

# STANDARDIZATION ROADMAP

For Unmanned Aircraft Systems, Version 2.0



Prepared by the ANSI Unmanned Aircraft  
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Parentheses following a name signify participation also on behalf of another organization.

## Executive Summary

In September 2017, the [American National Standards Institute](#) (ANSI) launched the [Unmanned Aircraft Systems Standardization Collaborative \(UASSC\)](#). The UASSC was established to coordinate and accelerate the development of the standards and conformity assessment programs needed to facilitate the safe integration of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) into the national airspace system (NAS) of the United States, with international coordination and adaptability. The UASSC was not chartered to write standards.

Founded in 1918, ANSI serves as the administrator and coordinator of the United States private-sector voluntary standardization system. As a neutral facilitator, the Institute has a successful track record of convening stakeholders from the public and private sectors to define standardization needs for emerging technologies and to address national and global priorities, in areas as diverse as homeland security, electric vehicles, energy efficiency in the built environment, and additive manufacturing.

The purpose of the UASSC is to foster coordination and collaboration among industry, standards developing organizations (SDOs), regulatory authorities, and others on UAS standardization issues, including pre-standardization research and development (R&D). A primary goal is to clarify the current and desired future UAS standardization landscape to enable stakeholders to better focus standards participation resources. A third objective is to provide a basis for coherent and coordinated U.S. policy and technical input to regional and international audiences on UAS standardization. Ultimately, the aim is to support the growth of the UAS market with emphasis on civil, commercial, and public safety applications.

This *Standardization Roadmap for Unmanned Aircraft Systems, Version 2.0* (“roadmap”) is an update to version 1.0 of this document published in December 2018. It identifies existing standards and standards in development, assesses gaps, and makes recommendations for priority areas where there is a perceived need for additional standardization and/or pre-standardization R&D.

The roadmap has examined 78 issue areas, identified a total of 71 open gaps and corresponding recommendations across the topical areas of airworthiness; flight operations (both general concerns and application-specific ones including critical infrastructure inspections, commercial services, and public safety operations); and personnel training, qualifications, and certification. Of that total, 47 gaps/recommendations have been identified as high priority, 21 as medium priority, and 3 as low priority. A “gap” means no *published* standard or specification exists that covers the particular issue in question. In 53 cases, additional R&D is needed.

As with the earlier version of this document, the hope is that the roadmap will be broadly adopted by the standards community and that it will facilitate a more coherent and coordinated approach to the future development of standards for UAS. To that end, it is envisioned that the roadmap will continue to be promoted in the coming year. It is also envisioned that a mechanism may be established to assess progress on its implementation.

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# Summary of Major Changes from Version 1.0

## High-Level Structural and Content Changes

- Updates were made to all sections of the Introduction
- Generally speaking, updates were made to the overviews in chapters 2-5 and lists of published and in-development standards were updated in chapters 6-10.
- This Summary of Major Changes from Version 1.0 was added along with a Breakdown of the High, Medium, and Low Priority Open Gaps

## Renamed/Repositioned Roadmap Chapters/Sections/Subsections (23)

- Section 2, Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and International Cooperation
- Section 2.2, Rules and Measures to Enable UAS Operations and Integration into the NAS (previously 2.2 and 2.3)
- Section 4.7, European Organization for Civil Aviation Equipment (previously 5.6)
- Section 6.2, UAS System Safety
- Section 6.4.1, Command and Control (C2) Link and Communications
- Section 6.4.3, Systems Performing Detect and Avoid (DAA) Functions
- Section 6.4.4, Software Considerations and Approval
- Section 6.4.5, Flight Data and Voice Recorders for UAS
- Section 6.8, Mitigation Systems for Various Hazards to UAS
- Section 7.2, Continued Operational Safety (COS)
- Section 7.8, UAS Remote Identification (UAS Remote ID)
- Chapter 8, Flight Operations Standards: Infrastructure Inspections, Environmental Applications, Commercial Services, Workplace Safety – WG3
- Section 8.1.1, Power Plants and Industrial Process Plants
- Section 8.2.3, Power Transmission Lines, Structures, and Environs
- Section 8.3, Environmental Applications
- Section 8.4, Commercial Services
- Section 8.4.1, Commercial Package Delivery via UAS (previously 8.4)
- Section 8.5, Workplace Safety
- Section 9.2, Hazardous Materials Incident Response
- Section 9.6.1, sUAS IR Camera Sensor Capabilities
- Section 9.6.2, sUAS Automated Missions during Emergency Response
- Section 9.8, Public Safety Tactical Operations
- Section 9.9.2: UAS Mitigation (previously 9.9)

## Substantially Revised Roadmap Sections/Subsections (31)

- Section 2.2, Rules and Measures to Enable UAS Operations and Integration into the NAS
- Section 6.1, Design and Construction
- Section 6.2, UAS System Safety

- Section 6.3, Quality Assurance/Quality Control
- Section 6.4.1, Command and Control (C2) Link and Communications
- Section 6.4.2, Navigation Systems
- Section 6.4.3, Systems Performing Detect and Avoid (DAA) Functions
- Section 6.4.4, Software Considerations and Approval
- Section 6.4.5, Flight Data and Voice Recorders for UAS
- Section 6.5, Electrical Systems
- Section 6.6, Power Sources and Propulsion Systems
- Section 6.7, Noise, Emissions, and Fuel Venting
- Section 6.8, Mitigation Systems for Various Hazards to UAS
- Section 6.9, Parachutes for Small Unmanned Aircraft
- Section 6.11, Enterprise Operations: Level of Automation/Autonomy and Artificial Intelligence (AI)
- Section 7.1, Privacy
- Section 7.2, Continued Operational Safety (COS)
- Section 7.3, Beyond Visual Line of Sight (BVLOS)
- Section 7.7, UAS Traffic Management (UTM)
- Section 7.8, UAS Remote Identification (UAS Remote ID)
- Section 8.1.1, Power Plants and Industrial Process Plants
- Section 8.2.1, Bridges
- Section 8.2.2, Railroads
- Section 8.3.2, Pesticide Application
- Section 8.4.1, Commercial Package Delivery via UAS
- Section 8.5, Workplace Safety
- Section 9.1, sUAS for Public Safety Operations
- Section 9.6.2, sUAS Automated Missions during Emergency Response
- Section 9.8, Public Safety Tactical Operations
- Section 9.9.2: UAS Mitigation
- Section 10.7, Human Factors in UAS Operations

*New Roadmap Sections/Subsections (33)*

- Section 2.3.1, International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)
- Section 2.3.2, Joint Authorities for Rulemaking on Unmanned Systems (JARUS)
- Section 3.1, Department of Defense
- Section 3.1.1, North Atlantic Treaty Organization
- Section 3.7, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
- Section 3.8, USDA Forest Service
- Section 4.10, Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)
- Section 4.11, NACE International (NACE)
- Section 4.16, SAE Industry Technologies Consortia (SAE ITC)
- Section 5.1, Academy of Model Aeronautics (AMA)

- Section 5.2, Aerospace Industries Association (AIA)
- Section 5.6, Aviators Code Initiative (ACI)
- Section 5.7, AW-Drones
- Section 5.10, General Aviation Manufacturers Association (GAMA)
- Section 5.12, Helicopter Association International (HAI)
- Section 5.16, Performance Review Institute® (PRI)
- Section 5.19, Vertical Flight Society (VFS)
- Section 6.12, Blockchain for UAS
- Section 7.10, Recreational Operations
- Section 7.11, Design and Operation of Aerodrome Facilities for UAS
- Section 7.12, UAS Service Suppliers (USS) Process and Quality
- Section 8.2.4, Implementing UAS for Hydrocarbon Pipeline Inspections
- Section 8.2.5, Implementing UAS in Airport Operations
- Section 8.4, Commercial Services
- Section 8.4.2, Commercial Cargo Transport via UAS
- Section 8.4.3, Commercial Passenger Air Taxi Transport via UAS (short-haul flights carrying few passengers)
- Section 8.4.4, Commercial Passenger Transport via UAS (long-haul flights carrying many passengers)
- Section 8.4.5, Commercial Sensing Services
- Section 8.4.6, Use of sUAS for News Gathering
- Section 9.9, UAS Detection and Mitigation
- Section 9.9.1: UAS Detection
- Section 9.10, UAS for Emergency Management and Disasters
- Section 9.11, Standardization of Data Formatting for sUAS Public Safety Operations

### **Gap Analysis Changes**

- 60 gaps were identified in roadmap version 1.0. Using a traffic light analogy, the status of progress on these is:
  - 42 are Green (moving forward)
  - 4 are Yellow (delayed)
  - 0 are Red (at a standstill)
  - 3 are Not Started
  - 6 are Unknown
  - 2 are Closed
  - 3 have been Withdrawn
- 25 version 1.0 gaps have been substantially revised in roadmap version 2.0
- 16 new gaps identified
- 78 issue areas examined
- 5 areas had no gap identified
- 71 gaps are open. Of these:

- 47 are High priority (should be addressed in 0-2 years)
- 21 are Medium priority (should be addressed in 2-5 years)
- 3 are Low priority (should be addressed in 5+ years)
- 53 open gaps require research and development

#### Closed Gaps (2)

- Gap S1: Use of sUAS for Public Safety Operations (High priority, Tier 2)
- Gap P6: Compliance and Audit Programs (High priority, Tier 3)

#### Withdrawn Gaps (3)

- Gap A3: Quality Assurance/Quality Control
- Gap A5: Command and Control (C2)/Command, Control and Communications (C3) Link Performance Requirements
- Gap P8: Flight Control and Automation System Failures

#### Substantially Revised Gaps (25)

- Gap A1: UAS Design and Construction (D&C) Standards
- Gap A2: UAS System Safety
- Gap A4: Avionics and Subsystems
- Gap A6: Alignment in Standards Between Aviation and Cellular Communities
- Gap A7: UAS Navigation Systems
- Gap A9: Detect and Avoid (DAA) Capabilities
- Gap A10: Software Considerations and Approval
- Gap A11: Flight Data and Voice Recorders for UAS
- Gap A12: UAS Cybersecurity
- Gap A13: Electrical Systems
- Gap A16: Mitigation Systems for Various Hazards to UAS
- Gap O1: Privacy
- Gap O3: Beyond Visual Line of Sight (BVLOS)
- Gap O7: UTM Services Performance Standards
- Gap O11: Geo-fence Provisioning and Handling
- Gap I1: UAS Inspections of Power Plant and Industrial Process Plant Assets
- Gap I5: Bridge Inspections
- Gap I6: Railroad Inspections: Rolling Stock Inspection for Transport of Hazardous Materials (HAZMAT)
- Gap I7: Railroad Inspections: BVLOS Operations
- Gap I9: Inspection of Power Transmission Lines, Structures, and Environs Using UAS
- Gap I11: Commercial Package Delivery via UAS
- Gap I12: Occupational Safety Requirements for UAS Operated in Workplaces



- Gap S7: Need for Command and Control Software Specifications for Automated Missions during Emergency Response
- Gap P7: Displays and Controls
- Gap P9: Human Factors in UAS Operations

New Gaps (16)

- New Gap A20: Unlicensed Spectrum Interference Predictability
- New Gap A21: Blockchain for UAS
- New Gap O12: Design and Operation of Aerodrome Facilities for UAS
- New Gap O13: UAS Service Suppliers (USS) Process and Quality
- New Gap I13: Inspection of Pipelines and Operating Facilities - BVLOS Operations
- New Gap I14: Inspection of Pipelines and Operating Facilities – Sensor Validation & Use
- New Gap I15: UAS in Airport Operations
- New Gap I16: Commercial Cargo Transport via UAS
- New Gap I17: Commercial Passenger Air Taxi Transport via UAS (short-haul flights carrying few passengers and/or cargo)
- New Gap I18: Commercial Passenger Transport via UAS (long-haul flights carrying many passengers)
- New Gap I19: Commercial Sensing Services
- New Gap I20: Use of sUAS for Newsgathering
- New Gap S10: Use of Tethered UAS for Public Safety Operations
- New Gap S11: UAS Detection
- New Gap S12: Integration of UAS into FEMA ICS Operations Section, Air Operations Branch
- New Gap S13: Data Format for Public Safety sUAS Operations

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# Breakdown of the High, Medium, and Low Priority Open Gaps

The criteria for identifying and prioritizing gaps is described in section 1.3. The full text of the gaps can be found in the summary table that follows this section and in the gap analysis in chapters 6 through 10. The list below follows the order that the gaps appear in sequence in the sections comprising chapters 6 through 10. It does not represent a hierarchy within each priority level and tier. Some gap numbers may appear to be missing or out of sequence in cases where gaps have been closed or withdrawn or where new gaps have been added since the publication of roadmap version 1.0.

## **Total Number of Open Gaps (71)**

### **High Priority Gaps (47)**

#### **High (Tier 1) (Most Critical) (19)**

- Gap A1: UAS Design and Construction (D&C) Standards
- Gap A2: UAS System Safety
- Gap A6: Alignment in Standards Between Aviation and Cellular Communities
- New Gap A20: Unlicensed Spectrum Interference Predictability
- Gap A7: UAS Navigational Systems
- Gap A8: Protection from Global Navigation Satellite Signals (GNSS) Interference Including Spoofing and Jamming
- Gap A9: Detect and Avoid (DAA) Capabilities
- Gap A10: Software Considerations and Approval
- Gap A12: UAS Cybersecurity
- Gap O2: Continued Operational Safety
- Gap O3: Beyond Visual Line of Sight (BVLOS)
- Gap O4: UAS Operations Over People (OOP)
- Gap O8: Remote ID: Direct Broadcast
- Gap O9: Remote ID: Network Publishing
- New Gap I17: Commercial Passenger Air Taxi Transport via UAS (short-haul flights carrying few passengers and/or cargo)
- New Gap I19: Commercial Sensing Services
- New Gap I20: Use of sUAS for Newsgathering
- New Gap S11: UAS Detection
- Gap S9: UAS Mitigation

#### **High (Tier 2) (Critical) (15)**

- Gap A4: Avionics and Subsystems
- Gap A16: Mitigation Systems for Various Hazards to UAS
- Gap A18: Maintenance and Inspection (M&I) of UAS
- Gap A19: Enterprise Operations: Levels of Automation/ Autonomy and Artificial Intelligence (AI)
- Gap O5: UAS Operations and Weather

- Gap O7: UTM Services Performance Standards
- Gap O10: Geo-fence Exchange
- New Gap O12: Design and Operation of Aerodrome Facilities for UAS
- New Gap O13: UAS Service Suppliers (USS) Process and Quality
- Gap I12: Occupational Safety Requirements for UAS Operated in Workplaces
- New Gap S13: Data Format for Public Safety sUAS Operations
- Gap P2: Manuals
- Gap P3: Instructors and Functional Area Qualification
- Gap P5: UAS Maintenance Technicians
- Gap P9: Human Factors in UAS Operations

### **High (Tier 3) (Least Critical) (13)**

- Gap A13: Electrical Systems
- Gap A14: Power Sources and Propulsion Systems
- Gap A15: Noise, Emissions, and Fuel Venting
- Gap A17: Parachute or Drag Chute as a Hazard Mitigation System in UAS Operations over People (OOP)
- Gap I1: UAS Inspections of Power Plant and Industrial Process Plant Assets
- Gap I7: Railroad Inspections: BVLOS Operations
- Gap I9: Inspection of Power Transmission Lines, Structures, and Environs Using UAS
- Gap I10: Pesticide Application Using UAS
- Gap I11: Commercial Package Delivery via UAS
- Gap S3: Transport and Post-Crash Procedures Involving Biohazards
- Gap S5: Payload Interface and Control for Public Safety Operations
- Gap P1: Terminology
- Gap P7: Displays and Controls

### **Medium Priority Gaps (21)**

- Gap A11: Flight Data and Voice Recorders for UAS
- New Gap A21: Blockchain for UAS
- Gap O1: Privacy
- Gap O6: UAS Data Handling and Processing
- Gap O11: Geo-fence Provisioning and Handling
- Gap I2: Crane Inspections
- Gap I3: Inspection of Building Facades using Drones
- Gap I4: Low-Rise Residential and Commercial Building Inspections Using UAS
- Gap I5: Bridge Inspections
- New Gap I13: Inspection of Pipelines and Operating Facilities - BVLOS Operations
- New Gap I14: Inspection of Pipelines and Operating Facilities – Sensor Validation & Use
- New Gap I15: UAS in Airport Operations

- New Gap I16: Commercial Cargo Transport via UAS
- New Gap I18: Commercial Passenger Transport via UAS (long-haul flights carrying many passengers)
- Gap S2: Hazardous Materials Response and Transport Using a UAS
- Gap S4: Forensic Investigations Photogrammetry
- Gap S6: sUAS Forward-Looking Infrared (IR) Camera Sensor Capabilities
- Gap S8: UAS Response Robots
- New Gap S10: Use of Tethered UAS for Public Safety Operations
- New Gap S12: Integration of UAS into FEMA ICS Operations Section, Air Operations Branch
- Gap P4: Training and Certification of UAS Flight Crew Members Other Than the Remote Pilot

### **Low Priority Gaps (3)**

- Gap I6: Railroad Inspections: Rolling Stock Inspection for Transport of Hazardous Materials (HAZMAT)
- Gap I8: Railroad Inspections: Nighttime Operations
- Gap S7: Need for Command and Control Software Specifications for Automated Missions during Emergency Response

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# Summary Table of Gaps and Recommendations

Row	Section	Title	Gap	R&D Needed	Recommendation	Priority	Organization(s)	Status of Progress
			<b>Chapter 6. Airworthiness Standards – WG1</b>					
1.	6.1	Design and Construction	<p><b>Gap A1: UAS Design and Construction (D&amp;C) Standards.</b> There are numerous standards applicable to the D&amp;C of manned aircraft which are scalable in application to UASCS. However, these standards fail to address the critical and novel aspects essential to the safety of unmanned operations (i.e., DAA, software, BVLOS, C2 link, CS, Highly Integrated System, etc.). Lacking any regulatory certifications/publications/guidance (type certificate (TC)/ supplemental type certificate (STC)/Technical Standard Order (TSO)/AC), manufacturers and/or operators require applicable industry standards capable of establishing an acceptable baseline of D&amp;C for these safety-critical flight operation elements such as CS to support current regulatory flight operations and those authorized by waiver and or grants of exemption. Since the CS is one of the most critical parts and functions of the UAS needed to command and control UA remotely, the standards applicable to traditional manned aviation’s airborne electronics (software, hardware, integration, spectrum, etc.) may need to be considered for the UAS as well either in the same manner and level or higher than that of the manned aviation aircraft to provide the acceptable level of safety. Some industry standards such as RTCA DO-278 may be applicable to the software aspects of the CS. However, there are currently no known industry standards that support the D&amp;C of UAS CS, other than <a href="#">ASTM F3002-14a</a> for sUAS under Part 107 and <a href="#">SAE AS6512</a>, which addresses all unmanned systems whose means of conveyance includes air, water, and ground. The AS6512 UxS Control Segment Architecture is concerned with control station software but not the control station software external environment, which including information access, communications, and human-computer interfaces. <a href="#">ASTM WK62670, New Specification for Large UAS Design and Construction</a>, addresses requirements for</p>	No	<p>1) Complete work on in-development standards.                  2) Develop D&amp;C standards for UA and CS, and consider operations beyond the scope of regular Part 107 operations such as flight altitudes over 400 feet AGL, and any future technological needs.                  3) Develop D&amp;C standards for UA weighing more than 19,000 pounds and develop standards for accompanying CS.</p> <p><b>Update:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• SAE S-18UAS Autonomy WG/EUROCAE WG-63 AIR7121</li> <li>• SAE S-18/EUROCAE WG-63: AS7209, ARP4754B, ARP4761A</li> <li>• SAE A-6A3: ARP94910A</li> <li>• ASTM F38: WK62670, WK72958, WK72960</li> <li>• Numerous standards have been published and are in-development that address the entire spectrum of UAS and its operations.</li> </ul>	High (Tier 1)	ASTM, SAE, ISO, EUROCAE	Green

Row	Section	Title	Gap	R&D Needed	Recommendation	Priority	Organization(s)	Status of Progress
			Control Station (CS) of varying size, complexities and functions.					
2.	6.2	UAS System Safety	<b>Gap A2: UAS System Safety.</b> Numerous UAS airworthiness standards, appropriate regulations, operational risk assessment (ORA) methodologies, and system safety processes already exist. Any gaps that exist in standards applicable to specific vehicle classes and weight are being addressed by SAE S-18UAS Autonomy WG / WG-63 (with collaboration with EUROCAE WG-105).	Yes. Further examination is needed to determine if existing safety system processes are indeed adequate and if gaps are being addressed to the extent needed. S-18UAS Autonomy WG is looking at this.	Develop an aerospace information report or standard(s) in which the various existing airworthiness and safety analyses methods are mapped to the sizes and types of UAS to which they are most relevant, and the UAS system safety and development assurance are addressed.  <b>Update:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>SAE S-18UAS Autonomy WG/EUROCAE WG-63 AIR7121 (with collaboration with EUROCAE WG-105)</li> <li>SAE S-18/EUROCAE WG-63 AS7209, ARP4754B, ARP4761A</li> <li>SAE AS-4</li> <li>SAE G-32 (with collaboration with EUROCAE WG-72)</li> <li>SAE G-34 / EUROCAE WG-114</li> <li>Numerous standards have been published and are in-development that address the entire spectrum of UAS and its operations.</li> </ul>	High (Tier 1)	SAE, EUROCAE, RTCA, IEEE, ASTM, DOD, NASA	Green
3.	6.3	Quality Assurance / Quality Control	No Gap	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
4.	6.4	Avionics and Subsystems	<b>Gap A4: Avionics and Subsystems.</b> Existing avionics standards are proven and suitable for UAS. However, they become unacceptable for the following scenarios: 1) As the size of UAS scales down, airborne equipment designed to existing avionics standards are too heavy, large, and/or power hungry. Therefore, new standards may be necessary to achieve an acceptable level of performance for smaller, lighter, more efficient, more economical systems. 2) As the quantity of UAS scales up based on the high demand of UAS operations into the NAS, the new standards are required to handle the traffic congestion. 3) Many UAS introduce new capabilities – new capabilities may not be mature (not statistically proven or widely used) and/or they may be proprietary, therefore industry standards do not exist yet.  Avionics are becoming highly integrated with more automation compared to traditional avionics instruments and equipment that were found in manned aviation aircraft a few	Yes	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>One approach is to recommend that existing standards be revised to include provisions that address the points listed above. The UAS community should get involved on the committees that write the existing avionics standards. Collaboration around a common technological subject is more beneficial than segregating the workforce by manned vs. unmanned occupancy. The standards should address any differing (manned/unmanned) requirements that may occur.</li> <li>Another approach is to recommend new standards that will enable entirely new capabilities.</li> <li>Complete work on the standards of ICAO, ASTM, SAE, and DOD listed above in the “In-Development Standards” section.</li> <li>Review existing and in-development avionics standards for UAS considerations.</li> <li>Create a framework for UAS avionics spanning both airborne and terrestrial based systems.</li> </ol> <b>Update:</b> SAE AS-4JAUS published <a href="#">AS8024, JAUS Autonomous Capabilities Service Set</a> in June 2019. A new standard in development in SAE G-34 is SAE <a href="#">AS6983, Process Standard for Qualification of</a>	High (Tier 2)	For Avionics Issues: RTCA, EUROCAE, SAE, SAE ITC ARINC, IEEE, AIAA, ASTM, DOD, NASA, ICAO. For Spectrum Issues: FCC, NTIA, International Telecommunication Union (ITU)	Green



Row	Section	Title	Gap	R&D Needed	Recommendation	Priority	Organization(s)	Status of Progress
			<p>decades ago. UAS will decreasingly rely on human confirmations, human commands, human monitoring, human control settings, and human control inputs. A time is approaching when the UAS conveys the bare minimum information about its critical systems and mission to the human, that is, a message that conveys, "Everything is OK."</p> <p>Consideration of the interactions that may occur between avionics systems and higher level mission and decision making systems is needed. In particular, as the avionics functions become more automated there needs to be clear demarcation of responsibility between lower level guidance, navigation, and control (GNC) and the higher level decision making systems (which may include aspects of AI/ML).</p> <p>Standards to get there are different from those that created the cockpits in use today. Some of the major areas of concern include the reliability and cybersecurity of the command and control (C2) data link, use of DOD spectrum (and non-aviation) on civil aircraft operations, and enterprise architecture to enable UTM, swarm operations, autonomous flights, etc. Cybersecurity, in particular, shall be an important consideration in the development of avionics systems. Cybersecurity is further discussed in section 6.4.6.</p>		<p><a href="#">Aeronautical Systems Implementing AI: Development Standard. ASTM F3298-19, Standard Specification for Design, Construction, and Verification of Lightweight Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS)</a>, was also published.</p>			
5.	6.4.1	Avionics and Subsystems: Command and Control (C2) Link and Communications	<p><b>Gap A6: Alignment in Standards Between Aviation and Cellular Communities.</b> A gap exists in alignment between the aviation and cellular SDO communities, even when sufficient SDO efforts exist within each community. The telecommunications industry has already taken a number of steps to develop standards, particularly in 3GPP, to prepare networks for UAS applications. However, it is expected that fully addressing all KPIs of the C2 link and all the realistic use cases coming from the aviation industry will require further standardization activities.</p>	<p>Yes. The FAA also has worked with CTIA to develop testing principles for use of the commercial wireless networks to support UAS and is considering the outcome of those tests in conjunction with the IPPs and other testing.</p>	<p>Collaboration between the UAS industry and communications industry is required to ensure feasibility of implementation. The aviation and cellular communities should coordinate more closely to achieve greater alignment in architecture and standards between the two communities. Specifically, advance existing work in 3GPP and ensure C2 link requirements are communicated to that group. In addition, architectures and standards could be developed for predicting or guaranteeing C2 link performance for a specific flight that is about to be undertaken.</p> <p><b>Update:</b> Numerous standards are in development.</p>	High (Tier 1)	3GPP, GSMA/GUTMA ACJA, ASRI, IEEE	Green
6.	6.4.1	Avionics and Subsystems: Command and Control (C2) Link and Communications	<p><b>New Gap A20: Unlicensed Spectrum Interference Predictability.</b> Performance in the unlicensed spectrum bands is inherently unpredictable to some extent. There are approaches to enhance modeling and prediction, but there has been little work towards doing so. Identification of Key</p>	<p>Yes. ASTM's Remote ID workgroup is performing studies to determine likely performance under various RF conditions.</p>	<p>Additional R&amp;D could include statistical characterization of congestion in various environments (urban, rural, etc.), and study of interference caused by aerial radios.</p>	High (Tier 1), especially in evaluating Remote	See list of organizations listed in the text.	N/A

Row	Section	Title	Gap	R&D Needed	Recommendation	Priority	Organization(s)	Status of Progress
			Performance Indicators needs to be demonstrated/analyzed.			ID broadcast range		
7.	6.4.2	Avionics and Subsystems: Navigation Systems	<p><b>Gap A7: UAS Navigation Systems.</b> There is a lack of standards specifically for UAS navigation. There is a lack of navigation standards in novel environments where aircraft typically do not operate such as in “urban canyons.” Challenging environments may invoke capabilities such as vision-based navigation. Otherwise, UAS could use existing ground infrastructure such as very high frequency (VHF) omni-directional range (VOR), non-directional beacons (NDB), instrument landing systems (ILS), and satellite infrastructure (GPS), which has vast coverage, and make use of the new enhanced, long-range navigation (eLORAN) standards in development. UAS navigation can leverage many of the same standards used for manned aircraft, but at a smaller scale and lower altitudes.</p> <p>UAS stakeholders should evaluate their PNT performance requirements (precision, accuracy, timing, robustness, etc.) for their flight profiles. SAE6857 can be used as a point of reference.</p>	Yes. A specific R&D effort geared towards applying tracking innovations in satellite navigation for UAS is needed. Additional R&D effort is needed to further mature, test, and validate vision-based navigation systems.	Depending on the operating environments, apply existing navigation standards for manned aviation to UAS navigation and/or develop UAS navigation standards for smaller scale operations and at lower altitudes. Refer to R&D needed. Furthermore, existing navigation practices used by connected/automated vehicle technology should be leveraged to develop integrated feature-based/object-oriented navigation standards to orient the UAS platform in GNSS-deficient areas. Future standards work should be reviewed to allow for the installation of navigation systems on UAS limited by swap capabilities.	High (Tier 1)	SAE, NASA, RTCA, EUROCAE, IEEE	Green
8.	6.4.2	Avionics and Subsystems: Navigation Systems	<p><b>Gap A8: Protection from Global Navigation Satellite Signals (GNSS) Interference Including Spoofing and Jamming.</b> There are standards in place for spoofing and jamming mitigation for manned aircraft. However, these standards are currently being updated to reflect increasing demands on GNSS systems, ongoing efforts to improve mitigation measures/operational needs, and heightened awareness of nefarious activities using spoofing and jamming technologies. Given the fact that manned aircraft standards are being updated/improved, there is a significant gap with how these standards may be applied to UAS platforms. See the command and control section for related discussion.</p>	Yes. An evaluation of the specific characteristics of current aircraft navigation equipment is needed including technical, cost, size, availability, etc. Higher performance spoofing/jamming mitigations should be developed.	There are likely insignificant differences in navigation system protection measures between manned aircraft and UAS, but it is recommended that this be evaluated and documented. Based on this evaluation, standards and/or policy may be needed to enable UAS platforms to be equipped with appropriate anti-spoofing and anti-jamming technologies. Also, operational mitigations are recommended including updating pilot and traffic control training materials to address interference and spoofing.	High (Tier 1)	SAE, DOD, NASA, RTCA, EUROCAE, IEEE	Green
9.	6.4.3	Avionics and Subsystems: Performing Detect and Avoid (DAA) Functions	<p><b>Gap A9: Detect and Avoid (DAA) Capabilities.</b> Standards are needed to address systems that provide a DAA capability for UAS that do not have the size, weight, and power (SWAP) required by the current DAA TSOs (TSO-C211, TSO-C212 and TSO-C213). Work already has been done and is ongoing to address this gap</p>	Yes	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) Complete the above listed in-development standards.</li> <li>2) Encourage the development of standards to address and accommodate systems to provide a DAA capability for UAS that cannot accommodate the current SWAP requirements. This is a necessary first step toward approval for smaller or limited performance systems for DAA</li> </ol>	High (Tier 1)	RTCA, EUROCAE SAE, SAE ITC ARINC, AIAA, ASTM, DOD, NASA, 3GPP, IETF	Green

Row	Section	Title	Gap	R&D Needed	Recommendation	Priority	Organization(s)	Status of Progress
			as noted in the text above and in the update statement below.		<p>and full and complete integration of UAS into the NAS.</p> <p>3) Recommendation that the standards bodies look into the usefulness of Detect and Avoid Track Classification and Filtering for low altitude operations below 1000 feet/400 feet.</p> <p><b>Update:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• RTCA SC-228, WG-1 Phase 2</li> <li>• RTCA SC-147/EUROCAE WG-75: They continue their work with the addition of Airborne Collision Avoidance System (ACAS) Xa/Xo, ACAS Xu, and ACAS sXu. ACAS Xu will provide DAA minimum performance standards specifically designed for large UAS. ACAS sXu will provide DAA minimum performance standards specifically designed for smaller UAS.</li> <li>• ASTM F38.01 has developed WK62668 on DAA performance requirements standard for low and medium risk UAS operations which will be published in June 2020 as F3442-20.</li> <li>• ASTM F38.01 is developing WK62669 on testing and validating low SWAP systems.</li> <li>• IETF work on trust in Broadcast Remote ID Messages</li> </ul>			
10.	6.4.4	Avionics and Subsystems: Software Considerations and Approval	<b>Gap A10: Software Considerations and Approval.</b> Standards are needed to address software considerations for UAS operations outside of Part 107, control stations, flight control, navigation elements, associated equipment, and support services in the cloud., The majority of the current resources from manned aviation (standards, regulations, ACs, orders, etc.) are targeted at traditional aircraft and do not address the system of systems engineering used in UAS operations comprising man, machine, the NAS, and integration. UAS standards related to software dependability must properly account for all the unknown risks and potential safety issues (e.g., DAA, cybersecurity) during the software design, development, and assurance processes.	Yes, on assurance methods	<p>1) Complete in-development standards work of SAE.</p> <p>2) Develop standards to address software dependability for UAS operating outside of Part 107, control stations, flight control, navigation elements, associated equipment, and support services in the cloud.</p> <p><b>Update:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• RTCA DO-178, DO-278</li> <li>• RTCA SC-240/EUROCAE WG-117 for UAS and COTS</li> <li>• SAE A-6A3</li> <li>• SAE G-32: JA6678, JA7496</li> <li>• SAE G-34: AS6983, AIR6987, AIR6988</li> <li>• SAE S18 UAS Autonomy WG/EUROCAE WG-63</li> <li>• ASTM WK65056, WK68098</li> </ul>	High (Tier 1)	ASTM, EUROCAE, RTCA, SAE	Green
11.	6.4.5	Avionics and Subsystems: Flight Data and Voice Recorders for UAS	<b>Gap A11: Flight Data and Voice Recorders for UAS.</b> Standards are needed for crash protected voice and data recorder systems for UAS.	Yes. Research should be conducted to determine the proper: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) Size requirements, based on the class of UAS, class of airspace, performance characteristics of the aircraft, and other relevant factors.</li> <li>2) Test procedures for crash survival based on the class of</li> </ol>	<p>Revise an existing standard and/or draft a new standard, similar to ED-112A, for a voice and data recorder systems for UAS.</p> <p><b>Update:</b> EUROCAE WG-118: ED-112B</p>	Medium	SAE, RTCA, ASTM, IEEE, EUROCAE	Green

Row	Section	Title	Gap	R&D Needed	Recommendation	Priority	Organization(s)	Status of Progress
				<p>UAS and performance characteristics, including, but not limited to: impact shock, shear and tensile force, penetration resistance, static crush, high temperature fire, low temperature fire, deep sea pressure and water immersion, and fluid immersion.</p> <p>3) Method(s) for recording data both on the aircraft and in the CS.</p> <p>4) Minimum data that must be captured (dependent on UAS size and criticality of operation).</p>				
12.	6.4.6	Avionics and Subsystems: Cybersecurity	<b>Gap A12: UAS Cybersecurity.</b> Cybersecurity needs to be considered in all phases of UAS design, construction, operation, maintenance, training of personnel (pilots, crews, others), including cloud based functions.	Yes	<p>Since there exists such a wide spectrum in UAS designs, CONOPS, and operator capabilities, a risk-based process during which appropriate cybersecurity measures are identified is recommended. Explicitly address the need for &amp; efforts directed at assessing/ensuring trustworthiness, esp. of safety critical information &amp; systems that move, store &amp; process it. Explicitly address the need for crypto techniques supporting authenticity, integrity, confidentiality, privacy, etc. &amp; efforts to apply them to UAS.</p> <p><b>Update:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• RTCA SC-216/EUROCAE WG-72 Aeronautical Systems Security</li> <li>• SAE G-32 (with participation from WG-72, S-18/WG-63, S-18UAS Autonomy WG/WG-63, and G-34): Cyber Physical Systems Security Committee: JA6678, JA7496, JA6801</li> <li>• ASTM WK56374</li> <li>• IETF</li> </ul>	High (Tier 1)	RTCA, EUROCAE, SAE, ASTM, JARUS, AIA, IETF, ICAO IATF	Green
13.	6.5	Electrical Systems	<p><b>Gap A13: Electrical Systems.</b> The existing standards from manned aviation need to be scalable to address the entire spectrum of UAS. Unique aspects of UAS electrical systems include: wiring, EWIS, electrical load analysis, aircraft lighting, etc. These areas (electrical systems, wiring, EWIS, etc.) are also not covered for control stations (CSs), auxiliary systems, etc.</p> <p>UAS such as optionally piloted aircraft carrying cargo and/or passengers need standards for high voltage systems.</p>	Yes	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) Complete work on in-development standards.</li> <li>2) Encourage the development of standards that are scalable to UAS to address electrical systems, wiring, EWIS, electrical load analysis, aircraft lighting, etc., for UA, CS, and auxiliary system(s).</li> <li>3) Establish maximum voltage limits for propulsion power transmission cables based on UA power needs and maximum operating altitudes.</li> </ol> <p><b>Update:</b> Numerous standards have been published and are in-development that address the entire spectrum of UAS and its operations.</p>	High (Tier 3)	ASTM, SAE, RTCA, AIAA, NASA, UL, IEC, IEEE, ISO	Green
14.	6.6	Power Sources and Propulsion Systems	<b>Gap A14: Power Sources and Propulsion Systems.</b> Standards are needed for UAS power sources and propulsion systems.	Yes	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) Complete work on in-development standards.</li> </ol>	High (Tier 3)	ICAO, RTCA, SAE, AIAA, ASTM, DOD,	Green

Row	Section	Title	Gap	R&D Needed	Recommendation	Priority	Organization(s)	Status of Progress
					2) Encourage the development of standards to address UAS power sources and propulsion systems.  <b>Update:</b> Numerous standards have been published and are in-development that address the entire spectrum of UAS and its operations.		NASA, UL, IEC, IEEE, ISO	
15.	6.7	Noise, Emissions, and Fuel Venting	<b>Gap A15: Noise, Emissions, and Fuel Venting.</b> No published standards have been identified that address UAS-specific noise, emissions, and fuel venting standards and requirements.	Yes. Data would be helpful.	1) Complete in-development standards. 2) Encourage the development of standards to address noise, emissions, and fuel venting issues for UAS. This is a necessary first step toward UAS rulemaking relating to these topics.  <b>Update:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>SAE A-21 Project Working Team for UAM Noise</li> <li>Numerous standards have been published and are in-development that address the entire spectrum of UAS and its operations.</li> </ul>	High (Tier 3)	ICAO, EPA, RTCA, SAE, AIAA, ASTM, DOD, NASA, ISO	Not Started
16.	6.8	Mitigation Systems for Various Hazards to UAS	<b>Gap A16: Mitigation Systems for Various Hazards to UAS.</b> There are no UAS-specific standards in the areas of hazard mitigation systems for bird strikes on UAS, engine ingestion, hail damage, water ingestion, lightning, electrical wiring, support towers, etc.	Yes	1) Complete in-development standards. 2) Create new standards to include hazard mitigation systems for bird strikes on UAS, engine ingestion, icing, and lightning.  <b>Update:</b> SAE has a number of standards in development as noted in the text.	High (Tier 2)	Various SAE Committees	Green
17.	6.9	Parachutes for Small Unmanned Aircraft	<b>Gap A17: Parachute or Drag Chute as a Hazard Mitigation System in UAS Operations over People (OOP).</b> Standards are needed to address parachutes or drag chutes as a hazard mitigation system in UAS operations, particularly OOP, from the perspectives of FAA Type Certification (TC), Production Certificates (PC) and Airworthiness Certificates (AC).	No	Complete work on <a href="#">ASTM WK65042, New Specification for Operation Over People</a> .  <b>Update:</b> ASTM F38: F3322	High (Tier 3)	ASTM, AIAA, SAE, PIA, DOD, NASA	Green
18.	6.10	Maintenance and Inspection	<b>Gap A18: Maintenance and Inspection (M&amp;I) of UAS.</b> M&I standards for UAS are needed.	No	Complete work on standards in development to address M&I for all UAS.  <b>Update:</b> Numerous standards have been published and are in-development that address the entire spectrum of UAS and its operations.	High (Tier 2)	ASTM, ISO, SAE	Green
19.	6.11	Enterprise Operations: Level of Automation/ Autonomy and Artificial Intelligence (AI)	<b>Gap A19: Enterprise Operations: Level of Automation/Autonomy and Artificial Intelligence (AI).</b> Neither the current regulatory framework nor existing standards support fully autonomous flights at this time.	Yes	1) Develop standards and guidelines for the safety, performance, and interoperability of fully autonomous flights, taking into account all relevant factors needed to support the seamless integration of UAS into the NAS. These include: type of aircraft/UA, operators/pilots/crew, air traffic controllers, airspace service suppliers/providers, lost link procedures, human factors/human-machine interactions as well as levels of human intervention, etc. 2) Encourage the development of standards to address fully autonomous flights, per the FAA	High (Tier 2)	SAE, SAE ITC ARINC, RTCA, AIAA, ASTM, DOD, NASA, FCC, Aerospace Vehicle Systems Institute (AVSI), UL, ISO/IEC JTC1/SC42	Green

Row	Section	Title	Gap	R&D Needed	Recommendation	Priority	Organization(s)	Status of Progress
					<p>Reauthorization Act of 2018 and the needs of the UAS industry and end users.</p> <p>3) Encourage the development of consistent, uniform, harmonized, standardized, and aviation field- acceptable definitions of terms like autonomy, automation, autonomous, AI, machine learning, deep learning, etc. This will lay a foundation for identification of correct and incorrect definitions/ terminologies.</p> <p><b>Update:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• SAE S-18UAS Autonomy WG/EUROCAE WG-63: AIR7121</li> <li>• SAE G-34/EUROCAE WG-114: AS6983, AIR6987, AIR6988</li> <li>• SAE AS-4JAUS: AS8024</li> <li>• SAE S-18/EUROCAE WG-63: various standards</li> <li>• Underwriters Laboratories: UL 4600</li> </ul>			
20.	6.12	Blockchain for UAS	<b>New Gap A21: Blockchain for UAS.</b> There are no published industry standards for blockchain in the aviation ecosystem (including but not limited to UAS).	Yes	Complete in-development standards and write new standards to address blockchain for UAS.	Medium	SAE International, SAE-ITC, ISO, IEEE	N/A
			<b>Chapter 7. Flight Operations Standards: General Concerns – WG2</b>					
21.	7.1	Privacy	<b>Gap O1: Privacy.</b> UAS-specific privacy regulations are needed as well as standards to enable the privacy framework. Privacy law and rulemaking related to UAS, including topics such as remote ID and tracking, are yet to be clearly defined.	Yes	Develop UAS-specific privacy standards as needed and appropriate in response to the evolving policy landscape. Monitor the ongoing policy discussion.	Medium	ISO/IEC JTC1/SC 27, ISO/TC 20/SC 16, APSAC, IACP, IETF	Yellow
22.	7.2	Continued Operational Safety (COS)	<b>Gap O2: Continued Operational Safety (COS).</b> The existing industry standards and regulatory framework related to COS from manned aviation still apply to UAS. However, there exist some gaps unique to UAS certification and its operations.	Yes	Complete in-development standards.	High (Tier 1)	SAE, EUROCAE, SAE-ITC, RTCA, JARUS, ASTM, IEEE	Green
23.	7.3	Beyond Visual Line of Sight (BVLOS)	<b>Gap O3: Beyond Visual Line of Sight (BVLOS).</b> Although there is an existing BVLOS standard with supplemental revisions in the works and a best practices document, robust BVLOS operations will require a comprehensive DAA solution, Remote ID, and UTM infrastructure to be completely effective. Additional safety measures must be considered such as reduced limits on energy transfer; weight; speed; altitude; stand-off and redundant systems for power; collision avoidance; positioning; loss-of-control automatic soft landing; and methods for two-way communications between the competent operator and worker	Yes	Complete work on aforementioned BVLOS standards and related documents in development and address for future consideration UAS including payloads larger than 55 pounds as defined in Part 107. Research is also required but more to the point connectivity is needed to ensure interoperability or compatibility between standards for BVLOS/DAA/Remote ID/UTM/C2.	High (Tier 1)	ASTM, IETF	Green

Row	Section	Title	Gap	R&D Needed	Recommendation	Priority	Organization(s)	Status of Progress
			<p>supervisor(s) or workers to ensure safety of BVLOS operations.</p> <p>These standards should be addressed in a collaborative fashion. In addition, pilot competency and training is especially critical for BVLOS operations. It is anticipated that appendices for BVLOS will be added to <a href="#">ASTM F3266-18, Standard Guide for Training Remote Pilots in Command of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Endorsement</a>.</p>					
24.	7.4	Operations Over People (OOP)	<b>Gap 04: UAS Operations Over People (OOP).</b> Standards are needed for UAS OOP.	No	<p>Complete work on <a href="#">ASTM WK65042, New Specification for Operation Over People</a>.</p> <p><b>Update:</b> ASTM F3389-20, ASTM F38 WK65042</p>	High (Tier 1)	ASTM	Green
25.	7.5	Weather	<p><b>Gap 05: UAS Operations and Weather.</b> Standards are needed for flight planning, forecasting, and operating UAS (including data link and cockpit/flight deck displays), particularly in low altitude and/or boundary layer airspace.</p> <p>Gaps have been identified related to two different facets of weather, and the related acquisition and dissemination of weather-related data, especially as it relates to BVLOS operations:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) Weather requirements for flight operations of UAS. For example, to operate in airspace BVLOS, the aircraft must meet certain standards for weather robustness and resiliency, e.g., wind, icing, instrument meteorological conditions (IMC), etc.</li> <li>2) Weather data standards themselves. Currently, published weather data standards by National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), World Meteorological Organization (WMO), ICAO, and others do not have sufficient resolution (spatial and/or temporal) for certain types of UAS operations and have gaps in low altitude and boundary layer airspaces.</li> </ol> <p>Other standardized delivery mechanisms for weather data exist, but the considerations must be made with respect to the computational processing power required on the aircraft or controller to use such data.</p>	<p>Yes. Research should be conducted to determine the following:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) For a given UAS CONOPS, what spatial and temporal resolution is required to adequately detect weather hazards to UAS in real-time and to forecast and flight plan the operation?</li> <li>2) What are the applicable ways to replicate the capability of a “flight deck display” in UAS C2 systems for the purpose of displaying meteorological information (and related data link communications with ATC)?</li> <li>3) To what extent can boundary layer conditions be represented in existing binary data formats?</li> <li>4) To what extent can current meteorological data acquisition infrastructure (e.g., ground-based weather radar) capture data relevant to UAS operations, particularly in low altitude airspace?</li> <li>5) What weather data and data link connectivity would be required to support fully autonomous UAS operations with no human operator in the loop?</li> <li>6) What is the highest temporal resolution currently possible with existing or proposed meteorological measurement infrastructure?</li> <li>7) To what extent do operators need to consider that weather systems have different natural</li> </ol>	<p>Encourage relevant research, amending of existing standards, and drafting of new standards (where applicable).</p> <p><b>Update:</b> NASA, ASTM F38 Weather Supplemental Data Service Provider Sub-Group</p>	High (Tier 2)	RTCA, SAE, NOAA, WMO, NASA, universities, National Science Foundation (NSF) National Center for Atmospheric Research (NCAR), ASTM	Yellow

Row	Section	Title	Gap	R&D Needed	Recommendation	Priority	Organization(s)	Status of Progress
			Additionally, standards for cockpit displays, data link, avionics, and voice protocols that involve, transmit, or display weather will need to be amended to apply to UAS (e.g., the “cockpit display” in a UAS CS).	scales in both space and time, depending on whether the weather systems occur in polar, mid-latitude, or tropical conditions?				
26.	7.6	Data Handling and Processing	<b>Gap 06: UAS Data Handling and Processing.</b> Given the myriad of UAS “observation” missions in support of public safety, law enforcement, urban planning, construction, and a range of other applications, and given the diversity of standards applicable to the UAS lifecycle, a compilation of best practices is needed to identify standards-based “architectural guidance” for different UAS operations.	No R&D should be required, as community examples already exist. However, interoperability piloting of recommended architectures with the user community based on priority use cases/scenarios is recommended.	Develop an informative technical report to provide architectural guidance for data handling and processing to assist with different UAS operations.  <b>Update:</b> As noted in the text, the OGC GeoTIFF standard was adopted as an OGC standard in 2019, and best practices are in development in OGC UxS DWG.	Medium	OGC, ISO TC/211	Green
27.	7.7	UAS Traffic Management (UTM)	<b>Gap 07: UTM Services Performance Standards.</b> UTM service performance standards are needed.	Yes. Considerable work remains to develop the various USS services listed as well as testing to quantify the level of mitigation they provide. Only after some level of flight testing to define the “realm of the possible” can the community of interest write performance-based standards that are both achievable and effective in mitigating operational risk.	There is quite a lot of work for any one SDO. A significant challenge is finding individuals with the technical competence and flight experience needed to fully address the subject. What is needed is direction to adopt the performance standards and associated interoperability standards evolving from the research/flight demonstrations being performed by the research community (e.g., NASA/FAA RTT, FAA UTM Pilot Project, UAS Test Sites, GUTMA, etc.). Given a draft standard developed by the experts in the field (i.e., the ones actively engaged in doing the research), SDOs can apply their expertise in defining testable and relevant interoperability and performance-based requirements and thus quickly converge to published standards.  <b>Update:</b> New activity is underway in ASTM, IEEE, ISO, EUROCAE, and JARUS.	High (Tier 2)	NASA, ASTM, ISO, IEEE, EUROCAE, JARUS	Green
28.	7.8	UAS Remote Identification (UAS Remote ID)	<b>Gap 08: Remote ID: Direct Broadcast.</b> Standards are needed for transmitting UAS ID and tracking data with no specific destination or recipient, and not dependent on a communications network to carry the data. Current direct broadcast standards for aviation and telecommunications applications do not specifically address UAS operations, including secure UAS ID, authentication, and tracking capabilities, and specifically when UAS operations are conducted outside ATC.	Yes, to enhance observer trust in UAS ID in an unconnected environment.	1) Revise published ASTM F3411 Remote ID standard once UAS Remote ID Rule is finalized. 2) Continue development of the Open Source implementations and enablement. 3) Continue development of 3GPP specs and ATIS standards to support direct communication broadcast of UAS ID and tracking data with or without the presence of a 4G or 5G cellular network.  <b>Update:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• ASTM F3411-19</li> <li>• 3GPP W1810049 Release 16</li> <li>• EUROCAE WG-105</li> <li>• ASD-STAN</li> <li>• IEEE P1920.2</li> <li>• IETF DRIP</li> </ul>	High (Tier 1)	ASTM, 3GPP, ATIS, IETF	Green



