsibly achieve shared security objectives.

**WHAT IS INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY BUILDING?**

**ILLUSTRATIVE PARTNER INSTITUTIONS FOR ICB**
Partner nations’ civilian and military organizations focused at the strategic and operational levels such as Ministries of Defense and Interior, intelligence services, law enforcement organizations, military services, and legislatures.

**ILLUSTRATIVE ICB DOMAINS**
- Strategy & Policy
- Resource Management
- Human Resource Management
- Acquisition & Logistics
- Force Management
- Law & Human Rights

**PRINCIPLES OF EFFECTIVE ICB**

**STRATEGICALLY DRIVEN**
Driven by U.S. interests and values. When integrated early into Security Cooperation (SC) planning, ICB supports strategic dialogue about the partner’s capability and will to execute a specified role.

**PROBLEM FOCUSED**
Assesses shortfalls in institutional performance that may impede partners’ ability to execute role. Considers appropriate entry points for engagement and the enablers and inhibitors of change.

**PARTNER CENTRIC**
Avoids the projection or imposition of U.S. models, which may not fit a partner’s specific context. Responsive to partners’ priorities and their unique political and institutional dynamics.

**MOVING FROM PROBLEM TO SOLUTION**

**SC PLANNING & ENGAGEMENT**

**IDENTIFY PARTNER ROLE**
Frame role U.S. wants partner to play and ensure SC objectives are feasible given capacity.

**FLAG SHORTFALLS THAT MAY REQUIRE ICB**
Identify shortfalls in will and/or capacity that may impede partner’s ability to execute role.

**JOINTLY IMPLEMENT ICB SOLUTIONS**
Deliver integrated ICB solutions across multiple stakeholders and assess viability of approach.

**JOINTLY MONITOR AND ADAPT**
Continuously monitor progress and adapt actions based on what’s working.

**JOINT PARTNER AND U.S. ICB OPERATIONS**

**ICB OFFERINGS**

**ADVISING & CONSULTING**
Present partner with possibilities for institutional improvements or reform and assist with approaches tailored to partners’ political and institutional context for change.

**EDUCATION & TRAINING**
Equip partners with the knowledge, skills, tools, and expertise to design and implement solutions.

**CONFERENCES & SEMINARS**
Engage partner stakeholders, explore country best practices, and help create space for progress.

**ICB PLANNERS AND IMPLEMENTERS**
- Defense Institute of International Legal Studies (DIILS)
- Defense Technology Security Administration (DTSA)
- Institute for Security Governance (ISG)
- International School of Education and Advising (ISEA)
- Regional Centers

**QUESTIONS ABOUT ICB?**
Questions or comments about this Smart Sheet or any ICB topic?
Ask an ISG expert about any ICB question at: dsca.isg.mbx.icbexpert@mail.mil