Row	Section	Title	Gap	R&D Needed	Recommendation	Priority	Organization(s)	Status of Progress
29.	7.8	UAS Remote Identification (UAS Remote ID)	<b>Gap O9: Remote ID: Network Publishing.</b> Standards are needed for secure UAS ID, authentication, and tracking data transmitted over a secure communications network (e.g., cellular, satellite, other) to a specific destination or recipient. Current manned aviation standards do not extend to the notion of transmitting UAS ID and tracking data over an established secure communications network to an internet service or group of services, specifically the cellular and satellite networks and cloud-based services. Nor do they describe how that data is received by and/or accessed from an FAA-approved internet-based database.	Yes	<p>1) Revise the published ASTM F3411 Remote ID standard and other applicable standards once UAS Remote ID Rule is finalized.</p> <p>2) Continue development of 3GPP specs and ATIS standards related to remote ID of UAS and UTM support over cellular or satellite networks.</p> <p><b>Update:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• ASTM F3411-19</li> <li>• 3GPP WI810049 Release 16</li> <li>• EUROCAE WG-105</li> <li>• ASD-STAN</li> <li>• IEEE P1920.2</li> <li>• IETF DRIP</li> </ul>	High (Tier 1)	ASTM, 3GPP, ATIS, IETF	Green
30.	7.9	Geo-fencing	<b>Gap O10: Geo-fence Exchange.</b> Standards have been developed (or are in development) to provide a consistent description of the limits of a geo-fence. Standards also exist to define and encode the geometry for a geo-fence. However, a new standard or a profile of an existing standard is needed to exchange geo-fence data. This standard must encode the attributes of a geo-fence necessary for UAS operators or autonomous systems to respond to the proximity of a geo-fence.	Yes. The encoding mechanism should rely upon existing standards. Investigation is needed to identify which attributes should be included to handle geo-fence interaction. R&D is needed to trigger unmanned aircraft landing or evasion when approaching/entering/leaving a geo-fenced location (including when it comes into close proximity of manned aircraft).	<p>A draft conceptual model should be developed that identifies allowed geometries in 2D, 3D, as well as temporal considerations and which articulates the necessary attributes. Critical to this model is a definition of terminology that is consistent with or maps to other UAS operational standards. The model should consider “active” vs. “passive” geo-fences, the former being geo-fences where a third party intervenes in the aircraft operation, and the latter being geo-fences where the UAS or operator is expected to respond to proximity/intersection. The model should also define geo-fences with respect to the aircraft operational limits, either: 1) the aircraft operates inside a geo-fence and an action occurs when the aircraft leaves that geo-fence, or 2) the aircraft operates outside a geo-fence and an action occurs when the aircraft intersects the geo-fence boundary. The conceptual model can be used to develop one or more standard encodings so that equipment manufacturers can select the ideal format for their hardware (e.g., XML, JSON, binary).</p> <p>Industry has taken the lead on proposing geo-fencing solutions improving safety on current UAS operations but guidelines from the UAS community (industry+regulator) are needed to harmonize this functionality.</p> <p>The geo-fence exchange standard must be machine-readable to take advantage of existing geospatial processing code and ensure consistent application of rules against the geo-fence as well as be a format suitable to allow manufacturers to integrate (and update) hard geo-fence limitations into UAS firmware.</p> <p><b>Update:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• EUROCAE WG-105 SG-33 / UTM Geo-fencing</li> </ul>	High (Tier 2)	OGC, ISO/TC 20/SC 16, EUROCAE, ICANN, IETF	Green

Row	Section	Title	Gap	R&D Needed	Recommendation	Priority	Organization(s)	Status of Progress
					<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Standards are in development</li> </ul>			
31.	7.9	Geo-fencing	<b>Gap O11: Geo-fence Provisioning and Handling.</b> There is a need for standards and a guiding best practices document to inform manufacturers of the purpose, handling, and provisioning requirements of geo-fences.	Yes. The proposed geo-fence exchange standard discussed earlier will suffice for the geo-fence content. Standards will be required to translate regulatory guidance into provisioning/ unprovisioning rules as well as interpretation of aircraft behavior when encountering a geo-fence. There are many existing methods to deploy such data to hardware.	<p>Create a best practices document on geo-fence provisioning and handling and standards describing circumstances under which geo-fence provisioning must occur as well as for autonomous and remote pilot behavior. These documents should include specific guidance on when geo-fences must be provisioned to an aircraft, conditions under which geo-fences may be unprovisioned, and how an aircraft must behave when approaching or crossing a geo-fence. For a passive geo-fence boundary, behavior is governed based on the attributes contained in the geo-fence data, such as: not entering restricted airspace, notifying the operator to turn off a camera, changing flight altitude, etc. For active geo-fences, the documents should detail the types of third party interventions. These best practices may not need to be expressed in a separate document, but rather could be provided as content for other documents for control of aircraft operations, such as UTM. Ideally, the geo-fence provisioning standards will integrate with regulatory systems such as the FAA-USS to support the safe, seamless, and timely management of the overall system.</p> <p><b>Update:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>EUROCAE WG-105 SG-33 / UTM Geo-fencing</li> <li>Standards are in development</li> </ul>	Medium	OGC, RTCA, EUROCAE	Not Started
32.	7.10	Recreational Operations	No Gap	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
33.	7.11	Design and Operation of Aerodrome Facilities for UAS	<b>New Gap O12: Design and Operation of Aerodrome Facilities for UAS.</b> Standards do not exist for special cases of UAS-only infrastructure. Existing standards should be evaluated for addressing special considerations for UAS. Numerous standards apply to mixed use infrastructure (manned and UAS).	Yes	Complete work on standards in development. Look at how existing standards for dual-use (manned and unmanned) ground infrastructure (airports, heliports) can be applied in the UAS context for unmanned-only locations.	High (Tier 2)	ASTM, ISO, SAE, NFPA, AASHTO	N/A
34.	7.12	UAS Service Suppliers (USS) Process and Quality	<b>New Gap O13: UAS Service Suppliers (USS) Process and Quality.</b> The airborne standards discussed in Chapter 6 don't address the process and quality requirements needed for the 24/7 cloud-based operations associated with UAS Service Suppliers (e.g., security, privacy, health monitoring, etc.). Non-aviation cloud-based standards and initial UTM standards (e.g., RID and UTM) don't address the safety and consistency requirements needed for the NAS. Standards are needed to ensure adequate process assurance and quality for the cloud-based USS that are	No	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Develop a USS quality standard, with multiple classification levels, that includes tailoring of existing software, security, and quality standards related to a USS and any cloud-specific process aspects (e.g., external verification, audits, version compatibility checks)</li> <li>Develop a standard that maps the appropriate classification level for each planned UTM/USS service coupled with the end user vehicle and operational environment. This may be included in the USS quality standard.</li> </ul>	High (Tier 2)	ASTM, EUROCAE, ISO, RTCA, SAE	N/A

Row	Section	Title	Gap	R&D Needed	Recommendation	Priority	Organization(s)	Status of Progress
			providing functions with safety and security considerations. The standards need to define multiple levels of assurance given the varying function, end user vehicle, and operational environment. However, for a given USS function, end user vehicle, and operational environment, the assurance level should be consistent across all USS providers of that function. See also sections 7.7 on UTM and 7.8 on Remote ID.					
			<b>Chapter 8. Flight Operations Standards: Infrastructure Inspections, Environmental Applications, Commercial Services, Workplace Safety – WG3</b>					
35.	8.1.1	Vertical Infrastructure Inspections: Power Plants and Industrial Process Plants	<b>Gap I1: UAS Inspections of Power Plant and Industrial Process Plant Assets.</b> No published standards have been identified for inspections of power plant and industrial process plant assets using UAS.	No	Develop standards for power plant inspections using UAS  <b>Update:</b> As noted in the text, ASME is developing a standard on the use of UAS to perform inspections of power plant and industrial process plant assets.	High (Tier 3)	ASME BPV Committee on Nondestructive Examination (V) and ASME Mobile Unmanned Systems (MUS) Standards Committee	Green
36.	8.1.2	Vertical Infrastructure Inspections: Cranes	<b>Gap I2: Crane Inspections.</b> Standards are needed to establish requirements for the use of UAS in the inspection, testing, maintenance, and operation of cranes and other material handling equipment covered within the scope of ASME’s B30 volumes.	No	Complete work on draft <a href="#">B30.32-20XX, Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) used in Inspection, Testing, Maintenance, and Lifting Operations</a> to address crane inspections using UAS.  <b>Update:</b> Work continues on development of the draft B30.32 standard.	Medium	ASME	Green
37.	8.1.3	Vertical Infrastructure Inspections: Building Facades	<b>Gap I3: Inspection of Building Facades using Drones.</b> There are no known published standards for vertical inspections of building facades and their associated envelopes using a drone.  A standard is needed to provide building professionals and remote pilots with a methodology for documenting facade conditions utilizing a sensor mounted to a drone. This should include best practices for the operation of the drone and establish an approach to sensing a building facade, preserving the data, and utilizing data recorded for reporting purposes.  The standard should consider the safe operating distance from a building, which may vary depending on the construction material of the facade, and the size and height of the building. It should also take into account FAA	Yes, for navigation systems to mitigate potential GPS reception loss while operating in close proximity of structures that might obstruct GPS transmission signals.	Expand work on <a href="#">ASTM WK58243, Visual Inspection of Building Facade using Drone</a> to include non-visual sensors, such as radar and thermal.  <b>Update:</b> As noted, standards are in development.	Medium	ASTM	Green

Row	Section	Title	Gap	R&D Needed	Recommendation	Priority	Organization(s)	Status of Progress
			<p>requirements that apply to operational navigation (visual and beyond line of sight) and OOP.</p> <p>In addition, the standard should consider the relationship between the licensed design professional and the remote pilot if they are not one-in-the-same. For example, the local jurisdiction authority may stipulate that only a licensed design professional may qualify the inspection results. The remote pilot may help document the inspection findings, but might not be qualified to provide analysis.</p>					
38.	8.1.4	Vertical Infrastructure Inspections: Low-Rise Residential and Commercial Buildings	<b>Gap 14: Low-Rise Residential and Commercial Building Inspections Using UAS.</b> There is a need for a set of best practices or a standard operating procedure (SOP) to inform industry practitioners how to conduct low-rise residential and commercial inspections using UAS.	No	<p>Develop a guide or SOP for low-rise residential and commercial inspections using UAS. The document should consider safe operating distance from the building, which may vary depending on the construction material of the facade, and the size and height of the building. It should also take into account FAA requirements that apply to operational navigation (visual and beyond line of sight whether day or night), and OOP.</p> <p><b>Update:</b> No update provided at this time.</p>	Medium	ASHI, ASTM	Unknown
39.	8.1.5	Vertical Infrastructure Inspections: Communications Towers	No Gap	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
40.	8.2.1	Linear Infrastructure Inspections: Bridges	<b>Gap 15: Bridge Inspections.</b> Standards are needed for conducting bridge inspections using a UAS to provide state Department of Transportation agencies and bridge owners with a methodology for documenting bridge conditions utilizing sensors mounted to a UAS. This should include best practices for the operation of the UAS and establish an approach to sensing a bridge structure, preserving the data, and utilizing data recorded for reporting and modeling purposes. All bridge types should be considered, including rail, road, and pedestrian. The role of UAS in assisting with fracture critical inspections, which usually require an inspector to be able to touch the fracture critical element, should be considered. Bridge owners and operators should use sUAS that make physical contact for touch-based fracture and other touch-based inspections when possible to mitigate the risk of workers at elevation.	Yes, for navigation systems to mitigate potential GPS reception loss, magnetic compass biases, imprecise barometric pressure and other data points critical for safe flight of a UAS while in close proximity to structures. R&D is also needed on the role of collision avoidance systems.	<p>Develop standards for bridge inspections using a UAS</p> <p><b>Update:</b> ASTM WK58243</p>	Medium	AASHTO, ASTM, state DOTs	Yellow

Row	Section	Title	Gap	R&D Needed	Recommendation	Priority	Organization(s)	Status of Progress
			The standards should address safety and operator training. They should also take into account FAA requirements that apply to operational navigation (visual and beyond line of sight) and OOP (to include vehicular traffic), including short-term travel over people and traffic. In addition, the standards should consider the relationship between the qualified bridge inspector and the remote pilot if they are not one-and-the-same. The remote pilot may help document the inspection findings, but might not be qualified to provide an analysis. Recommendations on how to coordinate their work to maximize the value of UAS-enabled inspections should be part of new standards.					
41.	8.2.2	Linear Infrastructure Inspections: Railroads	<b>Gap 16: Railroad Inspections: Rolling Stock Inspection for Transport of Hazardous Materials (HAZMAT).</b> Standards are needed to address rolling stock inspections for regulatory compliance of transporting HAZMAT. Considerations for BVLOS and nighttime operations are critical. OSHA standards (29 C.F.R. 1910) related to personal protective equipment (PPE) need to be factored in. SDOs should consult/engage with the rail industry in the development of such standards.	Yes. Current inspection procedures are likely more hands-on when in close proximity of HAZMAT containers, so using UAS to reduce the inspector's exposure is similar to other inspection use cases. There are many on-going R&D activities for UAS inspection applications.	It is recommended that guidance be developed for performing inspections of HAZMAT rolling stock that incorporates OSHA and FRA requirements.  <b>Update:</b> No update provided at this time.	Low	SAE, OSHA, ASME	Unknown
42.	8.2.2	Linear Infrastructure Inspections: Railroads	<b>Gap 17: Railroad Inspections: BVLOS Operations.</b> Standards are needed to address BVLOS operations for railroad inspection. See section 7.3 on BVLOS.	Yes. Research to develop underlying technologies for BVLOS at low altitudes.	It is recommended that standards be developed that define a framework for operating UAS BVLOS for rail system infrastructure inspection. This may include the need to identify spectrum used for BVLOS railroad inspections.  <b>Update:</b> As noted above and in the text.	High (Tier 3)	SAE, ASTM AC-478 BLOS, American Public Transportation Association (APTA), American Railroad Engineering and Maintenance-of-Way Association (AREMA), ASME	Green
43.	8.2.2	Linear Infrastructure Inspections: Railroads	<b>Gap 18: Railroad Inspections: Nighttime Operations.</b> Standards are needed to address nighttime operations for railroad inspections. Railroads operate 24/7, which poses significant hurdles for leveraging UAS technology for rail system infrastructure inspections. The majority of inspections occur during daytime, but incident inspections can occur at any time of day or under poor visibility conditions and, hence, may have OSH considerations.	Yes. Current R&D activities for operating UAS at night are unknown. Exposing UAS technology and operators to nighttime operations is necessary to encourage the maturation of the technology and processes.	It is recommended that standards be developed that define a framework for operating UAS at night.  <b>Update:</b> No update provided at this time.	Low	SAE, ASTM AC-478 BLOS, APTA, AREMA	Unknown
44.	8.2.3	Linear Infrastructure	<b>Gap 19: Inspection of Power Transmission Lines, Structures, and Environs Using UAS.</b> No	Yes. There is a need to study acceptable methods of	Develop standards related to inspections of power transmission lines, structures, and environs using	High (Tier 3)	SAE, IEEE, Department of	Green

Row	Section	Title	Gap	R&D Needed	Recommendation	Priority	Organization(s)	Status of Progress
		Inspections: Power Transmission Lines, Structures, and Environs	standards have been identified that specifically address the qualifications of UAS pilots or specifications of a UAS to operate near energized equipment to meet Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) physical and cyber security requirements. (See also section 6.4.6 on cybersecurity.) Nor have any standards been identified that specifically address the qualifications of UAS pilots to operate around transmission and distribution equipment. This equipment may include telephone, fiber, and cable assets, as well as natural gas and pipeline assets. A standard is needed to address these issues as well as operational best practices and training in how to conduct a safe inspection of power transmission lines, structures, and environs using drones. See also section 10.3 on UAS flight crew.	<p>airspace deconfliction around electrical equipment and infrastructure. Identifying appropriate data to collect and study relevant airspace activity around electrical equipment is recommended.</p> <p>Understanding the impact of electromagnetic interference around different types of high voltage lines can help identify what mitigation techniques are needed. Further study should be undertaken regarding the effects of magnetic field interference on UAS C2 signals and communications when in the proximity of energized high voltage electrical transmission, distribution, or substation equipment.</p> <p>Acceptable C2 link methods for BVLOS operation exist, but establishing the equipment and techniques for managing autonomous operations during disruptions in connectivity can help spur further acceptable BVLOS practices.</p> <p>Different DAA techniques exist internationally and in the U.S. Studying their effectiveness in the U.S. NAS is needed.</p>	<p>UAS. Review and consider relevant standards from other organizations to determine manufacturer requirements. As part of the standard, include guidelines on aircraft performance requirements and safe pilot and autonomous flight operations in proximity to energized equipment, for example, to avoid a scenario where arcing occurs.</p> <p><b>Update:</b> As noted, ASME has some relevant work and SAE is contemplating future work. The ASTM F38 Executive Committee gap analysis viewed this as a low priority for F38, with no action at this time.</p>		Energy (DOE), North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC), FERC, ORNL, ASTM, ASME	
45.	8.2.4	Linear Infrastructure Inspections: Implementing UAS for Hydrocarbon Pipeline Inspections	<b>New Gap I13: Inspection of Pipelines and Operating Facilities - BVLOS Operations.</b> Standards are needed to address BVLOS operations for pipeline inspection.	No.	Develop standards that define a framework for operating UAS BVLOS for pipeline inspection as well as standards that describe best practices and use cases for the pipeline industry. Request API to review their portfolio of pipeline inspection standards to determine if revisions to enable inspections performed by UAS could be incorporated. Complete NACE SP21435 on monitoring of pipeline integrity threats.	Medium	API, NACE, Pipeline Research Council International (PRCI) (R&D), California Energy Commission (R&D), ASME, ASTM F38	N/A
46.	8.2.4	Linear Infrastructure Inspections: Implementing UAS for Hydrocarbon Pipeline Inspections	<b>New Gap I14: Inspection of Pipelines and Operating Facilities – Sensor Validation &amp; Use.</b> Standards are needed for minimum testing to validate sensors on UAS platforms at varying flight altitudes utilized for pipeline inspections. Standards are needed to provide agencies and operators with a methodology for documenting pipeline conditions utilizing	<p>Yes, for validation of sensor quality and accuracy on varying platforms (long-range and short-range UAVs) for risks associated with:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Environmental changes (i.e., ground movement, water</li> </ul>	Develop standards for validating sensor quality and accuracy on UAS platforms utilized for pipeline inspections. Request API to review their portfolio of pipeline inspection standards to determine if revisions to enable inspections performed by UAS could be incorporated. Complete NACE SP21435 and NACE SP21436 standard practices.	Medium	API, NACE, PRCI (R&D), California Energy Commission (R&D), ASME	N/A

Row	Section	Title	Gap	R&D Needed	Recommendation	Priority	Organization(s)	Status of Progress
			sensors mounted to a UAS. This should include best practices for the operation of the UAS and establish an approach to sense and avoid surrounding infrastructure within facilities, safeguarding the data, and utilizing data recorded for reporting and modeling purposes. The standards should address safety and operator training. They should also consider FAA requirements that apply to operational navigation (visual and beyond line of sight).	<p>saturation, slip / subsidence / sinkhole / erosion)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Third-party threats</li> <li>• Active loading on pipelines (i.e., equipment crossing right of way (ROW), equipment on ROW, material on ROW)</li> <li>• Waterways (i.e., boat anchorage, dredging, levee construction / maintenance)</li> <li>• Structures (i.e., building construction, fence installation, non-permanent structure on ROW)</li> <li>• Pipeline monitoring (i.e., exposure (pipe), pipeline construction / maintenance, possible leak / lost gas, slip / subsidence / sinkhole / erosion / metal loss / corrosion)</li> <li>• Earthwork (i.e., clearing, drainage, excavation, mining activity)</li> <li>• Forestry (i.e., logging activity, portable sawmill operations)</li> </ul>				
47.	8.2.5	Linear Infrastructure Inspections: Implementing UAS in Airport Operations	<b>New Gap I15: UAS in Airport Operations.</b> Standards are needed for UAS usage in airport operations.	Yes	Develop standards for the application of UAS in airport operations	Medium	Standards bodies publishing UAS standards and/or regulators	N/A
48.	8.3.1	Environmental Applications: Environmental Monitoring	No Gap	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
49.	8.3.2	Environmental Applications: Pesticide Application	<p><b>Gap I10: Pesticide Application Using UAS.</b> Standards are needed to address pesticide application using UAS. Issues to be addressed include communication and automated ID, treatment efficacy (treatment effectiveness), operational safety, environmental protection, equipment reliability, and integration into the national air space, as further described below.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Communication.</b> As pesticide application occurs in near-ground air space, it is also the domain of manned aerial application aircraft. Automated ID and location communication is critical in this increasingly crowded, near surface airspace.</li> <li>• <b>Treatment Efficacy and Drift Mitigation.</b> Assumptions that spraying patterns and</li> </ul>	Yes. Mostly engineering development, demonstration, and performance including factors unique to UAS which could impact off-target drift. There is some indication that treatment efficacy and drift mitigation does not meet expectations in some scenarios.	<p>Develop standards for pesticide application using UAS. Organizations such as NAAA, USDA Aerial Application Technology Research Unit (AATRU), ASABE, and ASSURE should be consulted in conjunction with such standards development activities.</p> <p><b>Update:</b> As noted in the text, standards development is underway by ISO and CEN with respect to aerial application by manned aircraft that has potential relevance to UAS.</p>	High (Tier 3)	ISO/TC 23/SC 6, CEN/TC 144, ASABE	Green

Row	Section	Title	Gap	R&D Needed	Recommendation	Priority	Organization(s)	Status of Progress
			<p>efficacy are similar to heavier, existing manned aircraft are incorrect for lighter, multi-rotor UAS. Equipment standards for differing size and rotor configurations may be needed.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Operational Safety and Environmental Protection.</b> Safety to operators, the general public, and the environment are critical. Transporting hazardous substances raises further safety and environmental concerns. As noted, UAS operate in low altitude air space with various surface hazards including humans and livestock. Standards for safety need to be developed based on the FAA's models of risk as a function of kinetic energy. See also section 9.2 on HAZMAT.</li> <li>• <b>Equipment Reliability.</b> Aviation depends on reliability of the equipment involved. Failure at height often results in catastrophic damage and represents a serious safety hazard. Reliability of equipment and specific parts may also follow the FAA's risk curve, though catastrophic failure and damage of expensive equipment that is not high kinetic energy (precision sprayers, cameras, etc.) may require higher standards of reliability due to the potential for large economic loss due to failure.</li> <li>• <b>Airspace Integration.</b> This is tied to automated ID and location communication so that other aircraft can sense the spraying UAS and avoid collisions. Detailed flight plans are probably not necessary and controlled airspace restrictions are already in place.</li> </ul>					
50.	8.3.3	Environmental Applications: Livestock Monitoring and Pasture Management	No Gap	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
51.	8.4.1	Commercial Services: Commercial Package Delivery via UAS	<b>Gap I11: Commercial Package Delivery via UAS.</b> Standards are needed to enable UAS commercial package delivery operations.	Yes	<p>1) Complete work on ASTM WK62344 and SAE AIR7121. Review small UAS oriented standards for scaling into larger UAVs (those that exceed Part 107 and have Part 135 applicability).</p> <p>2) Write new standards to address commercial package delivery UAS and its operations.</p> <p><b>Update:</b> Relevant standards in development are noted above.</p>	High (Tier 3)	ASTM, SAE, RTCA, EUROCAE, SAE ARINC	Green



Row	Section	Title	Gap	R&D Needed	Recommendation	Priority	Organization(s)	Status of Progress
52.	8.4.2	Commercial Services: Commercial Cargo Transport via UAS	<b>New Gap I16: Commercial Cargo Transport via UAS.</b> Additional standards may be needed to enable UAS commercial cargo transport and operations.	Yes. Review existing standards used for traditional commercial cargo transport and determine gaps that are unique to UAS.	Complete work on in-development standards. Engage with industry to determine intent for future services (e.g., replace short haul rail and road freight with small general aviation aircraft cargo operations).	Medium	SAE, RTCA, EUROCAE, SAE, ARINC, ASME, ASTM	N/A
53.	8.4.3	Commercial Services: Commercial Passenger Air Taxi Transport via UAS (short-haul flights carrying few passengers)	<b>New Gap I17: Commercial Passenger Air Taxi Transport via UAS (short-haul flights carrying few passengers and/or cargo).</b> Standards are needed to support commercial short haul transport via UAS covering areas such as aircraft automation, passenger cabin interiors and furnishings, safety equipment and survival, etc.	Yes	1) Complete work on in-development standards. Complete work on use of AI and non-deterministic techniques on autonomous, non-piloted UAS. Develop safety and operations standards applicable to non-piloted UAS carrying passengers. 2) Consult the NASA AAM ConOps and write standards to address commercial passenger air taxi transport via UAS.	High (Tier 1)	ASTM, RTCA, SAE, EUROCAE	N/A
54.	8.4.4	Commercial Services: Commercial Passenger Transport via UAS (long-haul flights carrying many passengers)	<b>New Gap I18: Commercial Passenger Transport via UAS (long-haul flights carrying many passengers).</b> Standards are needed to support commercial passenger transport via UAS and its operations.	Yes	Complete work on in-development standards to support commercial passenger transport via UAS and its operations. Industry and SDOs should work together to develop standards to enable this type of operation.	Medium	RTCA, SAE, EUROCAE, SAE ARINC	N/A
55.	8.4.5	Commercial Services: Commercial Sensing Services	<b>New Gap I19: Commercial Sensing Services.</b> Standards are needed to enable the provision of commercial sensing services by UAS operators. Such standards should address the integrity and security of the information collected, transmitted, and stored by the service provider on behalf of the client.	Yes	Develop standards to enable commercial sensing services. Industry groups should be consulted to determine if additional and/or higher level standards are required for UAS sensor operations conducted by outsourced service providers.	High (Tier 1)	ASME, NACE, ASTM	N/A
56.	8.4.6	Commercial Services: Use of sUAS for News Gathering	<b>New Gap I20: Use of sUAS for Newsgathering.</b> Standards or best practices are needed on the use of drones by newsgathering organizations whether the drone controllers are stationary or mobile. sUAS use for newsgathering operations should also include safety and health considerations for participating crew and the public from the NIOSH and OSHA aspects.	No	Develop operational best practices or standards on the use of UAS by newsgathering organizations	High (Tier 1)	companies, industry trade associations	N/A
57.	8.5	Workplace Safety	<b>Gap I12: Occupational Safety Requirements for UAS Operated in Workplaces.</b> There is a need for occupational safety standards for operating UAS in workplaces. In addition to collision avoidance and awareness systems that are required to be installed on critical infrastructure, at construction sites, and on buildings, such standards should address: 1) Hazard identification, risk characterization, and mitigation to ensure the safe operation of UAS in workplaces. This includes incorporating hazard prevention through safety design	Yes. Collecting and analyzing objective data about negative safety outcomes is a key to identifying causes of injuries. This includes investigating: 1) navigation and collision avoidance systems in the design of commercial UAS so as to proactively address workplace safety. 2) the effects of stiffness and pliability in structural designs of	1) Develop proactive approach-based occupational safety standards/recommended best practices for UAS operations in workplace environments. Such work should be done in collaboration and consultation with diverse groups (governmental and non-governmental), to help integrate UAS operations in construction and other industries while ensuring the safety and health of workers and others in close proximity to the UAS. 2) Develop educational outreach materials for non-participating people in workplaces, including construction sites where UAS operations are taking place. Occupational safety and health	High (Tier 2)	SAE, ASTM, ASSP, BLS, OSHA, NIOSH, CPWR, ISO/TC 20/SC 16, FAA, NTSB, etc.	Yellow

Row	Section	Title	Gap	R&D Needed	Recommendation	Priority	Organization(s)	Status of Progress
			<p>features/concepts such as frangible UAS, lightweight manipulators, passive compliant systems, safe actuators, passive robotic systems, operating warning devices (audio/visual), two-way communications between the operator and worker supervisor(s) or workers, etc. It also includes the deployment of Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) such as helmets and other equipment and gears.</p> <p>2) Training, especially in relation to: a) the competency, experience and qualification of UAS operators; b) operator, bystander, and worker safety; c) identification of potential hazards to equipment such as cranes, elevators, fork lifts, etc.; and, d) corrective actions, procedures, and protocols that are needed to mitigate safety hazards. (See also section 10.3 on UAS Flight Crew.)</p>	<p>UAS in relation to UAS collisions with critical infrastructure.</p> <p>3) the severity of UAS collisions with workers wearing and not wearing helmets and other protective devices.</p> <p>4) potential safety risks of drones in the workplace such as anti-collision lights distracting workers, increasing noise levels, psychological effects.</p> <p>5) potential mitigation methods that follow the hierarchy of controls to reduce risks of drones to workers.</p> <p>See also section 7.4 on Operations Over People and section 9.2 on HAZMAT (e.g., operations at a chemical manufacturing plant).</p>	<p>professional organizations should invite speakers on UAS workplace applications to further increase awareness among their members.</p> <p>3) Encourage the voluntary reporting of events, incidents, and accidents involving UAS in workplace environments.</p> <p>4) Encourage BLS to modify the SOII and CFOI databases to facilitate search capability that would identify injuries caused by UAS.</p> <p><b>Update:</b> These recommendations require community efforts. It is believed that work is underway by NIOSH in regard to recommendations 1 and 2.</p>			
<b>Chapter 9. Flight Operations Standards: Public Safety – WG4</b>								
58.	9.1	sUAS for Public Safety Operations	<b>Gap S1: Use of sUAS for Public Safety Operations.</b> The roadmap version 1.0 gap stated that “Standards are needed on the use of drones by the public safety community.”	No	<p>The roadmap version 1.0 recommendation stated “With the publication of <a href="#">NFPA® 2400, Standard for Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems (sUAS) Used for Public Safety Operations</a>, complete work on the development of use cases by the ASTM/NFPA JWG.” As noted above, the JWG is now inactive.</p> <p><b>Update:</b> APSAC standards, ASTM F3379, NFPA® 2400, NFPA 1500™</p>	High (Tier 2)	NFPA, ASTM	Closed
59.	9.2	Hazardous Materials Incident Response	<b>Gap S2: Hazardous Materials Response and Transport Using a UAS.</b> Standards are needed to address the transportation of known or suspected HAZMAT by UAS and UAS being exposed to HAZMAT in a response environment.	Yes. Research to assist policy makers and practitioners in determining the feasibility of using UAS in emergency response situations.	<p>Create a standard(s) for UAS HAZMAT emergency response use, addressing the following issues:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The transport of HAZMAT when using UAS for detection and sample analysis</li> <li>The design and manufacturing of ingress protection (IP) ratings when dealing with HAZMAT</li> <li>The method of decontamination of a UAS that has been exposed to HAZMAT</li> </ul> <p><b>Update:</b> Numerous standards have been published.</p>	Medium	ASTM, NFPA, OSHA, U.S. Army	Not Started
60.	9.3	Transport and Post-Crash Procedures Involving Biohazards	<b>Gap S3: Transport and Post-Crash Procedures Involving Biohazards.</b> No published or in-development standards have been identified that address UAS transport of biohazards and associated post-crash procedures and precautions.	Yes	<p>1) Write standards to address UAS transportation of biohazards and post-crash procedures and containments</p> <p>2) Encourage the development of standards to address and accommodate transport of biohazards and post-crash procedures and containments that cannot meet the current regulatory requirements and standards of manned aviation</p>	High (Tier 3)	UN, WHO, ICAO, DOD, DHS, CDC, USDA, NIH, NFPA, SAE	Unknown

Row	Section	Title	Gap	R&D Needed	Recommendation	Priority	Organization(s)	Status of Progress
					<b>Update:</b> None provided at this time.			
61.	9.4	Forensic Investigations Photogrammetry	<b>Gap S4: Forensic Investigations Photogrammetry.</b> Standards are needed for UAS sensors used to collect digital media evidence. The equipment used to capture data needs to be able to survive legal scrutiny. Standards are also needed for computer programs performing post-processing of digital media evidence. Processing of the data is also crucial to introducing evidence into trial.	Yes. R&D will be needed to develop the technical standards to meet legal requirements for the admissibility of digital media evidence into court proceedings.	Develop standards for UAS sensors used to collect digital media evidence and for computer programs performing post-processing of digital media evidence. These standards should take into account data, security and accountability.  <b>Update:</b> The OGC GeoTIFF standard was adopted as an OGC standard in 2019, and best practices are in development in OGC UxS DWG.	Medium	OGC	Green
62.	9.5	Payload Interface and Control for Public Safety Operations	<b>Gap S5: Payload Interface and Control for Public Safety Operations.</b> Standards are needed for public safety UAS payload interfaces including: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Hardware</li> <li>• Electrical connections (power and communications)</li> <li>• Software communications protocols</li> </ul> <p>Additional standards development may be required to define location, archiving, and broadcast of information which will grow in need as data analytics plays a larger role in public safety missions.</p> <p>There currently are no published standards that define the expected capabilities, performance, or control of sUAS payload drop mechanisms.</p>	Yes. Need to examine available options in universal payload mounting as well as electrical connections and communications. Stakeholders including end users and manufacturers of drones should be engaged to contribute to the process of defining acceptable standards. Existing payload drop and control systems should be researched with attention to weight, degree of operator control, and interoperability considered in defining standards that are useful for both public safety and commercial operators.	Develop standards for the UAS-to-payload interface, which includes hardware mounting, electrical connections, and software message sets. Develop a standard for a UAS payload drop control mechanism that includes weight, control, safety and risk metrics, and remote status reporting.  <b>Update:</b> IEEE P1937.1, ISO/WD 24354	High (Tier 3)	ASTM, DOJ, NFPA, DHS, NIST, IEEE, ISO	Green
63.	9.6.1	Search and Rescue: sUAS IR Camera Sensor Capabilities	<b>Gap S6: sUAS Forward-Looking Infrared (IR) Camera Sensor Capabilities.</b> UAS standards are needed for IR camera sensor capabilities. A single standard could be developed to ensure IR technology meets the needs of public safety missions, which would be efficient and would ensure an organization purchases a single camera to meet operational objectives.	Yes. R&D (validation/testing) is needed to identify IR camera sensor sensitivity, radiometric capabilities, zoom, and clarity of imagery for identification of a person/object for use in public safety/SAR missions.	Complete work on standards in development related to IR camera sensor specifications for use in public safety and SAR missions.  <b>Update:</b> ASTM E54.09	Medium	NIST, NFPA, ASTM	Green
64.	9.6.2	Search and Rescue: sUAS Automated Missions during Emergency Response	<b>Gap S7: Need for Command and Control Software Specifications for Automated Missions during Emergency Response.</b> While standards exist for software specifications to complete automated missions, there remains a need to encourage the user community to purchase professional grade equipment that is compliant with these standards, rather than using low-cost, consumer grade equipment.	No	Encourage UAS OEMs to adopt existing standards. Encourage public safety agencies to consider equipment that is compliant with industry standards, and NIST/FEMA guidelines, prior to acquiring UAS. See section 7.6 on data handling and processing and 6.4.4 on software considerations and approval.  <b>Update:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• RTCA DO-178, DO-278; RTCA SC-240/EUROCAE WG-117</li> </ul>	Low	NIST, NFPA, ASTM, RTCA, EUROCAE, OGC, UAS OEMs, public safety agencies/organizations	Green

Row	Section	Title	Gap	R&D Needed	Recommendation	Priority	Organization(s)	Status of Progress
					<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>ASTM F32; ASTM F38: F3201, WK68098; ASTM E54: WK58938</li> <li>Standards exist for software specifications to complete automated missions. Other standards are under development.</li> </ul>			
65.	9.7	Response Robots	<b>Gap S8: UAS Response Robots.</b> There is a need for standardized test methods and performance metrics to quantify key capabilities of sUAS robots used in emergency response operations and remote pilot proficiencies.	Yes	<p>Complete work on UAS response robot standards in development in <a href="#">ASTM E54.09</a> and reference them in <a href="#">NFPA® 2400, Standard for Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems (sUAS) Used for Public Safety Operations</a></p> <p><b>Update:</b> ASTM E54.09, ASTM F38: ASTM WK70877, NFPA® 2400.</p>	Medium	NIST, ASTM E54.09, NFPA, DHS	Green
66.	9.8	Public Safety Tactical Operations	<b>New Gap S10: Use of Tethered UAS for Public Safety Operations.</b> Training and operational standards are needed on the use of Actively Tethered sUAS by public safety agencies.	Yes	Develop standards for Actively Tethered Public Safety sUAS operations	Medium	ISO, NFPA, APSAC, ASTM	N/A
67.	9.9.1	UAS Detection	<p><b>New Gap S11: UAS Detection.</b> No standards exist for the performance of UAS detection systems that might be used by operators of critical infrastructure or public safety agencies.</p> <p>Given the importance of drone detection capabilities, standards must be developed for user identification, design, performance, safety, and operations. User identification ensures accountability and provides a necessary tool to public safety officials and operators of critical infrastructure. Design, performance, and safety standards can ensure that risk management decisions are based on reliable and valid data.</p> <p>A comprehensive evaluation template for testing UAS detection systems is needed to: (1) identify current capabilities and anticipated advancement for C-UAS technologies and (2) forecast trends in the C-UAS burgeoning market. The test and evaluation (T&amp;E) community must have clear guidance and a framework to test and evaluate the needs of the end user.</p>	Yes	Encourage the development of detection standards addressing user identification, design, performance, safety, operational aspects, and various available technological methods for detecting UAS. For example, RF detection based systems will follow a different standards protocol than electro-optical or infra-red based systems.	High (Tier 1)	DOD, DHS, DOJ, DOE, FCC, NTIA, EUROCAE, RTCA	N/A
68.	9.9.2	UAS Mitigation	<b>Gap S9: UAS Mitigation.</b> Given the imperative that C-UAS technologies be available for use by the proper authorities, user identification, design, performance, safety, and operational standards are needed. User identification ensures accountability and provides a necessary tool to public safety officials. Design, performance, and safety standards can reduce the likelihood of harming or	Yes	<p>Encourage the development of Counter-UAS standards addressing user identification, design, performance, safety, operational aspects, and various available technological methods for C-UAS. For example, laser-based systems will follow a different standards protocol than a kinetic, acoustic, or RF-based solution. Encourage the T&amp;E community to collaborate.</p> <p><b>Update:</b> RTCA SC-238/EUROCAE WG-115</p>	High (Tier 1)	DOD, DHS, DOJ, DOE, FCC, NTIA, EUROCAE, RTCA	Green

Row	Section	Title	Gap	R&D Needed	Recommendation	Priority	Organization(s)	Status of Progress
			<p>disrupting innocent or lawful communications and operations.</p> <p>Today's C-UAS technologies are often the result of an immediate need for a life-saving measure that was neither originally anticipated, nor given time to mature. Regarding test and evaluation (T&amp;E) of C-UAS technologies, the goals, methods, data collected, and results output are generally not uniform. A comprehensive evaluation approach and template for testing C-UAS systems is needed. The test and evaluation (T&amp;E) community must have clear guidance on what to look for in order to test and evaluate to the needs of the acquisition community; the model, simulation, and analysis (MS&amp;A) community; the systems engineering community; and the end user. Model Based Systems Engineering (MBSE) and Interchange of data and results will benefit from standardizing the data formats for: the data collected, the aggregated performance, and the metrics. Clearly defined metrics and standards require foundational criteria upon which to build.</p>					
69.	9.10	UAS for Emergency Management and Disasters	<b>New Gap S12: Integration of UAS into FEMA ICS Operations Section, Air Operations Branch.</b> The FEMA NIMS does not fully address UAS operations. FEMA's ICS does not presently contain official guidance surrounding the use of UAS within the Operation Section, Air Operations Branch.	Yes, limited	<p>The NIMS should be revised to integrate the use of UA of all types as part of the ICS. Specific recommendations include:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) Air Operations Summary (ICS 220) should be updated to incorporate UAS as an aviation resource.</li> <li>2) FEMA, Resource Typing Definition for Response, should be expanded to include such positions as UAS Coordinator and UAS Base Manager, or similar positions necessary to manage UAS operations under the Air Operations Branch (e.g., sUAS airbase manager, sUAS air operations supervisor, etc.) including taskbooks and training.</li> <li>3) Update FEMA, National Training and Education Division, Course Number AWR-345, "Unmanned Aircraft Systems in Disaster Management."</li> </ol>	Medium	FEMA NIMS, National Wildfire Coordinating Group (NWCG)	N/A
70.	9.11	Standardization of Data Formatting for sUAS Public Safety Operations	<b>New Gap S13: Data Format for Public Safety sUAS Operations.</b> Standards are needed for the formatting and storage of UAS data for the public safety community, especially to foster inter-agency cooperation and interoperability, and to help guide industry product development.	No	Develop standards for accepted format of live video and still imagery and associated GIS data for use in sUAS public safety operations.	High (Tier 2)	NFPA, ASTM, Airborne Public Safety Association (APSA), DRONERESPON DERS, AIRT, OGC	N/A

Row	Section	Title	Gap	R&D Needed	Recommendation	Priority	Organization(s)	Status of Progress
			<b>Chapter 10. Personnel Training, Qualifications, and Certification Standards: General – WG2</b>					
71.	10.1	Terminology	<b>Gap P1: Terminology.</b> Standards for UAS terminology are needed. Several are in development and will satisfy the market need for consumer and commercial UAS terminology.	No	Complete work on terminology standards in development.  <b>Update:</b> Numerous standards have been published and are in-development.	High (Tier 3)	ASTM, IEEE, ISO, RTCA	Green
72.	10.2	Manuals	<b>Gap P2: Manuals.</b> Several published UAS standards have been identified for various manuals. Several more are in development and will satisfy the market need for civil and public operators.	No	Complete existing work on manual standards in development  <b>Update:</b> ASTM F2908-18, F3330-18, F3366-19; ASTM WK62734, WK62744, WK63407	High (Tier 2)	ASTM, JARUS, NPTSC, NFPA	Green
73.	10.3	UAS Flight Crew	<b>Gap P3: Instructors and Functional Area Qualification.</b> Several published UAS standards have been identified for various crewmember roles. Several are in development and will satisfy the market need for remote pilot instructors and functional area qualification.	No	Complete work on UAS standards currently in development  <b>Update:</b> ASTM F3330-18, ASTM F3379-20, ASTM WK61763, WK62741; ISO/DIS 23665	High (Tier 2)	SAE, ASTM, AUVSI, PPA, ISO	Green
74.	10.4	Additional Crew Members	<b>Gap P4: Training and Certification of UAS Flight Crew Members Other Than the Remote Pilot.</b> There is a standards gap with respect to the training and/or certification of aircrew other than the RPIC specifically around the following: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Functional duties of the crew member</li> <li>• Crew resource management principles</li> <li>• Human factors</li> <li>• General airmanship and situational awareness, and</li> <li>• Emergency procedures</li> </ul>	No	1) Develop a framework to classify additional UAS crew members around common flight activities identifying in particular those who directly or indirectly influence safety-of-flight. 2) Develop a standard(s) around training, evaluation, and best practices for the relevant UAS crew members other than the RPIC for UAS >55Lbs for activities affecting safety-of-flight. 3) Consider the possibility of recommending – through best practices or a standard – that all flight crew members actively participating in flight activities on UAS > 55Lbs meet the minimum training of a remote pilot for the applicable UA.  <b>Update:</b> ASTM F3330-18, ASTM F3379-20, ASTM WK61763, WK62741; ISO/DIS 23665	Medium	SAE, ASTM, AUVSI, JARUS, ISO	Green
75.	10.5	Maintenance Technicians	<b>Gap P5: UAS Maintenance Technicians.</b> Standards are needed for UAS maintenance technicians. Ensure that maintenance requirements are appropriate for the scale and risk of the UAS.	No	Complete work on UAS maintenance technician standards currently in development  <b>Update:</b> ASTM WK60659	High (Tier 2)	ASTM, SAE	Green
76.	10.6	Compliance / Audit Programs	<b>Gap P6: Compliance and Audit Programs.</b> The version 1.0 gap stated “No published UAS standards have been identified for UAS-specific compliance/audit programs. However, several are in development and will satisfy the market need.”	No	The version 1.0 recommendation stated “Complete work on compliance and audit program standards currently in development.”  <b>Update:</b> ASTM F3364-19, ASTM F3365-19	High (Tier 3)	ASTM, AUVSI	Closed

Row	Section	Title	Gap	R&D Needed	Recommendation	Priority	Organization(s)	Status of Progress
77.	10.7	Human Factors in UAS Operations	<p><b>Gap P7: Displays and Controls.</b><sup>1</sup> Standards are needed for the suite of displays, controls, and onboard sensors that provide the UAS pilot with the range of sensory cues considered necessary for safe unmanned flight in the NAS.</p> <p>The UAS pilot is deprived of a range of sensory cues that are available to the pilot of a manned aircraft. Hence, compared to the pilot of a manned aircraft, a UAS pilot must perform in relative “sensory isolation” from the aircraft under his/her control.</p> <p>Of particular interest are recent developments in the use of augmented reality and/or synthetic vision systems (SVS) to supplement sensor input. Such augmented reality displays can improve UAS flight control by reducing the cognitive demands on the UAS pilot.</p> <p>The quality of visual sensor information presented to the UAS pilot will also be constrained by the bandwidth of the communications link between the aircraft and its CS. Data link bandwidth limits, for example, will limit the temporal resolution, spatial resolution, color capabilities and field of view of visual displays, and data transmission delays will delay feedback in response to operator control inputs.</p>	Yes	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) Develop Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS) for the suite of displays, controls, and onboard sensors that provide the UAS pilot with the range of sensory cues considered necessary for safe operation in the NAS.</li> <li>2) Conduct further research and development in several areas, specifically, to:<sup>2</sup> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Explore advanced display designs which might compensate for the lack of direct sensory input from the environment.</li> <li>b. Examine the potential use of multimodal displays in countering UAS pilot sensory isolation, and to determine the optimal design of such displays for offloading visual information processing demands. A related point is that multimodal operator controls (e.g., speech commands) may also help to distribute workload across sensory and response channels, and should also be explored.</li> <li>c. Determine the effects of lowered spatial and/or temporal resolution and of restricted field of view on other aspects of UAS and payload sensor control (e.g., flight control during takeoff and landing, traffic detection).</li> </ol> </li> <li>3) Examine the design of displays to circumvent such difficulties, and the circumstances that may dictate levels of tradeoffs between the different display aspects (e.g., when can a longer time delay be accepted if it provides higher image resolution). For example, research indicates that a UAS pilot’s ability to track a target with a payload camera is impaired by low temporal update rates and long transmission delays.</li> </ol> <p><b>Update:</b> ICAO, EUROCAE</p>	High (Tier 3)	RTCA, NASA, SAE, INCOSE, ASTM, EUROCAE, ICAO	Unknown
78.	10.7	Human Factors in UAS Operations	<p><b>Gap P9: Human Factors in UAS Operations.</b><sup>3</sup> Standards are needed to address human factors-related issues in UAS operations.</p>	Yes	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) Complete in-development standards, and develop new standards for UAS human factors-related issues, including those relevant to the composition, selection, and training of UAS flight crews.</li> </ol>	High (Tier 2)	RTCA, NFPA, MITRE, NASA, ICAO	Unknown

<sup>1</sup> Adapted from McCarley, J. & Wickens, C. (2005): pp1-3

<sup>2</sup> Ibid

<sup>3</sup> Adapted from McCarley, J. & Wickens, C. (2005): pp3-4

Row	Section	Title	Gap	R&D Needed	Recommendation	Priority	Organization(s)	Status of Progress
					<p>2) Conduct further research to:<sup>4</sup></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Determine the crew size and structure necessary for various categories of UAS missions in the NAS, and to explore display designs and automated aids that might reduce crew demands and potentially allow a single pilot to operate multiple UASs simultaneously.</li> <li>b. Develop techniques to better understand and facilitate crew communications, with particular focus on inter-crew coordination during the hand off of UAS control from one team of operators to another.</li> <li>c. Identify specific ways in which sensory isolation affects UAS pilot performance in various tasks and stages of flight.</li> <li>d. Examine the concept of “shared fate,” as related to UAS operations. There might be negative consequences from the pilot not having a shared fate with the aircraft, but whether an exocentric viewpoint diminishes the feeling of shared fate or not is unknown.</li> <li>e. Determine the circumstances (e.g., low time delay vs. high time delay, normal operations vs. conflict avoidance and/or system failure modes) under which each form of UAS control is optimal. Of particular importance will be research to determine the optimal method of UAS control during takeoff and landing, as military data indicate that a disproportionate number of the accidents for which human error is a contributing factor occur during these phases of flight.</li> <li>f. Examine the interaction of human operators and automated systems in UAS flight. For example, allocation of flight control to an autopilot may improve the UAS pilot’s performance on concurrent visual mission and system fault detection tasks.</li> <li>g. Determine which of the UAS pilot’s tasks (e.g., flight control, traffic detection, system failure detection, etc.) should be automated and what levels of automation are optimal.</li> </ul> <p><b>Update:</b> None provided at this time.</p>			

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<sup>4</sup> Ibid



# 1. Introduction

## 1.1. Situational Assessment for UAS

While unmanned aircraft systems (UAS, aka “drones”) have been around and used for military purposes for quite some time, their use in civil and public safety applications goes back a little over a decade ago. It is only within the last seven years that interest in commercial uses has emerged. Today, visions of a future where passenger-carrying “flying taxis” are part of the urban landscape is the subject of discussion at industry conferences and has begun to capture the popular imagination. Still, there remain many complex issues to be addressed in order for the potential of drone technology to be fully realized, most of which are centered around non-interference with manned aviation and ensuring the safety of the flying public and persons, aircraft, and property on the ground.

FAA Order 8130.34, Airworthiness Certification of Unmanned Aircraft Systems, dated 03/27/2008, enabled the first airworthiness certification of UAS. Section 332, Integration of Civil Unmanned Aircraft Systems into National Airspace System, of the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 (FMRA 2012) enabled 14 CFR part 107 rulemaking effort. A July 2018 Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) report on integrating UAS into the National Airspace System (NAS) reviews recent accomplishments and regulatory developments, collaborative relationships, public policy and technological challenges still to be overcome, ongoing work, and next steps.<sup>5</sup> Technology challenges are described as including: detect and avoid (DAA) methods to maintain a safe distance between UAS and other aircraft, especially with respect to minimum performance requirements for operations beyond visual line of sight (BVLOS) of the pilot; the command and control (C2) link between a UAS and its pilot; management of radio frequency (RF) spectrum for UAS operations; standards development; and airspace management. Public policy challenges include: continued educational efforts to promote safe UAS operations, physical security in relation to individuals operating with or without ill intent, cybersecurity, privacy, and adequate funding.

UAS are being deployed in a wide variety of sectors including construction, mining, agriculture, surveying, real estate, insurance, public safety, infrastructure, media, and entertainment. Market forecasts tend to vary depending on the segment evaluated and research methodology used. A 2019 market analysis by BIS Research found that “the global UAV market generated \$25.59 billion in 2018 and is estimated to grow at a CAGR of 8.45% during the forecast period, 2019-2029.”<sup>6</sup> Research and Markets reported in 2019 that “the global drone market will grow from \$14 billion in 2018 to over \$43 billion in 2024 at a CAGR of 20.5%.”<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> Federal Aviation Administration. [Integration of Civil Unmanned Aircraft Systems \(UAS\) in the National Airspace System \(NAS\) Roadmap, Second Edition, July 2018.](#)

<sup>6</sup> [Global Unmanned Aerial Vehicle \(UAV\) Market - Analysis and Forecast 2019-2029](#) (accessed March 25, 2020)

<sup>7</sup> [The Drone Delivery Report 2019-2024](#) (accessed March 25, 2020)

Clearly, there is considerable interest in UAS technology. Developing solutions in a consensus-based environment with the involvement of all interested and affected parties will result in the strongest possible solutions and help to realize the market's full potential.

## 1.2. Roadmap Background, Objectives, and Audience

During 2016-17, the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) had discussions with numerous stakeholders on standardization related to UAS and the potential need for coordination via an ANSI standardization collaborative. For one hundred years, ANSI has served as the administrator and coordinator of the United States private-sector voluntary standardization system. As a neutral facilitator, the Institute has a long track record of bringing public and private sectors together through its collaborative process to identify standardization needs for emerging technologies and to address national and global priorities in areas as diverse as: homeland security, electric vehicles, energy efficiency in the built environment, and additive manufacturing.

On May 19, 2017, ANSI convened a standardization collaboration meeting in Washington, DC involving close to seventy representatives from industry, trade associations, SDOs, federal agencies, coalitions, academia, et al. Presentations on UAS priorities were given by federal agencies, a representative of the Joint Authorities for Rulemaking on Unmanned Systems (JARUS), SDOs, and industry. The landscape of current known standardization activities was reviewed and it was clear that many participants were unaware of the breadth of activity taking place. The ANSI collaborative process was explained along with different options for its format. A draft mission statement, objectives, and deliverables were discussed. The outcome of the meeting was broad-based support for ANSI to establish the [Unmanned Aircraft Systems Standardization Collaborative \(UASSC\)](#) and undertake to develop a standardization roadmap for UAS. Details were provided in the [May 19, 2017 meeting report](#).

ANSI formally announced the establishment of the UASSC on May 30, 2017. Because the primary focus of the effort was on the integration of UAS in the U.S. NAS and was so closely tied to the U.S. regulatory environment, participation was open to UAS stakeholders that have operations in the United States. Broad participation was sought from all affected parties. ANSI membership was not a prerequisite to engagement in the collaborative and there was no fee to participate.

On September 28, 2017, the [UASSC kick-off meeting](#) was held in Washington, DC. Over eighty representatives from close to sixty organizations attended, including representatives of industry, trade associations, SDOs, government, and others. At the meeting, the following mission statement, deliverable, and objectives were approved:

**Mission:** To coordinate and accelerate the development of the standards and conformity assessment programs needed to facilitate the safe integration of UAS into the NAS of the United States, with international coordination and adaptability

**Deliverable:** A comprehensive roadmap developed over the course of a year describing the current and desired standardization landscape for UAS

**Objectives:**

- To foster coordination and collaboration among industry, standards developing organizations, regulatory authorities, and others on UAS standardization issues, including pre-standardization research and development (R&D)
- To clarify the current and future UAS standardization landscape and enable stakeholders to better focus standards participation resources
- To provide a basis for coherent and coordinated U.S. policy and technical input to regional and international audiences on UAS standardization
- To support the growth of the UAS market with emphasis on civil, commercial, and public safety applications

Much of the balance of the kick-off meeting was centered around how the UASSC would be organized to develop the roadmap. During this discussion, four primary topical areas were identified: credentialing, airworthiness, operations/procedures, and airspace/infrastructure.

The UASSC adopted the following working group (WG) structure, with the four WGs holding virtual meetings twice a month to develop the roadmap:

- **WG1 – Airworthiness Standards (Roadmap Chapter 6)**
  - Covers aircraft systems and communications with the control station (CS)
- **WG2 – Flight Operations Standards: General Concerns and Personnel Qualifications (Roadmap Chapters 7 and 10)**
  - Covers general flight planning and operational concerns, plus personnel training, qualifications, and certification
- **WG3 – Flight Operations Standards: Infrastructure Inspections, Environmental Applications, Commercial Services, and Workplace Safety (Roadmap Chapter 8)**
  - Covers application-specific operational concerns for vertical and linear infrastructure inspections, environmental applications, commercial services, and workplace safety
- **WG4 – Flight Operations Standards: Public Safety (Roadmap Chapter 9)**
  - Covers application-specific operational concerns for conducting public safety operations

On September 20, 2018, the UASSC held its [second face-to-face meeting](#) to review a first draft of the roadmap. Following a review and comment period, the WGs further refined the document and finalized it for publication.

The [Standardization Roadmap for Unmanned Aircraft Systems, Version 1.0](#), was published in December 2018, representing the culmination of the UASSC’s initial phase of work. The roadmap subsequently was promoted at industry events.

Throughout the process, the project was guided by a Steering Committee which typically met virtually on a monthly basis. In the lead-up to and following publication of the roadmap version 1.0, the Steering

Committee discussed further developing the document and feedback on it. The Steering Committee also undertook a survey to rank the high priority gaps. Goals for a version 2.0 update were identified:

- Expand the topics covered (e.g., spectrum, recreational operations, urban air mobility, etc.)
- Bring in subject matter experts not previously involved
- Identify potentially overlooked issues and gaps
- Track progress to address the roadmap recommendations, including new or completed work
- Review priorities, noting the Steering Committee rankings of high priority gaps
- Incorporate participant feedback and update the document as appropriate

A [kickoff meeting to launch this version 2.0](#) update of the roadmap was held on September 12, 2019. From October 2019 through March 2020, the working groups met virtually to update the document. The draft version 2.0 roadmap was released for public comment on April 1, 2020. Following the review of submitted comments by the working groups, the document was finalized for publication.

Ultimately, the goal of this roadmap is to coordinate and accelerate the development of UAS standards and specifications, consistent with stakeholder needs. The intent is to facilitate UAS integration into the NAS and to foster the growth of the UAS industry with emphasis on civil, commercial, and public safety applications. The scope of the roadmap covers all UAS, not just small UAS (sUAS). Areas that are out of scope are the operation of UAS in indoor environments and policy recommendations.

The roadmap can be viewed as a tool designed to help focus resources in terms of participation by stakeholders in the planning and development of industry-wide standards and related R&D activities to the extent R&D needs are identified. It can also provide a basis for policy and technical discussions relating to alignment and harmonization of standards internationally.

There are many potential audiences for this roadmap including standards bodies (both U.S. based and others), certification bodies, trade associations, professional societies, manufacturers and suppliers, service providers, academia, U.S. government Executive agency personnel, even Congressional members and their staff. It is generally assumed that those reading the document are directly affected stakeholders who have a basic understanding of UAS technologies.

### **1.3. Roadmap Structure**

A summary of major changes from the roadmap version 1.0 can be found immediately following the Executive Summary in this document. That is followed by a breakdown of the identified gaps. Following that is a table summarizing the gaps and recommendations.

Chapter 2 of this document provides introductory context from FAA's perspective as regulator with information on intergovernmental cooperation with ICAO and JARUS.

Chapters 3-5 provide overviews of UAS activities from selected U.S. federal government agencies, private-sector SDOs, and industry stakeholders, respectively.

The gap analysis of standards and specifications is set forth in Chapters 6-10 of this document and maps to the WG structure noted above as follows: Chapter 6-WG1; Chapters 7 & 10-WG2; Chapter 8-WG3; Chapter 9-WG4. For each topic that is addressed, there is a description of the issue(s), identification of relevant published standards (and in a number of cases related regulatory requirements or guidance materials), as well as standards in development. Newly published standards are flagged as such.

A “gap” is defined to mean that no *published* standard, specification, etc. exists that covers the particular issue in question. Where gaps are identified and described, they include an indication whether additional pre-standardization R&D is needed, a recommendation for what should be done to fill the gap, the priority for addressing the gap, and an organization(s) – for example, an SDO or research organization – that potentially could carry out the R&D and/or standards development based on its current scope of activity. Where more than one organization is listed, there is no significance to the order in which the organizations are listed.

Carryover gaps from roadmap version 1.0 retain their original numbering and now include a descriptor of the status of progress since the release of version 1.0 in December 2018. The status of progress is described as: Closed (completed) or, using a traffic light analogy, Green (moving forward), Yellow (delayed), Red (at a standstill), Not Started, Withdrawn, or Unknown. A brief update statement summarizes voluntary consensus standards that may be used to demonstrate means of compliance to address the gap, emphasizing in particular activity since publication of version 1.0. New gaps for version 2.0 are identified as such, starting with the next number in sequence from version 1.0 for a particular section.

Each gap has been assessed and ranked using the criteria described in Table 1 below as being high, medium, or low priority. In terms of taking action to address the priorities, the desired timeframes for having a published standard available are as follows: high priority (0-2 years), medium (2-5 years), and low (5 + years). Following publication of roadmap version 1.0, the UASSC Steering Committee undertook to further rank high priority gaps as being either: Tier 1 (most critical), Tier 2 (critical), or Tier 3 (least critical). These tiers have been confirmed with the publication of this version 2.0. See also the Breakdown of the High, Medium, and Low Priority Open Gaps at the beginning of this document.

Table 1: UASSC Prioritization Matrix (provided by ANSI)

Criteria (Make the <u>C</u> - <u>A</u> - <u>S</u> - <u>E</u> for the Priority Level)	Scoring Values
<b><u>C</u>riticality (Safety/Quality Implications).</b> How important is the project? How urgently is a standard or guidance needed? What would be the consequences if the project were not completed or undertaken? A high score means the project is more critical.	3 - critical 2 - somewhat critical 1 - not critical
<b><u>A</u>chievability (Time to Complete).</b> Does it make sense to do this project now, especially when considered in relation to other projects? Is the project already underway or is it a new project? A high score means there's a good probability of completing the project soon.	3 - project near completion 2 - project underway 1 - new project
<b><u>S</u>cope (Investment of Resources).</b> Will the project require a significant investment of time/work/money? Can it be completed with the information/tools/ resources currently available? Is pre-standardization research required? A high score means the project can be completed without a significant additional investment of resources.	3 - low resource requirement 2 - medium resource requirement 1 - resource intensive
<b><u>E</u>ffect (Return on Investment).</b> What impact will the completed project have on the industry? A high score means there are significant gains for the industry by completing the project.	3 - high return 2 - medium return 1 - low return
<b>Score Rankings</b>	
<b>High Priority</b> (a score of 10-12)	
<b>Medium Priority</b> (a score of 7-9)	
<b>Low Priority</b> (a score of 4-6)	

Chapter 11 briefly describes next steps.

This roadmap is supplemented by the [UASSC Standards Landscape](#), a partial list of standards and other documents directly or peripherally related to the issues described in the roadmap. Some though not all of the documents listed in this roadmap are included there and vice versa. Some documents apply to multiple sections. For various sections, where noted, the roadmap is supplemented by a list of additional committees, standards, and other documents in the [UASSC Reference Document](#).

## 1.4. Definitions

The regulatory authority for civil aviation in the United States is the FAA, part of the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT). Some definitions that are relevant to this roadmap are defined in 14 CFR § 1.1 (except where noted):

*Aircraft* means a device that is used or intended to be used for flight in the air.

*Unmanned aircraft* means an aircraft operated without the possibility of direct human intervention from within or on the aircraft.

*Unmanned aircraft system* means an unmanned aircraft and associated elements (including communication links and the components that control the unmanned aircraft) that are required for the operator to operate safely and efficiently in the national airspace system. [49 USC § 44801(12)]

*Small unmanned aircraft* means an unmanned aircraft weighing less than 55 pounds on takeoff, including everything that is on board or otherwise attached to the aircraft.

*Small unmanned aircraft system (small UAS)* means a small unmanned aircraft and its associated elements (including communication links and the components that control the small unmanned aircraft) that are required for the safe and efficient operation of the small unmanned aircraft in the national airspace system.

*Model aircraft* means an unmanned aircraft that is:

- (1) Capable of sustained flight in the atmosphere;
- (2) Flown within visual line of sight of the person operating the aircraft; and
- (3) Flown for hobby or recreational purposes.

According to the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), in the 2003-04 timeframe, the term unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) came to be used to describe “a pilotless aircraft, in the sense of Article 8 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation, which is flown without a pilot in-command on-board and is either remotely and fully controlled from another place (ground, another aircraft, space) or programmed and fully autonomous.”<sup>8</sup> In 2007, ICAO agreed to adopt the term “unmanned aircraft systems (UAS)” for consistency with technical specifications being developed within and coordinated between RTCA Inc. and the European Organisation for Civil Aviation Equipment (EUROCAE). An ICAO UAS Study Group (UASSG) was formed as a focal point to ensure global harmonization and interoperability. In 2009, the UASSG decided to focus its efforts on “remotely piloted aircraft systems (RPAS),” being of the view “that only unmanned aircraft that are remotely piloted could be integrated alongside manned aircraft in non-segregated airspace and at aerodromes.” In 2014, an RPAS Panel was established to continue the work begun by the UASSG. The term unmanned aircraft (UA) may refer to a remotely piloted aircraft, an autonomous aircraft, or a model aircraft. As used within this roadmap, unless otherwise specified, UA, UAV, and UAS are synonymous with remotely piloted aircraft and RPAS,

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<sup>8</sup> International Civil Aviation Organization. *Manual on Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS)*. Doc 10019, First Edition-2015.

respectively. Further discussion of technical differences in UAS-related taxonomy, terminology, and definitions is beyond the scope of this roadmap and is addressed in standards development.

As used in this document, the term “standards” refers to voluntary consensus standards developed in accordance with the principles outlined in the World Trade Organization’s Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement, the National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995, OMB Circular A-119, and ANSI’s [\*Essential Requirements: Due process requirements for American National Standards\*](#). These principles provide that the process for standards development must be consensus-based, open, have balanced participation, and include all the other elements that are the hallmarks of the U.S. standards system.



## **2. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and International Cooperation**

### **2.1. Introduction**

The mission of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is to provide the safest, most efficient aerospace system in the world. The National Airspace System (NAS) is a complex national asset providing essential capabilities for the United States along with a critical medium for aviation, the traveling public, commerce, and national security.

The emergence of UAS technology triggered a broad range of applications in government, industry, academia, and recreational endeavors. The rapid growth of the UAS industry has created the need to ensure this new technology is safely integrated into the NAS. As with any rapidly advancing technology, successful integration of UAS into the NAS provides opportunities for innovation and growth, but also presents many challenges.

One such challenge is the standardization of UAS integration into the NAS. Standards are necessary, not only to enable FAA rulemaking efforts, but also to enhance the entire industry's ability to advance safely and efficiently while supporting FAA's global leadership roles and international capabilities. These UAS standards ensure a level playing field to support global fair trade and provide consumers the quality and safety they expect while supporting innovation and growth.

### **2.2. Rules and Measures to Enable UAS Operations and Integration into the NAS**

The Small UAS Rule (Part 107) became effective on August 29, 2016. This was the first comprehensive regulation to enable routine small UAS operations in the NAS.

There are now three baseline airspace related operating rules (Parts 91, 101 and 107) for UAS operations that are needed to access the airspace/NAS. Depending on the type of UAS operations and missions, additional operating rules such as Parts 133, 135, 137, 121, etc. may also apply to UAS operations.

Seven test sites ([https://www.faa.gov/uas/programs\\_partnerships/test\\_sites/](https://www.faa.gov/uas/programs_partnerships/test_sites/)) collect and analyze operational and technical data to support safe UAS integration into the NAS.

Beginning in 2017, the Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) Integration Pilot Program (IPP) has brought state, local, and tribal governments together with private sector entities, such as UAS operators or manufacturers, to test and evaluate the integration of civil and public drone operations into our national airspace system. The program is assisting the U.S. Department of Transportation (USDOT) and Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) craft new rules that support more complex low-altitude operations.

More information about unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) and their operational expansion and integration into the NAS can be found at <https://www.faa.gov/uas/>. Questions about the applicability of Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) to UAS and their integration into the NAS should be directed to [FAA's Regulations Division, Legal Interpretations & Chief Counsel's Opinions](#).

## **2.3. International Outreach and Engagement**

The integration of UAS into the existing aviation operational environment requires the development and introduction of new requirements to promote continued safety and efficiency around the world. Many countries (e.g., Switzerland, India, China, etc.) are currently confronting the challenge of developing a regulatory framework, supported by effective program implementation and oversight, for the safe integration of UAS into their respective domestic aviation systems. Collaboration with the international aviation community will guide the development of interoperable and harmonized UAS standards, policies, and regulations, support more seamless operations of UAS across national boundaries, and facilitate the cross-border movement of new products.

The FAA continually develops relationships with other Civil Aviation Authorities (CAAs) and international organizations to encourage global cooperation and information sharing. Additionally, the FAA has conducted, and continues to conduct global outreach to communicate information on the FAA's UAS integration strategies and activities, and to acquire knowledge about other countries' UAS regulatory systems. International relationships will enable the FAA to develop and implement bilateral agreements and other cooperation mechanisms, encouraging harmonization of UAS certification, airworthiness, production and operational standards and oversight.

The two primary UAS-focused international bodies that the FAA participates in are the ICAO RPAS Panel and the JARUS. The ICAO RPAS Panel is composed of experts nominated by ICAO member states and international organizations. Among other things, the panel coordinates and develops ICAO standards and recommended practices for RPAS (UAS) integration. Similarly, JARUS is a group of international experts gathered to recommend requirements for use by civil aviation authorities around the world.

### **2.3.1. International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)**

At the global level, States collaborate through the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) to secure the highest practicable degree of uniformity in regulations, standards, procedures, and organization in relation to aircraft, including unmanned aircraft, in all matters in which such uniformity will facilitate and improve air navigation. ICAO works with its 193 Member States and industry groups to reach consensus on Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) for aviation, manned and unmanned. It should be noted that, unlike many voluntary industry standards, ICAO SARPs are mandatory on States.

Unmanned aircraft (UA) include a broad spectrum from meteorological balloons that fly freely to highly complex aircraft piloted from remote locations by licensed aviation professionals. The latter are part of

the category referred to as remotely piloted aircraft (RPA) and operate as part of a remotely piloted aircraft system (RPAS). RPAS therefore consists of an RPA, a remote pilot station (RPS), a C2 Link for control and management, and any other components as specified in the type design.

ICAO's Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems Panel (RPASP) develops SARPs and other provisions to support international instrument flight rules (IFR) operations of RPAS in controlled airspace and at controlled aerodromes. In 2018, ICAO adopted RPAS-specific provisions in Annex 1 – Personnel Licensing. This amendment introduced a regulatory structure for the issuance of remote pilot licences and the provision of a global framework for the regulation of RPAS licensing within the competency-based training and assessment (CBTA) framework.

The current focus of the RPASP is on airworthiness, operations, operator certification, air traffic management, C2 Link, detect and avoid (DAA), safety management, and security. The Panel's work will also provide a context within which simplified regulations can be developed for less demanding national operations.

Additionally, other aspects of international aviation regulation are being increasingly addressed by other groups at the ICAO level to cater for unmanned aviation activities, including environmental protection, facilitation, economic regulation, as well as infrastructure funding and financing.

Smaller UA, including those commonly referred to as "drones" as well as the development of solutions for the UAS traffic management (UTM) system, are addressed by ICAO through its DRONE ENABLE symposia. These events bring together key stakeholders from government, industry, academia, and international organizations active in the unmanned aviation sector to exchange research, best practices, lessons learned and respective challenges.

In that regard, ICAO has recently published UTM Guidance, providing States that are considering the implementation of a UTM system with a framework and core capabilities of a "typical" UTM system.

Finally, ICAO has developed UAS Model Regulations, which will assist those States that have not yet adopted regulations for UAS and inform those that have implemented UAS regulations.

### **2.3.2. Joint Authorities for Rulemaking on Unmanned Systems (JARUS)**

JARUS is a group of experts gathering regulatory expertise from all continents of the world. At present, 61 countries, as well as the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) and EUROCONTROL, are contributing to the development of JARUS work products.

At the end of 2015, the Stakeholder Consultation Body (SCB), representing all industry communities of interest, was established to allow stakeholders the opportunity to support JARUS activities. SCB members representing aircraft manufacturers (e.g., AIA and ASD), the unmanned system industry (e.g., AUUVSI, UVS International, and Small UAV Coalition), ANSPs (e.g., CANSO and COCESNA), standardization

bodies (e.g., ISO, EUROCAE, ASTM, and RTCA), airlines (e.g., IATA), and aviation associations (e.g., IAOPA, IBAC, IFALPA and IFATCA) joined the JARUS Plenary meeting for the first time in April of 2016.

Participation in JARUS is open to all regulatory authorities having expertise in unmanned aircraft systems (UAS, remotely piloted aircraft systems included). Industry participation in the SCB is also welcome.

The purpose of JARUS, as stated in its Terms of Reference, is to recommend a single set of technical, safety, and operational requirements for all aspects linked to the safe operation of (UAS, remotely piloted aircraft systems included, UAS for short). This requires review and consideration of existing regulations and other material applicable to manned aircraft, the analysis of the specific tasks linked to UAS, and the drafting of material to cover the unique features of UAS. The JARUS publications aim to facilitate each authority to draft their own requirements and to avoid duplicated efforts.

In 2020, JARUS will consider a new work structure with the following program areas: 1) Automation Concept, 2) Operations and Organizations, 3) Airworthiness, and 4) Safety and Risk Management. The programs, if approved by the plenary, will be led by Working Group Leaders who coordinate the timing and execution of all interrelated work tasks they manage. Three major new work areas with tasks under one or more programs are Autonomy/Automation, UTM/U-Space, and Flight Rules.

The documents drafting and review process for deliverable products is described in the JARUS Terms of Reference under "JARUS deliverables development and approval process." JARUS conducts internal consultation to refine draft work products and make them ready for an external consultation from all interested parties. The external consultation is conducted on the JARUS website at: <http://www.jarus-rpas.org/external-consultations>. Final JARUS deliverables may be found at: <http://www.jarus-rpas.org/publications>.

JARUS is open on a voluntary basis to all national aviation authorities and industry stakeholders to make recommendations on operational, technical, and certification requirements. JARUS Working Group Leaders may also accept external advisors nominated by the SCB to provide the technical expertise required for each deliverable. This is a joint effort to share knowledge and provide harmonized requirements that help members establish their national/regional regulatory frameworks.

JARUS needs the support of experienced aviation experts and is committed to limiting travel by holding virtual meetings using IT tools such as web meetings, teleconferencing, document management systems, etc. However, the bi-annual JARUS plenary meetings are intended to be face-to-face. Other face-to-face meetings within work programs may occur when the tasked Working Group has agreed it is necessary to make progress in the development of the assigned activity.

### **3. Overviews of Other Selected U.S. Federal Government Agency Activities and Intergovernmental Cooperation**

#### **3.1. Department of Defense (DOD)**

The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Armed Services have made extensive efforts to incorporate unmanned systems into their existing organization structures, showing the integral importance that unmanned systems considerations represent. There is still room for improved collaboration throughout DOD. Standardizing the ongoing efforts, cooperating whenever possible, and consolidating the foundational policies and technologies will enable the seamless teamwork that highlights future defense operations – whether the teams are manned, unmanned, or combined.

DOD, industry, and academia have advanced technologies, strategies, and standards that challenge the evolution of unmanned systems and their integration into the DOD mission. These major advancements, challenges, and trends can be consolidated into four critical themes, which address foundational areas of interest that will continue to accelerate unmanned systems into the future:

- **Interoperability** – Interoperability has historically been, and continues to be, a major thrust in the integration and operation of unmanned systems. Manned and unmanned systems have increasingly synergized their capabilities, focusing on the critical need to use open and common architectures. A robust, interoperable foundation provides the very structure that will allow for future advances in warfighting.
- **Autonomy** – Advances in autonomy and robotics have the potential to revolutionize warfighting concepts as a significant force multiplier. Autonomy will greatly increase the efficiency and effectiveness of both manned and unmanned systems, providing a strategic advantage for DOD.
- **Network Security** – Unmanned systems operations ordinarily rely on networked connections and efficient spectrum access. Network vulnerabilities must be addressed to prevent disruption or manipulation.
- **Human-Machine Collaboration** – If interoperability lays the foundation, then human-machine collaboration is the ultimate objective. Teaming between human forces and machines will enable revolutionary collaboration where machines will be valued as critical teammates.

The supporting policy, requirements, and acquisition environments must continue to evolve and advance to keep pace with the rapid technical and capability advancements of all systems. To ensure our military advantage, emphasis should be placed on the evolution, availability, and employment of unmanned technology. Alignment of DOD initiatives in unmanned systems will influence the future makeup of the U.S. military.

More information can be found here in the [DoD UAS Roadmap](#).

### 3.1.1. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

NATO is the world's largest political and military alliance, currently standing at 30 member states. NATO's purpose is to guarantee the freedom and security of its members through political and military means. NATO works with its 30 member states across all areas that relate to NATO's core tasks of collective defense, crisis-management, and cooperative security. This includes inter alia the development of common guidelines, procedures, and standards across the spectrum of military capabilities.

In the Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) context, NATO works with its member states through a variety of key committees and internal structures. Notably, the heart of UAS co-ordination and expertise within NATO lies in the Joint Capability Group UAS (JCGUAS) reporting to the Conference of National Armament Directors (CNAD). This core group supports and is supported by high level policies developed in the Military Committee and the political committees of the CNAD, the Air and Missile Defence Committee, and the Aviation Committee.

The JCGUAS meets twice annually in plenary session, and along with its sub structure develops and maintains a raft of technical and operational NATO UAS Standards (see Chapter 6). The standards that can be made publically available are published in the NATO e-publishing portal at the [NATO website](#). The JCGUAS comprises air, land, and maritime practitioners from the technical and operational domains. The focus is on 4 key UAS goals: capability advancement, interoperability, operational effectiveness, and acceptance of UAS across NATO (member states). On the latter, the JCGUAS is playing an increasingly important role in ensuring coherence across NATO UAS activity and driving acceptance of UAS. Key focus areas of the group from 2020 are the finalisation of a sense and avoid performance-based specification anticipated at the end of 2020, to inform future work in this critical area. Additionally, the JCGUAS is at the nascent stages of investigating the potential for autonomy and artificial intelligence for supportive applications in areas such as mission planning, modes of failure, and data fusion.

The Air and Missile Defence Committee is the home of NATO's Counter-UAS (C-UAS) Working Group, bringing allies together to work on the emergent issues associated with the threat and response required. The Military Committee is concerned with the delivery of UAS operations, in particular the employment of the first commonly owned NATO UAS, the Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) Global Hawk RQ-4D High Altitude Long Endurance (HALE) UAS, based at Sigonella Italy. This marks a major milestone on the journey to achieve “acceptance of UAS,” but significant challenges remain and are continually being worked across NATO, centered on the heart of expertise within the JCGUAS.

A significant incremental step towards full airspace integration of UAS was achieved at the end of 2019 with the publication of NATO STANAG 7234 defining high level standards for Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems Airspace Integration. This standard will drive further incremental work to develop airspace integration across small, medium, and large UAS.

All of the above efforts are guided by NATO UAS policy that promotes a coherent and consistent approach to UAS across the Alliance. It guides the development and continuance of appropriate organizational structures and international and multinational cooperation with NATO members, partners, and international organizations. The policy concludes by detailing the requirement for international and multinational cooperation across but not limited to the ICAO, UN, EU, EUROCONTROL, EASA, and FAA. It is available on request through the NATO office contact listed in this document.

For more information, contact Ross McKenzie ([mckenzie.ross@hq.nato.int](mailto:mckenzie.ross@hq.nato.int)) NATO UAS Officer.

### **3.2. Department of Homeland Security (DHS)**

Unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), commonly known as drones, continue to change and challenge the homeland security landscape. There have been significant changes in the policy, use, testing and other aspects related to UAS use in the past year. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) operational components—such as the U.S. Coast Guard, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and others—employ UAS for several purposes. UAS allow operators to monitor remote locations, improve situational awareness, and are a critical tool in emergency response such as search and rescue. However, UAS can also be used for illegal activities. The Department of Homeland Security and the DHS Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) are tackling these challenges by researching ways to protect against UAS-based threats and ways to make UAS more usable for the Homeland Security Enterprise. Through this multifaceted approach, DHS is helping to protect against nefarious UAS use while researching operational use for homeland security officials.

One major development, the Preventing Emerging Threats Act of 2018, grants DHS statutory authority to counter credible threats from UAS to the safety or security of a covered facility or asset. This authority is paramount to the Department's mission to protect and secure the Homeland from evolving threats. The Department is in the process of coordinating with Components and stakeholders regarding the need for additional counter-UAS authorities. More information on DHS counter UAS efforts can be found at [https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/dhs\\_cuas-legal-authorities\\_fact-sheet\\_190506-508.pdf](https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/dhs_cuas-legal-authorities_fact-sheet_190506-508.pdf) and at <https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Counter%20UAS%20Factsheet.pdf>.

DHS is actively participating in several interagency UAS activities, ranging from developing policy and guidance for the procurement and use of UAS, to cybersecurity issues and concerns, and UAS and critical infrastructure. The DHS Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) is taking a lead in many of these activities, more information can be found at <https://www.cisa.gov/publication/uas-fact-sheets> . Additionally, DHS S&T is working closely with NASA, FAA and other agencies to develop a capability to manage national airspace UAS traffic in the future, called the Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Traffic Management (UTM) infrastructure. More information on the UTM can be found at <https://www.dhs.gov/science-and-technology/news/2019/02/12/snapshot-working-nasa-secure-drone-traffic> .

DHS Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) established test sites to support UAS demonstrations, operational testing, and training. The site at Camp Shelby, Mississippi includes outdoor space and building facilities for land-based testing and training with UAS and robots. The facility at Singing River Island, Pascagoula, Mississippi is used for maritime-based UAS and related operations. The National Urban Security Technology Laboratory (NUSTL) in New York, conducts tests, evaluations, and operational assessments of homeland security technologies, including UAS, for the national first responder community. The NUSTL First Responder Robotic Operations System Test (FRROST) program conducts assessments of UAS in various operational scenarios. Details on the FRROST program is at <https://www.dhs.gov/science-and-technology/saver/st-small-unmanned-aircraft-systems-search-and-rescue-frrost>

DHS S&T is continuing the development of a suite of standardized test methods, designed to evaluate and measure key UAS performance parameters through research and test method development at the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). The standards are published and promulgated through ASTM, International. The standard test methods are used to quantifiably measure robot maneuvering, mobility, sensors, energy, radio communication, dexterity, durability, reliability, logistics, safety, autonomy, and operator proficiency. These standard tests use tangible, repeatable measurements to ensure operator confidence in the capability of the system, while building operator familiarity and skill. These test methods are adopted by numerous organizations around the world and have informed over \$100 million in response robot procurements. These test methods also support the training of UAS and response robot operators, are incorporated and adopted by several organizations as part of their UAS operator training and certification programs. More information on the standardized test methods can be found at <https://www.dhs.gov/publication/st-can-your-response-robot-really-do-fact-sheet-and-video>.

This very short summary just touches on few areas of DHS engagement in UAS-related activities. For more information on S&T activities, please visit <https://www.dhs.gov/science-and-technology/unmanned-aerial-systems>. For information on DHS UAS activities, visit <https://www.dhs.gov/publication/uas-fact-sheets> or go to <https://www.dhs.gov/publications> and search for “UAS” to access other documents.

### **3.3. Department of the Interior (DOI)**

The U.S. Department of the Interior (DOI) is a Cabinet-level agency that manages America's vast natural and cultural resources. The department employs some 70,000 people, including expert scientists and resource-management professionals, in nine technical Bureaus:

- Bureau of Indian Affairs
- Bureau of Land Management
- Bureau of Ocean Energy Management
- Bureau of Reclamation
- Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement



- National Park Service
- Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement
- U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
- U.S. Geological Survey

DOI manages nearly 20% of the land in the United States and has nearly every use case for UAS in its portfolio. The department has an extensive need for remote sensing data for those use cases. Beginning in 2009, in conjunction with the Bureaus, the DOI Office of Aviation Services began its programmatic planning for the use of UAS for DOI missions. In 2010, DOI acquired over \$20M in excess U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) equipment to begin testing and evaluation of whether or not they would support the DOI mission. Over the next several years, DOI operated the excess military equipment on a variety of missions. In the testing of the excess DOD equipment, it became clear that DOI needed more and different sensors than were available on the DOD aircraft. This led the Department to search for commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) solutions that would allow for the development of many different payloads. In 2016, DOI awarded its first contract for drone operations and today has a fleet of nearly 400 small UAS nationwide. In addition, DOI operates a vertical take-off and landing (VTOL) fixed wing aircraft and has contracts with several vendors for the support of emergency missions. Since the inception of the DOI UAS program there have been over 17,000 flights and in FY18 alone DOI conducted over 10,000 flights across the U.S. The goal of the DOI UAS program is to maintain standardization of UAS platforms while building a variety of payloads. DOI has developed or used over 30 different payloads on the four models of fleet aircraft it currently operates. The roadmap for DOI over the next several years will be to increase the availability of low cost UAS solutions for the Bureaus, increase availability of contractor provided services and continue to find new and innovative ways to conduct the many missions of the Department.

### **3.4. International Trade Administration (ITA)**

The International Trade Administration (ITA) strengthens the competitiveness of U.S. industry, promotes trade and investment, and ensures fair trade through rigorous enforcement of trade laws and agreements. ITA has more than 1,500 employees assisting U.S. exporters in 108 U.S. locations and in 78 markets worldwide. More information is available on [ITA's website](#).

#### **I&A UAS-Related Equities**

The Industry & Analysis Aerospace Team has roles in both domestic and international development of the Unmanned Aircraft System market. To begin with, I&A serves as a gateway for industry to interact with relevant USG agencies (such as FAA, TSA, and NASA) as well as the parts of Commerce directly involved in the development of UAS policies, procedures, operations, and standards (such as NIST and NTIA).

Moreover, the Director of the I&A Office of Transportation and Machinery regularly represents ITA/Commerce on the UAS Executive Committee (EXCOM), an interagency body hosted by the FAA to coordinate UAS policies across the USG. The UAS EXCOM membership consists of representatives of the

FAA, DOD, Commerce, Justice, DHS, Interior, and NASA. The EXCOM oversees rulemaking, addresses specific issues such as Counter-UAS threats and solutions, and identifies research gaps. ITA is working with the interagency on strengthening the industrial base for UAS through EXCOM discussions and multiple other avenues.

On a regular basis, I&A addresses factors that affect the competitiveness of U.S. products, including export control issues. For instance, the U.S. is a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), which seeks to limit the risks of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by controlling transfers that could contribute to delivery systems for such weapons (other than manned aircraft). As currently written, MTCR regards larger UAS (with a range exceeding 300km and/or a payload exceeding 500kg) as part of Category I. Category I items face a strong presumption of denial of export to anyone except allies.

In discussions with officials from the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), I&A determined that certain UAS have the possibility of being reclassified to allow for freer exports. BIS has indicated that they are working with their international partners on providing Category II treatment for a certain subset of UAS with a yet-to-be-determined maximum speed value (as well as associated parts and components).

U.S. export controls reflect the reality of MTCR such that a great number UAS components and complete systems require licensing in order to export (either the more restrictive International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) process governed by State or the less onerous process for products on the Commerce Control List or designated as falling under the Export Administration Regulations (EAR). Continued movement of UAS-related products from ITAR to the CCL/EAR will be dependent on changes to MTCR that allow governments to shift more UAS out of Category I.

### **3.5. National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)**

#### **UAS Traffic Management (UTM)**

NASA's Ames Research Center in California's Silicon Valley has set out to create a research platform that will help manage drones flying at low altitude (e.g., below 400 ft.) along with other airspace users. Known as UAS Traffic Management (UTM), the goal is to create a system that can integrate drones safely and efficiently into air traffic that is already flying in low-altitude airspace. That way, package delivery and recreational flights won't interfere with helicopters, nearby airports, or even public safety drones being flown by first responders helping to save lives.

The system will be a bit different than the air traffic control system used by the FAA for today's commercial airplanes. UTM will be based on digital sharing of each user's planned flight details. Each user will have the same situational awareness of airspace, unlike what happens in today's air traffic control. The multi-year UTM project continues NASA's long-standing relationship with the FAA. Throughout the collaboration, NASA Ames has provided research and testing to the agency, which will ultimately put this knowledge to use in the real world. NASA leads the UTM project along with dozens of

partners across various industries and academia who are committed to researching and developing a safe platform.

### **How does the research work?**

UTM research is broken down into four phases called TCLs, technology capability levels, each with specific technical goals that help build up the system as the research progresses.

**TCL1:** Successfully completed in August 2015 and serving as the starting point of the platform, researchers conducted field tests addressing how drones can be used in agriculture, firefighting, and infrastructure monitoring. The researchers also worked to incorporate different technologies to help with flying the drones safely such as scheduling and geofencing, which is an invisible flight zone assigned to each small aircraft.

**TCL2:** Successfully completed in October 2016 and focused on monitoring drones that are flown in sparsely populated areas where an operator can't actually see the drones they're flying. Researchers tested technologies for on-the-fly adjustment of areas that drones can be flown in and clearing airspace due to search-and-rescue (SAR) or for loss of communications with a small aircraft.

**TCL3:** Successfully completed in 2018 with flight demonstration tests conducted at six test sites between May and June. These sites were in Alaska, Nevada, New York, North Dakota, Texas, and Virginia. Approximately 40 partners participated, completing shakedowns and flight tests. All sites connected to the UTM system and testing was coordinated from the Airspace Operations Lab at NASA Ames Research Center.

**TCL4:** Successfully completed In August 2019 when NASA successfully concluded simultaneous flight operations of multiple small UAS over complex urban environments. TCL4 flight demonstration tests were carried out with 35 partner organizations, from May through August, at Reno, Nevada, and Corpus Christi, Texas.

FAA's operational Low Altitude Authorization and Notification Capability (LAANC) system for enabling small UAS operations expanded to 21 industry service suppliers and approximately 600 airports in 2019. The Notice of Proposed Rulemaking governing the remote identification of small UAS was also published in 2019.

After the research is completed and the results are compiled, NASA will then transfer the findings to the FAA for implementation. This partnership between research and regulatory agencies, along with the input of thousands of experts and users will set the stage for a future of a well-connected sky. Drones will offer many benefits by performing jobs too dangerous, dirty, or dull for humans to do, and NASA is helping to navigate to that future.

More information about the UTM program is available at <https://utm.arc.nasa.gov/index.shtml>

### **UAS Integration in the NAS (UAS-NAS)**

To address UAS-NAS integration technical challenges, NASA initiated the UAS integration in the NAS (UAS-NAS) Project within the Integrated Aviation Systems Program of the Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate in 2010. The UAS-NAS Project approach was to contribute research findings to reduce technical barriers related to the safety and operational challenges associated with enabling routine UAS access to the NAS in technology areas aligned with current NASA expertise and capabilities. Unlike the research activity of UTM, the goal of UAS-NAS is to develop and test specific technologies leading to the operational integration of UAS into the NAS and providing specific research findings to inform the RTCA-developed Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS) for flights above 500 feet. The technology development is coordinated with the FAA through a Research Transition Team. The Project consists of two phases, with Phase 1 having a Part 1 from FY11 – FY13, and a Part 2 from FY14 - FY16. Phase 2 of the Project was initiated in FY17 and will run through the end of calendar year 2020. By the end of the project, NASA will have invested nearly \$300M in support of technology and standards development.

#### **How does the research work?**

Phase 1 - Part 1 included development and integration of system-level key concepts, technologies, and procedures based on UAS stakeholder and community needs collected during UAS-NAS Project formulation. This phase also included refinement of those needs as part of defining the specifics of the Phase 1 - Part 2 research portfolio. Phase 1 - Part 1 research activities were continued in Phase 1 - Part 2 and modified as necessary based on the research portfolio. Phase 1 - Part 2 of the Project included demonstration of the integrated technologies in operationally-relevant environments. The technology areas selected for Phase 1 - Part 2 included Detect and Avoid (DAA), Command and Control (C2), Human Systems Integration (HSI), and Integrated Test and Evaluation (IT&E) for Live, Virtual, Constructive - Distributed Environment (LVC-DE) development. By using a rigorous research selection process, the contribution of the Project Phase 1 - Part 2 research activities to the development of RTCA SC-228 Phase 1 DAA and C2 MOPS, as well as providing foundational research associated with full integration of UAS into the NAS, was maximized.

Phase 2 of the Project was formulated simultaneously with the final year of execution for Phase 1 - Part 2. The technology areas selected for Phase 2 include DAA, C2, and Systems Integration and Operationalization (SIO). The DAA and C2 research findings will inform RTCA SC-228 Phase 2 MOPS, and the SIO activity will culminate in an operational demonstration with numerous operational concepts in the summer of 2020. The research findings from the SIO demonstration will be coordinated with the FAA with the intent of informing an accelerated UAS type-certification process.

### **Resilient Autonomy (RA)**

Resilient Autonomy (RA) is an activity initiated at Armstrong Flight Research Center several years ago which was recently jointly funded under a DOD Joint Capabilities Technology Demonstration (JCTD) with investments from NASA, DOD, and industry. The goal of RA is to provide improved autonomous safety capabilities for a range of UAS. RA has a very close connection with the FAA and is structured to establish an FAA certification process for increasing levels of autonomy on UAS. Standards work is being

coordinated through both the FAA and ASTM. RA will continue through the summer of 2021 with final deliverables including an Expandable Variable-Autonomy Architecture (EVAA), EVAA software, flight-test artifacts to support safe integration of increasingly automated UAS, and a plan which informs certification strategies and architecture best practices for increasingly automated aircraft (both manned and unmanned).

### **How does the research work?**

RA will take a stepwise approach to informing the UAS certification process by first looking at a Part 23 vehicle with increasing levels of autonomy during FY19. Flight-test artifacts will be infused into the Part 23 certification process to assess the impact of increased levels of autonomy. During FY20, collections of flight-test artifacts will be used to develop a crosswalk between Part 23 and an improved certification process for increasing levels of autonomy on a UAS. RA will culminate in an operational demonstration of a mission using high levels of automation conducted in the NAS during the fall of 2021. RA will deliver a certification guide for increasingly automated aircraft, and a gap analysis of additional work needed by NASA, FAA, and industry to enable routine access for fully automated aircraft into the NAS.

### **Advanced Air Mobility (AAM)**

NASA's vision for Advanced Air Mobility (AAM) is to help emerging aviation markets to safely develop an air transportation system that moves people and cargo between places previously not served or underserved by aviation – local, regional, intraregional, urban – using revolutionary new aircraft that are only just now becoming possible. AAM includes NASA's work on Urban Air Mobility (UAM), and will provide substantial benefit to U.S. industry and the public.

NASA is seeking public, private, and academic organizations to collaborate with NASA within working groups focused on enabling the AAM ecosystem. The realization of the AAM vision will be possible only through the input and contributions of multiple stakeholders, each possessing the necessary authority, expertise, and/or resources to fulfill a critical role in AAM's development, approval, and implementation. Active participation will become integral to the working groups, which will provide a forum for those stakeholders to comment, collaborate and impact the overall ecosystem.

The primary purpose of the AAM ecosystem working groups is to share input, information and opinions that may help to accelerate the development of safe, high-volume AAM flight operations in the existing and anticipated future national airspace system. A broad participation from many organizations will enable NASA, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and the AAM community to supplement the existing efforts in the industry, focusing on understanding the viewpoints of a diverse group of stakeholders and an understanding of the ecosystem as a whole. The AAM ecosystem working groups, in coordination with the National Campaign series, industry developments, and other Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate (ARMD) efforts, will contribute to the enablement of AAM markets.

NASA's AAM research seeks to accomplish the following goals:

- Communicate the current and future state of the AAM ecosystem and align on terminology, challenges, barriers, and solutions.

- Provide a forum to forge collaborative opportunities to advance the AAM state of the art, including establishing new industry partnerships.
- Increase awareness of NASA's research and planned transition paths.
- Develop a reference AAM framework and system architecture for AAM technology, systems, and operations.
- Support discussions of regulatory and standards development activities at the federal, state, and local level.
- Inform the community on the current state of the industry to identify research gaps and areas of highest industry need.
- Engage the public on AAM, including stakeholders from state and local governments.

### **How does the research work?**

The working group participants will be asked to share their diverse expertise, information, and opinions on these topics. The working groups will be a forum to communicate industry demonstrations and research and development (R&D) priorities, and to share concepts that may enable AAM.

NASA is seeking information and viewpoints on the following priority topics:

- The overall approach to the National Campaign (NC) Series, including elements of NC Developmental Testing and the first National Campaign.
- Requirements associated with each aircraft system and subsystems, airspace system and subsystems, and infrastructure necessary to advance AAM.
- Community wide R&D efforts, with a focus on areas of NASA R&D that will enable critical elements of AAM integration.
- Federal, local, and other industry led initiatives.

Participants will be asked to share their diverse expertise, information, and opinions on these topics. Their participation in the working groups will help identify the critical parameters and standards that may impact the future framework development and approach for safety, certification, airspace, aircraft concepts, technologies, and architectures.

NASA commenced the AAM ecosystem working groups in March 2020 in a virtual forum. To view the discussed content, please visit the following webpage: <https://nari.arc.nasa.gov/aamwgvirtualekickoff>

In addition to the virtual kickoff, NASA will be hosting periodic working group meetings to continue to facilitate community engagement and information related to the AAM ecosystem. NASA expects inputs from the community will be broad and diverse and thereby not expected to reach consensus. The meetings will function similar to open workshops with specific topics serving to focus discussions. By registering, the parties will be added to the distribution list and informed of all meeting times. This is not a formal membership, and, consequently, there will be opportunity for all registered parties to attend any scheduled meetings.

The meetings will typically be in a virtual environment to minimize impact on participating organizations while maximizing the opportunities to interface. However, the working group's goals will determine the need and frequency for in-person (if circumstances allow) and virtual meetings.

Participation in the AAM ecosystem working groups will give contributors the opportunity to closely collaborate with NASA and other government organizations in discussions relating to standards, policies, and operationalization of AAM. These discussions will leverage NASA's knowledge and lessons learned with designing and testing airspace management systems and flying one-of-a-kind aircraft. Moreover, participants will receive consistent updates regarding the current state of the AAM ecosystem, allowing them to determine where they can provide the best value to their organizations and industry.

For more information, see <https://www.nasa.gov/aam> and <https://nari.arc.nasa.gov/aam>

### **AAM National Campaign**

NASA has announced plans for a series of technology demonstrations known as the Advanced Air Mobility (AAM) National Campaign (formerly the UAM Grand Challenge). The goal of the challenge is to assure AAM safety and accelerate scalability through integrated demonstrations of candidate operational concepts and scenarios.

The AAM National Campaign is managed by the NASA's Advanced Air Mobility project, a new project office established in the agency's Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate (ARMD) to coordinate all of NASA's AAM-related activity as part of its focus to enable emerging aviation markets.

When fully implemented, AAM will provide a safe and efficient system for passenger and cargo air transportation and could include such innovations as small package delivery within dense urban areas; personal taxi service by air; air medical services, such as patient ambulance transportation; and cargo delivery to underserved communities.

NASA's partnership with the FAA will also be a key factor in the successful and safe outcomes for industry that can be expected from conducting these series of National Campaigns during the coming years.

### **How does the research work?**

The NASA-led National Campaign series will bring together companies intending to develop and/or operate air vehicles or airspace management services within the larger AAM ecosystem. In addition to bringing together companies involved in emerging air transportation systems, the challenge will help to ensure public safety by informing requirements for UAM operations and formalizing best practices to enable the development of regulations by the Federal Aviation Administration.

While the first National Campaign is targeted for 2022, several developmental testing activities are planned for 2020 and 2021. The first step involves activities – known as the National Campaign Developmental Testing (NC-DT) – that will lay the groundwork for the first challenge. The goal of the developmental test is to assess the readiness of NASA's airspace and range test infrastructure. It is a risk

reduction step toward National Campaign 1, designed to allow U.S. developed aircraft and airspace management service providers to try out their systems against real-world scenarios in live, virtual, constructive environments. The test will verify relevant flight test scenarios, assist in data collection, and assess readiness.

NASA selected industry partners proposals from three categories:

- **Developmental Flight Testing:** Industry partners will provide a vehicle to fly in the NC-DT and demonstrate key integrated operational UAM scenarios as designed by NASA’s UAM National Campaign team.
- **Developmental Airspace Simulation:** Industry partners will test UAM traffic management services in robust NASA-designed airspace simulations in the NC-DT and demonstrate key integrated operational UAM scenarios.
- **Vehicle Provider Information Exchange:** Industry partners and NASA will exchange information with the intent to prepare that partner for possible flight activities during the first National Campaign at a NASA-provided or other approved test range in 2022.

So far, 17 companies have signed Space Act Agreements with NASA to participate in NC-DT and activities leading up to the first National Campaign. With these agreements, both NASA and the signing parties agree to provide resources to accomplish the goals of the testing.

For more information, see <https://www.nasa.gov/aamnationalecampaign>.

### **3.6. National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH)**

The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) is a research agency focused on the study of worker safety and health, and empowering employers and workers to create safe and healthy workplaces. NIOSH is part of the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, in the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. It has the mandate to assure “every man and woman in the Nation safe and healthful working conditions and to preserve our human resources.”

NIOSH established the [Center for Occupational Robotics Research \(CORR\)](#) in September 2017 to provide scientific leadership to guide the development and use of occupational robots that enhance worker safety, health, and well-being. The Center includes multidisciplinary scientists from across NIOSH.

The Center works in partnership with academic researchers, trade associations, robotics manufacturers, employers using robotics technology, labor organizations, and other federal agencies. The Center focuses on:



- the potential of robotics technology to prevent worker injuries and musculoskeletal disorders. The Center addresses traditional robots and emerging technologies such as collaborative robots, mobile robots, exoskeletons, and remotely controlled or autonomous vehicles and drones.
- increasing understanding of human and robot interactions to ensure human worker safety.
- improving the ability to identify and track injuries involving robotics technologies.
- providing guidance on working safely with robotics technologies.

Unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) have the potential to reduce rates of injury and death in the workplace. However, as is the case with other emerging technologies, occupational safety assessments of UAS lag behind technological advancements. UAS may create new workplace hazards that need to be evaluated and managed to ensure their safe operation near workers. A 2017 paper from the NIOSH in the American Journal of Industrial Medicine *UAVs in Construction and Worker Safety* describes the four major uses of UAS (military, public, recreational and commercial), the potential risks of their use to workers, approaches for risk mitigation, and the important role that safety and health professionals can play in ensuring safe approaches to their occupational use. NIOSH has set the stage for future research by incorporating research needs related to drones into its [Strategic Plan](#) and a [contract](#) to develop and test autonomous drone navigation in dark underground mining environments. See also section 8.5 of this roadmap on workplace safety.

### **3.7. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)**

NIST promotes U.S. innovation and industrial competitiveness by advancing measurement science, standards, and technology in ways that enhance economic security and improve the quality of life. NIST is a non-regulatory agency of the U.S. Department of Commerce. More information is available on NIST's website.

#### **Standard Test Methods for UASs in the Public Safety Sector (Ongoing)**

NIST is developing the measurement and standards infrastructure necessary to evaluate robotic capabilities for emergency responders and military organizations addressing critical national security challenges. This includes leading the development of a comprehensive suite of *ASTM International Standard Test Methods for Response Robots*. The aerial suite includes 20 draft standard test methods for evaluating small UAS with the initial emphasis on vertical take-off and landing (VTOL) systems and small hand-launched fixed wing systems. For the VTOL systems, testing and practice starts within netted aviaries indoors and outdoors to avoid issues of flying in the national airspace. The test methods measure essential capabilities of robots and operator proficiency for hazardous missions defined by emergency responders and soldiers.

These test methods and performance metrics developed by NIST will allow small unmanned aircraft systems (sUAS) and aerial system pilots to get comprehensively evaluated and quantitatively compared prior to deploying into more operationally significant scenarios involving mock villages and cities with scripted scenarios. Embedded standard test apparatuses within the scenarios enable the periodic measurement of performance to capture degradations that may occur due to environmental variables

such as shadows, smoke, etc. In addition, these tests include those for navigating hallways within buildings, searching and mapping wide areas, and avoiding situations that may interfere with radio communications.

NIST's test methods and performance metrics are contributing to a new strategic collaboration between the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) and ASTM International. ASTM will standardize the underlying test methods. NFPA will select various combinations of those test methods representing essential mission capabilities to define sUAS equipment standards for public safety operations. Specifically, the new standard [NFPA® 2400, Standard for Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems \(sUAS\) Used for Public Safety Operations](#) includes a suite of 10 aerial test methods developed by NIST that quantitatively measure both the system capabilities of the drone and the proficiency of the pilot in carrying out five basic maneuvers, including accurate landing, vertical climbing, and straight and level flying. There also are five functionality test methods, including circular orbits to identify objects from afar and spiral maneuvers to conduct close-range inspections.

Additional information is available on the NIST Intelligent Systems Division, Standard Test Methods for Response Robots, Aerial Systems [webpage](#).

### **NIST Grants (Use of UAVs/UASs in Emergency Situations)**

In addition to the investment in the development of test methods for UAS, NIST has invested research funding into improvements and the use of UAS for applications in the public safety sector. NIST has also used UAS to collect data, such as during wildland fire research. The following are examples of grants released by NIST specific to the application of UAS.

#### **2018 UAS Flight and Payload Challenge**

NIST designed a competition to support field operations of UASs for first responders. One of the barriers for UAS used in a public safety realm is payload versus flight time. VTOL of a UAS provides many different mission capabilities, but their flight time is limited. The payload capacity, energy source, and flight time are linked through design trade-offs that can be optimized for efficiency and flexibility. With these parameters in mind, this challenge was designed to help public safety operations by keeping a UAS and its payload airborne for the longest time possible with vertical and hovering accuracy. Additionally, at a cost of less than \$20,000 per UAS, this challenge shows first responders that there may someday be an affordable drone in their toolkit to carry wireless networks for search and rescue (SAR) operations. Additional information can be found on the 2018 UAS Flight and Payload Challenge [webpage](#).

#### **Improving Disaster Resilience through Scientific Data Collection with UAV Swarms**

The University of California, San Diego (San Diego, California), received a grant for \$749,924 from NIST to develop a method by which a “swarm” of UAVs can be used to collect field data on the health of structures and infrastructure lifelines (such as water, electrical, and gas) before, during, and after a natural disaster. This grant was part of NIST’s [Disaster Resilience Research Grants Program](#) and noted along with other funded projects in an August 2, 2017 NIST news item.

### **3.8. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)**

As the nation's environmental intelligence agency, the mission of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) is one of science, service, and stewardship, in which science provides the critical foundation for all other elements. NOAA provides weather information that is considered as one of the important components of the aviation ecosystem. In support of this mission, the use of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) is revolutionizing NOAA's ability to bolster science through enhanced monitoring and understanding of the global environment by complimenting observations from satellites, ships, aircraft, balloons, and surface-based sensors. In recognition of these opportunities, NOAA is developing a framework to efficiently provide requirements-driven, safe, cost-effective, and compliant unmanned systems services across the agency. This is accomplished by working to identify, evaluate, and transition innovative capabilities that meet NOAA's observing requirements. The agency also prioritizes strategic investments in unmanned systems applications and technologies that fuel innovation and strengthen operations, and accelerates and enhances capabilities through partnerships.

NOAA has been involved with the testing and development of UAS for several years. Collaboration with NASA and industry partners in 2005-2007 resulted in a series of tests using both large and small UAS for various applications. Since those beginnings, NOAA has been expanding UAS research, development, and transition of matured capabilities into operations and commercialization. The capabilities have ranged from small multi-rotor, fixed wing, and hybrid platforms with wingspans of less than six feet, up to the very large, complex platforms with wingspans of more than 115 feet and capable of flying in the stratosphere. Applications have also been quite diverse, requiring missions geographically ranging from the planet's oceans, poles, vast land masses, and in much of the atmosphere above.

NOAA uses a requirements-based approach for developing UAS technologies and observing strategies with overlapping functions in research, development, and transition processes. During the research phase, emerging trends and capabilities with the potential to meet NOAA's observing requirements are identified and included in an analysis of alternatives to help match stakeholder needs (e.g., observation requirements, sensor requirements, risk, and budget) with the capabilities and performance of potential UAS platforms and sensors. During development, an initial end-user transition plan, including a concept of operations, data management plan, and cost-benefit analysis are prepared prior to demonstrating the UAS capability in an operational setting. Testing, evaluation, and demonstration of a UAS involve assessing and tracking the readiness level (RL) of the platform, payload, and observing system application. RLs typically need to be re-assessed with the development of each new operationally ready system.

To ensure that NOAA's strategy for implementing UAS realizes transformational advances in performance, skill, and efficiency, the agency is developing an unmanned systems implementation plan that will define detailed action items, deadlines, and responsibilities that are scaled to potentially available funding levels. Meanwhile, NOAA's use of unmanned systems is already significantly improving performance in its lifesaving and economically impactful missions, and is setting the course to strengthen its renowned environmental science and technology leadership for the coming decades.

Because NOAA’s research impacts all American citizens in terms of our economies, natural environments, and societal resilience, the agency plans to continue the development and implementation of UAS as a means to continue providing actionable and reliable environmental intelligence to improve forecasts, save lives, property, and resources, on path toward advancing NOAA's mission goals.

### **3.9. USDA Forest Service**

Created in 1905 to care for the land and serve the people, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) Forest Service is the Nation’s foremost Federal forestry organization. The agency is supported by more than 30,000 professionals focused on a mission to sustain the health, diversity, and productivity of the Nation's forests and grasslands to meet the needs of present and future generations. Forest Service mission activities are concentrated in four major areas.

**National Forest System:** The Forest Service is the steward of 154 national forests and 20 grasslands encompassing nearly 193 million acres, commonly referred to as the National Forest System (NFS). These lands comprise about eight percent of the United States’ total land area and are located in 44 states as well as Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands. These natural resources managed by the agency are some of America's greatest assets and have major economic, environmental, and social significance.

**State and Private Forestry:** The Forest Service supports and cooperates with state and private landowners in the management of non-NFS forested lands and watersheds. The agency provides direct technical and financial assistance to States, Tribes, communities and non-industrial private landowners towards improved stewardship and sustainable management, focusing on forest health, fire protection, active management strategies, and conservation efforts.

**Research and Development:** With programs in all 50 states, U.S. territories, and commonwealths, the Forest Service is the largest forestry research organization in the world. The agency operates a network of research units, laboratories, and experimental forests and rangelands to conduct leading-edge research on all aspects of forestry, rangeland management, biological and physical sciences, socioeconomics, forest uses, and more.

**International Programs:** The Forest Service provides international assistance to formulate policy and coordinate U.S. support on global forest resource management issues such as climate change and carbon sequestration, illegal logging, biodiversity conservation, habitat protection, and disaster preparedness and response. The agency currently engages in scientific research, technical cooperation, development, and conservation activities in more than 90 countries around the world.

#### **Forest Service Integration of UAS**

Wildland fire management has been the primary focus for UAS in the Forest Service since it first applied the technology in 1996 to capture data for a prescribed fire event on the Lolo National Forest in Montana. Since the early 2000s, the agency has leveraged both small and large UAS platforms in partnership with other agencies, academia and private industry to evaluate and enhance its capacity to

address wildland fire management information needs. In 2003, NASA and the Forest Service jointly implemented the Wildfire Research and Applications Partnership (WRAP) to explore emerging technologies to improve fire remote sensing capabilities and response to fire events. WRAP efforts included the *Small UAS Demonstration Series* conducted with UAS industry at NASA Ames Research Center in 2005 and Ft. Hunter Liggett, CA in 2006 to demonstrate and explore how UAS can be used to support fire suppression activities in operational conditions.

Research to operations activities under WRAP also included the 2007-2009 Western States Mission. This milestone effort by NASA and the Forest Service used NASA's Ikhana MQ-9 Predator platform to fly 18 missions, collect high resolution multispectral and thermal imagery with the Autonomous Modular Sensor (AMS) and provide timely science data products for 81 wildfires across eight western states. Several additional small UAS research and collaborative technology development efforts were conducted by the Forest Service in coordination with private industry in 2010. This included a series of missions at DOD sites throughout the US to demonstrate/evaluate sensor payloads, software technologies to generate near real-time geospatial products, communication relay capabilities, and aircraft modifications for operations in incident airspace.

Since 2015, the Forest Service has also worked closely with its sister agencies in the Department of Interior (DOI) to test commercially manufactured UAS platforms and technologies to support wildland fire management activities. Examples include increasing personnel safety and fire management effectiveness by acquiring and providing of near real-time remote sensing products during operational periods to increase situational awareness and support tactical decision making, and removing personnel from safety hazards associated with low and slow aviation operations by conducting unmanned aerial ignition operations. These efforts have resulted in the routine presence of both fixed wing and rotary small UAS platforms over the past few years in support of DOI/Forest Service incident management activities.

The Forest Service also follows a deliberate approach to ensure safe and cost-effective use of UAS to support non-wildland fire applications. Over the past decade, the Forest Service has leveraged interagency agreements and contracted services to demonstrate and evaluate the use of small UAS to support numerous resource management applications. These activities include inspection of infrastructure, estimation of forest biophysical parameters, detection and mapping of pests/pathogens impacting forest health, detection and mapping of invasive species on rangelands, estimation of grass height and streambank conditions in grazing allotments, assessing burn severity and damage from wildfires, mapping and characterizing aquatic habitat in riparian areas, mapping vegetation types in wetlands and meadows, and surveying and measuring paleontological features.

### **Forest Service UAS Program Implementation**

To date the Forest Service operates a relatively limited number of UAS mostly through contracted services and interagency agreements. However, the scope and diversity of the Forest Service resource management activities present numerous use cases for UAS (more than 30 use cases are currently documented) and underscores the need for an agency UAS program. Consequently, by the end of CY20,

the agency will complete the final stages of a sustained effort to formally stand up a comprehensive UAS program. This effort includes the essential cornerstones of a successful program including development and approval of aviation policy and standards for UAS operations, onboarding necessary program management and support staff, and the initial acquisition of fleet aircraft and related infrastructure. The strategic vision of the Forest Service's UAS Program is to provide world-class UAS services and support its employees, partners, cooperators, and the public. This vision combines effective acquisition and fleet management with continually improving employee and pilot training, efficient planning and mission execution tools, service contracting and agreement support options, and state-of-the-art program management based around evolving and continually monitored performance metrics that drive planning.

## 4. Overviews of Private-Sector Standards Development Organization Activities

### 4.1. 3<sup>rd</sup> Generation Partnership Project (3GPP)

The 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) unites seven telecommunications standard development organizations: Association of Radio Industries and Businesses (ARIB), Alliance for Telecommunications Industry Solutions (ATIS), China Communications Standards Association (CCSA), European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI), Telecommunications Standards Development Society India (TSDSI), Telecommunications Technology Association (TTA), and Telecommunication Technology Committee (TTC). These are known as “Organizational Partners” and 3GPP provides their members with a stable environment to produce the Reports and Specifications that define 3GPP technologies.

The original scope of 3GPP (1998) was to produce Technical Specifications and Technical Reports for a 3G Mobile System based on evolved Global System for Mobile (GSM) core networks and the radio access technologies that they support (i.e., Universal Terrestrial Radio Access (UTRA) both Frequency Division Duplex (FDD) and Time Division Duplex (TDD) modes).

This scope was then expanded to include the maintenance and development of the GSM communications Technical Specifications and Technical Reports including evolved radio access technologies (e.g., General Packet Radio Service (GPRS) and Enhanced Data rates for GSM Evolution (EDGE)).

The 3GPP's scope was subsequently amended to include the specification of 4G Mobile System (aka LTE or EPS) and then 5G, which is the bulk of current 3GPP activities.

The project covers cellular telecommunications network technologies, including radio access, the core transport network, and service capabilities – including work on codecs, security, and quality of service (QoS) – and thus provides complete system specifications. The specifications also provide hooks for non-radio access to the core network, and for interworking with Wi-Fi networks.

3GPP specifications and studies are contribution-driven by member companies. The 3GPP structure consists of sixteen Working Groups (WGs), each one covering a dedicated topic (e.g., Radio Layer 1, codecs). These WGs have one to two meetings per quarter. Once per quarter the WGs officials meet and report to three Technical Specification Groups (TSG) where their work is presented for information, discussion, and approval.

The three TSGs in 3GPP are: Radio Access Networks (RAN), Services & Systems Aspects (SA), and Core Network & Terminals (CT).

Each TSG has a particular area of responsibility for the Reports and Specifications within its own Terms of Reference (details available in the Specification Groups pages). The last meeting of the cycle of plenary meetings is TSG SA, which also has responsibility for the overall coordination of work and for the monitoring of its progress.

The 3GPP technologies from these groups are constantly evolving through Generations of commercial cellular / mobile systems. Since the completion of the first LTE and the Evolved Packet Core specifications, 3GPP has become the focal point for mobile systems beyond 3G.

Although these Generations have become an adequate descriptor for the type of network under discussion, real progress on 3GPP standards is measured by the milestones achieved in particular Releases. New features are “functionality frozen” and are ready for implementation when a Release is completed. 3GPP works on a number of Releases in parallel, starting future work well in advance of the completion of the current Release. Although this adds some complexity to the work of the groups, such a way of working ensures that progress is continuous and stable.

Normative work related to UAS is targeted for Release 17, to be published by the second half of 2021. Previous Releases 15 and 16 covered preliminary studies.

The following standards, technical reports, and other documents related to unmanned systems are in development or published from 3GPP:

Published Documents:

- 3GPP TR 36.777, Study on Enhanced LTE Support for Aerial Vehicles (V15.0.0, Release 15)
- 3GPP TR 22.825, Study on Remote Identification of Unmanned Aerial Systems (V16.0.0, Release 16)
- 3GPP TS 22.125, Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) support in 3GPP (V16.3.0, Release 16 and V17.1.0, Release 17)

In-Development Documents:

- SP-181252 Rel-17 Work Item “Study on application layer support for Unmanned Aerial System (UAS)” (FS\_UASAPP)
- SP-181114 Rel-17 Work Item “Study on supporting Unmanned Aerial Systems Connectivity, Identification, and Tracking” (FS\_ID\_UAS\_SA2)

Further updates to both published and ongoing 3GPP specifications related to UAS/UAV can be found at <https://www.3gpp.org/uas-uav>.

## **4.2. Airborne Public Safety Accreditation Commission (APSAC)**

The Airborne Public Safety Accreditation Commission (APSAC, formerly the Public Safety Aviation Accreditation Commission) was created in 2004 to establish standards for manned law enforcement aviation programs. Standards for fire and SAR aviation programs have been added to the original law



enforcement standards. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) recognizes the APSAC standards for manned aviation as the industry standards for public safety aviation.

The Airborne Public Safety Association (APSA, formerly the Airborne Law Enforcement Association) sponsored the development of sUAS standards to be added to existing manned aviation standards. A committee of experienced law enforcement and fire safety personnel held their first meeting in December 2016. Unlike manned aviation standards, UAS standards also address the legal and ethical use of the technology. The final version of the standards was released in October of 2017.

The standards contain five sections:

- 1) Administrative Matters
- 2) Operational Procedures
- 3) Safety
- 4) Training
- 5) Maintenance and Minimum System Requirements

More information is available on the [APSA website](#).

### **4.3. American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME)**

ASME helps the global engineering community develop solutions to real world challenges. Founded in 1880 as the American Society of Mechanical Engineers, ASME is a not-for-profit professional organization that enables collaboration, knowledge sharing, and skill development across all engineering disciplines, while promoting the vital role of the engineer in society. ASME codes and standards, publications, conferences, continuing education, and professional development programs provide a foundation for advancing technical knowledge and a safer world. More information is available on [ASME's website](#).

#### **Use of UAS for Inspection**

ASME has formed the Use of UAS for Inspection Subcommittee under the Mobile Unmanned Systems (MUS) Standards Committee tasked to develop a standard that provides the requirements for utilization of UAS to safely and reliably perform visual inspection of fixed equipment including pressure vessels, tanks, piping systems, and other components considered part of the critical infrastructure to obtain quality data and repeatable results. The intent of this standard, regardless of the industry, is not to re-define the inspection acceptance criteria but to define the requirements to use a UAS to perform the inspection in accordance to the acceptance criteria selected by the user. This standard is intended for pilot-operated UAS applications for VLOS and BVLOS.

The standard consists of the following table of contents sections: scope, general definitions, purpose of inspection, preparation for inspection, equipment for inspection, duties and responsibilities, conducting inspections, and documentation. The committee membership consists of 24 subject matter experts in nondestructive testing (NDT) and UAS/UAV, with more than 40 interested party individuals. The

committee meets four times per year in-person at the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Week and holds 2-3 teleconferences in-between meetings.

This standard provides the basis of using a UAS safely and reliably and can be applied for inspection of most (if not all) critical infrastructure, e.g., pipelines, wind turbines, solar arrays, hydro dams, etc.

There is a similar effort ongoing with the B30 committee on cranes and derricks for the use of UAS for inspections of cranes. The UAS content will be added to the B30 Standard as a separate volume ASME B30.32-20XX, *Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) used in Inspection, Testing, Maintenance and Material Lifting Operations*. This new standard will provide requirements and recommendations that address the use of UAS to support inspecting, maintaining, and operating cranes, and other material handling equipment of the ASME B30 Series of Standards.

The ASME B30.32 subcommittee that was established to develop the standard consists of 16 subject matter experts and reports to the ASME B30 Standards Committee, which has many volunteer experts from the crane and material handling industry. The subcommittee currently plans to meet 6-8 times over the next year.

#### **4.4. American Society of Safety Professionals (ASSP)**

The American Society of Safety Professionals (ASSP), formerly known as ASSE, is a global association for occupational safety and health professionals. For more than 100 years, ASSP has supported occupational safety and health (OSH) professionals in their efforts to prevent workplace injuries, illnesses, and fatalities. ASSP provides education, advocacy, standards development, and a professional community to their members in order to advance their careers and the OSH profession as a whole.

ASSP, as secretariat for the ANSI Accredited [A10 Committee for Construction and Demolition Operations](#), continues to receive requests for information addressing the use of drones. From the secretariat perspective most of the drones used for safety related purposes appear to involve construction and demolition operations and/or mining and natural resources. Accordingly, the A10 Committee approved the creation of an ASSP A10 ASC Technical Report (to be registered with ANSI) addressing practices for the safe use of drones for construction and demolition operations.

#### **4.5. ASTM International (ASTM)**

ASTM International (ASTM) is a globally recognized leader in the development of voluntary consensus standards. Today, [over 12,000 ASTM standards](#) are used around the world to improve product quality, enhance safety, strengthen market access and trade, and build consumer confidence. ASTM [welcomes and encourages participation](#) from around the world.

ASTM's leadership in international standards development is driven by the contributions of its members: more than 30,000 of the world's top technical experts and business professionals representing 140 countries. Working in an open and transparent process and using ASTM's advanced information

technology (IT) infrastructure, ASTM members create the tools that support industries and governments worldwide.

ASTM's [150 technical standards-writing committees](#) serve a broad range of industries: aerospace, infrastructure, public safety personnel, consumer products, and many more. When new industries — such as nanotechnology, additive manufacturing, and robotics — look to advance the growth of cutting-edge technologies through standardization, many of them come to ASTM International.

Beyond standards development, ASTM offers [certification and declaration through its subsidiary, the Safety Equipment Institute](#), as well as [technical training programs](#) and [proficiency testing](#). All of ASTM's programs complement its standards development activities and provide enterprise solutions for companies, government agencies, researchers, and laboratories worldwide.

### **ASTM UAS Portfolio**

ASTM International's portfolio of UAS standardization activities extends from the platform and software needs, operational and use, personnel and maintenance, all the way to user community applications. With ASTM's broad sector reach, industry has the ability to leverage UAS expertise and integrate it into long-standing and accepted procedures.

ASTM's manned aircraft committees offer a wide selection of standards that can serve as demonstrated means of compliance to the increasing risk-based regulatory approach of global civil aviation authorities. Depending on the aircraft category or risk class, ASTM standards offer a selection of resources to meet user needs.

At the same time, ASTM standards can help users meet local to international codes, insurance policies or even contractual needs. ASTM standards have commonly been referenced by various regulations and voluntary programs worldwide. With ASTM standards as the baseline of these various programs and regulations, industry can rely on one set of procedures across the NAS.

A detailed roadmap listing specific UAS related standards is maintained on the [ASTM F38 website](#).

### **ASTM UAS Related Activities**

#### **F38 Unmanned Aircraft Systems**

This Committee addresses issues related to design, performance, quality acceptance tests, operational applications, personnel, and safety monitoring for UAS. Stakeholders include manufacturers of UAS and their components, federal agencies, design and maintenance professionals, commercial services providers, trade associations, financial organizations, and academia. Three subcommittees support F38.

A [Full Listing of Standards and Work Items](#) is on the F38 website; its subcommittees are as follows:

- [F38.01](#) *Airworthiness: Product related – platform, system, hardware, software, devices, components*
- [F38.02](#) *Flight Operations: Operations related – overall & specific operations, situational considerations, scenario based*

- [F38.03](#) Personnel Training, Qualification and Certification: *Personnel related – Operators, maintenance, instructors, terminology*

### **E54 Homeland Security Applications**

This Committee addresses issues related to standards and guidance materials for homeland security applications with a specific focus on infrastructure protection, decontamination, personal protective equipment (PPE), security controls, threat and vulnerability assessment, operational equipment and chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRNE) sensors and detectors. The work of E54 supports public safety personnel through a [memorandum of understanding \(MOU\) agreement](#) with the National Institute of Justice (NIJ). E54's primary UAS standards work is in subcommittee E54.09 on Response Robots. A [Full List of Standards and Work Items](#) is on the E54 website. A high-level description of E54.09 is as follows:

- [E54.09](#) Response Robots: *Standards for aerial, aquatic and ground response robotic systems with test methods on platform and personnel performance*

### **F37 Light Sport Aircraft**

This Committee addresses issues related to design, performance, quality acceptance tests, and safety monitoring for light sport aircraft (LSA). LSA includes the two categories of aircraft created by the Certification of Aircraft and Airmen for the Operation of Light Sport Aircraft Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM): (1) special light-sport aircraft (used for personal flight and flight training), or (2) rental and experimental light-sport kit aircraft (any level of kit from zero to 95-percent prebuilt). F37 LSA standards related to structures, systems, and powerplants can be used for UAS requirements depending on the risk class. A [Full List of Standards and Work Items](#) is on their website.

### **F39 Aircraft Systems**

This committee addresses the design, inspection, alteration, and maintenance of aircraft systems. F39 was formed in response to the FAA's Small Airplane Directorate request for a voluntary consensus standards effort to develop standards addressing general aviation electrical wiring systems. A [Full List of Standards and Work Items](#) is found on their website. Depending on the UAS risk class, Committee F39 subcommittee structure develops global standards for:

- F39.01 Design, Alteration, and Certification of Electrical Systems
- F39.02 Inspection, Alteration, Maintenance, and Repair
- F39.03 Design of Avionics Systems
- F39.04 Aircraft Systems
- F39.05 Design, Alteration, and Certification of Electric Propulsion Systems

### **F44 General Aviation Aircraft**

This Committee addresses issues related to the design and construction (D&C), systems and performance, quality acceptance tests, and safety monitoring for general aviation aircraft. F44 was formed in response to the recommendation of the Part 23 Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC). A [Full](#)

[List of Standards and Work Items](#) is found on their website. Committee F44 is designed to develop global standards for:

- F44.10 General
- F44.20 Flight
- F44.30 Structures
- F44.40 Powerplant
- F44.50 Systems and Equipment
- F44.91 Terminology

### **[F46 Aerospace Personnel](#)**

This Committee addresses issues related to the development and maintenance of internationally accepted standards and guidance materials for aerospace personnel education, qualification, testing, certification requirements, and continued education concurrent with technological advancements. The work of this committee includes but is not limited to maintenance. F46's primary UAS standards work is in subcommittee F46.06 on Autonomous and Electric Aircraft Maintenance Personnel. A [Full List of Standards and Work Items](#) is on the F46 website. A high-level description of F46.06 is as follows:

- [F46.06](#) Autonomous and Electric Aircraft Maintenance Personnel: *Standards for the education, training and certification of aerospace personnel working in UAS and electric powered and electric propulsion aircraft (eVTOL)*

### **[F32 Search and Rescue](#)**

This Committee addresses issues related to equipment, testing and maintenance, management and operations as well as personnel training and education for SAR activities. Historically, F32 efforts have been focused on wilderness applications, including land, water, ice, and underwater SAR as well as canine use. A [Full List of Standards and Work Items can](#) be found on their website.

### **[E06 Performance of Buildings](#)**

This Committee address issues relating to the performance of buildings, their elements, components, and the description, measurement, prediction, improvement, and management of the overall performance of buildings and building-related facilities. E06 has 18 technical subcommittees that maintain jurisdiction of over 275 standards. The primary subcommittee that addresses UAS operations related to infrastructure needs is E06.55 Performance of Building Enclosures. A [Full List of Standards and Work Items](#) can be found on their website.

### **[E57 3D Imaging Systems](#)**

This Committee addresses issues related to 3D imaging systems, which include, but are not limited to laser scanners and optical range cameras (also known as flash LADAR or 3D range cameras). UAS using LIDAR technologies may benefit from E57 methods. Stakeholders include manufacturers, federal agencies, design professionals, trade associations, and academia. A [Full List of Standards and Work Items](#) can be found on their website.

## [F15 Consumer Products](#)

This Committee addresses issues related to standards for several different consumer product categories, including toy safety. Developed by a unique mixture of representatives from industry, government, testing laboratories, retailers, and the ultimate consumer, the F15 standards have and continue to play a preeminent role in reducing the number of injuries and deaths associated with the use and performance of consumer products based on identified hazards. A [Full List of Standards and Work Items](#) can be found on their website; however, F15.22 on Toy Safety develops standards for toy, hobby, or model UAS needs, such as micro-UAS.

## **4.6. Consumer Technology Association (CTA)**

As a catalyst to the dynamic technology industry, the [Consumer Technology Association](#) (CTA)<sup>™</sup> accelerates growth and progress for the fast-paced economy. With leading market research, CTA educates members, and by establishing standards, CTA shapes the industry at large.

A proponent of innovation, CTA advocates for the entrepreneurs, technologists, and innovators who mold the future of the consumer technology industry. CTA provides a platform that unites technology leaders to connect and collaborate, and it avidly supports members who push the boundaries to propel consumer technology forward.

CTA initiated standards work associated with drones in May of 2016, with the involvement of a variety of stakeholders, including the FAA. R6 WG 23, Unmanned Aerial Systems, began with a standard addressing serial numbers for sUAS. ANSI/CTA-2063-A, *Small Unmanned Aerial Systems Serial Numbers*, (now freely available via [CTA.tech](#)) was published in September 2019. The standard provides manufacturers with the structure for the creation of a physical serial number. Additionally, ANSI/CTA-2063-A outlines the maintenance and management of the four-digit manufacturer code that is used to identify the manufacturer of the sUAS. ANSI/CTA-2063-A has been adopted as the definitive standard for UAS serial numbers in both pending US and European regulation.

CTA's R14 WG 3, Cybersecurity for Small UAS, was established in September 2019 to develop a baseline set of requirements and recommendations for small UAS cybersecurity. ANSI/CTA-2088.1 will build upon the baseline cybersecurity requirements in CTA-2088, *Baseline Cybersecurity Standard for Devices and Device Systems*, to address the cybersecurity requirements and recommendations relevant to the unique capabilities, uses, and applications of small UAS.

## **4.7. European Organisation for Civil Aviation Equipment (EUROCAE)**

EUROCAE is a non-profit organisation, created in 1963, with the objective to support aviation with industry standards. EUROCAE currently has over 300 members, including industry, service providers, regulators, research institutes, and international organizations. EUROCAE is the European leader in the development of worldwide recognized industry standards for aviation. EUROCAE membership is open to

organisations and industries worldwide. EUROCAE, in the interest of its stakeholders, develops standards for the industry and in support of regulations, aiming to increase safety and market potential, facilitate international harmonisation and global interoperability, and encourage technological development.

The development of EUROCAE Documents (ED) is governed by a well-proven core process promoting teamwork, excellence, industry buy-in, openness, transparency, and consensus. EUROCAE has extended its activity from airborne equipment to complex air traffic management (ATM), and communications, navigation, and surveillance systems (CNS).

To date, EUROCAE has published more than 200 EUROCAE Documents (EDs), which are recognised worldwide as high quality and state-of-the-art standards.

EUROCAE's headquarters are located in the Paris region, Saint-Denis, France.

### **WG-105 UAS**

WG-105 is tasked to develop the necessary standards to enable the safe integration of UAS/RPAS into all classes of airspace, with due consideration of the European regulatory proportionate risk-based approach, of the related categories of operations (Open, Specific, and Certified), and of the industry requirements. WG-105 is also tasked, in cooperation with the Technical Advisory Committee (TAC), to develop proposals for future activities (to be reflected in the Technical Work Programme (TWP)). WG-105 is specifically tasked to develop standards in the following domains:

- DAA
- Command, Control, Communication, Spectrum, and Security
- UTM
- Design & Airworthiness (D&AW) Standards
- Enhanced RPAS Automation (ERA)
- Specific Operation Risk Assessment (SORA)

#### **Focus Area 1: Detect and Avoid**

The objective of the work on DAA is to develop standards related to conflict management for all conditions of operation, for all UAS categories of operation, and in all airspace classes, to support the performance-based regulation. It is recognized that under DAA, the ICAO RPAS Manual covers a range of different hazards: conflicting traffic, terrain and obstacles, hazardous meteorological conditions, ground operations, and other airborne hazards.

The scope of this FA includes conflicting traffic for the work related to VFR and IFR flight, and all hazards for Very Low-Level operations (VLL) operations, in relation with the U-space definition.

#### **Focus Area 2: Command, Control and Communication, Spectrum, and Security**

The objective of the work on Command, Control, and Communication, Spectrum, and Security (C3&S) is to maximise the relevance of its outputs to all classes of UAS and achieve alignment with regulatory

directions and operational needs. The main technical deliverables (MASPS and MOPS) tactically address the needs of Certified RPAS for the C2 Link, Spectrum Management, and Security. A series of technical reports will provide complementary guidance on communications, spectrum management, and cybersecurity applicable to the other UAS categories.

### **Focus Area 3: UAS Traffic Management**

The objective of the work on UTM is to develop standards related to the operation of UAS while under U-space. Following the analysis of regulations and guidance related to the emerging UTM and VLL operations, two initial areas have been identified for the development of such standards:

- E-Identification, i.e., the capability to identify a flying UA without direct physical access
- Geo-fencing, i.e., providing the remote pilot (RP) with information related to the UA position and its airspace environment, and limiting the access of the UA to certain areas. This area also addresses the concept of geo-caging (maintaining the unmanned vehicle in a defined flight volume) for the Specific Operations category.

Additional activities are under investigation.

### **Focus Area 4: Design & Airworthiness Standards**

The objective of the work on D&AW is to develop Acceptable Means of Compliance and supporting standards in the framework of the European Aviation Safety Agency's (EASA) UAS-certified category on topics such as Automatic Recovery, Flight Termination system, RPS, and Human factors.

### **Focus Area 5: Enhanced RPAS Automation**

The objective of the work on ERA is to develop Minimum Aviation System Performance Standards (MASPS) related to Automatic Take-Off and Landing (ATOL), Automatic Taxiing (AutoTaxi), and Automation and Emergency Recovery (A&ER), in the context of fixed-wing RPAS in the certified category and their integration in non-segregated airspace.

### **Focus Area 6: Specific Operational Risk Assessment (SORA)**

The objective of the work on SORA methodology is to support the regulatory requirements with industry-based standards.

The detailed Work Programme of the WG-105 can be found on the EUROCAE website.

### **Other relevant EUROCAE activities**

Further EUROCAE activities, with potential to complement the inputs to the UAS community, and which should be noted in the context of the ANSI UASSC are:

- WG-63 on Complex Aircraft Systems,
- WG-112 VTOL,
- WG-114 Artificial Intelligence,
- WG-117 Topics on Software advancement and
- WG-118 Crash-Protected and Lightweight Flight Recorders.



Their full work programme is available [here](#).

### **EUSCG Initiative**

The EUSCG is a joint coordination and advisory group established to coordinate the UAS-related standardisation activities across Europe, essentially stemming from the EU regulations and EASA rulemaking initiatives. The EUSCG provides a bridge between the European activities and those at the international level. The secretariat of EUSCG is provided by EUROCAE.

The tasks of the EUSCG are to:

- develop, monitor, and maintain an overarching European UAS Standardisation Rolling Development Plan (RDP), based on the standardisation roadmap developed by EASA and other organisations and inputs from the EUSCG members (including the military), and where needed other key actors in the aviation domain
- facilitate the sharing of work among the regulators and SDOs thus avoiding the risk of overlapping developments and gaps
- monitor all relevant processes, resource availability, and other related risks and issues
- provide a forum to manage specific issues and resolution of conflict
- advise the EC and other organisations on standardisation matters

In order to fulfil its tasks, the EUSCG has to:

- facilitate the participation of various member organisations, in order to develop a comprehensive set of industry standards needed to cover the whole spectrum of UAS and their operations including U-space
- identify and share a common recognition of the fields of competencies of the various contributors in order to avoid the risk of overlapping activities
- establish and maintain a continuous information flow between stakeholders to ensure that changes, delays, and new developments can be taken into account
- maintain awareness of the status of upstream rationale and progress associated with identified needs for standardisation activities

The main deliverable of the EUSCG is the RDP as described above. The RDP is progressively updated to reflect the current situation. It also provides a method for the identification and discussion of overlaps and gaps, and as a basis for feedback to contributing organisations, to improve overall coordination of standards developments. The process should also identify the technical input from other sources (such as ICAO) into the standards plan. The Work Programme of the WG-105 is reflected in the RDP as well.

Further information on EUSCG and RDP can be accessed on the EUSCG website. It includes a subscription feature to be notified when a new RDP version is being published.

## 4.8. Institute for Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)

IEEE is the world's largest technical professional organization dedicated to advancing technology for the benefit of humanity. Through its highly cited publications, conferences, technology standards, and professional and educational activities, IEEE is the trusted voice in a wide variety of areas ranging from aerospace systems, computers, and telecommunications to biomedical engineering, electric power, and consumer electronics. More information is available on [IEEE's website](#).

IEEE Standards Association (IEEE SA) is a collaborative organization where innovators raise the world's standards for technology. IEEE SA provides a globally open, consensus-building environment and platform that empowers people to work together in the development of leading-edge, market-relevant technology standards and industry solutions shaping a better, safer and sustainable world. For more information, visit <https://standards.ieee.org>.

As of April 2020, the IEEE Standards Association has several activities related to the topic of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs):

1. **Topic:** IEEE P1920.1: Standard for Aerial Communications and Networking Standards
  - a. **Roadmap Relevance:** C2 - Section 6.4.1
  - b. **Description:** Defining air-to-air communications for self-organized ad hoc aerial networks. The communications and networking standards are independent of the type of network (Wireless or Cellular or other) and are applicable to manned and unmanned, small and large, and civil and commercial aircraft systems.
2. **Topic:** IEEE P1920.2: Standard for Vehicle to Vehicle Communications for Unmanned Aircraft Systems
  - a. **Roadmap Relevance:** C2 – Section 6.4.1, Remote ID - Section 7.8 and DAA - Section 6.4.3
  - b. **Description:** Vehicle to Vehicle Communications (V2V) standard for Unmanned Aircraft Systems defines the protocol for exchanging information between the vehicles. The information exchange will facilitate beyond line of sight (BLOS) and beyond radio line of sight (BRLOS) communications. The information exchanged between the aircraft may be for the purpose of command, control, and navigation or for any application specific purpose.
3. **Topic:** IEEE P1937.3: Standard for Protocol for the Flight Data Transmission of Civil Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Based on BeiDou Short Message
  - a. **Roadmap Relevance:** Data Handling - Section 7.6
  - b. **Description:** Specifying the general requirements for the content of flight data and transmission protocol of civil unmanned aerial vehicle systems based on the BeiDou short message protocol.

4. **Topic:** IEEE P1939.1: Standard for a Framework for Structuring Low Altitude Airspace for Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Operations
  - a. **Roadmap Relevance:** UTM - Section 7.7
  - b. **Description:** Defining a structure for low altitude airspace that enables safe and efficient Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) traffic management. It defines UAV capabilities and related infrastructure for UAVs to operate in and comply with low altitude air space regulations.
  - c. **Content:**
    - Gridding
    - Remote sensing
    - Communication and networking
    - Identification and authentication
    - Path planning
    - Operation and management
  
5. **Topic:** IEEE P2821: Guide for Unmanned Aerial Vehicle-based Patrol Inspection System for Transmission Lines
  - a. **Roadmap Relevance:** Power Transmission Lines - Section 8.2.3
  - b. **Description:** Guidelines on the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV)-based patrol inspection systems for transmission lines. This guide addresses the composition, general technical requirements, testing method and testing rules of UAV-based patrol inspection systems.
  
6. **Topic:** IEEE P1936.1: Standard for Drone Applications Framework
  - a. **Roadmap relevance:** Navigation Systems – Section 6.4.2 (or for any application specific purpose), COS – Section 7.2, and Terminology - Section 10.1
  - b. **Description:** Establishing a framework for support of drone applications. It specifies drone application classes and application scenarios and the required application execution environments.
  - c. **Work items:**
    - **Drone Applications Framework**
    - **Power patrol.** UAV patrols along the power line and related facilities to check whether the equipment is normal. If it is damaged, report to the superior department in time for emergency repair, so as to avoid delaying the normal transmission of power.
    - **Aerial photography.** Using UAV to take the earth's topography from the air and get the top view; this picture is an aerial photograph. The aerial camera can be controlled by a photographer, or it can be taken automatically or remotely. In order to stabilize aerial photographs, advanced photographic equipment such as a space camera is sometimes used. It utilizes the stabilization function of three-axis gyroscope to provide high-quality and stable images, even under long focal lenses. Aerial photography can clearly express

the geographical form, so it is also used in military, traffic construction, water engineering, ecological research, urban planning and so on, besides being a part of photography art.

- **Remote sensing.** UAV remote sensing, which uses advanced UAV technology, remote sensing sensor technology, remote sensing and remote control technology, communication technology, GPS differential positioning technology and remote sensing application technology, can achieve automation, intelligence, specialization and rapid acquisition of land resources, natural environment, earthquake-stricken areas and other space remote sensing information, and the end application technology of remote sensing data processing, modeling and application analysis. Because of its advantages of maneuverability, rapidity and economy, UAV remote sensing system has become a hot research topic in the world. It has gradually developed from research and development to practical application stage and become one of the main aviation remote sensing technologies in the future.
- **Law enforcement.** Unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) police law enforcement makes up for the shortcomings of previous work, such as violations of compaction lines, occupying emergency lanes, vehicle racing, etc., especially in non-video probe sections and congested sections, where it is difficult to conduct forensic investigation. Unmanned aerial vehicle law enforcement cannot be affected by road conditions to achieve full terrain coverage, multi-perspective, intuitive display of vehicle violations, and more flexible and mobile investigation. After taking photos, evidence is collected through the background. If the violation is true, the law enforcement system will be entered and the owner informed to deal with the violation.
- **Agriculture and plant protection.** For the protection of agriculture and forestry plants, UAV is composed of three parts: flight platform (fixed wing, helicopter, multi-axis aircraft), navigation flight control, and spraying mechanism. Through ground remote control or navigation flight control, the UAV can realize spraying operation, and can spray chemicals, seeds, powder, etc.
- **Logistics.** By using radio remote control equipment and a self-contained program control device, the UAV carries parcels to the destination automatically. Its advantages mainly lie in solving the distribution problems in remote areas, improving the distribution efficiency, and reducing the human cost.

7. **Topic:** IEEE P1937.1: Standard Interface Requirements and Performance Characteristics for Payload Devices in Drones

- a. **Roadmap Relevance:** Payload - Section 9.5

- b. **Description:** Establishing a framework for drone interface to payload. It defines the interfaces, performance metrics, provisioning, operation control and management for drone payload devices.
- c. **Work items:**
  - Interface Requirements and Performance Characteristics of Payload Devices in Drones
  - Interface for Optical
  - Protocol for the Flight Data Transmission of Civil Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Based on BeiDou Short Message
  - Interface for Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR)
  - Interface for Light Detection and Ranging (LiDAR)
  - Interface for Infrared

8. **Topic:** IEEE WG on Management of Existing Overhead Lines

- a. **Roadmap Relevance:** Power Transmission Lines - Section 8.2.3
- b. **Description:** The scope of the IEEE WG on Management of Existing Overhead Lines includes providing a forum for exchanging and discussing information on existing technologies and technology needs for inspection, assessment, management, and utilization of overhead lines. It also includes developing papers, guides, and/or standards to present methods for assessing and extending the life expectancy and optimizing the use of the components of existing overhead lines. Organizationally, the WG falls within the Overhead Lines Subcommittee, of the Transmission and Distribution Committee of the IEEE Power and Energy Society. In mid-2015, the WG voted to form a Task Force (TF) on the Application of Unmanned Aerial Systems to Overhead Line Inspection, Assessment, and Maintenance. The mission of the TF is to foster adoption, advancement, and safe and cost-effective use of unmanned aerial systems for overhead line inspection, assessment, and maintenance. The TF is comprised of the following four teams, each of which is active to varying degrees:
  - Applications/Case Studies of UAS for Overhead Lines and Substations
  - FAA and Other Relevant Rules and Regulations
  - UAS Technology (aircraft, sensors and related tools)
  - Data Management Needs, Processes, and Technologies

The WG within which the UAS TF resides has two face-to-face meetings per year. In addition, some of the TF teams connect one or more times via web meetings and conference calls between the regularly scheduled WG meetings.

## 4.9. International Organization for Standardization (ISO)

ISO is an independent, non-governmental international organization with a membership of 162 [national standards bodies](#). Through its members, it brings together experts to share knowledge and develop voluntary, consensus-based, market relevant, International Standards that support innovation and provide solutions to global challenges. Its Central Secretariat is located in Geneva, Switzerland. More information is available on the [ISO's structure and governance webpage](#).

ISO Technical Committee 20 Subcommittee (SC) 16, Unmanned Aircraft Systems, was formed in 2014 and has the following scope: "Standardization in the field of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) including, but not limited to, classification, design, manufacture, operation (including maintenance) and safety management of UAS operations." The chair of SC 16 is Mr. John Walker, The Padina Group. The manager is Chris Carnahan, Aerospace Industries Association (AIA). 29 countries are currently members of SC 16, with the United States, specifically the AIA, serving as secretariat. The list of member countries can be found on the [SC 16 Member's webpage](#). SC 16 has [liaison relationships](#) with a number of ISO and IEC committees, and 6 external organizations.

SC 16 currently has six WGs:

### **WG 1, General**

- Scope: This WG specifies general requirements for UAS for civil applications in support of other standards created within ISO/TC 20/SC 16.
- Work items:
  - ISO/CD 21384-1, *Unmanned aircraft systems -- Part 1: General specification* (under development)
  - ISO/FDIS 21384-4, *Terms and Definitions* (under development)
  - ISO 21895, *Categorization and classification of civil unmanned aircraft systems* (published)

### **WG 2, Product Manufacturing and Maintenance**

- Scope: This WG specifies the quality and safety requirements for components of UAS to influence the design and manufacturing process. This group focuses on the individual components that comprise a UAS to further operational safety. The standards will include information regarding components associated with the UA, any associated remote control station(s), the command and control links, any other required data links (e.g., payload, traffic management information, vehicle identification) and any other system elements as may be required.
- Work items:
  - ISO/CD 21384-2, *Unmanned aircraft systems -- Part 2: Product systems* (under development)
  - ISO/WD 24356, *General requirements for tethered unmanned aircraft system* (under development)

### **WG 3, Operations & Procedures**

- Scope: This WG details the requirements for safe commercial UA operations and applies to all types, categories, classes, sizes, and modes of operation of UA.
- Work items:
  - ISO/DIS 21384-3, Unmanned aircraft systems -- Part 3: Operational procedures (published)
  - ISO/DIS 23665, *Unmanned Aircraft Systems -- Training of Operators* (under development)
  - ISO/NP 5015-1, Unmanned aircraft systems — Part 1: Operational procedures for passenger-carrying UAS (proposed)
  - ISO/NP 5015-2, Unmanned aircraft systems — Part 2: Operation of vertiports for unmanned aircraft (UA) (proposed)

### **WG 4, UAS Traffic Management**

- Scope: To establish international standards and guidelines in the area of Unmanned Aircraft Systems Traffic Management (UTM). The standards and guidelines are to be developed aligned with the rules and guidance provided by aviation authorities.
- Work items:
  - ISO TR 23629-1, *UAS Traffic Management (UTM) -- Part 1: General requirements for UTM -- Survey results on UTM* (published)
  - ISO/WD 23629-5, UAS traffic management (UTM) — Part 5: UTM functional structure (under development)
  - ISO/CD 23629-7, UAS traffic management (UTM) — Part 7: Data model for spatial data (under development)
  - ISO/PWI 23629-8, UAS Traffic Management (UTM) — Part 8: Remote identification (proposed)
  - ISO/WD 23629-12, UAS traffic management (UTM) — Part 12: Requirements for UTM services and service providers (under development)

### **WG 5, Testing and Evaluation**

- Scope: Testing and evaluation of UAS for safety and quality of product.
- Work items:
  - ISO/NP 5110, Test method for flight stability of multi-copter UA under wind and rain conditions (proposed)
  - ISO/NP 5109, Evaluation method for the resonance frequency of multi-copter UAV by measurement of rotor and body frequencies (proposed)
  - ISO/PWI 4594, UA Wind Gust Test (proposed)
  - ISO/PWI 4595, Suggestion for improvement in the guideline for UA testing classification (proposed)
  - ISO/PWI 4584, Improvement in the guideline for UA testing/design of accelerated lifecycle testing (ALT) for UAS/Sub-system/components (proposed)
  - ISO/WD 4358, Test methods for civil multi-rotor unmanned aircraft system (under development)

### **WG 6, UAS Subsystems**

- Scope: Development of standards for UAS subsystems

- Work items:
  - ISO/WD 24355, General requirements of flight control system for civil small and light multirotor UAS (under development)
  - ISO/WD 24354, General requirements for civil small and light UAS payload interface (under development)
  - ISO/WD 24352, Technical requirements for light and small unmanned aircraft electric energy system (under development)

## 4.10. Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)

The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) is the Internet’s premier technical standards body. It gathers a large open international community of network designers, operators, vendors, and researchers concerned with the evolution of the Internet architecture and the smooth operation of the Internet.

### **Mission and Principles**

The mission of the IETF is to make the Internet work better by producing high quality, relevant technical documents that influence the way people design, use, and manage the Internet. The IETF pursues this mission in adherence to the following principles:

**Open processes.** Any interested person can participate in the work, know what is being decided, and make their voice heard on the issue. Part of this principle is our commitment to making documents, working group mailing lists, attendance lists, and meeting minutes publicly available on the Internet.

**Technical Competence.** The issues on which the IETF produces its documents are issues where the IETF has the competence needed to speak to them, and the IETF is willing to listen to technically competent input from any source. Technical competence also means that IETF output follows sound network engineering principles—this is also often referred to as “engineering quality.”

**Volunteer core.** IETF participants and leadership are people who come to the IETF because they want to do work that furthers the IETF’s mission of “making the Internet work better.”

**Rough Consensus and Running Code.** The IETF makes standards based on the combined engineering judgment of participants and real-world experience in implementing and deploying IETF specifications.

**Protocol ownership.** When the IETF takes ownership of a protocol or function, it accepts the responsibility for all aspects of the protocol, even though some aspects may rarely or never be seen on the Internet.

### **IETF Participation and Organization**

The IETF is about individual participation with most of the work organized into Working Groups (WGs). While the actual technical work of working groups is accomplished largely through email lists, IETF meetings are held three times a year with the primary goal of supporting IETF Working Groups in getting



their tasks done. A secondary goal of IETF meetings is to promote interaction among the WGs and the Areas.

There is no membership in the IETF— the IETF is made up of volunteers. Anyone may register for and attend any meeting. The closest thing to being an IETF member is contributing to the technical discussion on an IETF WG mailing list.

IETF Working Groups are grouped into Areas, and managed by Area Directors (ADs). The ADs are members of the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG), which is responsible for technical management of IETF activities and the Internet standards process. The General Area Director also serves as the Chair of the IESG and of the IETF, and is an ex-officio member of the IAB.

### **More Information**

- IETF website: <https://www.ietf.org>
- A Mission Statement for the IETF: <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc3935/>
- The Internet Standards Process: <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc2026/>

### **Charter for Drone Remote ID Protocol (DRIP) Working Group**

Civil Aviation Authorities (CAAs) worldwide have initiated rule making for Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Remote Identification (RID). CAAs currently promulgate performance-based regulations that do not mandate specific techniques, but rather cite industry-consensus technical standards as acceptable means of compliance. Existing technical specifications define UAS RID message formats, and transmission methods. Network RID defines a set of information for UAS to be made available globally via the Internet. Broadcast RID defines a set of messages for UAS to send locally one-way over Bluetooth or Wi-Fi. Current standards do not address how to populate/query registries, how to ensure trustworthiness of information, nor how to make the information useful.

DRIP's goal is to specify how RID can be made trustworthy and available in both Internet and local-only connected scenarios, especially in emergency situations. Some UAS operate in environments where the network or the devices or both are severely constrained in terms of processing, bandwidth (e.g., Bluetooth 4 beacon payload is 25 bytes long), or battery life, and DRIP aims to function in these environments. The specifications produced by the WG will need to balance public safety authorities' need to know trustworthy information with UAS operators' and other involved parties' privacy.

The working group will primarily leverage Internet standards (including HIP, EPP, RDAP, and DNS) and infrastructure as well as domain name registration business models. The WG will track and align with the requirements being developed by various regulatory authorities.

The working group will work on the following items:

**Requirements:** the WG is expected to provide an informational document that lists the technical requirements for applying IETF protocols to the UAS Remote Identification (UAS RID) - that is the system for identifying Unmanned Aircraft (UA) during flight by other parties. These requirements also include

showing that new or adapted identifiers from existing protocols conform and meet the specifications to be certified as a UAS RID.

**Architecture:** the WG will propose a standard document that describes the architecture that address the technical requirements and that will attempt to re-use protocols or architectures already standardized at the IETF.

**Protocol design:** while the primary purpose of the DRIP WG is to leverage existing protocols, the specificity of the UAS environment is likely to require existing protocols to be extended or new protocols to be designed. The WG will focus on getting these protocols or extensions standardized, coordinating with other WGs relevant for the protocol(s) in question on the most appropriate home for any given piece of work.

For more information on DRIP, including contact information and documents in progress see:  
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/drip/about/>.

## 4.11. NACE International (NACE)

NACE International is an ANSI-accredited standards development organization which has been publishing corrosion control and mitigation industry consensus standards for fifty years, since 1969. As the premier authority for corrosion control solutions, NACE's Standards Program is utilized by both private industry and government agencies to ensure safety and integrity of assets through design as well as maintenance and inspection standards. NACE's IMPACT program released a study in 2016 revealing that the global cost of corrosion is US\$2.5 trillion annually, equating to 3.4% of a country's GDP.

NACE International's standards portfolio includes over 175 standards and 70 technical reports. More than 300 technical committees comprised of 4300 subject matter experts from over 20 countries lend their expertise to develop best practices that help preserve the longevity of assets. Utilizing an established framework accredited by ANSI, NACE standards committees develop and maintain standard practices, material requirements, test methods and technical reports which support the needs of numerous industries impacted by corrosion including oil and gas, transportation infrastructure, electrical and utilities, water and wastewater, maritime, and chemical processing.

### Use of UAS for Infrastructure Inspection

Several standardization activities were recently initiated by Task Groups (TG) 552 and 587 to develop standard practices related to the utilization of unmanned aircraft systems for pipeline inspections: SP21435 Drone-Based Condition Monitoring of Below and Above Ground Pipeline Integrity Threats and SP21436 Large Standoff Magnetometry (LSM) Inspection of Pipelines. While the LSM document primarily addresses sensor technology used as an above ground, non-intrusive screening tool to identify stress concentration in pipelines, it is likely that the platform utilized to conduct such screening will be UAS.

There is interest in UAS applications from other industries that NACE serves, and it is anticipated that additional standards development for infrastructure corrosion and coatings inspections and measurements will be initiated in the near future.

#### **4.12. National Fire Protection Association (NFPA)**

Founded in 1896, NFPA is a global, nonprofit organization devoted to eliminating death, injury, property and economic loss due to fire, electrical, and related hazards. The association delivers information and knowledge through more than 300 consensus codes and standards, research, training, education, outreach, and advocacy; and by partnering with others who share an interest in furthering the NFPA mission. More information can be found on [NFPA's website](#). All NFPA codes and standards can be viewed online at [NFPA's Free Access webpage](#).

[NFPA® 2400, Standard for Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems \(sUAS\) Used for Public Safety Operations](#), has been developed by representatives from all types of public safety departments that are using UAS, including the fire service, law enforcement, and EMS. Released on November 25, 2018, NFPA® 2400 acts as an all-encompassing standard providing a foundation for sUAS integration into the public safety community. It breaks sUAS integration down into three main elements amongst three core chapters. Chapter 4, *Organizational Deployment and Considerations for sUAS*, provides requirements on program development, program assessment, deployment, general operations, and multiple aircraft operations. A key element of Chapter 4 is the identification of the need for a risk assessment and consideration of mission objectives. Chapter 5, *Professional Qualifications for sUAS Public Safety Personnel*, identifies the minimum JPRs a remote pilot in command (RPIC) and visual observer are required to perform. In essence, it covers the essential job tasks that can be evaluated and tested. Finally, Chapter 6, *Maintenance of sUAS*, provides requirements aimed at identifying the maintenance needs within a sUAS program. It stipulates the need for record keeping, cleaning, and decontamination protocols. Combined, these three chapters form the core of NFPA® 2400 and provide a roadmap for public safety entities to begin to develop and integrate sUAS into their daily operations. NFPA® 2400 is the foundation from which public safety departments can develop sUAS programs, and do so based on the most current industry knowledge and backing of ANSI accreditation. A revision to NFPA® is open for public input until June 30, 2020. The next edition will be 2022 and published late in 2021. More information and free access to the document can be found on the [NFPA® 2400 webpage](#).

#### **4.13. Open Geospatial Consortium (OGC)**

The Open Geospatial Consortium (OGC) is an international not-for-profit organization committed to making quality open standards for the global geospatial community. These standards are made through a consensus process and are freely available for anyone to use to improve the sharing of the world's geospatial data.

OGC standards are used in a wide variety of domains including: Geosciences & Environment; Aviation; Defense & Intelligence; Smart & Resilient Cities, including the Internet of Things (IoT) & Sensor Webs,

mobile tech, and the 3D & Built Environment; Emergency Response & Disaster Management; Energy & Utilities; and many more.

OGC's 500+ member organizations come from across government, commercial organizations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), academia, and research institutes.

OGC standards development occurs in its Technical Committee (TC). This group represents all member organizations. The TC includes a large number of [WGs](#), divided into Domain Working Groups (DWGs) and Standards Working Groups (SWGs). A DWG is where discussion occurs on use cases and requirements for standards, as well as application standards to activities in that domain. DWGs are, by default, open to the public and often include domain experts who are not members of OGC. A SWG is where the actual standards writing and review occurs. Many DWGs actively initiate new SWGs.

The OGC has an Unmanned Systems (UxS) DWG. The UxS DWG was established in 2017 and holds sessions at each of OGC's quarterly TC Meetings. While the scope of the UxS DWG broadly encompasses all unmanned vehicles and the sensors or equipment on those vehicles, and the broader systems that support them, most of the conversation in the DWG at this time is focused on the tasking, observations, processing, and usage of aircraft and mounted sensors. However, it is important to note that the UxS DWG does include in its membership experts on autonomous submersibles and automobiles, with the former providing some very relevant expertise to the aircraft community due to its maturity with respect to the use of standards. Participants in the UxS DWG include government organizations with long histories in developing and operating large UASs (e.g., Global Hawk, Predator, etc.), such as NASA, the U.S. Army Geospatial Center, the U.S. National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, Harris Corporation, Lockheed Martin Corporation, Unifly, and others.

OGC also has an Aviation DWG to cover more general aviation topics. This DWG is currently chaired by the FAA and Eurocontrol and has focused mostly on aviation information, air traffic control (ATC), and meteorology standardizations topics. The Aviation and UxS DWGs regularly collaborate and held a joint coordination Workshop at the June 2018 TC meeting in Fort Collins, Colorado.

OGC has a long history of supporting the aviation community. The Aeronautical and Flight Information Exchange Models (AIXM, FIXM) and Weather Information Exchange Model (WXXM) rely heavily upon OGC standards to describe geospatial parameters and geometries. These standards (such as Geography Markup Language (GML), Web Map Service (WMS), Web Coverage Service (WCS), Observations and Measurements) are developed in dedicated OGC Standards WGs, often with use cases drawn from the Aviation and UxS DWGs and their respective membership.

OGC plans and conducts numerous interoperability testbeds, pilots, and experiments with aviation requirements. These initiatives are focused on joining industry and users in a rapid prototyping / engineering environment to test, validate, and demonstrate potential new standards and related best practices. A large number of Engineering Reports have been delivered from these efforts. These can be found by searching for "aviation" on the [OGC Engineering Reports webpage](#).

#### 4.14. RTCA, Inc. (RTCA)

RTCA is a private, not-for-profit association founded in 1935 as the Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics, now referred to simply as “RTCA.” RTCA has provided the foundation for virtually every modern technical advance in aviation. Its products serve as the basis for government certification of equipment used by the tens of thousands of aircraft flying daily through the world’s airspace.

A standards development organization (SDO), RTCA works with the FAA to develop comprehensive, industry-vetted, and endorsed standards that can be used as a means of compliance with FAA regulations. RTCA deliberations are open to the public and its products are developed by aviation community volunteers functioning in a consensus-based, collaborative, peer-reviewed environment.

While RTCA’s documents and committees cover a wide range of aviation technology, the **UAS Steering Committee** is identifying those standards that are involved in the UAS technology space. The committees that are developing standards specifically for this area include:

- RTCA SC-228/EUROCAE WG-xx, Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS) for UAS, established May 20, 2013, is working to develop the MOPS for DAA equipment and a C2 Data Link MOPS establishing L-Band and C-Band solutions. The initial phase of standards development focused on civil UAS equipped to operate in Class A airspace under instrument flight rules (IFR). The Operational Environment for the MOPS is the transitioning of a UAS to and from Class A or special use airspace, traversing Class D and E, and perhaps Class G airspace. The committee published the first of the Phase 1 documents in September 2016 with the release of [DO-362, C2 Data Link MOPS \(Terrestrial\)](#), and followed that with *Detect and Avoid Standards* ([DO-365A](#)) and the accompanying *Air-to-Air RADAR MOPS* ([DO-366](#)). Phase 2 of MOPS development is underway to specify DAA equipment to support extended UAS operations in Class D, E, and G airspace, transit operations in B and C airspace, and C2 Link MASPS, and MASPS for Satellite-based C2. The committee has begun Phase 3 activities that include: a Lost Link (LL) Guidance Working Group to create guidance material that will regularize the lost link behavior of UAS operating in controlled airspace; Navigation Standards (NS) Working Group established to enable GNSS-based UAS operations to meet navigation requirements for all phases of flight without the use of legacy ground-based navigation aids, including precision approach capability with auto-takeoff and autoland features. The DAA WG will address smaller UAS operations that occur at slower speeds and closer to terrain and obstacles; High Altitude Pseudo-Satellite launch and recovery operations (limited to the transition to/from Class E above A); VTOL operations including the AAM use case; and Part 135 cargo operations.
- RTCA SC-147/EUROCAE WG-75, Traffic Alert & Collision Avoidance System (TCAS), established November 1, 1980, has defined and updated the TCAS and TCAS II performance standards, thereby contributing to one of the most significant advances in aviation safety in the past twenty years. Their work continued with the publication of Airborne Collision Avoidance System (ACAS) Xa, ACAS Xo ([DO-385](#)), and continues with the expected publication of ACAS Xu in late 2020. ACAS Xu will provide the minimum operational performance standards (MOPS) for the interaction of an ACAS system

specifically designed for UAS to interact with other ACAS Xu and Xa/Xo systems (compatible with Xo/Xa). SC-147 is also developing a MOPS and Algorithm Design Document (ADD) that will address applications of ACAS sXu (Small Xu) for small UAS.

- RTCA SC-238/EUROCAE WG-115, Counter UAS, was established in December of 2019. As UAS operations in airspace continue to grow and UAS technology continues to mature, full integration into the aviation ecosystem highlights the need for industry and government to work together to develop standards around Counter-UAS technology. This committee will be focused solely on developing a consensus standard that details detection and mitigation standards and will operate as a joint committee with EUROCAE Working Group (WG) 115.
- RTCA SC-135/EUROCAE WG-14, Environmental Testing, established October 1, 1977, continues to maintain RTCA [DO-160](#) (current version is [DO-160G](#)), Environmental Conditions and Test Procedures for Airborne Equipment. This document is the international de facto standard for environmental testing of commercial avionics and provides standard procedures and environmental test criteria for testing airborne equipment to determine their performance characteristics. [DO-160G](#) was published in December 2010, and an update of the Users' Guide material for this document is in development, with the aim of providing rationales, guidance and background information for the environmental, test procedures and requirements, as well as lessons learned from aircraft and laboratory experience. The committee is currently working in coordination with SC-228 to develop standards for ground based equipment environments and qualification procedures.
- While not a committee in the same sense as a typical RTCA Special Committee, the Forum on Aeronautical Software (FAS) has been established to provide a forum for those involved in the development of aeronautical software to share experiences and good practices and to provide a platform for the exchange of information regarding subjects addressed in the "software document suite," new and emerging technologies, development methodologies, interesting use cases, and other topics related to aeronautical software and related technologies.

The FAS is a joint RTCA/EUROCAE User Group that holds discussions and develops Information Papers (IPs) relating to aeronautical software topics in efforts to harmonize these informational papers. Topics typically addressed by the FAS will relate to aeronautical software, including topics covered by the following set of RTCA/EUROCAE published documents (referred to as the "software document suite"):

- o [DO-178C](#) - Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment Certification
- o [DO-278A](#) - Software Integrity Assurance Considerations for Communication, Navigation, Surveillance and Air Traffic Management (CNS/ATM) Systems
- o [DO-248C](#) - Supporting Information
- o [DO-330](#) - Software Tool Qualification Considerations
- o [DO-331](#) - Model Based Development & Verification Supplement

- o [DO-332](#) - Object Oriented Technology and Related Techniques Supplement
- o [DO-333](#) - Formal Methods Supplement

In 2019 the FAS reviewed a subset of these documents to determine their applicability with respect to UAS and has determined that additional informative material would benefit stakeholders. The FAS is preparing FAS Topic Papers that will provide clarity to existing material already in the standards. In addition, RTCA is exploring forming a new special committee to develop Topics on Software Advancement that will produce documents that explore 1) software considerations in low-risk applications, equipment certifications and approvals and 2) integration of COTS, open source and service history into software.

RTCA SC-240/EUROCAE WG-117, Topics on Software Advancement, was approved by the Program Management Committee in March of 2020 to work jointly with EUROCAE WG-117 in addressing the evolving need for direction in the software development process. The group is tasked with creating a guidance document capturing software development best practices for Low Risk Operations. These operations are expected to include both general aviation and what is termed the specific category of UAS by EASA. The joint group's first action will be to review and update the Terms of Reference (TOR) and then begin work on two documents: 1) additional guidance for all software developers which addresses the inclusion of commercial off the shelf (COTS) software as well as Operating Systems, and 2) appropriate use of service history as a means of compliance. The work defined in the TOR is a direct result of the FAS Ad Hoc and members of the UAS community who identified the gap between the processes defined in DO-178C and the emerging technologies that are being implemented in UAS development.

#### **4.15. SAE International (SAE)**

[SAE International](#) is a global body of scientists, engineers, and practitioners that advances self-propelled vehicle and system knowledge in a neutral forum for the benefit of humanity. It is a not-for-profit, non-lobbying technical organization and membership association with 138,000 members in over 100 countries. It is the largest non-government mobility standards developing organization in the world. The first aerospace standard was published in 1917, and today there exist over 8900 active aerospace standards and over 21000 historical standards in circulation. SAE International's core competencies are life-long learning and voluntary consensus standards development.

SAE International is working with external agencies/programs including ICAO, FAA, NASA, DoD, [NATO](#) EASA, MoD, Transport Canada, JAXA, CAAC, AUVSI, ANSI, and others to provide a holistic approach to standardization.

Over 250 SAE International aerospace technical committees & subcommittees have developed many existing standards that can be applied to unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), and going forward, new and revised standards are including provisions and special considerations for UAS. Furthermore, some SAE International committees are focused solely on UAS. Participation in the SAE technical committees

includes global representation from OEMs, suppliers, robotics and UAS integration companies, consulting firms, government, think tanks, academic institutions, and others across the unmanned systems industry.

- Learn about [SAE International standards development](#) and the [standards developing process](#)
- View the complete list of all [SAE International Aerospace Technical Committees](#)
- Visit the SAE International Technical Standards Committee [webpages](#).
- View the [SAE International Aerospace Technical Committee Meeting Schedule](#)
- Join an [SAE technical standards committee](#)
- Make a [recommendation for standards development](#)

### **UAS Committees**

#### **S-18UAS Autonomy Working Group**

To support Type Certification of UAS, S-18UAS is currently identifying the specific gaps in both ARP4754 and ARP4761 processes that affect UAS development, the domains where the gaps should be filled, and to provide a common understanding of necessary guidance needed to support development assurance and system safety of UAS for both developers and regulators. For example, [AIR7121 Applicability of Existing Development Assurance and System Safety Practices to Unmanned Aircraft Systems](#) is in-development.

#### **S-18/EUROCAE WG-63 Aircraft and System Development and Safety Assessment Committee**

The S-18/WG-63 committee brings together qualified specialists for the advancement of aerospace safety and to support effective safety management. It provides a resource for other committees and organizations with common interests in safety and development processes. The committee develops aerospace vehicle and system:

- Safety assessment processes
- Development assurance processes
- Practices for accomplishing in-service safety assessments

#### **G-34/EUROCAE WG-114 Artificial Intelligence in Aviation**

The G-34/WG-114, Artificial Intelligence in Aviation Committee, is a joint committee with EUROCAE. It is responsible for creating and maintaining SAE/EUROCAE documents (i.e., Aerospace Information Reports), Aerospace Recommended Practices, and Aerospace Standards) on the implementation and certification aspects related to AI technologies inclusive of any on or off-board system for the safe operation of aerospace systems and aerospace vehicles.

#### **G-32 Cyber Physical Systems Security (CPSS) Committee**

SAE G-32 and its Software Assurance and Hardware Assurance Sub-Committees are developing standards to:

- Characterize and address the risk to CPSS, assess vulnerabilities, and recommend system engineering focused mitigation actions



- Share the knowledge of how vulnerabilities are introduced and exploited in cyber physical systems and document best practices for addressing areas of concern utilizing existing processes, procedures, and standards
- Develop a taxonomy for CPSS
- Establish standard methods for identifying vulnerabilities in cyber physical systems introduced at any point in the CPSS life cycle and mitigating impacts
- Develop validation and verification methods to ensure requirements are addressed

#### **[A-6 Aerospace Actuation, Control and Fluid Power Systems](#)**

The SAE A-6 Aerospace Actuation, Control and Fluid Power Systems committee addresses all aspects of aerospace flight and utility actuation and control systems as well as fluid power systems. The committee is comprised of three subcommittees: System/Subsystem Integration, Actuation and Control, and Fluid Power Generation and Distribution. The subcommittees work together to assure compatibility and integration of the various types of actuation systems (electrohydraulic, electromechanical and electrohydrostatic) with the entire functioning flight and utility control systems and the fluid power systems. As an example, [ARP94910](#) specifically addresses UAS flight control and vehicle management system. A revision activity is in progress.

#### **[AS-4JAUS Joint Architecture for Unmanned Systems Committee](#)**

AS-4 was formed as a result of the Joint Architecture for Unmanned Systems Working Group (JAUS WG) migration to SAE International. The JAUS WG was chartered by the Deputy Director, Office of the Undersecretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Strategic & Tactical Systems/Land Warfare. The objective is to define and sustain a joint architecture for the domain of unmanned systems. JAUS is a service-oriented architecture that defines services, messages and message transport between software components within an unmanned system, between the unmanned system and its payloads, between the unmanned system and its command and control system(s), and among unmanned systems. The architecture defines messages and component behaviors that are independent of technology, computer hardware, operator use, communications equipment, and vehicle platforms, providing a basis for interoperability of compliant components.

#### **[AS-4UCS Unmanned Systems \(UxS\) Control Segment Architecture](#)**

Responsibility for the UCS Architecture transitioned from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) to SAE International in April 2015. It was republished as SAE [AS6512](#) in December 2016. The [AS6512](#) Revision A is a Service-Oriented Architecture (SOA) and Data Model (DM) that includes 250+ services for the control and exploitation of heterogeneous unmanned systems, including unmanned aircraft (UAS), ground vehicles, and surface/subsurface maritime vehicles. The SOA/DM is expressed as a UML model from which interface software can be automatically generated for a chosen middleware technology. The architecture is scalable from a handheld device for small robots, to a fixed facility with intercontinental control of theater assets. [AS6512](#) supports an Open Business Model (OBM) for the development and reuse of UxS application software. Government adoption of [AS6512](#) (and its OSD precursor) includes several branches of the military. Peer interest in UCS includes the National Information Exchange Model (NIEM) MilOps Domain and the NATO Multi-Domain Vehicle Control architecture.

[AS6969](#) is the Data Dictionary for Quantities Used in Cyber Physical Systems. It provides a mathematically-coherent substrate from which data modelers can develop their own UxS datatypes based on shared and unambiguous semantics.

#### **[E-39 Unmanned Aircraft Propulsion Committee](#)**

SAE E-39, Unmanned Aircraft Propulsion Systems Committee, is a technical committee in SAE's Aerospace Propulsion Systems Group with the responsibility to develop and maintain standards for all facets of unmanned aircraft propulsion systems. Both chemical (internal combustion) and electrical propulsion and the supporting systems will be addressed. The UAS industry benefits by understanding well-defined categories and system types, familiarization of accepted test methods and measurements, and building upon industry best practices and specifications. For example, [AS6971](#), *Test Protocol for UAS Reciprocating (Intermittent) Engines as Primary Thrust Mechanism*, is in-development.

#### **[A-20 Aircraft Lighting Committee](#)**

The SAE A-20 Aircraft Lighting committee addresses all facets of aircraft lighting equipment— design, manufacture, operation, maintenance, and in-service experience. It is responsible for standards pertaining to aircraft lighting and lighting emission sources which will fulfil the needs and requirements of operational control and utility, including all lighting on and in an aircraft and under its control. The group is comprised of three committees – [A-20A Crew Station Lighting](#), [A-20B Exterior Lighting](#), and [A-20C Interior Lighting](#) – dedicated to creating, preparing, and maintaining all relevant specifications, standards, and requirements for aircraft lighting systems. For UAS, for example, A-20B published [ARP6336](#), *Lighting Applications for Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS)*.

#### **[AC-9C Aircraft Icing Technology Committee](#)**

AC-9C is a professional technical committee working in the field of aircraft inflight icing under the auspices of the SAE. The committee is charged with the responsibility of developing and continually updating standards, recommended practices, and information reports which contribute to the operational capability and safety of civil and military aircraft. In many instances, these objectives are achieved through an international exchange of ideas, data, and experience. The scope of the committee includes all facets of aircraft inflight icing including ice protection and detection technologies and systems design, meteorological and operational environments, maintenance, regulation, certification, and in-service experience. For example, [AIR6962](#), *Ice Protection for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles*, is in-development.

#### **[G-47 Systems Engineering](#)**

The G-47 Committee serves as an industry focal point for systems engineering by developing and maintaining standards, coalescing industry positions, preparing and coordinating positions on government policies & practices, and promoting sharing of best practices on the engineering of systems. For example, [SAE1001](#), *Integrated Project Processes for Engineering a System*, provides an integrated set of project-level technical processes to aid in the engineering or reengineering of a system.

### **[PNT Position, Navigation, and Timing Committee](#)**

The PNT Committee develops standards that define architectures, sensors, interfaces, training, and certification recommended practices, so that the commercial marketplace can continue to develop products and capabilities to provide robust and resilient PNT solutions for consumers. These standards will provide governments, managers, engineers, technicians, and educators with the tools they need to develop a robust and reliable critical infrastructure.

### **[APMC Avionics Process Management](#)**

The SAE International Avionics Process Management Committee (APMC) develops process management standards for systems and equipment used in the field of avionics. Avionics includes electronics used in commercial, civil, and military aerospace applications. The committee also provides input to government and other industry organizations and standards.

APMC supports the US Technical Advisory Group (US TAG) for International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) Technical Committee 107, Process Management for Avionics, and also coordinates with [SAE G-24](#), [SAE CE-12](#), and [SAE G-19](#).

### **[A-4 Aircraft Instruments Committee](#)**

The SAE A-4 Aircraft Instruments committee addresses all facets of aircraft instruments—design, manufacture, operation, maintenance, and in-service experience. It is responsible for mechanical, electromechanical, and electronic cockpit instrumentation standards applicable to all civil aircraft, with emphasis on minimum performance standards intended for reference in the FAA Technical Standard Orders (TSO). The group is dedicated to creating, preparing, and maintaining all relevant specifications, standards, and requirements for aircraft instrument systems.

### **[G-30 UAS Operator Qualifications Committee & G-10U Unmanned Aerospace Vehicle Committee](#)**

The Unmanned Aircraft Systems Operator Qualifications Committee, will develop and maintain supplementary qualification standards beyond the existing regulatory requirements of UAS operators, instructors, and remote pilots, for a variety of unmanned aircraft system types, sizes, operations, and missions. The Committee also will look to qualifications of the organizations that engage UAS. For example, [ARP5707](#), *Pilot Training Recommendations for Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Civil Operations*, has been published.

### **[AE-7 Aerospace Electrical Power and Equipment Committee](#)**

The AE-7 Aerospace Electrical Power and Equipment Committee is dedicated to developing standards and specifications relative to the generation and control, storage, conversion, charging, distribution, load management and utilization of electric power for aerospace vehicles. The Committee also provides a forum for gathering and disseminating electrical power and technical equipment information between users and suppliers. Currently, AE-7's newest initiatives involve developing standards for high voltage.

### **[AE-8A Elec Wiring and Fiber Optic Interconnect Sys Install Committee](#)**

The SAE AE-8A committee addresses all facets of aerospace electrical/electronic distribution systems installation—design, test, maintenance, and in-service experience. It provides a forum for gathering and

disseminating technical information on electrical and fiber optic interconnect systems in aerospace vehicles and equipment. The group is dedicated to creating, preparing, and maintaining all relevant specifications, standards, and requirements for the installation of these system types.

#### **Electric Aircraft Steering Group**

Established in 2015, the Electric Aircraft Steering Group (EASG) of SAE International strategically identifies, landscapes, and coordinates the various standardization activities necessary to support full-electric and more-electric aircraft applications at system, subsystem, and component levels. All aircraft featuring either hybrid or totally electric solutions for propulsion and systems are target applications. Aircraft segments addressed encompass general aviation, business aviation, UAM, VTOL, and regional and transport category aircraft.

For those segments, the EASG has tracked the progress made to date by standardization activities, and the group has also put into perspective the gaps that need to be addressed by new standards. The EASG then delegates to relevant SAE Technical Committees the required development and/or updates of standards. When deemed necessary, the EASG recommends the creation of ad hoc standardization committees. Three new committees have been recently created:

- [E-40 Electrified Propulsion](#)
- [AE-7D Aircraft Energy Storage and Charging](#)
- [AE-9 Electrical Materials](#)

Wherever appropriate, to avoid duplication, collaboration with other SDOs can be part of EASG recommendations. Prioritization of standards development for targeted aircraft segments is one of the core missions of the EASG. The EASG is developing a report on the status of standardization with special emphasis on gaps and the means to address them.

## **4.16. SAE Industry Technologies Consortia (SAE ITC)**

The true industry impact of standards development is achieved with adoption of the standard throughout operations and the supply chain to reduce costs, improve quality, and increase competitiveness. SAE ITC enables new or existing consortia to successfully impact their industry through widespread adoption. Existing SAE ITC programs demonstrate how specific industry challenges can be addressed collaboratively, cost-effectively and without compromising IP.

SAE ITC enables public and private organizations to collaborate, even with competitors, under an anti-trust umbrella to quickly and efficiently establish pre-competitive best practices and principles which they mutually agree to implement. Multiple standards organizations can also participate in these neutral forums to establish a holistic approach to the ecosystem by embodying the principles into standards based on their respective areas of domain knowledge and stakeholder communities.

SAE ITC offers a full suite of strategic and operational resources for consortia and other programs to quickly organize around key industry challenges and opportunities. Leveraging SAE ITC's dedicated,

experienced staff and access to the larger SAE group resources and relationships will allow any new or existing collaborative venture to improve the speed of technology adoption and cost-effectively accelerate desired changes in industry. SAE ITC's programs are unique communities set up to work on important initiatives that positively impact their specific industries and develop shared technical solutions that no one organization could accomplish as effectively independently.

For additional information,

- Visit the [SAE ITC website](#)
- Discover the [benefits](#) of working with SAE ITC
- Contact us with your [idea for a new Initiative](#)

### **UAS Related Forums and Consortia**

#### **ARINC Industry Activities** (ARINC IA)

ARINC IA is the only standards organization developing equipment installation standards for the air transport industry. ARINC IA also uniquely addresses standards for communications, navigation, surveillance, networks, flight deck, simulation, equipment maintenance, and in-flight entertainment. ARINC IA is made up of three committees (AEEC – Airlines Electronic Engineering Committee, FSEMC – Flight Simulator Engineering and Maintenance Committee, AMC – Avionics Maintenance Committee). ARINC standards, Datalink and Electronic Flight Bag Users Forums, and Maintenance Conferences for Flight Simulators, Avionics and Mechanical Components promote competition, enable interchangeability, reduce life-cycle costs, and positively contribute to the safety and reliability of flight.

ARINC IA committees and subcommittees cover many aspects of aviation applicable to both manned and unmanned aircraft systems. These committees are described below and subcommittees that are most relevant to UAS are specifically highlighted.

#### **Airlines Electronic Engineering Committee** (AEEC)

AEEC creates value for airlines and the aviation industry by developing engineering standards and technical solutions for avionics, networks, and cabin systems that foster increased efficiency and reduced life cycle costs for the aviation community. AEEC is an international standards organization that represents technical positions of the air transport industry. AEEC provides a forum for collaboration, teamwork, and decision making. The products of AEEC's efforts are published as ARINC Standards that collectively promote market competition and economies of scale. Aircraft manufacturers and avionics suppliers work with the AEEC in this endeavor.

The following subcommittees have particular relevance to UAS:

- [Aeronautical Databases \(ADB\) Subcommittee](#)
- [Aeronautical Mobile Airport Communication \(AeroMACS\)](#)
- [Aeronautical Operational Control \(AOC\) Subcommittee](#)
- [Air-Ground Communications System \(AGCS\) Subcommittee](#)
- [Avionics Application/Executive \(APEX\) Software Subcommittee](#)

- [Cockpit Display Systems \(CDS\) Subcommittee](#)
- [Data Link \(DLK\) Systems Subcommittee and Users Forum](#)
- [Fiber Optics Subcommittee \(FOS\)](#)
- [Flight Management System \(FMS\)](#)
- [Global Aircraft Tracking \(GAT\) / Timely Recovery of Flight Data \(TRFD\) Working Group](#)
- [Global Navigation Satellite System \(GNSS\)](#)
- [Internet Protocol Suite \(IPS\) for Aeronautical Safety Services](#)
- [Ku/Ka Band Satellite \(KSAT\) Subcommittee](#)
- [Navigation Data Base \(NDB\) Subcommittee](#)
- [Network Infrastructure and Security \(NIS\) Subcommittee](#)
- [Software Distribution and Loading \(SDL\) Subcommittee](#)
- [Systems Architecture and Interfaces \(SAI\) Subcommittee](#)
- [Traffic Surveillance](#)

#### [Aviation Maintenance Conference \(AMC\)](#)

AMC contributes to increased reliability and maintainability which results in reduced operating costs for aircraft components and aircraft electronic systems. These contributions are achieved through the internationally acclaimed Aviation Maintenance Conference and the development of technical standards. AMC is an air transport industry activity organized by ARINC IA. The objectives of AMC are to promote reliability and reduced operating cost in air transport aircraft components by improving maintenance and support techniques through the exchange of technical information.

The following subcommittees have particular relevance to UAS:

- [Air Transport – Avionics Service Bulletin \(AT-ASB\) Harmonization Working Group](#)
- [Electronic Distribution of Software \(EDS\) Working Group](#)
- [Test Program Set \(TPS\) Quality Working Group](#)

#### [Flight Simulator Engineering and Maintenance Committee \(FSEMC\)](#)

FSEMC provides cost effective solutions to simulator operational and maintenance problems through the widely respected international FSEMC Conference and establishes technical standards that increase simulator readiness and reduce operational costs. Attended by more than 300 flight simulator experts from around the world, the annual conference identifies technical solutions to engineering and maintenance issues resulting in immediate and long-term savings and increased efficiency for simulator users.

The following subcommittees have particular relevance to UAS:

- [European FSTD Technical Group \(EFTeG\)](#)
- [Future Concepts for Simulators \(FCS\) Subcommittee](#)
- [Simulated Air Traffic Control Environment \(SATCE\) Working Group](#)
- [Simulator Continuing Qualification \(SCQ\) Working Group](#)

#### [Aerospace Engine Supplier Quality Strategy Group \(AESQ\)](#)

AESQ's vision is to establish, deploy, and maintain a common set of quality requirements that enable the global aero-engine supply chain to be truly competitive through lean, capable processes and a culture of continuous improvement. AESQ creates common quality standards in the aerospace engine industry, deploys collectively the industry standards throughout the supply chain, and establishes capable quality processes and a culture of continuous improvement. AESQ best practices, principles and training may also be beneficial for particular elements of the UAS supply chain.

#### [Aerospace Standards and Part Qualification Program \(ASPQP\)](#)

ASPQP currently manages over 3000 standards and has qualified thousands of nuts, bolts and electrical connectors for critical applications, including those which may be applicable to UAS. This program is being used as a pilot for blockchain (distributed ledger) technology for the database of approved sources of qualified parts and supporting qualification documentation. This program is growing through new standards and continued database development.

#### [ExchangeWell \(EW\)](#)

ExchangeWell partners with industry thought leaders to provide the means to achieve strategic data management goals while maintaining data ownership, privacy and security. ExchangeWell fosters data driven innovations in the aviation, automotive and other highly engineered industry sectors by establishing strategic, pre-competitive governance and technology requirements for trusted, fair and risk-mitigated collaboration between data owners, users, algorithm developers and data service providers. It provides a means for industry leaders to access industry experts, develop practical experience from pilot studies, and collaborate on pre-competitive research. ExchangeWell enables industry to influence and leverage the direction of digital transformation technologies. Such technologies include digital documents, digital standards, registries, exchanges, marketplaces, and associated tools. ExchangeWell envisions three initial Subcommittees: Digital Standards Implementation and Deployment Criteria, Digital Registries Connectivity Criteria, and Digital Data Marketplace and AI Access Protocols.

#### [SAE AMS-Additive Manufacturing Data Consortium \(SAE AMS-AMDC\)](#)

SAE AMS-AMDC provides a global neutral collaborative forum for organizations in aerospace and other safety critical industries to convene and mutually support an agreed upon method for generating pedigreed additive manufactured material property data which meets the requirements for inclusion in industry accepted databases and serves as a basis for generating specification minima for international standards. Additive manufacturing is expected to play an important role in the manufacture and maintenance of UAS.

#### [Health-Ready Components and Systems Strategy Group \(HRCS\)](#)

The HRCS consortium is focused on implementing cost-effective Integrated Vehicle Health Management (IVHM) systems for enabling improvements in performance, reliability and safety. The consortium promotes uniform information sharing methods and protocols between integrators, OEMs, operators, and the supplier base through reference to SAE JA6268. The methods are applicable to multiple

industrial sectors (aerospace, automotive, trucking, shipping, rail, off-highway, manufacturing and defense).

HRCS is focused on bringing SAE JA6268 into practice by (1) creating a Win-Win-Win environment encompassing OEMs, suppliers and customer; (2) supporting the emerging paradigm shift from diagnosis to prognosis; (3) providing for better logical abstraction of physical systems; (4) facilitating sharing of semantic data from suppliers; and offering enhanced methods for model-based engineering. Optimal design of UAS systems takes into consideration (health-ready) design functions at the component, subsystem, and system level.

#### [International Alliance for Mobility Testing and Standardization](#) (IAMTS)

IAMTS is a global, membership-based alliance of organizations involved in the testing, standardization and certification of advanced mobility systems and services. This is accomplished through unbiased evaluations of smart mobility testbed capabilities, identification of global experts, the collaborative development of a testbed framework by testbed users and operators, and the capture of data pools from testing at IAMTS registered testbeds.

#### [Mobility Data Collaborative](#) (MDC)

Public, private and not-for-profit mobility partners gather to establish a framework, including glossary, practice-ready guidelines, governance models and tools which are easily scalable internationally and applicable across shared travel modes, for secure and effective data sharing that provides public benefit while protecting consumer privacy and promotes safe, equitable operations.

#### [Probitas Authentication](#)

Probitas Authentication is an internationally recognized organization for authentication of personnel credentials and a registrar committed to improving the quality of personnel, products and processes. Probitas is the world's largest Aerospace Auditor Authentication Body and an approved registrar for training providers. Custom programmed software and standardized authentication process provides a template which has been applied to multiple industry needs such as Aerospace Engine Delegated Product Release Validation (DPRV) and automated vehicle driving skills. The Probitas Authentication database contains over 9,000 records and continues to grow as new personnel and training needs are identified in new technology areas.

### **4.17. Telecommunications Industry Association (TIA)**

The Telecommunications Industry Association (TIA) represents manufacturers and suppliers of global communications networks through standards development, policy and advocacy, business opportunities, market intelligence, events, and networking. TIA enhances the business environment for broadband, mobile wireless, information technology, networks, cable, satellite and unified communications. Members' products and services empower communications in every industry and market, including healthcare, education, security, public safety, transportation, government, the



military, the environment, and entertainment. TIA is accredited by the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) as a standards developing organization (SDO).

Engineering Committee TR-14 is responsible for the ANSI/TIA-222, *Structural Steel Standards for Steel Antenna Towers and Supporting Structures* and ANSI/TIA-322, *Loading, Analysis, and Design Criteria Related to the Installation, Alteration and Maintenance of Communication Structures* standards. TR-14 is launching a new UAS working group to draft a telecom specific document for use case scenarios on workflow enhancement and best practices on data management. This includes the configuration of telecommunications towers and management of structural data as well as carrier audits.

Engineering Committee TR-34 is responsible for standards and studies related to satellite communications systems, including both the space and earth segments. The committee focuses on standards for space-borne and terrestrial hardware; interfaces on standards for satellite and terrestrial systems; and the efficient use of spectrum and orbital resources, including sharing between satellite and terrestrial services. TIA convenes the LEO Roundtable forum for discussing and consensus building around LEO specific issues and objectives including LEO satellite communication between unmanned systems and satellites at all altitudes.

Engineering Committee TR-8 formulates and maintains standards for private radio communications systems and equipment for both voice and data applications. TR-8 addresses all technical matters for systems and services, including definitions, interoperability, compatibility, and compliance requirements. The types of systems addressed by these standards include business and industrial dispatch applications, as well as public safety (such as police, ambulance and firefighting) applications.

Much of the work of the committee relates to the formulation of TIA-102 Series standards for APCO [Project 25 \(PDF\)](#). These are standards sponsored by the Association of Public-Safety Officials International ([APCO](#)), the National Association of State Telecommunications Directors (NASTD) and agencies of the federal government. Project 25 standards are developed to provide digital voice and data communications systems suited for public-safety and first-responder applications.

The communications and information exchange that TIA-102 Series standards covers are for use in tactical situations and to ensure interoperable communication (human to human) in tactical situations.

#### **4.18. Underwriters Laboratories, Inc. (UL)**

For more than 100 years, Underwriters Laboratories (UL) has been a leader in facilitating the safe introduction of new technologies through hazard-based safety engineering, research, and testing. UL Standards are the culmination of a broad stakeholder collaboration drawing from the very best in scientific methodology, testing expertise, and input from diverse stakeholders – from industry to academia, regulatory to retail, manufacturers to end-users – via UL’s consensus-based standards development process.

UL Standards development encompasses more than product standards; it also includes standards covering systems and services. With more than 1,700 standards and over 400 technical panels, UL is able to gain insight, knowledge, and expertise, from stakeholders from around the globe. Through this work, UL is able to develop standards that address not only safety, but also performance, environmental health, and sustainability.

UL's Standard Technical Panel (STP) 3030, Unmanned Aircraft Systems, developed [UL 3030, Standard for Unmanned Aircraft Systems](#), through stakeholder collaboration. The First Edition of ANSI/CAN/UL 3030 was published on September 18, 2018. UL 3030 covers the electrical system of UASs, as defined in the standard, used in flight for commercial applications or flight incidental to business applications. The requirements in UL 3030 are intended to cover a UAS that is operated by certified UAS pilots as identified in the Federal Regulations, where the unmanned aircraft is less than 25 kg (55 lbs). The UAS covered by UL 3030 is intended to be provided with an internal lithium ion battery that is charged from an external source.

## 5. Overviews of Selected UAS Industry Stakeholder Activities

### 5.1. Academy of Model Aeronautics (AMA)

The Academy of Model Aeronautics (AMA) is a nationwide, community-based organization of nearly 180,000 model aviation enthusiasts. Since 1936, AMA has successfully managed the recreational UAS community by providing robust safety guidelines and training programs. In addition to safety programming, AMA provides its members with the benefit of a \$2.5 million dollar liability insurance policy.

AMA's recreational safety programming focuses on creating a safe environment to protect bystanders, surrounding property, and the national airspace.

**AMA Safety Code:** <https://www.modelaircraft.org/sites/default/files/105.pdf>

In addition to the general safety guidelines, AMA members must also be diligent in actions to avoid collisions between all aircraft flying within the National Airspace System (NAS). This practice is known as "See and Avoid." Vigilance must be maintained by each person operating any aircraft to "see and avoid" other aircraft.

**See and Avoid Practices:**

<https://www.modelaircraft.org/system/files/documents/Safety%20%26%20Member%20Benefits%20-%20540-D.pdf>

In addition to the AMA Safety Code, First-Person View (FPV) operators must also abide by another set of safety and operational guidelines. FPV aircraft are RC UAS that are equipped with a video transmitter to send real-time video images from an onboard camera to a ground-based receiver for display on a pilot's video monitor/goggles. All recreational UAS operations must stay within line-of-sight of the operator or person co-located with the UAS operator.

**FPV operations:** <https://www.modelaircraft.org/sites/default/files/550.pdf>

AMA is the voice of its membership, providing liaison with the Federal Aviation Administration, the Federal Communications Commission, and all levels of government agencies. AMA works with local governments, zoning boards, and parks departments to promote the interests of local chartered clubs. These model clubs host events throughout the year, with many of these benefiting local and national charities.

AMA manages approximately 2400 clubs, most of which manage at least one flying site. Each club sets their own rules for operations at their flying site, but all who fly there must abide by the AMA Safety

Program. AMA provides clubs with guidelines in order to assist them in creating a flying site that is safe and promotes the enjoyment of model flying.

**Flying Site Specifications:**

<https://www.modelaircraft.org/sites/default/files/documents/Suggested%20Flying%20Site%20Specifications.pdf>

AMA provides \$2,500,000 in general liability coverage to members, clubs, and site owners. In addition to general liability insurance, members receive accident/medical coverage and fire/theft/vandalism coverage.

One of the main purposes of the AMA is to promote the advancement of model aviation into the future. AMA does this through educational programming and youth outreach. Model aviation is an effective tool for inspiring young people to explore careers in aviation STEM-related fields. Building and flying model airplanes have long been a gateway to aviation for aviators and engineers. Building and flying model aircraft are “hands-on” experiences to motivate and inspire a future generation of problem solvers and inventors, opening doors to careers in aviation and engineering.

**AMA Education:** <http://amaflightschool.org/>

## **5.2. Aerospace Industries Association (AIA)**

The Aerospace Industries Association (AIA) is the voice of the American aerospace and defense industry, representing more than 300 leading aerospace and defense manufacturers and suppliers, supporting over 2.5 million jobs and over \$151 billion in annual exports. Its members are on the cutting edge of innovation and are leading the industry on developing emerging technologies such as UAS that will revolutionize the way in which goods are moved, services are performed, and people connect.

To do this, AIA has an Emerging Technologies Committee that is comprised of a UAS Subcommittee, UAM Subcommittee, Spectrum Subcommittee and Airspace Integration Working Group that work in tandem with the FAA, NASA, and other government entities. AIA also houses the National Aerospace Standards, and has been actively writing standards for the aerospace and defense industry since 1941, including standards on emerging technologies and UAS cybersecurity.

All of these groups work together by looking at the entirety of the aviation ecosystem and how these new technologies, whether small, large, manned or unmanned will eventually become a part of it at all altitudes. AIA and its members work with a mature focus towards developing high level policies that will enable the regulatory framework to allow technologies into the airspace.

## **5.3. Alliance for Drone Innovation (ADI)**

The [Alliance for Drone Innovation \(ADI\)](#) is a leading policy voice for manufacturers, suppliers, and software developers of recreational and commercial drones. Headquartered in Washington, D.C., ADI

proudly supports policies that encourage the growth of the unmanned aircraft industry for personal, professional, educational, and governmental use. ADI members are the nation's industry leaders and corporate visionaries who are responsible for creating the vibrant drone ecosystem of today, and who will lead us to the future applications of tomorrow.

The mission of the Alliance for Drone Innovation is to promote stakeholder awareness and advance public policies that encourage a safety culture while enabling innovation and growth of the unmanned aircraft industry for both professional and personal use in the United States.

Drone manufacturers and those who use their technologies have specific insights and priorities that compel their voices to be heard. Among other things, ADI members have a strong interest in:

- Crafting a framework for professional and personal use of drones in a broad range of innovative applications for today and tomorrow
- Ensuring safety by maintaining user liability for operations and personal and corporate compliance with regulations during drone flight
- Advocating for objective, scientific risk assessments over arbitrary hardware or software mandates
- Harmonizing product requirements
- Partnering with the Congress and federal regulators in creating sound policies that promote unmanned aircraft manufacturing, and sensible standards and operations
- Protecting data privacy through technology-neutral policies; and
- Providing a respected resource for media inquiries and proactive public affairs efforts that represent the recreational and commercial industry leaders.

## **5.4. Alliance for Telecommunications Industry Solutions (ATIS)**

### **Background**

As a leading technology and solutions development organization, the Alliance for Telecommunications Industry Solutions, brings together the top global ICT companies to advance the industry's business priorities. ATIS membership includes North American network operators as well as some of the most innovative mobile equipment vendors. Increasingly, ATIS also collaborates with vertical industries and government agencies that utilize mobile technology. Member companies are currently working to address 5G, network-enabled artificial intelligence, distributed ledger technology/blockchain, network functions virtualization, emergency communications, IoT, cybersecurity, network evolution, quality of service, operations, and much more. All projects follow a fast-track development lifecycle – from design and innovation through standards, specifications, requirements, business use cases, software toolkits, open source solutions, and interoperability testing.

As the North American partner in 3GPP, ATIS is responsible for guiding 3GPP developments to ensure they meet market and regulatory requirements in the region and publishing regional standards that encapsulate 3GPP specifications.

## Overview

In 2017, ATIS launched its [Unmanned Aerial Vehicle \(UAV\)](#) initiative to apply ATIS members' expertise in mobile cellular and other communications networking technologies to better understanding the interaction of UAVs and communication technologies.

A focus of the UAV group is to advance the use of mobile cellular networks (especially 3GPP specified technology) to support the communication needs of UAVs. This includes monitoring and advancing the development of 3GPP specifications to address UAV-related requirements. The group helps align member strategies and contributions in 3GPP.

The group also considers how UAVs can provide benefits to mobile network operators – for example in helping restore cellular communications in emergency situations.

The group has published the following reports:

- [Use of Cellular Communications to Support Unmanned Aerial Vehicle \(UAV\) Flight Operations](#) (August 2019)
- [Use of UAVs for Restoring Communications in Emergency Situations](#) (December 2018)
- [Support for UAV Communications in 3GPP Cellular Standards](#) (October 2018)
- [Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Utilization of Cellular Services](#) (September 2017)

While much of the work to advance understanding of UAVs and communications technologies takes place in ATIS' UAV Initiative, ATIS also recognizes how its UAV findings are increasingly relevant to other work taking place in the organization. For example, ATIS's initiative to [characterize the communications needs for Internet of Things \(IoT\)](#) applications addresses several UAV-based services such as package delivery, aerial survey, and video production. It is this synergistic, cross-sector view that ATIS believes is critical to advancing how UAVs and communications technology can best work together.

## 5.5. Association for Unmanned Vehicle Systems International (AUVSI)

The Association for Unmanned Vehicle Systems International (AUVSI), the world's largest nonprofit organization dedicated to the advancement of UxS and robotics, represents corporations and professionals from more than 60 countries involved in industry, government, and academia. AUVSI members work in the defense, civil, and commercial markets.

AUVSI members who are participating in the development of the ANSI UAS roadmap view it as a vital activity that is needed to identify standards that will support the safe integration of UAS operations into society. Much of the effort involved with developing the ANSI UAS standards roadmap has taken place in conjunction with the [AUVSI Trusted Operator Program™ \(TOP\)](#), which was launched on November, 1, 2018.

There is positive synergy between the ANSI UAS roadmap and the AUVSI TOP. The ANSI roadmap, once completed, will point to the existing and future formal UAS standards, while TOP provides a practical industry solution to an industry problem now. TOP tests the veracity of commercial UAS operators, while supporting industry unification on best practices and protocols to be compliant with these emerging standards. TOP focuses heavily on safety, reliability, and professionalism in remote pilot training and operator certification, pointing to recognized standards and safety “behaviors” including: industry best practice, codes of conduct, and in some cases new association standards, such as the AUVSI AIRBOSS supplement and Airmanship Principles as contained in the TOP Protocols Certification Manual.

There is no doubt that as the industry continues to evolve so will the need to refine existing standards and develop new standards where more “gaps” become apparent. In the meantime, the TOP provides a practical certification program that supports future standardization.

## 5.6. Aviators Code Initiative (ACI)

[The Aviators Code Initiative \(ACI\)](#) provides original tools to advance aviation safety and professionalism, and to provide a vision of excellence for aviators. With aviation experience totaling more than 500 years, the [Permanent Editorial Board](#) builds upon the ACI’s 18-year foundation of creating a family of guidance materials for pilots of manned and unmanned aircraft, instructors, maintenance technicians and others. Its UAS guidance includes:

- [Unmanned Aircraft Systems Pilots Code](#) (UAS Pilots Code)
- [Improving Cockpit Awareness of Unmanned Aircraft Systems Near Airports](#) (whitepaper)
- [Flight Safety in the Drone Age](#) (for manned aircraft pilots operating near drones)

Other ACI resources that have contributed to the development of UAS practices and safety include:

- [Aviation Maintenance Technicians Model Code of Conduct](#)
- [Aviators Model Code of Conduct](#)
- [Flight Instructors Model Code of Conduct](#)
- [Glider Aviators Model Code of Conduct](#)
- [Helicopter Pilots Model Code of Conduct](#)
- [Light Sport Aviators Model Code of Conduct](#)
- [Seaplane Pilots Model Code of Conduct](#)
- [Student Pilots Model Code of Conduct](#)
- [Teaching the AMCC to Kids](#)

ACI also produces extensive commentary, [supporting materials](#), and code of conduct [language translations](#), all of which are available at [www.secureav.com](http://www.secureav.com). For more information, contact its Permanent Editorial Board [peb@secureav.com](mailto:peb@secureav.com).

## 5.7. AW-Drones

[AW-Drones](#) is a 36 month (2019-2021) project co-funded by the European Commission in the framework of [Horizon 2020](#), the biggest EU Research and Innovation programme. The project supports the on-going EU regulatory process for the definition of technical rules, standards, and procedures for civilian drones to enable safe, environmentally sound and reliable operations in the EU. This objective is met through four main strands of activity:

- **Collect** information on on-going and planned work with regards to technical rules, procedures and standards developed for mass-market drones worldwide;
- Carry out a critical **assessment/benchmarking** of all collected data to identify **best practices, gaps and bottlenecks**;
- **Propose and validate a well-reasoned set of technical standards** for each category of drone operations;
- **Engage with key stakeholders and end-users**, i.e., representatives of the whole drone value chain.

EC and EASA, together with the project consortium, considered the current regulatory needs at EU level and decided to give priority to the following areas:

- Year 1: Analysis of standards required to support effectively the Specific Operations Risk Assessment (SORA) methodology. In particular, AW-Drones will look at the mitigations strategies proposed by SORA in its Annexes B and E and identify to what extent supporting standards to implement those mitigations are available or need to be developed. The identification of these standards will initially focus on technical ones, but those that are more related to operations and procedures will be considered as well.
- Year 2: Analysis of standards supporting the development of U-Space in Europe. In particular, all standards required to support the technical implementation of U-Space services in both U1, U2 and U3 phases will be addressed.
- Year 3: Towards its end, AW-Drones will focus on standards needed to support the operation of highly automated UAS and to ensure that they can be operated safely in a variety of applications. Standards and principles needed for Autonomous UAS certification will be investigated.

### Collection of UAS standards

The starting point for the collection of data has been the EUSCG Rolling Development Plan as it provides an overview of a large number of standards related to UAS. However, this source has been complemented with other data, e.g., ANSI roadmap and other literature studies. Special importance has been placed on the collection of UAS related standards from ANSI and ASTM, as they cover a huge amount of documents and are obviously very much complete about the standards by these Standards Development Organizations (SDOs).



The collected standards are linked to the SORA Operational Safety Objectives (OSOs), ground/air risk mitigations (GRM/ARM), and Step #9 (Adjacent Area/Airspace Considerations). This is a first step for the assessment of a standard as a possible Acceptable Means of Compliance (AMC) to one or more OSO/mitigation.

### **Standards assessment**

During the first year (2019), the AW-Drones project focused on the collection and assessment of standards potentially suitable to support the demonstration of compliance to the requirements set in the Specific Operations Risk Assessment methodology (SORA). This methodology is officially recommended by EASA as AMC to Article 11 of EU Regulation 947/2019, but at the moment lacks clear guidance on which technical standards the UAS operators should use.

AW-Drones is in charge of the assessment of the standards collected as described in the previous section. In line with the iterative approach of the AW-Drones project, this work will be updated regularly in the next years to include updates related to the standards assessed and inputs from relevant UAS industry stakeholders (e.g. EASA, Standard Making Bodies, Operators, etc.).

According to the assessment [methodology](#) defined by the project, the assessment is focused on the following cases:

- CASE 1: one or more standards that are potentially suitable to comply with a given requirement have been identified;
- CASE 2: there is no standard fully covering a given requirement, thus a gap is identified.

For each SORA requirement AW-Drones is therefore able to present:

- A list of standards that are covering in part or fully the requirement, ranked by a global score obtained by assessing each standard according to the methodology;
- A list of gaps identifying aspects that are not adequately covered by existing standards. Gaps are also given a score based on the criteria identified by the methodology;
- Recommendations about the preferred standards and suggested strategies to fill the identified gaps based on their score.

The aforementioned assessment was carried out for all the requirements stemming from the SORA methodology, including:

- Ground Risk Mitigations
- Tactical Mitigations Performance Requirements (TMPR)
- Operational Safety Objectives
- Adjacent Area/Airspace requirements

With respect to the standards considered in the analysis, the scope was limited considering the following aspects:

- In general, no standards in the planning phase were considered, with few exceptions related to standards for which the first draft was already available.
- The maturity of the standards (i.e., their phase of development) was determined in September 2019, so there could be recent updates which are not yet included in this document.
- AW-Drones partners did not have full access to all standards at the time of the assessment. A complete assessment is provided only for the standards with full access. For the others, AW-Drones provides a preliminary assessment based on the publicly available information.

Finally, it is worth mentioning that the assessment did not address the technical quality of the individual standards. AW-Drones assumed that each standard was adequate to fulfil the scope for which it was developed, and focused the assessment only on the evaluation of its capability to address the requirements.

### **Results presentation**

The AW-Drones open repository is an online platform where users will be able to easily identify relevant information from the AW-Drones database of standards and regulations.

In the year 2019, the main requirements of the AW-Drones open repository have been produced and are detailed. The AW-Drones open repository is an online platform that will provide a single point of access to relevant information about:

- rules, procedures, and technical standards developed for civilian drones;
- best practices, gaps, and bottlenecks;
- technical standards for each category of drone operations.

Apart from an open platform that will be used as information exchange (access, mine, exploit, reproduce, disseminate data), the AW-Drones repository will also include collaboration features (commenting, rating, adding and editing content, reviewing, etc.) that will enhance its use and purpose and will further support its sustainability even after the end of the AW-Drones project.

The AW-Drones repository will store the following information for each standard: Domain (Domain and Subtopic); Type of Standard (Whether it is Standard/Specification, Best Practice or Information/Guidance); Document info (Document No, Title, Organization, Status, Description); Safety requirements (including affected SORA OSO, Technical requirements, Operational requirements, Remote crew training, Safe design, Deterioration of external systems supporting UAS operation, Human Error, Adverse Operating Conditions); Ground Risk Mitigations (M1 Generic, M2 Effects on ground impact, ERP); and Collision Risk/Air Risk (Strategic Mitigation, Tactical Mitigation).

Four types of users have been identified: Administrator, Editor, Acknowledged user and Basic user. Different functionalities will be offered for each type of user. The AW-Drones open repository will be ready in June 2020 and will be linked by the project website: <https://www.aw-drones.eu/>.

## Engagement with main stakeholders

The AW-Drones project is built upon a solid and structured communication with stakeholders external to the consortium. The project identified three main categories of stakeholders, with different levels of involvement and means of consultation:

1. Institutional bodies:
  - a. EU and EC: DG-INEA, DG-MOVE (EASA and the European Commission represent the main targets of the project, to be updated constantly on progress, findings and results);
  - b. European Joint Undertakings (e.g., SESAR, Clean-Sky);
  - c. Regulatory and safety agencies: ICAO, EASA and National CAAs, JARUS;
  - d. Standard making bodies: EUSCG, ISO, EUROCAE, ASTM, RTCA, ASD-STAN;
  - e. National bodies: National Ministries of Transport, National Agencies.
2. Specialised audience:
  - a. AW-Drones Advisory Board
  - b. Research community
    - i. R&I institutes;
    - ii. Universities;
    - iii. Private research companies;
  - c. Industry
    - i. Drones manufacturers and maintainers;
    - ii. Drones operators;
    - iii. Drones Pilots;
    - iv. ANSPs;
    - v. UTM/U-Space Service Providers;
    - vi. Industrial associations;
  - d. Training Institutes.
3. General stakeholders:
  - a. General public;
  - b. Media.

## Contacts

- AW-Drones Project Coordinator: Damiano Taurino, Deep Blue ([damiano.taurino@dblue.it](mailto:damiano.taurino@dblue.it))
- AW-Drones Communication manager: Vera Ferraiuolo, Deep Blue ([vera.ferraiuolo@dblue.it](mailto:vera.ferraiuolo@dblue.it))
- [AW-Drones Project website](#)
- [AW-Drones Project LinkedIn Page](#)

## References

- [JARUS, Specific Operations Risk Assessment \(SORA\)](#)
- [EASA, AMC and GM to Commission Implementing Regulation \(EU\) No 2019/947](#)
- [EUSCG \(EUROCAE\): European UAS Standardization Rolling Development Plan](#)
- ANSI: Standardization Roadmap – For Unmanned Aircraft Systems, Version 1.0

- [ASTM: Unmanned Aircraft Systems – A comprehensive solution](#)

## 5.8. Commercial Drone Alliance

The Commercial Drone Alliance is an industry-led non-profit association representing commercial drone end users and the broader commercial drone ecosystem. The Alliance’s members include key leaders in the commercial drone industry, including manufacturers, service providers, software developers, and end users in vertical markets such as oil and gas, precision agriculture, construction, security, communications technology, infrastructure, newsgathering, filmmaking, and more.

The goals of the Alliance are to reduce barriers to enable the emergence of drone technology, and to work with the federal government and other stakeholders to facilitate drone integration into the National Airspace System (NAS) in a way that is safe and secure. The Alliance is actively engaged in drone security issues. The Alliance is also dedicated to supporting commercial drone industry market growth, enhancing value for commercial enterprise drone end users, educating the public on the benefits of commercial drones, and merging policy with innovation to create relevant rules for operation. To this end, the Alliance regularly engages with federal regulators, policymakers, and industry stakeholders, and actively participates in rulemaking initiatives, aviation rulemaking committees, the development of legislation, and public debate about drones.

## 5.9. CTIA

CTIA® represents the U.S. wireless communications industry and the companies throughout the mobile ecosystem that enable Americans to lead a 21st century connected life. The association’s members include wireless carriers, device manufacturers, suppliers, as well as app and content companies. CTIA vigorously advocates at all levels of government for policies that foster continued wireless innovation and investment. The association also coordinates the industry’s voluntary best practices, hosts educational events that promote the wireless industry, and co-produces a leading wireless industry tradeshow. CTIA was founded in 1984 and is based in Washington, D.C.

CTIA engages with policymakers at regulatory agencies, in Congress, and in the Administration to address how commercial wireless technology (sometimes referred to as “networked cellular”) can support UAS communications functions. For example, CTIA responded to UAS spectrum inquiries from the Federal Aviation Administration and the Federal Communications Commission to explain the critical role of networked cellular in robust, reliable and secure UAS communications, and to address how wireless carriers are addressing interference and mobility issues CTIA advocates for flexible policies and standards related to spectrum and wireless infrastructure that will enable the growing UAS industry to flourish. CTIA also commented in the FAA’s Safe and Secure Operation of Small UAS proceeding on the role of wireless networks and devices in small UAS operational evolution. Additionally, CTIA monitors UAS discussions in SDOs such as 3GPP, which is developing specifications for 5G wireless technology, and ASTM’s UAS Remote ID Working Group. Through its UAS Working Group, CTIA provides a forum for

wireless carriers and suppliers, UAS and urban air mobility operators, and researchers from organizations such as NASA to explore concepts of UAS integration and communications needs. In 2019, the FAA and CTIA established common data testing principles across all FAA UAS Integration Pilot Program (IPP) to allow FAA to assess the wireless industry's readiness to address key UAS communications needs.

## **5.10. General Aviation Manufacturers Association (GAMA)**

The General Aviation Manufacturers Association (GAMA) is an international aviation industry trade association representing over 120 of the world's leading manufacturers of general aviation airplanes and rotorcraft, engines, avionics, components, and related service providers. GAMA exists to foster and advance the general welfare, safety, interests and activities of the global business and general aviation industry. This includes promoting a better understanding of general aviation manufacturing, maintenance, repair, and overhaul and the important role these industry segments play in economic growth and opportunity, and in serving the critical transportation needs of communities, companies and individuals worldwide.

GAMA works certification issues for passenger or cargo carrying Part 23 to Part 29 aircraft (and equivalent aircraft categories of the global authorities) through a collection of standing committees. [GAMA Standing Committees](#) evaluate common issues around design and safety, licensing and training, maintenance and operations as well as airspace integration to streamline where improvements can be made but also advocate on areas which impact the general and business aviation community. GAMA's electric propulsion & innovation committee (EPIC) also provides a forum to companies introducing new and innovative concepts to explore best pathways for certification and integration into the national airspace. Since 2015, EPIC has been working with over 80 global stakeholders to support hybrid and electric propulsion systems, eVTOL aircraft, autonomous systems, and urban air mobility operations concepts.

### **Publications and Resources**

GAMA produces important technical publications and specifications, which guide the industry in standards for development and maintenance of general aviation aircraft. Readers can also access numerous studies detailing general aviation's significant economic impact globally, as well as documents highlighting the industry's work on the environment and other issues. GAMA is well-known and respected for its close tracking of the industry's shipment and billing numbers, issuing new results each quarter. The association also publishes an annual report, which not only includes historical aircraft delivery data, but also fleet and flight activity data from around the globe and critical statistics about aviation safety.

The GAMA has developed an ["Aerospace Standards Applicability and Acceptance" database](#) including industry consensus standards which support the aviation industry. It includes all the standards approved or in development by the primary standards development organizations (SDOs) supporting the general and business aviation industries. With the safety continuum in mind, GAMA's database addresses

manned, unmanned, and cargo aircraft, as well as related systems and technologies, including major components. At this time, it does not include all materials, testing or chemicals but if needed can be expanded at a later date. The database is intended as a tool where companies may identify standards by categories, applicability, regulation, organization and more.

GAMA's database includes applicability and acceptance tables. The applicability tables highlight the standards' relationship to various EASA and FAA rules. For example, if a standard is intended for Light Sport Aircraft (LSA) but is also helpful to UAS, or intended for Level 1 Part 23 but helpful to LSA or Level 2, the user can sort to identify which standards they may want to review for applicability to their project. The acceptance tables denote where and if each standard has been accepted by the CAAs, including references to the published policy calling out its acceptance. Currently, cross reference tables to Part 23 and EASA's special condition vertical takeoff and landing (SC-VTOL) are also included.

Alongside the Aerospace Standards Portfolio and Matrices is a partnering website which addresses the various SDOs, available educational resources, and FAQs about how to participate in standards development as well as how to use the standards. Additionally, it will reference other industry roadmaps that the [GAMA's Aerospace Standards Database](#) does not address, such as UAS and additive manufacturing (ANSI UASSC and AMSC<sup>9</sup> offerings). The GAMA's Aerospace Standards Database will be maintained on the public GAMA standards website.

The GAMA Aerospace Standards Database aims to provide industry more visibility into the existing work available in order to save time and resources, both in terms of locating standards and so as not to create unnecessary new standards. It does not aim to identify gaps in standards, research and regulation as those areas are worked within the GAMA committees and with the appropriate outside organizations leading those initiatives. Other standards organizations have developed gap analyses that are relevant for standards needs for urban air mobility (UAM) aircraft and supporting technologies. The manned aviation community is looking to the unmanned aircraft community for needed airspace integration standards, such as Remote ID and Detect and Avoid (DAA). The ANSI UASSC roadmap already includes those gaps.

The general aviation industry is a significant economic contributor to the global economy, as seen in reports published by GAMA and others, and available [here](#). GAMA also provides guidance to manufacturers in addressing [technical issues](#) and meeting [product certification standards](#). Furthermore, GAMA periodically publishes documents on other topics of interest to the general aviation industry, such as [business aviation's commitment on climate change](#).

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<sup>9</sup> The America Makes & ANSI Additive Manufacturing Standardization Collaborative (AMSC) has developed a *Standardization Roadmap for Additive Manufacturing (version 2.0, June 2018)*. Additional information is available at [www.ansi.org/amsc](http://www.ansi.org/amsc).

**Related GAMA Technical Publications**

- [GAMA Specification No. 1: Specification for Pilot’s Operating Handbook \(Version 2.0\)](#)
- [GAMA Specification No. 7: Specification for Continuing Airworthiness Program \(CAP\) \(Version 1.0\)](#)
- [GAMA Publication No. 16: Hybrid and Electric Propulsion Performance Measurement \(Version 1.0\)](#)
- [Interim Procedure on Noise Certification for Emerging VTOL Aircraft Version1.0 \(Oct2019\)](#)
- [A Rationale Construct for Simplified Vehicle Operations \(SVO\); Whitepaper Version 1.0 \(May2019\)](#)

**Related Certification Publications**

- [The FAA and Industry Guide to Product Certification \(2017\)](#)
- [Implementing a Safety Management System for Design, Manufacturing and Maintenance Providers \(SM-001\)](#)

Questions regarding the GAMA’s standards strategies and the database can be directed to Christine DeJong Bernat at [cdejong@gama.aero](mailto:cdejong@gama.aero).

**5.11. Global UTM Association (GUTMA)**

The Global UTM Association (GUTMA) is a non-profit consortium of worldwide Unmanned Aircraft Systems Traffic Management (UTM) stakeholders. Its purpose is to foster the safe, secure and efficient integration of drones in national airspace systems. Its mission is to support and accelerate the transparent implementation of globally interoperable UTM systems.

Since its establishment in 2016, the association has grown to over 70 members, representing 28 countries worldwide. As UTM systems and services are taking shape in pilot programs and demonstrations around the globe, various new actors apply to join the emerging industry. The diversity can be tackled in the current composition of GUTMA community: civil aviation authorities and air navigation service providers share their views with telecommunication companies, UAS manufacturers, drone operators and UTM service providers to identify the new solutions, roles and responsibilities in the UTM ecosystem.

All GUTMA protocols are open source, publicly available, and have a process of engagement, updates, reviews, and tests.

<a href="#">Flight Declaration Protocol</a>	The Flight Declaration Protocol is targeted at drone operators. It provides a way to share interoperable flight and mission plans digitally.
<a href="#">Flight Logging Protocol</a>	The Flight Logging Protocol is targeted at drone manufacturers and UAS service suppliers (USSs). It offers an interoperable interface to access post-flight data. It is in the process of being expanded to enable access to inflight telemetry data.

<a href="#">Air Traffic Data Protocol</a>	The Air Traffic Data Protocol aims to standardize how sensor data are transmitted to the apps and services used during drone operations.
<a href="#">Drone Registry Database Schema</a>	This is a GUTMA sandbox for working on an interoperable drone registry. It has three main things to work with: Registry Landscape Whitepaper, Interoperable API Specification and a working API.
<a href="#">Database Brokerage API specification</a>	GUTMA’s drone registry broker sandbox has three things to work with: Registry Broker Whitepaper, two working registries with sample data and operating test system with IDs, tokens and status and results.
Aerial Connectivity Working Group	This Working Group addresses the need for better and more formal coordination between aviation stakeholders with bodies representing the commercial/cellular communication industries.
GUTMA is also addressing harmonized concepts and standards for remote ID, geo-awareness, inter-USS communications and “open FIMS.”	

## 5.12. Helicopter Association International (HAI)

Since its founding in 1948, the mission of the Helicopter Association International (HAI) has been to provide its members with services that directly benefit their operations, and to advance the international rotorcraft community by providing programs that enhance safety, encourage professionalism and economic viability, and promote the unique contributions vertical flight offers society. Today, HAI members in more than 70 nations annually operate more than 5,000 aircraft some 2.3 million flight hours while carrying out nearly 50 different operational missions.

HAI supports safety, operational, regulatory, and legislative initiatives to improve and promote the rotorcraft industry. Unique among aviation associations, it represents the interests of rotorcraft operators, manufacturers, and service providers. HAI also holds the world’s largest rotorcraft trade show, providing a platform where the international vertical flight community comes together to connect, conduct business, and address industry issues.

In 1948, when HAI was founded, the civil helicopter industry was only two years old, and the association grew and matured with the industry. Decades later, HAI is a leader in welcoming a new sector to the rotorcraft industry: unmanned aircraft systems (UAS).

Besides sharing vertical-lift technology, both manned and unmanned rotorcraft share the low-altitude airspace to perform many of the same missions. Unmanned rotorcraft, in a number of configurations, including quadcopters, tiltrotors, and traditional main/tail rotor designs, today execute a wide variety of operations that formerly required helicopters. Today, everything from small UAS weighing only a few pounds performing aerial photography and surveillance to full production-size unmanned aircraft conducting aerial firefighting and heavy construction missions fits within the continuum of modern rotorcraft aviation.



First and foremost, HAI supports the safe, efficient integration of UAS into the airspace. To ensure that integration, HAI staff have been foundational participants on a number of important UAS-related advisory groups, including aviation rulemaking committees, working groups, panels, the FAA Pathfinder program, and the FAA Drone Advisory Committee.

HAI has also welcomed UAS members into the association, launching in 2016 a new membership category for UAS operators and creating an Unmanned Aircraft Systems Working Group. HAI's 12 working groups provide the Board of Directors with industry perspectives and insight to a variety of topics. The UAS Working Group promotes cooperative communication among all sectors of rotorcraft aviation, helps HAI members incorporate unmanned systems into their operations, and develops best practices to enhance the safety and efficiency of both manned and unmanned aviation in shared airspace.

As technology evolves, unmanned rotorcraft will fill an increasing number of missions, eventually to include the movement of people and goods. The number of rotorcraft missions being performed is also expanding as consumers and businesses come to understand the capabilities and advantages provided by these new aircraft. Insurance adjusters, for example, now commonly use UAS to perform aerial inspection of property damage.

Each year, more traditional helicopter operators incorporate the use of unmanned aircraft in their business models. These companies have decades of experience in low-altitude rotorcraft operations, aviation regulatory compliance, and safety management and risk mitigation. As such, their UAS learning curve is more about incorporating a new aircraft into their fleet as opposed to a drone company trying to learn the complexities of aviation operations.

HAI will continue to be a leader in the integration of unmanned rotorcraft into global aviation. As has been the case since 1948, HAI will do so with a focus on safety and professionalism, while promoting the economic and social benefits of this latest addition to the rotorcraft industry.

You can learn more about HAI at [www.rotor.org](http://www.rotor.org).

### **5.13. National Agricultural Aviation Association (NAAA)**

The National Agricultural Aviation Association (NAAA), founded in 1966, represents approximately 1,900 members in 46 states. NAAA supports the interests of small business owners and pilots licensed as professional commercial aerial applicators who use aircraft to enhance food, fiber and biofuel production, protect forestry, and control health-threatening pests. NAAA works with its partner organization, the National Agricultural Aviation Research & Education Foundation (NAAREF), to provide research and educational programs focused on enhancing the efficacy, security, and safety of aerial application.

NAAA largely agrees with the gaps identified in the ANSI UAS roadmap. For example, NAAA strongly agrees with the roadmap's assessment that gaps exist in the communication, treatment efficacy,

operational safety, equipment reliability, and airspace integration of unmanned aircraft used for aerial application compared to their manned counterparts, and that extensive research and development should be required to prove their safe use. Efficacy, drift potential, and ability to comply with the aerial application requirements on EPA pesticide labels are key areas UAVs need to comply with before certification for pesticide application use. The drift characteristics and efficacy of applications made by UAVs are largely unknown and require extensive research and development to ensure environmental and human safety.

Currently, USDA's AgDRIFT model is the regulatory and industry standard for calculating drift risk for ag aircraft, ground sprayers, and air blasters. This model has been developed over the years through extensive research and smaller unmanned aircraft do not fit properly into the AgDRIFT model. NAAA has provided data to the EPA explaining why the agency needs to develop a committee to accurately study the drift characteristics of applications made by UAVs, so this data could be incorporated into the AgDRIFT model. NAAA also requested that until this research is conducted and evaluated, the EPA clarify the rules regarding how UAS can make aerial applications under existing law.

Additionally, NAAA strongly agrees that more research and development is needed to develop detect and avoid systems and that it should be a high priority for the aviation industry, if not the highest priority. Furthermore, NAAA believes detect and avoid systems should be standard on all unmanned aircraft, requiring unmanned aircraft to land autonomously when a manned aircraft is detected close by. Research shows pilots cannot reliably detect UAVs, so the burden of avoidance lies with the UAV operator. The Colorado Agricultural Aviation Association conducted a [study](#) on the visibility of UAVs at low levels and only one of five manned aircraft were able to positively identify a moving UAS, albeit briefly.

NAAA supports the safe integration of UAS into the NAS, provided they provide an equivalent level of safety to having a pilot on board. This includes installation of an Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B) like technology aboard that grounds the UAS when approaching an unsafe distance to a manned aircraft, strobe lighting, aviation orange and white marking to promote visibility, requiring line of sight operation and other measures to ensure proper operation, and awareness by manned low-level aviation operations. NAAA has met with the FAA UAS integration office and numerous members of Congress to communicate these safety concerns and promote a safety minded approach to UAV integration.

## **5.14. National Council on Public Safety UAS (NCPSU)**

The [National Council on Public Safety UAS \(NCPSU\)](#), a federation of national public safety organizations, is continuing its mission of advancing the safe and effective use of UAS in the public safety community. This is being accomplished in a number of ways. First, to collect and share best practices, lessons learned, UAS successes, and policies/procedures. Next, to increase the awareness about public safety UAS by partnering and participating with organizations such as AUVSI to provide public safety forums.

The National Council is in the process of reaching out to public safety organizations in Canada and Europe to create an international collaboration to share thoughts and ideas.

Presently, the NCPSU is promoting and facilitating the development of state public safety UAS councils for the simple purpose of identifying public safety UAS programs/resources within the state, UAS capabilities, and points of contact toward the goal of a statewide database that will also combine into a nationwide network of public safety UAS Programs. This is designed to enhance communication, coordination, and collaboration with and between public safety agencies. It will also serve as a way to identify UAS trends and issues. Agencies that are exploring a UAS program of their own can also learn how nearby agencies operate and access their policies and procedures. These state councils may be existing committees and are not designed to replace other WGs. 18 states are currently in the process of organizing a state public safety UAS council.

The NCPSU also stays abreast of technology and legislation related to counter-UAS (C-UAS) as this is a critical component to public safety and the communities they serve to address the clueless, the careless, and the criminal UAS operations.

The NCPSU submits articles, provides public safety speakers, works on and promotes UAS standards development, organizes a 2-day Public Safety UAS Forum at AUVSI's national XPONENTIAL Conference (in Chicago in 2019), supports the AUVSI Trusted Operator Program™ (TOP), promotes regional public safety UAS training, and more.

## **5.15. National Public Safety Telecommunications Council (NPSTC)**

The National Public Safety Telecommunications Council ([NPSTC](#)) is a federation of organizations whose mission is to improve public safety communications through collaborative leadership.

Public safety communications are comprised of voice and data. Data includes digital voice, images, video, and information from sensors. This includes the data/information that may be transmitted by UASs. NPSTC is represented on the governing board of the [NCPSU](#).

NPSTC has an [Unmanned Aircraft System Working Group](#) which has produced three reports:

- [Using UAS for Communications Support](#) (May 30, 2018)
- [UAS Communications Spectrum and Technology Considerations](#) (May 30, 2018)
- [Guidelines for Creating a UAS Program](#) (April 18, 2017)

The purpose of this UAS WG is to:

- 1) Review the work being done by other groups and organizations to better understand the current landscape.

- 2) Create a list of use cases that document public safety use of these devices by law enforcement, fire/rescue, and EMS.
- 3) Review the current regulatory environment including issues that impact research, affect public safety use, and concern appropriate management of commercial and hobby devices.
- 4) Provide input on pending rule-making actions which will impact public safety operations (either directly or via regulation of commercial and hobby operations).
- 5) Consider the need for additional spectrum to communicate with Public Safety UAS and coordinate with the NPSTC Spectrum Management Committee.
- 6) Develop outreach statements which will help to educate the public safety community of the current state of UAS and robotic usage.
- 7) Examine the need for best practices in the use of UAS and robotic systems.

On January 27, 2020, [NPSTC filed Comments](#) to the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) supporting the use of 960-1164 MHz and 5030-5091 MHz bands for UAS and reiterating previous recommendations filed with the FCC to authorize both manned and unmanned airborne public safety operations on the lower 10 MHz of the 4.9 GHz band.

Currently, NPSTC is not engaged in further UAS discussions or studies unless there is a new issue or need for updating current reports.

## **5.16. Performance Review Institute® (PRI)**

Performance Review Institute is the world leader in facilitating collaborative supply chain oversight programs, quality management systems approvals, and professional development in industries where safety and quality are shared values. A not-for-profit trade association, Performance Review Institute serves customers around the world.

### **Programs**

#### **The Nadcap® program**

The Nadcap program is an industry-managed approach to conformity assessment that brings together technical experts from the aviation, space and defense industries and government to establish requirements for accreditation, accredit suppliers, and define operational program requirements. This results in a standardized approach to quality assurance and a reduction in redundant auditing throughout the aerospace industry because prime contractors, suppliers and government representatives have joined forces to develop a program that:

- Establishes stringent industry consensus standards that satisfy the requirements of all participants
- Replaces routine auditing of suppliers with one approved through a consensus decision-making process of members from the user community
- Conducts more in-depth, technically superior critical process audits

- Improves supplier quality throughout industry through stringent requirements
- Reduces costs through improved standardization
- Utilizes technically expert auditors to assure process familiarity
- Provides more frequent audits for primes, fewer audits for suppliers
- Uses a web-based system for audit tracking and communication, allowing for 24-hour global access, and providing rich analytic capabilities

The Nadcap program has a membership which includes 40 prime contractors and 24 of the top 25 aerospace companies in the world. Nadcap meetings take place three times per year, with attendance often over 1,000 technical experts. There are over 8,500 Nadcap accreditations in 53 countries/locations across a range of critical processes. These are: Aero Structure Assembly, Chemical Processing, Coatings, Composites, Conventional Machining, Elastomer Seals, Electronics, Fluid Distribution Systems, Forgings, Heat Treating, Materials Testing, Measurement & Inspection, Non Destructive Testing, Non Metallic Materials Manufacturing, Non Metallic Materials Testing, Nonconventional Machining, Sealants, Surface Enhancement, and Welding.

#### **The PRI Registrar<sup>SM</sup> service**

PRI Registrar is an accredited independent third-party certification body that provides quality, environmental, and health & safety management system certification services designed to drive continual improvement in our client's manufacturing or service processes. PRI Registrar provides certifications to international standards including AS9100 and ISO9001.

#### **The PRI Training<sup>SM</sup> program**

The PRI Training program specializes in offering quality-related and technical training all over the world and in multiple languages to industries where safety and quality are shared values. The training is conducted via public sessions, webinars, onsite training, and hosted training. There are 4 core tracks of learning: Quality, Nadcap Audit Criteria Review, Nadcap Audit Preparation, and Special Process. More than 35,000 learners have attended PRI Training courses across 38 countries/locations, which are available in 8 different languages.

#### **The PRI Qualification<sup>SM</sup> program**

The PRI Qualification program is a global system managed by aerospace industry experts that creates aerospace manufacturing personnel qualifications. In collaboration with aerospace industry experts, the PRI Qualification program develops and maintains Bodies of Knowledge. These technical documents represent the baseline knowledge and experience required to be considered competent for a target position. 37 Bodies of Knowledge have been published across topics within the following areas: Brazing, Chemical Processing, Composite Repair, Heat Treating, and Welding. Using the Bodies of Knowledge, the industry develops written and practical assessments that are used to validate the competency of aerospace industry personnel. Over 10,000 assessments have been taken to date.

#### **The PRI CAAP<sup>SM</sup> program**

The PRI Counterfeit Avoidance Accreditation Program (CAAP) program is a cooperative industry effort to mitigate the risk of introducing counterfeit parts into the supply chain and the cost for compliance

throughout the aviation, defense, and space industries. The PRI CAAP program enables organizations that purchase components and assemblies to demonstrate that they have systems in place to identify counterfeit products, and to minimize the risks associated with them. The PRI CAAP program accreditation demonstrates vigilance and the ability to act appropriately. The Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement issued by the US Department of Defense has made this activity even more important. The PRI CAAP program currently offers accreditation in Electrical, Electronic, and Electromechanical (EEE) Parts, and Distributors.

### **PRI Qualified Products Listings**

PRI administers qualified products listing programs on behalf of the US government and global aerospace and ground vehicle industries. The PRI-QPL (Aerospace) program is managed by the Qualified Products Management Council (QPMC) made up of representatives from Industry and Government. Users such as the OEMs, government, and airlines benefit from reducing second party testing and reporting of test results, maximizing user resources, maximizing competition without the loss of quality, and avoidance of costs associated with maintaining their own aerospace QPLs. Suppliers benefit from the PRI-QPL (Aerospace) program by ensuring fairness among competitors, and utilizing a consistent approach to qualification of product and initial qualification data provided to a wider industry base, resulting in elimination of redundant testing and qualification processes.

## **5.17. Security Industry Association (SIA)**

[SIA](#) is an international trade association representing manufacturers and integrators of physical security equipment, cyber security technologies, and life safety solutions. Its membership ranges from large global technology companies to locally owned and operated security industry participants that develop, manufacture, install, or service security products. These products include alarm systems, access control, video surveillance, data analytics, and identity management solutions, as well as security-related unmanned systems, robotics, and a range of other cutting-edge security solutions that help keep streets, schools, critical infrastructure, and businesses safe. SIA is the primary sponsor of the largest security trade show in North America, ISC West, which attracts over 30,000 attendees annually. In 2017, ISC West unveiled its inaugural *Unmanned Security Expo* featuring SIA member companies showcasing several UAS, counter-UAS, and robotic technologies utilized in a security setting.

UAS technologies and ground-based robotics have diversified the security industry's technology portfolio. As a result, SIA has become actively involved in UAS and counter-UAS policy development, and was recently cited as a supporter of federal legislation creating a framework for agency use of counter-UAS technology during a congressional hearing. In 2018, SIA created the *Autonomous Security Robotics Working Group* (ASRWG), which is comprised of member volunteers advising SIA on UAS/robotic initiatives benefiting the security industry. SIA and ASRWG recently released a regulatory guide entitled, *UAS FAQ for the Security Industry* to assist members in comprehending the legal and regulatory landscapes governing UAS technology. Concurrently, the ASRWG assisted in the development of market research addressing how robotics are expanding and augmenting the capabilities of security personnel.

## 5.18. Small UAV Coalition

Industry leaders established the [Small UAV Coalition](#) to provide a unified voice advocating for changes to law and policy that will allow unfettered commercial, civil, and philanthropic UAS operations in the United States and abroad. The Coalition provides lawmakers and regulators with technical expertise needed to develop a progressive, forward-leaning regulatory framework that will allow businesses to seize the benefits of UAS technology in the near term.

The current pace of regulatory and policy development, particularly in the United States, is impeding UAS development, sales, services, and consumer and public benefits in the near term. Thus, the Coalition seeks to expedite testing and operation of UAS in the United States and abroad by spurring and shaping acceptable UAS regulations and policies that will allow businesses to begin to fully realize the potential of UAS technology in order to maximize revenue.

Specifically, the Coalition aims to:

- promote the safe commercial, civil, and philanthropic use of UAS;
- demonstrate the important economic, environmental, and public safety benefits of UAS;
- develop a sensible, efficient, and open regulatory process to ensure the timely introduction and operation of UAS; and
- support American competitiveness and exports in the UAS industry.

The Coalition's top priority is to promote safe and responsible commercial and civil use of UAS in the near term. The Coalition is working with Congress, the Federal Aviation Administration, DOT, the White House, the Federal Communications Commission, NASA, and the Departments of Commerce, Homeland Security, and Justice, and third party stakeholders to encourage coordination and to meet its key goals. The Coalition also works on other policy issues including privacy, spectrum use, public interest concerns, the roles and responsibilities of the Federal, State, and local governments, international trade, and international collaboration on UAS regulations.

Coalition members have participated in all FAA UAS initiatives to date, including the Aircraft Registration Task Force, the Drone Advisory Committee, the Micro Unmanned Aircraft Systems Aviation Rulemaking Committee, the UAS Identification and Tracking Aviation Rulemaking Committee, the Unmanned Aircraft Safety Team, the UAS Integration Pilot Program, and the UTM System Pilot Program. The Coalition also participates in the Joint Authorities for Rulemaking of Unmanned Systems (JARUS) through its Stakeholder Consultation Body.

In addition to its advocacy work, the Coalition serves as a meeting ground for the best and brightest minds in the UAS industry. Current Board and Associate members include Amazon Prime Air, Intel, PrecisionHawk, Verizon/Skyward, Wing (formerly Google X Project Wing), Aeronyde, Airmap, Dominion Energy, Dronecourse.com, Iris Automation, OneSky, Percepto, T-Mobile, and Yamaha Motor Ventures.

## 5.19. Vertical Flight Society (VFS)

The Vertical Flight Society (VFS) is the world's oldest and largest technical society dedicated to enhancing the understanding of vertical flight technology. Originally known as the American Helicopter Society (AHS), VFS is a non-profit charitable education and technical organization. Since it was founded in 1943 — just as the first US helicopter was being put into service — the Society has been the primary forum for interchange of information on vertical flight technology. According to the [Society Bylaws](#), the purpose of the Society is to "advance the theory and practices of the science of vertical flight aircraft."

Each year, the Society organizes or co-sponsors several regional and international conferences that facilitate the advancement of the theory and practices of helicopter and other VTOL aircraft technology, and publishes their [proceedings](#). The Society publishes the premier vertical flight technology bi-monthly magazine, [Vertiflite](#), as well as the world's only peer-reviewed vertical flight technical publication, [The Journal of the AHS](#) (JAHS). VFS also maintains the [eVTOL.news](#) site, which has the complete encyclopedia of electric vertical take-off and landing (eVTOL) aircraft and companies.

Society members participate in twenty-two technical committees to advance the industry's collective knowledge from acoustics and aerodynamics to test and evaluation and unmanned VTOL. While VFS is not a standards development organization, members are very active in industry standards development, participating on committees from SAE, ANSI, ASTM, ASME, ASD-Stan, AIA and others.

The Society [advocates](#) on behalf of rotorcraft technology to the public and to government bodies, awards some two dozen annual engineering [scholarships](#), and sponsors an annual [student design competition](#) and other challenges for undergraduate and graduate student teams. In addition, it presents two dozen annual [awards](#) to members of the vertical flight technical community for scientific and technical accomplishments, inspiring rescues and promoting the goals of the Society.



## 6. Airworthiness Standards – WG1

### 6.1. Design and Construction

Scalable, consensus-based, and acceptable design and construction (D&C) standards for UAS are critical to full integration of UAS into the NAS. Full integration of UAS will require standards that support Design (Type) and Production Approvals as the foundational requirements before additional standards for Operational Approval -- such as operations over people (OOP), beyond visual line of sight (BVLOS), and other operations -- can be issued and accepted. Such standards will support reliability and provide a minimum level of confidence/assurance that is not currently required for sUAS operating under Part 107. Prudence dictates D&C acceptance criteria as a basis for further standards and regulatory development, just as it is for manned aircraft. This is not limited to sUAS standards and it will allow expansion beyond sUAS low altitude use cases for aircraft in excess of 55lbs. Additionally, a standard developed for a larger UAS may not be practical for a sUAS less than 55lbs (25kg). Therefore, in some cases, D&C standards should be scaled and scoped to the size of the aircraft, risks foreseen to other aircraft/UAS operations, risks to individuals in air or on ground and to critical infrastructure, airspace, external threats including environmental conditions, and complexity of the operations, and focus on the needed system of systems and mission to support applications for waiver, exemptions, or airworthiness.

[SAE1001, \*Integrated Project Processes for Engineering a System\*](#), provides an integrated set of project-level technical processes to aid in the engineering or reengineering of a system. It applies to any type of system; commercial or non-commercial; large or small; complex or simple; new or legacy, preceded or unprecedented. The standard covers systems composed of any combination of hardware, software, firmware, personnel, facilities, data, materials, services, techniques, or processes.

SAE [ARP4754A, \*Guidelines for Development of Civil Aircraft and Systems\*](#) discusses the development of aircraft systems taking into account the overall aircraft operating environment and functions. This includes validation of requirements and verification of the design implementation for certification and product assurance. SAE [AIR7121, \*Applicability of Existing Development Assurance and System Safety Practices to Unmanned Aircraft Systems\*](#) is in development to examine the applicability of ARP4754 and ARP4761 to UAS and would identify the shortcomings in both recommended practices with regards to the specific technical aspects needed for UAS development. SAE [AS7209, \*Development Assurance Objectives for Aerospace Vehicles and Systems\*](#) is in development to provide a minimum set of development assurance objectives to ensure safety for aircraft and system development. It also provides a basis to emerging technologies where existing techniques are not effective and alternate strategies are not documented in industry guidance.

RTCA [DO-254 / EUROCAE ED-80, \*Design Assurance Guidance for Airborne Electronic Hardware\*](#) is a document providing guidance for the development of airborne electronic hardware.

ASTM [F2910-14, \*Standard Specification for Design and Construction of a Small Unmanned Aircraft System \(sUAS\)\*](#), establishes the design, construction, and test requirements for a small unmanned

aircraft system (sUAS). It is intended for all sUAS that are permitted to operate over a defined area and in airspace authorized by a nation's governing aviation authority (GAA). Unless otherwise specified by a nation's GAA, this specification applies only to UA that have a maximum takeoff gross weight of 55 lb/25 kg or less. ASTM [WK62670, New Specification for Large UAS Design and Construction](#) is in development for the design and construction of UAS up to 19000 lbs.

Aircraft design and construction, whether manned or unmanned, is supported by thousands of existing aerospace standards spanning everything from materials to aircraft-level systems, and from ground equipment/infrastructure/operations to airborne systems. Refer to the nonexhaustive list of committees listed below for more information about aerospace standards for specific applications, considerations, requirements, and best practices.

**Published Laws, Regulations, Standards and Related Documents:**<sup>10</sup> Additional committees, standards and other documents can be found in the [UASSC Reference Document](#). See also section 5.10 regarding the GAMA's Standards Applicability and Acceptance Tables (A&A Tables) and Voluntary Consensus Standards [webpage](#).

- [FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018](#). Sec. 548. Sense of Congress on Artificial Intelligence in Aviation
- 14 CFR 21.17(b)
- [ASTM F2910-14, Standard Specification for Design and Construction of a Small Unmanned Aircraft System \(sUAS\)](#)
- [ASTM F2911-14e1, Standard Practice for Production Acceptance of Small Unmanned Aircraft System \(sUAS\)](#)
- [ASTM F3002-14a, Standard Specification for Design of the Command and Control System for Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems \(sUAS\)](#)
- [ASTM F3003-14, Standard Specification for Quality Assurance of a Small Unmanned Aircraft System \(sUAS\)](#)
- [ASTM F3298-19, Standard Specification for Design, Construction, and Verification of Lightweight Unmanned Aircraft Systems \(UAS\)](#)
- [JARUS CS-LUAS, Recommendations for Certification Specification for Light Unmanned Aeroplane Systems](#)
- [JARUS CS-LURS, Certification Specification for Light Unmanned Rotorcraft Systems \(CS-LURS\)](#)
- [JARUS AMC RPAS 1309, Safety Assessment of Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems \(package\)](#)

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<sup>10</sup> While not specific to UAS, ASTM Committee F42, ISO/TC 261, SAE, ASME, and others have published standards and are developing standards related to additive manufacturing, an emerging technology being used by the aerospace sector. America Makes and ANSI have published a *Standardization Roadmap for Additive Manufacturing (version 2.0, June 2018)* and an on-line gaps portal to track progress against the roadmap recommendations. Both are freely available at [www.ansi.org/amsc](http://www.ansi.org/amsc).

- EASA Special Condition SC-RPAS.1309
- [JARUS CS-UAS, Recommendations for Certification for Unmanned Aircraft Systems](#)
- EUROCAE ER-019, UAS System Safety Assessment Objectives and Criteria Inputs to “[AMC RPAS.1309](#)”
- [RTCA DO-254, Design Assurance Guidance for Airborne Electronic Hardware](#)
- [RTCA DO-160G, Environmental Conditions and Test Procedures for Airborne Equipment](#)
- [SAE1001, Integrated Project Processes for Engineering a System](#)
- SAE [ARP4754A, Guidelines for Development of Civil Aircraft and Systems](#)
- SAE [ARP4761, Guidelines and Methods for Conducting the Safety Assessment Process on Civil Airborne Systems and Equipment](#)
- [SAE ARP6336, Lighting Applications for Unmanned Aircraft Systems \(UAS\)](#)
- SAE [ARP94910, Aerospace - Vehicle Management Systems - Flight Control Design, Installation and Test of, Military Unmanned Aircraft, Specification Guide](#)
- [SAE AIR5665B, Architecture Framework for Unmanned Systems](#)
- SAE [AIR6110, Contiguous Aircraft/System Development Process Example](#)
- SAE [AIR6218, Constructing Development Assurance Plan for Integrated Systems](#)
- [SAE AS6512, Unmanned Systems \(UxS\) Control Segment \(UCS\) Architecture: Architecture Description](#)
- [SAE AS6969, Data Dictionary for Quantities Used in Cyber Physical Systems](#)
- SAE [CMH-17, Composite Materials Handbook, Volumes 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6](#)[MIL-STD-461G, Department Of Defense Interface Standard: Requirements For The Control Of Electromagnetic Interference Characteristics Of Subsystems And Equipment \(11-Dec-2015\)](#)
- [DOD Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap 2017-2042](#)
- JSSG-2006, Department of Defense Joint Service Specification Guide: Aircraft Structures
- NATO STANAG 4671, *UAV System Airworthiness Requirements (USAR)* (Fix wing UAV, 150Kg <MTOW<20,000lbs)
- NATO STANAG 4702, *Rotary Wing Unmanned Aerial Systems Airworthiness Requirements* (Rotorcraft UAV, 150Kg<MTOW< 3125Kg)
- NATO STANAG 4703, *Light Unmanned Aircraft Systems Airworthiness Requirements* (Fix wing UAV, <150KgMTOW)
- NATO STANAG 4746, *Unmanned Aerial Vehicle System Airworthiness Requirements for Light Vertical Take Off and Landing Aircraft*

**In-Development Standards and Related Documents:** Additional committees, standards and other documents can be found in the [UASSC Reference Document](#).

- [ASTM WK49440, Revision of F3002 - 14a Standard Specification for Design of the Command and Control System for Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems \(sUAS\)](#)
- [ASTM WK59101, New Specification for Structures, Design and Construction](#) (Light Sport Aircraft)
- [ASTM WK61232, New Practice for Low Stress Airframe Structure](#) (Light Sport Aircraft)

- [ASTM WK62670, New Specification for Large UAS Design and Construction](#) (for Part 23 Type Aircraft)
- [ASTM WK70877, New Practice for Showing Durability and Reliability Means of Compliance for Unmanned Aircraft Systems](#)
- [ASTM WK72958, Revision of F3298 - 19 Standard Specification for Design, Construction, and Verification of Lightweight Unmanned Aircraft Systems \(UAS\)](#)
- [ASTM WK72960, New Practice for Verification of Lightweight Unmanned Aircraft Systems](#)
- ASD-STAN D1WG4, UAS Product requirements to develop European standards specifying the means of compliance to the regulatory requirements defined in Appendix I.1 to I.5 of EASA-NPA 2017-05(A) (defines the design, construction, and test requirements for CE marking conformity)
- ASD-STAN prEN4709-001 Product Systems
- EUROCAE Applicability of safe design standards for UAS in Specific Operations category;
- EUROCAE Guidelines on the Automatic protection of the flight envelope from human errors for UAS;
- EUROCAE Generic Functional Hazard Assessment (FHA) for RPAS
- EUROCAE Draft ED-272, Minimum Aviation Systems Performance Specification for Remote Pilot Stations supporting IFR operations into non-segregated airspace
- ISO/WD 4358, Test methods for civil multi-rotor unmanned aircraft system
- ISO/TR 4584, Design of Accelerated Lifecycle Testing (ALT) for UAS/Sub-system/Components
- ISO/TR 4595, Suggestion for improvement in the guideline for UAS Testing
- ISO/NP 5109, Evaluation method for the resonance frequency of multi-copter UAV by measurement of rotor and body frequencies
- ISO/NP 5286, Test methods for flight performance of civil lightweight and small fixed-wing UAS
- ISO/NP 5312, Evaluation and test method of rotor blade sharp injury to human body for civil lightweight and small UA
- [ISO/CD 21384-2, Unmanned aircraft systems -- Part 2: Product systems](#)
- ISO/WD 24352, Technical requirements for light and small unmanned aircraft electric energy system
- ISO/WD 24355, General requirements of flight control system for civil small and light multirotor UAS
- RTCA DO-3XX, Environmental Conditions and Test Procedures for Ground Based Equipment
- SAE [AIR6276](#), *Use of Modeling and Tools for Aircraft Systems Development – A Strategy for Development Assurance with Examples*
- SAE [AIR6913](#), *Using STPA During Development and Safety Assessment of Civil Aircraft*
- [SAE AIR6962, Ice Protection for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles \(UAV\)](#)
- [SAE AIR7121, Applicability of Existing Development Assurance and System Safety Practices to Unmanned Aircraft Systems](#) (S-18 UAS Autonomy Working Group)
- [SAE JA6678, Cyber Physical Systems Security Software Assurance](#) (G-32)
- [SAE JA7496, Cyber Physical Systems Security Engineering Plan \(CPSSEP\)](#) (G-32)
- SAE [AS6983, Process Standard for Development and Certification/Approval of Aeronautical Safety-Related Products Implementing AI](#) (G-34)
- SAE [AS6969A, Data Dictionary for Quantities Used in Cyber Physical Systems](#) (AS-4UCS)

- SAE [AS7209](#), *Development Assurance Objectives for Aerospace Vehicles and Systems*
- SAE [ARP4754B](#), *Guidelines for Development of Civil Aircraft and Systems*
- SAE [ARP4761A](#), *Guidelines and Methods for Conducting the Safety Assessment Process on Civil Airborne Systems and Equipment*
- SAE [ARP94910A](#), *Aerospace - Vehicle Management Systems - Flight Control Design, Installation and Test of, Military Unmanned Aircraft, Specification Guide*

**Gap A1: UAS Design and Construction (D&C) Standards.** There are numerous standards applicable to the D&C of manned aircraft which are scalable in application to UASCS. However, these standards fail to address the critical and novel aspects essential to the safety of unmanned operations (i.e., DAA, software, BVLOS, C2 link, CS, Highly Integrated System, etc.). Lacking any regulatory certifications/publications/guidance (type certificate (TC)/ supplemental type certificate (STC)/Technical Standard Order (TSO)/AC), manufacturers and/or operators require applicable industry standards capable of establishing an acceptable baseline of D&C for these safety-critical flight operation elements such as CS to support current regulatory flight operations and those authorized by waiver and or grants of exemption. Since the CS is one of the most critical parts and functions of the UAS needed to command and control UA remotely, the standards applicable to traditional manned aviation’s airborne electronics (software, hardware, integration, spectrum, etc.) may need to be considered for the UAS as well either in the same manner and level or higher than that of the manned aviation aircraft to provide the acceptable level of safety. Some industry standards such as RTCA DO-278 may be applicable to the software aspects of the CS. However, there are currently no known industry standards that support the D&C of UAS CS, other than [ASTM F3002-14a](#) for sUAS under Part 107 and [SAE AS6512](#), which addresses all unmanned systems whose means of conveyance includes air, water, and ground. The AS6512 UxS Control Segment Architecture is concerned with control station software but not the control station software external environment, which including information access, communications, and human-computer interfaces. [ASTM WK62670, New Specification for Large UAS Design and Construction](#), addresses requirements for Control Station (CS) of varying size, complexities and functions.

**R&D Needed:** No

**Recommendation:**

- 1) Complete work on in-development standards.
- 2) Develop D&C standards for UA and CS, and consider operations beyond the scope of regular Part 107 operations such as flight altitudes over 400 feet AGL, and any future technological needs.
- 3) Develop D&C standards for UA weighing more than 19,000 pounds and develop standards for accompanying CS.

**Priority:** High (Tier 1)

**Organization(s):** ASTM, SAE, ISO, EUROCAE

**Status of Progress:** Green

**Update:**

- SAE S-18UAS Autonomy WG/EUROCAE WG-63 AIR7121
- SAE S-18/EUROCAE WG-63: AS7209, ARP4754B, ARP4761A
- SAE A-6A3: ARP94910A
- ASTM F38: WK62670, WK72958, WK72960
- Numerous standards have been published and are in-development that address the entire spectrum of UAS and its operations.

## 6.2. UAS System Safety

Airworthiness safety and risk management are critical to integration of UAS into the U.S. airspace. The aviation safety process, which is well established, includes the design and operation of UAS (discussed elsewhere in this roadmap) in accordance with FAA rules and regulations. Safety is based on acceptable risks and appropriate mitigations as they pertain to people and property damage. Aircraft must be operated within the environmental and performance parameters defined by the manufacturer and must be maintained in accordance with established instructions for continued airworthiness.

The SAE [S-18UAS Autonomy Working Group](#) is developing [AIR7121, \*Applicability of Existing Development Assurance and System Safety Practices to Unmanned Aircraft Systems\*](#) to examine the applicability of SAE ARP4754 and SAE ARP4761 to UAS and to identify the shortcomings in both recommended practices with regards to the specific technical aspects needed for UAS development.

The SAE [S-18 Aircraft and Systems Development and Safety Assessment Committee](#) brings together qualified specialists for the advancement of aerospace safety and to support effective safety management. It provides a resource for other committees and organizations with common interests in safety and development assurance processes. As of March 2020, S-18 had published 9 documents and 8 are in development. The SAE S-18 Committee is active in the development of guidelines, including processes, methods and tools, to accomplish safety assessment of airplanes and related systems and equipment. The committee develops aerospace vehicle and system standards on:

- Safety assessment processes
- Development assurance processes
- Practices for accomplishing in-service safety assessments

SAE [ARP4761, \*Guidelines and Methods for Conducting the Safety Assessment Process on Civil Airborne Systems and Equipment\*](#) discusses the development of aircraft systems taking into account the overall aircraft operating environment and functions. This includes validation of requirements and verification of the design implementation for certification and product assurance. SAE [AS7209, \*Development Assurance Objectives for Aerospace Vehicles and Systems\*](#) is in development to provide a minimum set of development assurance objectives to ensure safety for aircraft and system development. It also provides a basis to emerging technologies where existing techniques are not effective and alternate strategies are not documented in industry guidance.

SAE [ARP5150A, Safety Assessment of Transport Airplanes in Commercial Service](#) describes guidelines, methods, and tools used to perform the ongoing safety assessment process for transport airplanes in commercial service. The process is intended to support an overall safety management program. It is associated with showing compliance with the regulations, and also with assuring a company that it meets its own internal standards. The methods identify a systematic means, but not the only means, to assess ongoing safety.

SAE [ARP5151A, Safety Assessment of General Aviation Airplanes and Rotorcraft in Commercial Service](#) describes a process that may be used to perform the ongoing safety assessment for (1) general aviation airplanes and rotorcraft (GAR), and (2) commercial operators of GAR aircraft. The process is to support an overall safety management program. It is to help a company establish and meet its own internal standards. The process identifies a systematic means, but not the only means, to assess continuing airworthiness.

#### **Published Laws, Regulations, Standards, and Related Documents:**

FAA: (see also the [FAA Data & Research Safety webpage](#))

- [FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018](#), Sec. 548. Sense of Congress on Artificial Intelligence in Aviation
- 14 CFR SUBCHAPTER C—AIRCRAFT
- Part 21 Certification procedures for products and articles
- Part 23 Airworthiness standards: Normal category airplanes
- Part 25 Airworthiness standards: Transport category airplanes
- Part 26 Continued airworthiness and safety improvements for transport category airplanes
- Part 27 Airworthiness standards: Normal category rotorcraft
- Part 29 Airworthiness standards: Transport category rotorcraft
- Part 31 Airworthiness standards: Manned free balloons
- Part 33 Airworthiness standards: Aircraft engines
- Part 34 Fuel venting and exhaust emission requirements for turbine engine powered airplanes
- Part 35 Airworthiness standards: Propellers
- Part 36 Noise standards: Aircraft type and airworthiness certification
- Part 39 Airworthiness directives
- [14 CFR §107 Operation small Unmanned Aircraft systems](#)
- [14 CFR §107.51, Operating limitations for small unmanned aircraft](#)
- [FAA Advisory Circular \(AC\), AC 107-2, Small UAS \(sUAS\), 6/21/2016](#)
- [FAA Order 8040.6, Unmanned Aircraft Systems Safety Risk Management Policy, 10/4/2019](#)
- [AC 23.1309-1E, System Safety Analysis and Assessment for Part 23 Airplanes](#)
- [AC 20-174, Development of Civil Aircraft and Systems](#)
- [AC 27-1B, Certification of Normal Category Rotorcraft](#)
- [AC 29-2C, Certification of Transport Category Rotorcraft](#)

#### ASTM:

- [ASTM F2909-19, Standard Specification for Continued Airworthiness of Lightweight Unmanned Aircraft Systems](#)
- [ASTM F3178-16, Standard Practice for Operational Risk Assessment of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems \(sUAS\)](#)
- [ASTM F3269-17, Standard Practice for Methods to Safely Bound Flight Behavior of Unmanned Aircraft Systems Containing Complex Functions](#)
- [ASTM F3298-19, Standard Specification for Design, Construction, and Verification of Lightweight Unmanned Aircraft Systems \(UAS\)](#)

#### RTCA:

- [DO-304, Guidance, Material and Considerations for UAS](#)
- [DO-178, Software Considerations](#)

#### SAE:

##### S-18 Aircraft and Systems Development and Safety Assessment Committee

- [ARP4754A, Guidelines for Development of Civil Aircraft and Systems](#)
- [ARP4761, Guidelines And Methods For Conducting The Safety Assessment Process On Civil Airborne Systems And Equipment](#)
- [AIR6219, Development of Atmospheric Neutron Single Event Effects Analysis for Use in Safety Assessments](#)
- [AIR6110, Contiguous Aircraft/System Development Process Example](#)
- [AIR6218, Constructing Development Assurance Plan for Integrated Systems](#)
- [ARP5150A, Safety Assessment of Transport Airplanes in Commercial Service](#)
- [ARP5151A, Safety Assessment of General Aviation Airplanes and Rotorcraft in Commercial Service](#)

##### G-48 System Safety

- [GEIASTD0010A, Standard Best Practices for System Safety Program Development and Execution](#)

##### A-6A3 Flight Control and Vehicle Management Systems Cmt

- [ARP94910, Aerospace - Vehicle Management Systems - Flight Control Design, Installation and Test of, Military Unmanned Aircraft, Specification Guide For](#)

##### G-41 Reliability

- [\(19 published documents\)](#)

##### AC-9C Aircraft Icing Technology Committee

#### SAE ITC:

- [SAE-ITC ARINC IA 431, No Fault Found - A Case Study](#)



- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 640, Resolution of Inservice Anomalies through ASAPP
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 658, Internet Protocol Suite (IPS) for Aeronautical Safety Services - Roadmap Document
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 672, Guidelines for The Reduction of No Fault Found (NFF)
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 680, Aircraft Autonomous Distress Tracking (ADT)
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 852, Guidance for Security Event Logging in an IP Environment
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 858D1, Internet Protocol Suite (IPS) for Aeronautical Safety Services - Technical Requirements

#### DOD:

- DOD Policy Memorandum 15-002, Guidance for the Domestic Use of Unmanned Aircraft Systems, February 17, 2015
- [DOD Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap 2017-2042](#)
- DOD-NATO, STANAG 4671, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Systems Airworthiness Requirements
- [DOD-NATO, STANAG 4702, Rotary Wing Unmanned Aircraft Systems Airworthiness Requirements](#)
- [DOD-NATO, STANAG 4703, Light Unmanned Aircraft Systems Airworthiness Requirements](#)
- [07-1-003 Unmanned Aircraft Systems \(UAS\) Sensor and Targeting, July 27, 2010](#)
- [DOD-NATO, Guidance For The Training Of Unmanned Aircraft Systems \(UAS\) Operators, April 22, 2014](#)
- [07-2-032 Unmanned Aircraft Systems \(UAS\) Navigation System Test, US Army, July 27, 2010](#)
- [DOD-NATO, Interoperable Command And Control Data Link For Unmanned Systems \(IC2DL\) – Operational Physical Layer / Signal In Space Description, November 14, 2016](#)
- [MIL-STD-882E Department of Defense Standard Practice: System Safety](#)
- [RCC 323-99 Supplement](#)
- OUSD Unmanned System Safety Guide for DoD Acquisition

#### NASA:

- [Small Unmanned Aircraft Electromagnetic Interference \(EMI\) Initial Assessment](#), Jung, Jaewoo, et al., ICNS 2018, April 10-12, 2018

#### **In-Development Standards and Other Documents:**

#### ICAO:

- Annex 2 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation – Rules of the Air
- Annex 3 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation – Meteorological Service for International Air Navigation
- Annex 6 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation – Part IV – International Operations – RPAS
- Annex 8 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation – Airworthiness of Aircraft
- Annex 10 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation – Volume IV, Part II – Detect and Avoid Systems

- Annex 11 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation – Air Traffic Services
- Annex 14 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation – Aerodromes
- Annex 19 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation – Safety Management
- Manual on RPAS (Doc 10019)
- Procedures for Air Navigation Services – Air Traffic Management (Doc 4444)
- Procedures for Air Navigation Services – Aircraft Operations – Vol I – Flight Procedures (Doc 8168)

SAE:

S-18UAS Autonomy WG / EUROCAE WG-63 (in collaboration with WG-105)

- [AIR7121, Applicability of Existing Development Assurance and System Safety Practices to Unmanned Aircraft Systems](#)

SAE S-18 / EUROCAE WG-63, Aircraft and System Development and Safety Assessment Committee

- [AS7209, Development Assurance Objectives for Aerospace Vehicles and Systems](#)
- [ARP4754B, Guidelines for Development of Civil Aircraft and Systems](#)
- [ARP4761A, Guidelines And Methods For Conducting The Safety Assessment Process On Civil Airborne Systems And Equipment](#)
- [AIR6913, Using STPA During Development and Safety Assessment of Civil Aircraft](#)
- [AIR6276, Use of Modeling and Tools for Aircraft Systems Development - A Strategy for Development Assurance Aspects with Examples](#)

AC-9C, Aircraft Icing Technology Committee

SAE G-32, Cyber Physical Systems Security Committee

- [JA7496, Cyber Physical Systems Security Engineering Plan \(CPSSEP\)](#)
- [JA6678, Cyber Physical Systems Security Software Assurance](#)
- [JA6801, Cyber Physical Systems Security Hardware Assurance](#)

SAE G-34 / EUROCAE WG-114, Artificial Intelligence in Aviation Committee

- [AS6983, Process Standard for Development and Certification/Approval of Aeronautical Safety-Related Products Implementing AI](#)
- [AIR6988, Artificial Intelligence in Aeronautical Systems: Statement of Concerns](#)
- [AIR6987, Artificial Intelligence in Aeronautical Systems: Taxonomy](#)

SAE G-48, System Safety Committee

- [GEIASTD0010B, Standard Best Practices for System Safety Program Development and Execution](#)
- [SAE1003, Glossary of System Safety Engineering and Management](#)
- [SAE1005, Model Based Functional Safety](#)

DOD:

- [DOD Unmanned Aircraft Systems \(UAS\) Airspace Integration, May 28, 2014](#)
- Systems Engineering of SAA Systems, US Army Unmanned Aircraft Systems, US Army 2015b

- DOD-NATO Standard, AEP-80, Rotary Wing Unmanned Aerial Systems Airworthiness Requirements, 2014

ASTM:

[F38.01 on Airworthiness](#)

- [ASTM WK65056, Revision of F3269 - 17 Standard Practice for Methods to Safely Bound Flight Behavior of Unmanned Aircraft Systems Containing Complex Functions](#)

F38.03 on Personnel Training, Qualification and Certification

- [ASTM WK62744, New Practice for General Operations Manual for Professional Operator of Light Unmanned Aircraft Systems \(UAS\)](#)

F44.50 on Systems and Equipment

- [ASTM WK56374, New Practice for Aircraft Systems Information Security Protection](#)

ISO:

- ISO/DIS 21384-3, Unmanned aircraft systems -- Part 3: Operational procedures

**Gap A2: UAS System Safety.** Numerous UAS airworthiness standards, appropriate regulations, operational risk assessment (ORA) methodologies, and system safety processes already exist. Any gaps that exist in standards applicable to specific vehicle classes and weight are being addressed by SAE S-18UAS Autonomy WG / WG-63 (with collaboration with EUROCAE WG-105).

**R&D Needed:** Yes. Further examination is needed to determine if existing safety system processes are indeed adequate and if gaps are being addressed to the extent needed. S-18UAS Autonomy WG is looking at this.

**Recommendation:** Develop an aerospace information report or standard(s) in which the various existing airworthiness and safety analyses methods are mapped to the sizes and types of UAS to which they are most relevant, and the UAS system safety and development assurance are addressed.

**Priority:** High (Tier 1)

**Organization(s):** SAE, EUROCAE, RTCA, IEEE, ASTM, DOD, NASA, ISO

**Status of Progress:** Green

**Update:**

- SAE S-18UAS Autonomy WG/EUROCAE WG-63 AIR7121 (with collaboration with EUROCAE WG-105)
- SAE S-18/EUROCAE WG-63 AS7209, ARP4754B, ARP4761A
- SAE AS-4
- SAE G-32 (with collaboration with EUROCAE WG-72)
- SAE G-34 / EUROCAE WG-114

- Numerous standards have been published and are in-development that address the entire spectrum of UAS and its operations.

### 6.3. Quality Assurance/Quality Control

The purpose of a quality system is to ensure products and articles can be produced repeatedly that conform to their approved design and are in condition for safe operation. An established quality assurance (QA)/quality control (QC) program is critical in establishing processes and procedures that support airworthiness and reliability essential to safe operations of UAS in the NAS.

Numerous quality assurance and quality control standards are used throughout the globe. For example, over 19,000 aerospace suppliers meet SAE AS9100, which is a family of 30 plus aerospace quality management standards. Those standards also apply to UAS.

Existing manned aviation regulations such as 14 CFR §§ 21.135, 21.137, 21.138 are also applicable to UAS manufacturers. No gaps have been identified at this time as existing regulations and industry standards adequately address QA/QC.

**Published Standards, Regulations, and Other Documents:** Additional committees, standards and other documents can be found in the [UASSC Reference Document](#).

#### ASTM:

The only identified published QA/QC standard specific to sUAS is:

- [F3003-14, Standard Specification for Quality Assurance of a Small Unmanned Aircraft System \(sUAS\)](#), developed by ASTM F38.01

The following were developed to be generic and applicable to both manned and unmanned systems and aircraft:

- [F3246-18, Standard Specification for Quality Assurance for Manufacturers of Aircraft Systems](#), developed by F39.04
- [F3361-18e1, Standard Guide for Classifying Alterations for In-Service Aircraft under FAA Authority Oversight](#), developed by ASTM F39.02

Other published QA/QC aviation/aerospace standards include:

- [F2972-15, Standard Specification for Light Sport Aircraft Manufacturer's Quality Assurance System](#), developed by ASTM F37.70

#### SAE:

The SAE [G-14 Americas Aerospace Quality Standards Committee \(AAQSC\)](#) committee addresses aerospace quality-design, maintenance, and in-service experience.

- [AS9100D, Aerospace Quality Management Systems – Requirement for Aviation, Space, and Defense Organizations](#) is the globally recognized de facto quality assurance document used in

the aerospace industry. AS9100D is not just one document, however. It is part of a family of over 30 quality-related standards with the 9,000 designation, developed by the G-14.

#### [AS-4UCS Unmanned Systems Control Segment Architecture](#)

Also related to UxS is:

- [SAE AS6522, Unmanned Systems \(UxS\) Control Segment \(UCS\) Architecture: Architecture Technical Governance](#)

The SAE [G-22 Aerospace Engine Supplier Quality \(AESQ\) Committee](#) is established to develop, specify, maintain and promote quality standards specific to the Aero Engine supply chain.

The SAE [G-19 Counterfeit Electronic Parts Committees \(G-19A, G-19AD, G-19C, G-19CI, G-19D, G-19DR, G-19T\)](#) address aspects of preventing, detecting, responding to, and counteracting the threat of counterfeit electronic components. As of March 2020, G-19 had published 21 documents and 19 are in development.

The SAE [G-21 Counterfeit Materiel Committees](#) (including [G-21B Counterfeit and Substandard Battery Risk Mitigation](#)) address aspects of preventing, detecting, responding to, and counteracting the threat of counterfeit materiel. The objective is to develop standards suitable for use in high performance/high reliability applications to mitigate the risks of counterfeit materiel. As of March 2020, G-21 had published 2 documents and 3 are in development.

The SAE [G-33 Configuration Management \(CM\) Committee](#) is an interdisciplinary, cross-sector (industry/commercial and defense/government) forum that is responsible for the development, coordination, publication, and maintenance of the SAE CM Standards, Technical Bulletins, and Handbooks for their evolution. Its focus is on promoting and understanding of CM functions, principles and practices through CM processes and CM products.

#### FAA:

Advisory Circulars (AC):

- AC 33.15-1 Manufacturing Process of Premium Quality Titanium Alloy Rotating Engine Components
- AC 21-26A Quality System for the Manufacture of Composite Structures
- AC 145-9A Guide for Developing and Evaluating Repair Station and Quality Control Manuals
- AC 21-31A Quality Control for the Manufacture of Non-Metallic Compartment Interior Components
- AC 33.15-2 Manufacturing Processes for Premium Quality Nickel Alloy for Engine Rotating Parts
- AC 23-20 Acceptance Guidance on Material Procurement and Process Specifications for Polymer Matrix Composite Systems
- AC 150/5370-12A Quality Control of Construction for Airport Grant Projects
- AC 00-41B FAA Quality Control System Certification Program
- AC 120-59A Air Carrier Internal Evaluation Programs

- AC 33.28-1 Compliance Criteria for 14 CFR §33.28, Aircraft Engines, Electrical and Electronic Engine Control Systems<sup>11</sup>
- AC 145-5 Repair Station Internal Evaluation Programs
- AC 25.783-1A Fuselage Doors and Hatches
- AC 150/5100-13A Development of State Standards for Non-Primary Airports
- AC 150/5300-16A General Guidance and Specifications for Aeronautical Surveys: Establishment of Geodetic Control and Submission to the National Geodetic Survey
- AC 150/5320-6D CHG 1 Change 1 to Airport Pavement Design and Evaluation
- AC 150/5210-19 Driver's Enhanced Vision System (DEVS)
- AC 25-19A Certification Maintenance Requirements
- AC 20-146 Methodology for Dynamic Seat Certification by Analysis for Use in Part 23, 25, 27, and 29 Airplanes and Rotorcraft<sup>12</sup>

Regulations:

- §13.401 - Flight Operational Quality Assurance (FOQA) program
- §21.137 - Quality System (Subpart G-PC)
- §21.138 - Quality Manual (Subpart G)
- §21.150 - Changes to Quality System (Subpart G)
- §21.307 - Quality System (Subpart K-PMA)
- §21.308 - Quality Manual (Subpart K)
- §21.320 - Chg. to Quality System (Subpart K)
- §21.607 - Quality System (Subpart O-TSO)
- §21.608 - Quality Manual (Subpart O)
- §21.620 - Chg. to Quality System (Subpart O)
- §414.19 - Technical criteria for reviewing a safety approval application.

DOD<sup>13</sup>:

- MIL-HDBK-516C – Airworthiness Certification Criteria (Ref. 4.4.4, p. 56) and Sections 11 and 15
- Note: DOD relies on contractors showing evidence of ISO9001 standards

Other published QA/QC standards for general industry include:

ISO:

- [ISO 9001:2015, Quality management systems – Requirements](#)

<sup>11</sup> AC 33.28-1 references the following SAE International documents: SAE ARP1834A; SAE ARP4754; SAE ARP4761; SAE ARP5107; SAE ARP926B.

<sup>12</sup> AC 20-146 references the following SAE International documents: SAE AS8049A; SAE J211/1; SAE J211/2.

<sup>13</sup> Additional DOD Quality Control/Assurance standards can be identified on the [DOD Assist-Quick Search webpage](#) by searching on “QCIC” in the FSC/Area drop down menu.

- [ISO/IEC/IEEE 90003:2018, Software engineering – Guidelines for the application of ISO 9001:2015 to computer software](#)
- [ISO 9004:2018, Quality management – Quality of an organization – Guidance to achieve sustained success](#)

ASTM:

Editorial/Terminology:

- [E456-13A\(2017\)e2, Standard Terminology Relating to Quality and Statistics](#)

Reliability:

- [E2555-07\(2018\), Standard Practice for Factors and Procedures for Applying the MIL-STD-105 Plans in Life and Reliability Inspection](#)
- [E2696-09\(2013\), Standard Practice for Life and Reliability Testing Based on the Exponential Distribution](#)
- [E3159-18, Standard Guide for General Reliability](#)

Sampling / Statistics:

- [E105-16, Standard Practice for Probability Sampling of Materials](#)
- [E122-17, Standard Practice for Calculating Sample Size to Estimate, With Specified Precision, the Average for a Characteristic of a Lot or Process](#)
- [E141-10\(2018\), Standard Practice for Acceptance of Evidence Based on the Results of Probability Sampling](#)
- [E178-16a, Standard Practice for Dealing With Outlying Observations](#)
- [E1325-16, Standard Terminology Relating to Design of Experiments](#)
- [E1402-13, Standard Guide for Sampling Design](#)
- [E2586-18, Standard Practice for Calculating and Using Basic Statistics](#)
- [E3080-17, Standard Practice for Regression Analysis](#)

Standards:

- [S110-16, IEEE/ASTM SI 10 American National Standard for Metric Practice](#)

Statistical QC:

- [E29-13, Standard Practice for Using Significant Digits in Test Data to Determine Conformance with Specifications](#)
- [E1994-09\(2018\), Standard Practice for Use of Process Oriented AOQL and LTPD Sampling Plans](#)
- [E2234-09\(2013\), Standard Practice for Sampling a Stream of Product by Attributes Indexed by AQL](#)
- [E2281-15, Standard Practice for Process Capability and Performance Measurement](#)
- [E2334-09\(2018\), Standard Practice for Setting an Upper Confidence Bound For a Fraction or Number of Non-Conforming items, or a Rate of Occurrence for Non-conformities, Using Attribute Data, When There is a Zero Response in the Sample](#)
- [E2587-16, Standard Practice for Use of Control Charts in Statistical Process Control](#)

- [E2762-10\(2014\), Standard Practice for Sampling a Stream of Product by Variables Indexed by AQL](#)
- [E2819-11\(2015\), Standard Practice for Single- and Multi-Level Continuous Sampling of a Stream of Product by Attributes Indexed by AQL](#)
- [E2910-12\(2018\), Standard Guide for Preferred Methods for Acceptance of Product](#)

#### Test Method Evaluation and QC:

- [E177-14, Standard Practice for Use of the Terms Precision and Bias in ASTM Test Methods](#)
- [E691-18, Standard Practice for Conducting an Interlaboratory Study to Determine the Precision of a Test Method](#)
- [E1169-18, Standard Practice for Conducting Ruggedness Tests](#)
- [E1323-15, Standard Guide for Evaluating Laboratory Measurement Practices and the Statistical Analysis of the Resulting Data](#)
- [E1488-12\(2018\), Standard Guide for Statistical Procedures to Use in Developing and Applying Test Methods](#)
- [E2282-14, Standard Guide for Defining the Test Result of a Test Method](#)
- [E2489-16, Standard Practice for Statistical Analysis of One-Sample and Two-Sample Interlaboratory Proficiency Testing Programs](#)
- [E2554-18, Standard Practice for Estimating and Monitoring the Uncertainty of Test Results of a Test Method Using Control Chart Techniques](#)
- [E2655-14, Standard Guide for Reporting Uncertainty of Test Results and Use of the Term Measurement Uncertainty in ASTM Test Methods](#)
- [E2709-14e1, Standard Practice for Demonstrating Capability to Comply with an Acceptance Procedure](#)
- [E2782-17, Standard Guide for Measurement Systems Analysis \(MSA\)](#)
- [E2935-17, Standard Practice for Conducting Equivalence Testing in Laboratory Applications](#)

#### SAE-ITC:

- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 672, Guidelines for The Reduction of No Fault Found (NFF)
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 676, Guidance for Assignment, Accomplishment, and Reporting of Special (Engineering) Investigation for Aircraft Components
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 847, Product Development Guidance for Maintainability and Testability(PDMaT)
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 429P1-19, Data Labels
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 429P1-19, Digital Information Transfer System (DITS), Part 1, Functional Description, Electrical Interfaces, Label Assignments and Word Formats
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 429P2-17, Digital Information Transfer System (DITS), Part 2, Discrete Word Data Standards
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 429P3-19 Mark 33, Digital Information Transfer System (DITS) - Part 3 - File Data Transfer Techniques



- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 429P4, Digital Information Transfer System (DITS), Part 4, Archive of ARINC429 Supplements
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 624-1, Design Guidance for Onboard Maintenance System
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 625-3, Industry Guide For Component Test Development and Management
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 625-4D7, Industry Guide for Component Test Development and Management
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 626-3, Standard ATLAS Language for Modular Test
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 627-2, Programmers Guide for SMART TM Systems Using ARINC 626 ATLAS
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 662-1, Obsolescence Management Strategies for Commercial Aircraft
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 663-1, Data Requirements for Avionics Component Maintenance

#### In-Development Standards:

- [ASTM WK67357, New Specification for Light Unmanned Aircraft System Manufacturers Quality Assurance System](#), under ASTM F38.03
- [ASTM WK51467, New Specification for Quality Assurance for Manufacturers of Aircraft Systems](#), under ASTM F39.04
- SAE [G-14 Americas Aerospace Quality Standards Committee \(AAQSC\)](#)
- SAE [G-19 Counterfeit Electronic Parts Committees](#) ([G-19A](#), [G-19AD](#), [G-19C](#), [G-19CI](#), [G-19D](#), [G-19DR](#), [G-19T](#))
- SAE [G-21 Counterfeit Materiel Committees](#) (including [G-21B Counterfeit and Substandard Battery Risk Mitigation](#))
- SAE [G-22 Aerospace Engine Supplier Quality \(AESQ\) Committee](#)

## 6.4. Avionics and Subsystems

Avionics are the electronic systems used on an aircraft (or UA) and/or control station (CS) to perform and manage various functions including but not limited to communications, navigation, display, and control of the aircraft. The aircraft cockpit (or avionics bay of a UA) or CS is the typical location for such equipment. Aircraft or CS cost, size, weight, and power (CSWaP) are factors that determine the avionics equipment needed. Payload is generally not considered part of avionics.

**Published Regulations, Standards, and Guidance:** Existing regulations, policies, standards, and guidance, including for manned aviation avionics and subsystems that may apply to UAS, are listed below. Additional committees, standards and other documents can be found in the [UASSC Reference Document](#).

#### FAA:

Of the numerous airborne avionics TSOs, TSO-embedded standards and regulations, the following may apply to UAS:

- 14 CFR Chapter I, Subchapter C (Aircraft), Subchapter F (General Operating Rules)
- TSO-C88b, Automatic Pressure Altitude Reporting Code-Generating Equipment, 2-06-07
- [TSO-C112e, ATCRBS/Mode S Airborne Equipment, 9-16-13](#)

- TCAS/TCAS I/ TCAS II (TSO-C118, C118a, C119d, C119e)
- [TSO-C124c, Flight Data Recorder Equipment, 12-19-13](#)
- TSO-C151c, -C151d, Terrain Awareness and Warning System (TAWS)
- TSO-C154c, Universal Access Transceiver (UAT) ADS-B Equipment, 12-02-09
- TSO-C177a, Data Link Recorder Equipment, 12-19-13
- TSO-C195b, Avionics Supporting ADS-B Aircraft Surveillance, 9-29-14
- [TSO-C211, Detect and Avoid \(DAA\) Systems, 9-25-17](#)
- [TSO-C212, Air-to-Air Radar \(ATAR\) for Traffic Surveillance, 9-22-17](#)
- [TSO-C213, UAS CNPC Terrestrial Link System Radios, 9-3-18](#)

#### RTCA:

In addition to RTCA airborne avionics standards, the following may apply to UAS:

- [DO-362 with Errata, Command and Control \(C2\) Data Link MOPS \(Terrestrial\), 9-22-16](#)
- [DO-365A, MOPS for Detect and Avoid \(DAA\) Systems, 3-30-20 \(New\)](#)
- [DO-366, MOPS for Air-to-Air Radar for Traffic Surveillance, 5-31-17](#)

#### ICAO:

In addition to ICAO airborne avionics standards, the following may apply to UAS:

- [Annex 8 – Airworthiness of Aircraft](#)
- Annex 10 Vol 1 - Radio Navigation Aids, Vol 2 - Com Procedures, Vol 3 - Communication Systems, Vol 4 - Surveillance and Collision Avoidance Systems
- Doc 9684 Manual for SSR Systems
- Doc 9871 Technical Provisions for Mode S Services and Extended Squitter

#### SAE:

In addition to SAE airborne avionics standards, the following may apply to UAS:

- [AS8034C, Minimum Performance Standard for Airborne Multipurpose Electronic Displays, 7-30-18](#)
- [ARINC718A-4, Mark 4 Air Traffic Control Transponder \(ATCRBS/Mode S\)](#)
- [ARINC735B-2, Traffic Computer TCAS and ADS-B Functionality](#)
- [AS6254A, Minimum Performance Standard for Low Frequency Underwater Locating Devices \(Acoustic\) \(Self-Powered\)](#)
- [AS8045A, Minimum Performance Standard for Underwater Locating Devices \(Acoustic\) \(Self-Powered\)](#)
- [ARINC677, Installation Standards for Low Frequency Underwater Locator Beacon \(LF-ULB\)](#)
- [Multi-Sensor Data Fusion Techniques for RPAS Detect, Track and Avoid, 9-15-15](#)
- [ARP4761, Guidelines and Methods for Conducting the Safety Assessment Process on Civil Airborne Systems and Equipment, 12-01-96](#)
- [ARP5621, Electronic Display of Aeronautical Information \(Charts\)](#)
- [AS6296, Electronic Flight Instrument System \(EFIS\) Displays, 3-16-16](#)
- [AS8024, JAUS Autonomous Capabilities Service Set \(New\)](#)

- [G-19 Counterfeit Electronic Parts \(G-19A, G-19AD, G-19C, G-19CI, G-19D, G-19DR, G-19T\)](#)
- [S-7 Flight Deck Handling Qualities Stds for Trans Aircraft](#)
- [ARP5061A](#) Guidelines for Testing and Support of Aerospace, Fiber Optic, Inter-Connect Systems
- [AS5659](#) WDM Lan Standard
- [AIR5601](#) A Guide for Application of RF Photonics to Aerospace Platforms
- [AIR6258](#) Fiber Optic Sensors for Aerospace Applications

#### APMC Avionics Process Management

- [EIA-STD-4899](#) *Requirements for an Electronic Components Management Plan*
- [EIA-933](#) *Requirements for a COTS Assembly Management Plan*

For avionic networks, subsystems, embedded computing, and fiber optics and applied photonics, the following aerospace standards committee's documents may apply:

- [AS-1A Avionic Networks Committee](#)
- [AS-1B Aircraft Store Integration Committee](#)
- [AS-1C Avionic Subsystems Committee](#)
- [AS-2 Embedded Computing Systems Committee](#)
- [AS-2C Architecture Analysis and Design Language](#)
- [AS-2D1 Time-Triggered Fieldbus](#)
- [AS-2D2 Deterministic Ethernet and Unified Networking](#)
- [AS-3 Fiber Optics and Applied Photonics Committee](#)

#### SAE ITC

- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 660, CNS/ATM Avionics, Functional Allocation and Recommended Architectures
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 677, Installation Standards for Low Frequency Underwater Locator Beacon (LF-ULB)
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 765, Ethernet Switch Unit
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 845, Fiber Optic Expanded Beam Termini
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 429P1-19, Data Labels
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 429P1-19, Digital Information Transfer System (DITS), Part 1, Functional Description, Electrical Interfaces, Label Assignments and Word Formats
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 429P2-17, Digital Information Transfer System (DITS), Part 2, Discrete Word Data Standards
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 429P3-19 Mark 33, Digital Information Transfer System (DITS) - Part 3 - File Data Transfer Techniques
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 429P4, Digital Information Transfer System (DITS), Part 4, Archive of ARINC 429 Supplements
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 629 Part 1-5, Multi-Transmitter Data Bus, Part 1-Technical Description
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 629 Part 2-2, Multi-Transmitter Data Bus, Part 2-Application Guide

- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 678, Guidance for Distributed Radio Architecture
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 679D1, Aircraft Server, Communications, and Interface Standard
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 688D2, Intersystem Network Integration
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 718A-4 Mark 4, Air Traffic Control Transponder (ATCRBS/Mode S)
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 735B-2, Traffic Computer TCAS and ADS-B Functionality
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 758-4, Communications Management Unit (CMU) Mark 2
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 763A Mark 2, Network Server System (NSS) Form and Fit Definition
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 801-3, Fiber Optic Connectors
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 802-3, Fiber Optic Cables
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 803-4, Fiber Optic Design Guidelines
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 804-2, Fiber Optic Active Device Specification
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 805-5, Fiber Optic Test Procedures
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 806-6, Fiber Optic Installation and Maintenance
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 807-4, Fiber Optic Training Requirements
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 825-4, General Standardization of CAN (Controller Area Network) Bus Protocol for Airborne Use
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 848D10, Media Independent Secure Offboard Network
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 858D1, Internet Protocol Suite (IPS) for Aeronautical Safety Services - Technical Requirements
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA/AEEC, Systems Architecture and Interfaces (SAI) Subcommittee

#### DOD:

In addition to DOD airborne avionics standards, the following may apply to UAS:

- Transponder and Electronic ID System (AIMS 03-1000B ATCRBS/IFF/MARK XIIA, AIMS 03-1101/2/3B Mark XIIA and Mode S, AIMS 03-1201/2/3 Mark XIIA and Mode S)
- MIL-STD-1796A-Avionics Integrity Program, 10-13-11
- [DOD Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap 2017-2042](#)

#### ASTM:

In addition to ASTM airborne avionics standards, the following may apply to UAS:

- [F3153-15, Standard Specification for Verification of Avionics Systems](#)
- [F3269-17, Standard Practice for Methods to Safely Bound Flight Behavior of Unmanned Aircraft Systems Containing Complex Functions](#)
- [F3298-19, Standard Specification for Design, Construction, and Verification of Fixed-Wing Unmanned Aircraft Systems \(UAS\) \(New\)](#)
- [ASTM F3411-19, Standard Specification for Remote ID and Tracking](#), published February 2020. **(New)**
- F3442-20, *Detect and Avoid Performance Requirements* (previously WK62668), has been approved and is expected to be published in June 2020 **(New)**

#### FCC:

- [Code of Federal Regulations, Title 47, Telecommunications, Chapter I](#)

#### AIAA:

- [ANSI/AIAA S-102.2.4-2015, Performance-Based Product Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality Analysis \(FMECA\) Requirements](#)
- [ANSI/AIAA S-102.2.18-2009, Performance-Based Fault Tree Analysis Requirements](#)
- [Various AIAA Standards](#)

**In-Development Standards:** Additional committees, standards and other documents can be found in the [UASSC Reference Document](#).

#### ICAO:

- Annex 8 – Airworthiness of Aircraft, Q1 2018
- Annex 10 – Volume IV, Part II – Detect and Avoid Systems, Q1 2020
- Manual on RPAS (Doc 10019), Q1 2021

#### DOD:

- Sense and Avoid (SAA) and Ground Based Sense and Avoid System (GBSAA)

#### ASTM:

- [WK62669, New Test Method for Detect and Avoid](#)
- [WK65041, New Practice for UAS Remote ID and Tracking](#)
- [WK65056, Revision of F3269 - 17 Standard Practice for Methods to Safely Bound Flight Behavior of Unmanned Aircraft Systems Containing Complex Functions](#)

#### IETF

- [Trustworthy Remote ID](#)
- [Secure UAS Network RID and C2 Transport](#)

#### RTCA

- DAA standards for sUAS have begun under RTCA SC-228
- ACAS-Xu MOPS for larger UAS are anticipated to be released in 2021

#### SAE:

- [AS6983, Process Standard for Development and Certification/Approval of Aeronautical Safety-Related Products Implementing AI](#)
- SAE [G-19 Counterfeit Electronic Parts \(G-19A, G-19AD, G-19C, G-19CI, G-19D, G-19DR, G-19T\)](#)

For avionic networks, subsystems, embedded computing, and fiber optics and applied photonics, the following aerospace standards committee's works in progress may apply:

- [AS-1A Avionic Networks Committee](#)

- [AS-1B Aircraft Store Integration Committee](#)
- [AS-2D1 Time-Triggered Fieldbus](#)
- [AS-3 Fiber Optics and Applied Photonics Committee](#)

**Gap A4: Avionics and Subsystems.** Existing avionics standards are proven and suitable for UAS. However, they become unacceptable for the following scenarios:

- 1) As the size of UAS scales down, airborne equipment designed to existing avionics standards are too heavy, large, and/or power hungry. Therefore, new standards may be necessary to achieve an acceptable level of performance for smaller, lighter, more efficient, more economical systems.
- 2) As the quantity of UAS scales up, based on the high demand of UAS operations into the NAS, the new standards are required to handle the traffic congestion.
- 3) Many UAS introduce new capabilities – new capabilities may not be mature (not statistically proven or widely used) and/or they may be proprietary, therefore industry standards do not exist yet.

Avionics are becoming highly integrated with more automation compared to traditional avionics instruments and equipment that were found in manned aviation aircraft a few decades ago. UAS will decreasingly rely on human confirmations, human commands, human monitoring, human control settings, and human control inputs. A time is approaching when the UAS conveys the bare minimum information about its critical systems and mission to the human, that is, a message that conveys, “Everything is OK.” Standards to get there are different from those that created the cockpits in use today.

Consideration of the interactions that may occur between avionics systems and higher level mission and decision making systems is needed. In particular, as the avionics functions become more automated there needs to be clear demarcation of responsibility between lower level guidance, navigation, and control (GNC) and the higher level decision making systems (which may include aspects of AI/ML).

Some of the major areas of concern include the reliability and cybersecurity of the command and control (C2) data link, use of DOD spectrum (and non-aviation) on civil aircraft operations, and enterprise architecture to enable UTM, swarm operations, autonomous flights, etc. Cybersecurity, in particular, shall be an important consideration in the development of avionics systems. Cybersecurity is further discussed in section 6.4.6.

**R&D Needed:** Yes

**Recommendation:**

- 1) One approach is to recommend that existing standards be revised to include provisions that address the points listed above. The UAS community should get involved on the committees that write the existing avionics standards. Collaboration around a common technological subject is more beneficial than segregating the workforce by manned vs. unmanned occupancy. The standards should address any differing (manned/unmanned) requirements that may occur.
- 2) Another approach is to recommend new standards that will enable entirely new capabilities.

- 3) Complete work on the standards of ICAO, ASTM, SAE, and DOD listed above in the “In-Development Standards” section.
- 4) Review existing and in-development avionics standards for UAS considerations.
- 5) Create a framework for UAS avionics spanning both airborne and terrestrial based systems.

**Priority:** High (Tier 2)

**Organization(s): For Avionics Issues:** RTCA, EUROCAE, SAE, SAE ITC ARINC, IEEE, AIAA, ASTM, DOD, NASA, ICAO. **For Spectrum Issues:** FCC, NTIA, International Telecommunication Union (ITU)

**Status of Progress:** Green

**Update:**

- RTCA SC-147
- Numerous standards committees from RTCA, EUROCAE, SAE, SAE-ITC, ASTM, IETF, et al. have developed and are developing avionics standards.

### **6.4.1. Command and Control (C2) Link and Communications**

UAS involve an aircraft, either remotely piloted or autonomous, and a secure and reliable communications link to a control station to relay telemetry, tracking, systems, and other information for aircraft awareness to some external entity, often, but not always, on the ground. For example, the link could be used in a primary control function, reporting function, or backup function. Still others have begun to call this capability the Command, Control, and Communications (C3) link. For purposes of this standards roadmap document, the most commonly used term “C2 link” is used, but the intent is certainly to cover all cases cited above.

#### **1. Applicable Rules and Regulations**

The following framing points are provided with respect to the scope of FCC rules, and the relationship between FCC and FAA rules.

FCC rules generally address radio specific rules and regulations, with an eye toward limiting harmful interference. The FAA is focused on aviation safety, thus its rules address issues such as radio link reliability, and aeronautical equipment (including radio equipment and relevant industry standards associated with various aviation radio equipment) and aviation/airspace operating rules and regulations.

FCC rules are partitioned into various radio services (e.g., aviation, maritime, broadcast, satellite, public mobile, amateur, various unlicensed frequency bands, etc.) and some rule parts that may be common to many types of radio services, such as 47 CFR Part 2, frequency allocations, treaty matters, and general rules (e.g., equipment authorization procedures).

As a general matter, some FCC radio service rules specifically address aeronautical mobile use, either allowing it (e.g., in the aviation services, satellite services – Earth Stations Aboard Aircraft (ESAA), and

some other radio services); or prohibiting such use (e.g., in the 47 CFR Part 2 table of frequency allocations, mobile except aeronautical mobile) and/or prohibiting specific radio service rules (e.g., 47 CFR Section 22.925 – cellular radiotelephone service). Other FCC rules do not expressly allow or prohibit aeronautical mobile use (e.g., some, but not all, of the 47 CFR Part 27 Miscellaneous Wireless Communications Services) and UAS operations in such instances must be considered on a case-by-case basis, as aeronautical uses were not considered when service rules were developed.

Operation under most radio service rules expressly requires an FCC-issued station/operator license. Some radio services may not expressly require an end-user station/operator license within their service rules, e.g., those found in 47 CFR Part 95. Operation in certain bands may occur without a license or registration in accordance with 47 CFR Part 15, provided no interference is caused, without any presumption of reliability or protection from interference.

In all instances, operation under any FCC rule part requires compliance with specific requirements beyond power level and allocated service. For example, the Amateur Radio Service as defined in 47 CFR Part 97 is expressly for the purpose of non-commercial personal aim and operation may not be in the pursuit of any pecuniary interest. Generally, each service has specific licensing rules and policies governing the assignment of frequencies, along with specific station operating requirements including operating procedures, prohibited uses, interstation communication, station identification, control requirements, and record keeping. Given such requirements, along with the inherent time involved in any application process, consideration of appropriate FCC rules should be an early step in any UAS implementation process.

Spectrum is a valuable and finite resource that is shared by many services. Demand for spectrum continues to grow rapidly as wireless communications become more and more ubiquitous and essential. Thus UAS implementation planning should also address the impact on reliable C2 links arising from potential changes in spectrum allocation driven by this demand. Aviation systems lifecycles are typically much longer than those for commercial systems, thus there is a need to address frequency flexibility in the early stages of the UAS system development.

## **2. Categories of Spectrum**

Potential datalinks for providing C2 to UAS include:

### **Aviation Bands**

Existing aviation spectrum for AM(R)S was also recommended for allocation to UAS C2 links by the ITU, in the 5030-5091 MHz band (C-Band) and the 960-1164 MHz band (L-Band). Both of these bands were subsequently allocated by the FCC for this purpose. The aerospace industry has developed standards and equipment for UAS C2 links using these bands, and extensive testing, focusing on the C-Band, has been conducted with NASA support. For the L-Band, various research efforts are being conducted into L-Band communications, such as the L-Band Digital Aeronautical Communications System (LDACS), but the band has many incumbent users for other AM(R)S applications and military airborne datalinks, limiting



its availability for UAS C2 Links. Routine (non-experimental) use of these bands for UAS C2 has not yet occurred, awaiting the development and publication of service rules by the FCC.

Aviation spectrum is also used for voice communications with ATC and with other nearby aircraft, when operating in controlled airspace. UAS use the same VHF band (118-137 MHz) and channels as manned aircraft for voice communications. For UAS operations conducted under instrument rules, such as those with a flight plan in controlled airspace, there is a requirement for the remote pilot to maintain voice communication with Air Traffic Control (ATC) and other local airspace users. At present, this can only be done using 2-way VHF radios tuned to the frequency of the applicable ATC tower or center. In cases where the VHF radio must be installed on the aircraft, to remain within radio range of ATC ground antennas and other aircraft in the vicinity, the audio is relayed between the pilot and the aircraft's radio over the C2 link. This requirement for relaying ATC voice communications places unique latency and reliability requirements on the C2 link.

#### **Regulations:**

- 47 CFR Part 87 – Aviation Services
- ICAO Annex 10

#### **Organizations:**

- RTCA SC-228, Minimum Performance Standards for Unmanned Aircraft Systems, Working Group 2, Command and Control Links
- Aviation Spectrum Resources, Inc. (ASRI)

#### **Published Standards and Related Documents:**

- [RTCA DO-377, Minimum Aviation System Performance Standards for C2 Link Systems Supporting Operations of Unmanned Aircraft Systems in U.S. Airspace](#), March 2019
- [RTCA DO-362 with Errata, Command and Control \(C2\) Data Link Minimum Operational Performance Standard \(MOPS\) \(Terrestrial\)](#), September 2016
- TSO-C213 Unmanned Aircraft Systems Control and Non-Payload Communications Terrestrial Link System Radios, September 2018
- TSO-C169a VHF Radio Communications Transceiver Equipment Operating Within Radio Frequency Range 117.975 To 137.000 Megahertz, September 2007
- AC 90-50D, Requirements for 760-Channel VHF Aeronautical Operations
- AC 90-117, Data Link Communications -- dated 2017
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 619-5, *ACARS Protocols for Avionic End Systems*
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 620-9, *Datalink Ground System Standard and Interface Specification (DGSS/IS)*
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 622-5, *ATS Data Link Applications Over ACARS Air-Ground Network*
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 623-3, *Character-Oriented Air Traffic Service (ATS) Applications*
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 753-3, *HF Data Link System*

- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 761-5, Second Generation Aviation Satellite Communication System, Aircraft Installation Provisions
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 781-7, Mark 3 Aviation Satellite Communication Systems
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 791P1-3, Mark I Aviation Ku-Band and Ka-Band Satellite Communication System, Part 1, Physical Installation and Aircraft Interfaces
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 791P2-1, Mark I Aviation Ku-Band and Ka-Band Satellite Communication System, Part 2, Electrical Interfaces and Functional Equipment Description
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 792, Second-Generation Ku-Band and Ka-Band Satellite Communication System
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 634, HF Data Link System Design Guidance Material
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 658, Internet Protocol Suite (IPS) for Aeronautical Safety Services - Roadmap Document
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 766, Aeronautical Mobile Airport Communication System (AeroMACS) Transceiver and Aircraft Installation Standards
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 830, Aircraft/Ground Information Exchange (AGIE) Using Internet Protocol
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 839, Function Definition of Airborne Manager of Air-Ground Interface Communications (MAGIC)
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 618-8, Air/Ground Character-Oriented Protocol Specification
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 618-9D2, Air-Ground Characteristic-Oriented Protocol Specification
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 619-5, ACARS Protocols for Avionic End Systems
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 620-10D3, Datalink Ground System Standard and Interface Specification (DGSS/IS)
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 620-9, Datalink Ground System Standard and Interface Specification (DGSS/IS)
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 622-5, ATS Data Link Applications Over ACARS Air-Ground Network
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 623-3, Character-Oriented Air Traffic Service (ATS) Applications
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 631-7, VHF Digital Link (VDL) Mode 2 Implementation Provisions Standards
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 631-8D4, VHF Digital Link (VDL) Mode 2 Implementation Provisions
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 633-2, AOC Air-Ground Data and Message Exchange Format
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 633-3, AOC Air-Ground Data and Message Exchange Format
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 633-4, AOC Air-Ground Data and Message Exchange Format
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 635-4, HF Data Link Protocols
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 664P1-2, Aircraft Data Network, Part 1, Systems Concepts and Overview
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 664P2-3, Aircraft Data Network, Part 2, Ethernet Physical and Data Link Layer Specification
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 664P2-4, Aircraft Data Network, Ethernet Physical, and Data Link Layer Specification
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 664P3-2, Aircraft Data Network, Part 3 - Internet-Based Protocols and Services
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 664P4-2, Aircraft Data Network, Part 4 - Internet-Based Address Structure & Assigned Numbers

- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 664P5, Aircraft Data Network, Part 5, Network Domain Characteristics and Interconnection
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 664P7-1, Aircraft Data Network, Part 7, Avionics Full-Duplex Switched Ethernet Network
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 664P8-1, Aircraft Data Network, Part 8, Interoperation with Non-IP Protocols and Services
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 716-11, Airborne VHF Communications Transceiver
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 719-5, Airborne HF/SSB System
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 724B-6, Aircraft Communications Addressing and Reporting System (ACARS)
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 750-4, VHF Data Radio
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 752-1, Terrestrial Flight Telephone System (TFTS) Airborne Radio Subsystem
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 753-3, HF Data Link System
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 822A, On-Ground Aircraft Wireless Communication
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 823P1, DataLink Security, Part 1 - ACARS Message Security
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 823P2, DataLink Security, Part 2 - Key Management
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 841-3, Media Independent Aircraft Messaging (MIAM)
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA/AEEC, Aeronautical Mobile Airport Communications (AeroMACS)
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA/AEEC, Aeronautical Operational Control (AOC) Subcommittee
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA/AEEC, Air-Ground Communications System (AGCS) Subcommittee
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA/AEEC, Data Link (DLK) Systems Subcommittee
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA/AEEC, Data Link (DLK) Users Forum
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA/AEEC, Internet Protocol Suite (IPS) for Aeronautical Safety Services
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA/AEEC, Ku/Ka Band Satellite (KSAT) Subcommittee
- ICAO, Performance-Based Communications and Surveillance (PBCS) Manual Doc 9869, June 2017.
- ICAO, Global Operational Data Link Document (GOLD), Second Edition, April 26, 2013.
- [RTCA AWP-2, Command and Control \(C2\) Data Link White Paper](#), Mar 2014
- [RTCA AWP-4, Command and Control \(C2\) Data Link White Paper Phase 2](#), Sep 2017
- [JARUS, RPAS C2 Link, Required Communication Performance \(C2 link RCP\) Concept](#), Oct 2014
- [JARUS, RPAS "Required C2 Performance" \(RLP\) Concept](#), May 2016
- [JARUS, Recommendations on the Use of Controller Pilot Data Link Communications \(CPDLC\) in the RPAS Communications Context](#), Jun 2016

#### **In-Development Standards and Related Documents:**

- RTCA DO-377A
- RTCA DO-362A
- EUROCAE WG-105 SG-21, RPAS C2 Datalink, *Minimum Operational Performance Specification (MOPS) for RPAS Command and Control Data Link (Terrestrial)*
- EUROCAE WG-105 SG-21, RPAS C2 Datalink, *MOPS for RPAS Command and Control Data Link (C-Band Satellite)*

- EUROCAE WG-105 SG-21, RPAS C2 Datalink, *MASPS for RPAS Command and Control Data Link*
- EUROCAE WG-105 SG-22, Spectrum, *MASPS for management of the C-Band Spectrum in support of RPAS C2 Link services*
- EUROCAE WG-105 SG-22, Spectrum, *Guidance on Spectrum Access, Use and Management for UAS*
- EUROCAE WG-105 SG-23, Security, *MASPS on RPAS C3 Security*
- EUROCAE WG-105 SG-23, Security, *Guidance on UAS C3 Security*
- JARUS, *RPAS C2 Link CONOPS*

**Summary of Aviation/Satellite Band Spectrum Allocation**

Safety communications requiring high integrity and rapid response such as those used for 1) safety-related communications carried out by the air traffic services (ATS) for air traffic control (ATC), flight information and alerting; and 2) communications carried out by aircraft operators, which also affect air transport safety, regularity and efficiency (aeronautical operational communications (AOC)), or command and control by UAS operators require radio frequency spectrum allocated to aviation safety, such as the aeronautical mobile (route) and aeronautical mobile satellite (route) services.

Currently, aviation communications and data between aircraft and ground stations, with priority 1 to 6 as defined in the international radio regulations RR No. 44.1, use radio frequency spectrum allocated to aviation safety, such as the AM(R)S and AMS(R)S services.

Table 2 below identifies 1) spectrum that has been allocated in the United States, including the status of the operational service rules, or 2) spectrum that is actively under consideration internationally that could be domestically implemented to support UAS C2 or payload communications. Table 2 does not include commercial mobile radio, amateur, or unlicensed spectrum.

**Table 2: Aviation/Satellite Band Spectrum Allocation**

Frequency Range	Spectrum Summary and Status
117.975-137.0 MHz	Allocated for civil air/ground voice and data communications. Pilots and air traffic controllers use these frequencies to communicate their intentions, instructions, and clearances.
960-1164 MHz	<p>Allocated for terrestrial-based communications relating to safety and regularity of flight (AM(R)S), primarily along national or international civil air routes.</p> <p>Use of this band by the aeronautical mobile (R) service is limited to systems that operate in accordance with recognized international aeronautical standards. Such use shall be in accordance with Resolution <b>417 (Rev. WRC-12)</b>.</p> <p>This frequency band is heavily used by civil aviation to provide critical aircraft separation, identification and landing functions, including traffic collision avoidance systems, automatic dependent surveillance – broadcast (ADS-B) and distance measuring functions are example systems using this frequency band.</p> <p>Operational service rules for UAS C2 have not been initiated at FCC.</p>

<p>1610-1626.5 MHz</p> <p><u>space-to-Earth:</u> 1545-1559 MHz</p> <p><u>Earth-to-space:</u> 1646.5-1660.5 MHz</p>	<p>Allocated and available for satellite-based communications relating to safety and regularity of flights (AMS(R)S), primarily along national or international civil air routes (can be considered for UAS C2).</p> <p>In the 1545-1559 MHz and 1646.5-1660.5 MHz bands, certain AMS(R)S communications also have priority and immediate access over any other mobile-satellite communication operating within a network in these bands</p>
<p>5030-5091 MHz</p>	<p>Allocated for terrestrial-based (AM(R)S) and satellite-based (AMS(R)S) communications relating to safety and regularity of flight, primarily along national or international civil air routes.</p> <p>At the time of writing of this roadmap, a petition for rulemaking for terrestrial-based UAS C2 operational service rules is pending with the FCC. (See FCC <a href="#">RM-11798</a>.)</p> <p>Satellite-based operational service rules for UAS C2 have not been initiated at FCC.</p>
<p><u>Space-to-Earth</u> <u>4000-4200 MHz</u></p> <p><u>Earth-to-Space</u> <u>6225-6425 MHz</u></p>	<p>Allocated for commercial use of Space to Earth Fixed Satellite communications. Potentially, could be made available for shared use for satellite-based UAS C2 link (currently 500 MHz is allocated, from which 3700-4000 MHz is being re-allocated for terrestrial 5G communications)</p> <p>Allocated for commercial use of Earth to Space Satellite communications. Potentially, could be made available for UAS C2 link (paired spectrum with above 4000-4200 MHz downlink)</p>
<p><u>space-to-Earth:</u> 10.95-11.2 GHz 11.45-11.7 GHz 11.7-12.2 GHz 19.7-20.2 GHz</p> <p><u>Earth-to-space:</u> 14-14.47 GHz 29.5-30.0 GHz</p>	<p>Internationally being studied to revise and finalize Resolution 155 (Rev. WRC-19) that enables regulations for UAS C2 use by GSO Fixed-Satellite Service (FSS) satellites. These allocations to allow UAS C2 use have not been allocated (nor have any operational service rules been adopted or initiated) within the United States by the FCC.</p> <p>ICAO is finalizing Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPS) to enable the FSS to be used in these frequency bands for UAS C2.</p>
<p><u>space-to-Earth:</u> 10.95-11.2 GHz 11.45-11.7 GHz 11.7-12.2 GHz 18.3–18.8 GHz 19.7–20.2 GHz</p> <p><u>Earth-to-space:</u> 14.0-14.5 GHz 28.35–28.6 GHz 29.25–30.0 GHz</p>	<p>Allocated and operational service rules adopted for Earth Stations in Motion (ESIMs) for Earth Stations Aboard Aircraft (ESAA) using GSO FSS Satellites that can be used for UAS payload communications. This spectrum could also be considered for UAS C2 using GSO FSS satellites in airspace that does not have equipage requirements.</p> <p>At the time of writing of this roadmap, there are ongoing FCC rulemaking proceedings related to operation in these bands (except the 18.6-18.8 GHz and 29.25–29.5 GHz) using Non-Geostationary Fixed Satellite (NGSO) for Earth Stations in Motion (ESIMs). (See FCC <a href="#">17-95</a> &amp; <a href="#">18-315</a>). <a href="#">FCC’s decision document</a> on the two dockets referenced.</p>

<p><u>NOTE:</u> Internationally, AMSS is allocated in the 14.0-14.5 GHz band and ESIMs may operate in allocations in the 17.7-20.2 GHz and 27.5-30 GHz bands</p>
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### **Satellite**

Spectrum for UAS communications can be provided via satellite communications on both geostationary and non-geostationary platforms with Aeronautical Mobile Service (AMSS), Mobile Satellite Service (MSS), and Aeronautical Mobile Satellite on Route Service (AMS(R)S) designations in portions of frequency bands below 3 GHz. Additionally, AMSS in portions of the Ku-band and earth stations in motion (ESIMs) in portions of the Ka frequency band can be used for UAS payload communications and considered for C2 in airspace that does not have equipage requirements.

Satellite communications networks provide a variety of services to traditional aviation including mobile broadband access, broadcast television/radio/weather, and critical safety services. Generally, the spectrum and services most appropriate for C2 operations are those approved for and utilized for safety services - that is to say cockpit to ground voice and data communications. Satellite communications are utilized in commercial transport to augment/supplement traditional ground based networks, and are particularly important for trans-oceanic flights where traditional ground based infrastructure does not exist or has limitations in range (horizon, altitude, interference). The spectrum bands specified and utilized for AMS(R)S for safety and regularity of flight that are defined as protected and prioritized by ICAO and ITU are 1545-1555 MHz, 1610-1626.5 MHz, and 1646.5-1656.5 MHz, and in the United States 1555-1559 MHz and 1656.5-1660.5 MHz. These frequencies fall within the L-Band range, and are less prone to rain/weather fade and rotor noise than other satellite communications bands like Ka/Ku.

In 2012, the ITU made the 5030-5091 MHz band available for AMS(R)S to support satellite command and control of UAS. In 2015, the ITU adopted Resolution 155 which identified Fixed-Satellite Service (FSS) spectrum in the 10.95-11.2 GHz (space-to-Earth), 11.45-11.7 GHz (space-to-Earth), 11.7-12.2 GHz (space-to-Earth) in Region 2, 12.2-12.5 GHz (space-to-Earth) in Region 3, 12.5-12.75 GHz (space-to-Earth) in Regions 1 and 3 and 19.7-20.2 GHz (space-to-Earth), and in the frequency bands 14-14.47 GHz (Earth-to-space) and 29.5-30.0 GHz (Earth-to-space) bands for satellite command and control of UAS in non-segregated airspace with the objective to finalize the regulations in 2023. The ITU is studying these provisions to ensure spectrum compatibility with other services operating in the frequency bands and developing technical characteristics of UAS. ICAO is developing the standards and recommended practices (SARPs) for FSS C2 Links.

### **Regulations:**

- ITU-R Res 155, for which final implementation has not yet been adopted and is in the process of being finalized to provide additional satellite bands
- ITU-R ESIMs in 17.7-19.7 GHz, 19.7-20.2GHz, 27.5-29.5 GHz, and 29.5-30 GHz
- FCC Part 25
- ITU Radio Regulations (specifically 5.357A)

## Organizations:

- RTCA SC-228, Minimum Performance Standards for Unmanned Aircraft Systems, Working Group 2, Command and Control Links
- RTCA SC-222, AMS(R)S
- ICAO
- ITU
- ETSI
- FCC
- SAE ITC ARINC

## Published Standards and Related Documents:

- [ETSI EN 301 473](#), *Satellite Earth Stations and Systems (SES); Harmonized Standard for Aircraft Earth Stations (AES) providing Aeronautical Mobile Satellite Service (AMSS)/Mobile Satellite Service (MSS) and/or the Aeronautical Mobile Satellite on Route Service (AMS(R)S/Mobile Satellite Service (MSS), operating in the frequency band below 3 GHz covering the essential requirements of article 3.2 of the Directive 2014/53/EU*
- [ETSI ETR 270](#), *Satellite Earth Stations and Systems (SES); Survey on the need for an ETS for Aircraft Earth Stations (AES) in the Aeronautical Mobile Satellite Service (AMSS)*
- RTCA DO-262E, *Minimum Operating Performance Standards for Avionics supporting Next Generation Satellite Systems*
- RTCA DO-343C, *Minimum Aviation System Performance Standard for AMS(R)S Data and Voice Communications Supporting Required Communications Performance (RCP) and Required Surveillance Performance (RSP)*
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 792, *Second-Generation Ku-Band and Ka-Band Satellite Communication System*
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 741P1-15, *Aviation Satellite Communication System, Part 1, Aircraft Installation Provisions*
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 741P2-11, *Aviation Satellite Communication System, Part 2, System Design and Equipment Functional Description*
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 761-6, *Second Generation Aviation Satellite Communication Systems, Aircraft Installation Provisions*
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 771-1, *Low-Earth Orbiting Aviation Satellite Communication Systems*
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 781-8 Mark 3, *Aviation Satellite Communication Systems*
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 791P1-3 Mark 1, *Mark I Aviation Ku-Band and Ka-Band Satellite Communication System, Part 1, Physical Installation and Aircraft Interfaces*
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 791P2-1 Mark 1, *Aviation Ku-Band and Ka-Band Satellite Communication System, Part 2, Electrical Interfaces and Functional Equipment Description*
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 791P2-2, *Mark 1 Aviation Ku-Band and Ka-Band Satellite Communication System, Part 2, Electrical Interfaces and Functional Equipment Description*

## In-Development Standards and Related Documents:

- RTCA DO-377A, Minimum Aviation System Performance Standard for UAS C2 Links
- RTCA SC-222 revisions in draft
- NGSO ESIMs in Ka band

### **Commercially licensed spectrum**

Use of commercial terrestrial wireless spectrum and networks to enable UAS is a topic that has been under discussion by the FCC and FAA for many years. Industry has been studying this new use of the commercial wireless networks, including as part of the Integration Pilot Programs in North Carolina, San Diego and other locations. The recently released FAA notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) related to remote identification of UAS mentions a number of times the intent to connect UAS to the Internet over the cellular networks.

The FCC's Technological Advisory Council ("TAC") UAS Working Group<sup>14</sup> validated use of commercial wireless technology for UAS communications, finding that "3GPP<sup>15</sup> technology satisfies the expected communications requirements for low altitude UAVs."<sup>16</sup> The TAC UAS Working Group identified advantages of 3GPP technologies, including leveraging existing infrastructure, readily-available commercial hardware, flexibility to meet varying flight operations, and extensive security and privacy support. The TAC did not consider the interference effects of UAS communications on commercial wireless networks.

An absence of expressed restrictions on Aeronautical Service in the Table of Allocations (ToA) or in the FCC's service rules for a band of spectrum, including commercial wireless spectrum, does not mean that the FCC has contemplated or analyzed aeronautical or UAS operations for that band. That analysis is ongoing. The FAA also has been supportive of exploring use of the commercial wireless networks for UAS. As government sponsored and industry working groups have noted, licensed commercial wireless networks provide the coverage, authentication and security, quality of service, reliability and redundancy, latency, and global interoperability required for safe UAS control links. See, for example,

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<sup>14</sup> The TAC, which provides technical advice to the Commission on a variety of emerging technologies, has included a sub-group specifically tasked to analyze the communications needs (including spectrum) for UAS applications. Information released by the TAC does not represent an official determination of the FCC.

<sup>15</sup> 3GPP is the [3rd Generation Partnership Project](#), a partnership between seven major standards development organizations from around the world that work to develop technical specifications for mobile systems.

<sup>16</sup> [Presentation by the Communication Strategies for UAS Working Group](#) at the FCC's March 26, 2019 TAC Meeting.



the FAA’s Drone Advisory Committee,<sup>17</sup> the FAA’s Remote ID Aviation Rulemaking Committee,<sup>18</sup> Qualcomm,<sup>19</sup> and the FCC Technology Advisory Council.<sup>20</sup>

**Regulations:** The FCC issues technical and service rules for terrestrial commercial wireless spectrum that can be found in 47 CFR of the FCC Rules.

**Organizations:** CTIA, GUTMA, ASRI, GSMA, ACJA, IEEE

The Global UTM Association (GUTMA) in conjunction with GSMA have formed the Aerial Connectivity Joint Activity (ACJA) to promote interchange between the aviation and cellular communities, and to synchronize contributions between the existing SDOs of each community in order to avoid incompatibilities between them.

3GPP is developing specifications for use of the 3GPP networks to support UAS communications links. 3GPP is now working on Release 17, the objectives of which are as follows:

- System requirements for UAS-related requirements;
- Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) for command and control traffic;
- Developing the architecture requirements and solution recommendations to enable application layer support for UAS over 3GPP networks;
- Radio architecture network frameworks for UAS payload communications for 5G which includes a proposal for the same functionality enabled in Release 15 for LTE, with additional aspects;
- System architecture work related to: identification and tracking of both drones and drone controllers, including studying the extent to which the 3GPP system is involved; authorization and identification of drones and drone controllers by UAS Traffic Management (“UTM”); and the role of the 3GPP system, if any, in authorization and/or authentication of the drone controller;
- Drone to controller communications, and drone to drone communications, including: identifying the impacts on UAS operations of lack of/revocation of authorization while considering the need for the system to keep track of and control drones; enhancements to existing mechanisms for connectivity between drone controllers; drones and the UTM, considering both line of sight connectivity and non-line of sight connectivity; and detection and reporting of unauthorized drones towards UTM.

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<sup>17</sup> RTCA, [Drone Advisory Committee Report \(November 8, 2017\)](#). The DAC report (p. 66) highlighted reasons why using commercial wireless networks is the right approach for safe and secure UAS operations. The DAC also cited the reliability of wireless networks as a positive factor in supporting beyond visual line-of-sight missions (p. 67, “Network Coverage/Reliability”).

<sup>18</sup> FAA [Remote ID and Tracking ARC Report](#) (Dec. 19, 2017)

<sup>19</sup> Qualcomm, [LTE Unmanned Aircraft Systems, Trial Report](#) (May 12, 2017)

<sup>20</sup> FCC Technological Advisory Council, [2016 Recommendations](#) (December 2016)

### Published Standards and Related Documents:

- 3GPP TR 36.777 V15.0.0 (2017-12), *Study on Enhanced LTE Support for Aerial Vehicles; Release 15*, Dec 2017. This technical report gives a broad overview, including simulation and test results, of aerial LTE connectivity quality, handover, and interference issues. Release 15 normative specification changes were more limited in scope, and focused on: height reporting when a drone crosses a network-configured reference altitude, interference detection and mitigation, UAS-dedicated radio measurement reporting, signaling of flight path information from drone to LTE network, location information reporting including a drone's horizontal and vertical velocity, and subscription-based aerial drone remote identification and authorization.
- 3GPP TS 22.125 V16.3.0 (2019-09), *UAS Support in 3GPP; Stage 1; Release 16*, Sep. 2019
- 3GPP TS 22.281 V16.0.0 (2018-09), *Mission Critical Video Services; Release 16 (includes UAV-related mission critical video requirements)*, Sep. 2018
- 3GPP TS 22.282 V16.4.0 (2018-12), *Mission Critical Data Services; Release 16 (includes UAV-related mission critical data requirements)*, Dec. 2018
- 3GPP TS 22.825 V16.0.0 (2018-09), *Remote ID of UAS; Stage 1; Release 16*, Sep. 2018
- 3GPP TR 22.829 Enhancements for UAVs
- [IEEE 802.16](#)

### In-Development Standards and Related Documents:

- 3GPP TS 22.125 V 17.0.0 (2019-09), *UAS Support in 3GPP; Stage 1; Release 17* (Note: KPI values negotiated by cellular/aviation communities are being worked for addition to this spec.)
- 3GPP TS 22.261 V17.0.1 (2019-10), *Service Requirements for the 5G System; Stage 1; Release 17*
- 3GPP TR 23.754 *Study on supporting Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) connectivity, Identification and tracking; Release 17* (anticipated completion at Stage 2 Architecture level by December 2020, with possible Stage 3 Protocol work to be done afterward)
- RTCA DO-377A will rely heavily on the Satcom information coming from SC-222. The Satcom discussion in SC-228 are largely ancillary to SC-222 and are relying on the MASPS and MOPS for traditionally piloted aircraft to make up the majority of the details for UAS/RPAS. Revisions to documents are in draft, and expected to be published 2020. DO-262E (MOPS) and DO-343C (MASPS) will generally be the guidelines for SC-228 and the Satcom performance standards. In the meantime, the current versions of SC-222 DO-262/343 can be utilized for reference to Satcom MOPS/MASPS.
- [IEEE 802.15.16t Task Group](#)

**Gap A6: Alignment in Standards Between Aviation and Cellular Communities.** A gap exists in alignment between the aviation and cellular SDO communities, even when sufficient SDO efforts exist within each community. The telecommunications industry has already taken a number of steps to develop standards, particularly in 3GPP, to prepare networks for UAS applications. However, it is expected that fully addressing all KPIs of the C2 link and all the realistic use cases coming from the aviation industry will require further standardization activities.

**R&D Needed:** Yes. The FAA also has worked with CTIA to develop testing principles for use of the commercial wireless networks to support UAS and is considering the outcome of those tests in conjunction with the IPPs and other testing.

**Recommendation:** Collaboration between the UAS industry and communications industry is required to ensure feasibility of implementation. The aviation and cellular communities should coordinate more closely to achieve greater alignment in architecture and standards between the two communities. Specifically, advance existing work in 3GPP and ensure C2 link requirements are communicated to that group. In addition, architectures and standards could be developed for predicting or guaranteeing C2 link performance for a specific flight that is about to be undertaken.

**Organization(s):** 3GPP, GSMA/GUTMA ACJA, ASRI, IEEE

**Priority:** High (Tier 1)

**Status of Progress:** Green

**Update:** Numerous standards are in development.

### **Unlicensed spectrum**

Using unlicensed spectrum for communication is attractive for many UAV makers and operators because no FCC license is required for the operator. Because these bands are used for a wide variety of purposes, there exists a healthy ecosystem of radio transceiver parts and modems that can be leveraged to create cost-effective solutions. These are deployed by manufacturers with varying degrees of customization specific to the UAV use case. It is important to consider that such operations only occur on a “non-interfering basis.” That is, users may not cause interference and, likewise, their operations are not protected from interference. Each user operating in an unlicensed band is required to comply with the pertinent FCC rules (generally 47 CFR Part 15), which specify maximum transmit power and other parameters. Some bands also require additional operating procedures, such as Listen Before Talk (LBT), that are intended to minimize interference. These bands are commonly used for both C2 and payload (such as video).

In the USA, unlicensed bands available for UAVs are:

- 915MHz (902MHz-928MHz); 2.4GHz (2400MHz-2483.5MHz); and 5.8GHz (5725-5850MHz). These three bands are typically governed by 47 CFR Section 15.247, which, among other things requires frequency hopping or wideband digital modulation. (Alternatively, 47 CFR Section 15.249 provides other lower power limits for usage not meeting these conditions.) The maximum transmitter power depends on parameters of modulation, but can generally be up to 1 watt total and 4 watt effective isotropic radiated power (EIRP) in the direction of highest gain. Note that fixed point-to-point usage can use much higher EIRP, per 15.247(c)(1), which increases the potential for interference to UAV communications. In many countries, the 5GHz band requires LBT, but the USA is not among these.

- 27MHz (6 channels from 26.995 MHz to 27.255 MHz). The primary usage of these bands for RC aircraft falls under 47 CFR Section 15.227, which allows only 30uW EIRP (10000uv/m at 3m). These frequencies are also part of the RCRS (Radio Control Radio Service) and are allocated for both surface and aerial vehicles. RCRS is governed by 47 CFR Part 95, which allows much higher powers (4 to 25 watts). But usage under Part 95 is relatively rare compared to usage in small low-cost toys under Section Part 15.227. This band is shared with the CB radio service (26.960 MHz to 27.410 MHz) and the industrial, scientific, and medical (ISM) radio band (26.957 MHz to 27.283 MHz).
- 49MHz (49.82-49.9 MHz). These are governed by 47 CFR Section 15.235 when used for RC aircraft. The power limit and usage is similar to the 27MHz usage under 15.227.
- 72MHz (72.0-73.0MHz). These are designated as RCRS and governed by Part 95 when used for model aircraft. This stipulates a limit of 0.75W (and thus the usage for larger model aircraft, versus 27MHz and 49MHz).
- Equipment in 27 MHz, 49 MHz, and 72 MHz generally relies on the operator to select an available frequency, and simply does not function if two users of the same channel are collocated. Places where RC modelers congregate may have a “flag” or “board” system for 72 MHz, to check out a frequency, to ensure that two users are not using the same frequency.

In other countries other bands may be used for RC aircraft. For example 35MHz is a common band in aero models in the EU (although similar to 72MHz in USA, it is largely replaced by 2.4GHz equipment).

**Organizations:** Among the organizations creating standards applicable to the usage of unlicensed bands for UAVs are:

- Bluetooth SIG
- IEEE 802.11 and Wifi Alliance
- IEEE 802.15.4
- ISO (18000-7)
- ITU-T (G.9959)

**Published Standards and Related Documents:** It is common for UAV manufacturers to modify drivers and upper layer software to introduce proprietary features, while still taking advantage of the ecosystem of standards-based integrated circuits and modules. All transmitters operated by non-federal users are subject to the FCC’s equipment authorization rules found in 47 CFR Part 2, Subpart J. Compliant devices will include a valid FCC ID number. Any modification to parameters associated with the FCC ID number must satisfy the FCC requirements before the device is marketed or operated.

General purpose standards leveraged for UAVs include:

- Wifi (802.11, various versions). Typically, this operates in 2.4 GHz and 5.8 GHz, except 802.11ah (Wifi HaLow) which operates in the 915 MHz band.
- Bluetooth. LAN/PAN standard operating in the 2.4 GHz band, defined by the Bluetooth SIG.

- Z-wave. This operates in the 915 MHz band in the USA, and other nearby bands in other countries. The physical layer is defined by ITU-T G.9959.
- Dash7. An IOT Protocol in the 433, 868, and 915MHz unlicensed bands based on ISO/IEC 18000-7.
- 802.15.4. This is the physical layer foundation for Zigbee, ISA100.11a, WirelessHART, MiWi, 6LoWPAN, thread and SNAP, each of which defines upper layers not defined in 802.15.4.

Some common UAV-specific protocols are:

- Spektrum DSM, DSM2 and DSMX
- JR DMSS, originally based on Spektrum DSM but with proprietary modifications
- Futaba FASST
- FrSky D8, D16, and LR12
- Hitec A-FHSS

In many cases, these protocols leverage chipset from the above standards. There is also a large selection of RF transceiver chips with proprietary protocols available for these bands.

#### **In-Development Standards and Related Documents:**

##### IETF

- [Trustworthy Remote ID](#)
- [Secure UAS Network RID and C2 Transport](#)

Gaps in the use of unlicensed bands for UAVs include the following:

**New Gap A20: Unlicensed Spectrum Interference Predictability.** Performance in the unlicensed spectrum bands is inherently unpredictable to some extent. There are approaches to enhance modeling and prediction, but there has been little work towards doing so. Identification of Key Performance Indicators needs to be demonstrated/analyzed.

**R&D Needed:** Yes. ASTM’s Remote ID workgroup is performing studies to determine likely performance under various RF conditions.

**Recommendation:** Additional R&D could include statistical characterization of congestion in various environments (urban, rural, etc.), and study of interference caused by aerial radios.

**Priority:** High (Tier 1), especially in evaluating Remote ID broadcast range

**Organization(s):** See list of organizations listed in the text.

### **Amateur bands**

Drone first person view (FPV) video transmitters using amateur radio bands require the operator(s) to have a minimum of a Technician Class Amateur Radio (HAM radio) license.

**Regulations:** 47 CFR Part 97, Amateur Radio Service, provides that any use of amateur bands must be for personal use, without any pecuniary or commercial interest. It further specifies which frequencies can be used, how to obtain an Amateur Radio license, that a minimum of a Technician class license is required for the pilot(s) / operator(s) to control a model airplane, and all the technical and other requirements needed to legally operate in any Amateur Radio band.

The frequencies that can be used for the remote control of model aircraft and boats in North America are (in MHz) 50.8, 50.1, 53.1, 53.2, 53.3, 53.4, 53.5, 53.6, 53.7, and 53.8.

The frequencies (in MHz) that can be used for downlinking video from the UAS are from 426.000 to 432.000 with a carrier frequency of 427.250.

These frequencies are determined by regional band plans established by the amateur radio community and its organizations as good operating practice intended to minimize the likelihood of interference between operators in the amateur radio service.

**Organizations:** American Radio Relay League (ARRL)

### **3. Spectrum-Agnostic IEEE In-Development Standards and Documents**

**IEEE P1920.1, Aerial Communications and Networking Standards.** IEEE P1920.1 defines air-to-air communications over self-organized aerial ad hoc networks and describes the reference architecture for aerial networks, where aircraft can form a network to share information with one another with or without any supporting infrastructure, such as satellite or cellular communications. It is primarily intended for small UASs used for civilian and commercial applications. This standard is still under development and is expected to be released in early 2021.

**IEEE P1920.2, Standard for Vehicle to Vehicle Communications for Unmanned Aircraft Systems.** IEEE P1920.2 defines a Vehicle to Vehicle Communications (V2V) standard for UASs. It is primarily focused on the protocol for exchanging information between the vehicles. The information exchange will facilitate beyond line of sight (BLOS) and beyond radio line of sight (BRLOS) communications. The information exchanged between the aircraft may be for the purpose of command, control, and navigation, or for any application specific purpose.

### **4. Conclusions**

Much work remains to be done with respect to spectrum options for UAS C2 in order to complete any required regulatory actions, and confirm which options are optimal or necessary for each category of UAS (small or large), in view of varying altitudes of operation and concepts of use. All of the spectrum options discussed above, aviation-protected bands, commercial licensed bands (cellular and satellite), and unlicensed bands are viable for UAS C2 and ultimately may be used in concert for certain UAS

operations. Until work on these spectrum options is concluded by the regulators and industry, many commercial UAS operations are relying on unlicensed bands, commercial wireless and satellite bands (with the licensee's authorization), and experimental licenses issued by the FCC to satisfy the UAS C2 function, which limits industry growth.

#### **6.4.2. Navigation Systems**

Radio frequency navigation requirements on UAS platforms are highly dependent on the platform and application. Satellite (including augmentation systems) navigation uses global navigation satellite signals (GNSS) to determine the position of the aircraft. Processing these signals into navigation solutions is dependent on the GNSS receiver's capability (e.g., multi-frequency (L1/L2/L5), multi-constellation (GPS, Galileo, GLONASS, etc.), ionospheric correction, multipath mitigation, Real-Time Kinematic Corrections, etc.), integration with other sensors/components on the platform, forecasting GNSS coverage, and integrity monitoring of the system. The operations of UAS are changing. Initially small UAS had the pilot operate the UAS remotely using visual contact with the assistance of a control station (small device, smartphone, tablet, or laptop). In this mode of operation, the control station maintains a communications link with the UA for manual and automated navigation using a GNSS receiver in the UAS, and alternative/backup to GPS for medium and large unmanned aircraft systems (medium and high risk UAS with medium and high kinetic energy) navigation. For very basic manual control, it's necessary to have GNSS position, altitude, and UTC time of applicability at the UA. (Note, regulatory requirements may mandate position, altitude, and time of applicability information at the control station and in the UA). As operations of UAS become increasingly automated, beyond visual line of sight (BVLOS) positioning, navigation, and time (typically derived from GNSS) will become critical to successful flights, and safe and efficient operation of the UAS. Furthermore, a UAS platform equipped with a transponder allows its broadcasted position to be known/tracked by other UAS, ground observers, UTM, ATC, etc. (See section 7.8 on remote ID.) It is even possible that the navigational performance of the UAS may impact the efficiency of the Unmanned Traffic Management (UTM) by making the volume of airspace allocated to each UAS dependent (in part) on the accuracy, reliability, and integrity of the navigation system.

Current flight control algorithms ensure that system sensors/components (e.g., GNSS, inertial measurement unit (IMU)/inertial navigation systems (INS), magnetometer/compass, pressure altimeter, etc.) are providing reliable navigational accuracy. Additionally, for UAS, improved component availability, system level fault detection, and advanced system component failure reversion techniques may be required to provide the needed capabilities to meet UAS system safety requirements. In certain situations, a magnetometer/compass may be adversely affected (e.g., operating in close proximity to ferrous materials or proximity to power transmission lines). Likewise, operating a UAS in close proximity to buildings, structures, vegetation, and in canyons creates multipath and obscuration of GNSS signals that may degrade navigational performance.

GNSS frequencies are in aeronautical band; however, recent advancements in ground-based communication signal transmission technologies have shown some interference with GNSS signals even

though their authorized frequencies are adjacent to the GNSS frequency bands. Currently, communication networks using these interfering frequencies have not been deployed, but this highlights how sensitive GNSS signals can be with technologies using GNSS frequencies.

For manned aviation, the FAA has signaled a transition from radar and VHF navigational aids to precise tracking using GNSS satellite signals by requiring ADS-B technology since January 2020. The improved accuracy, integrity, and reliability of satellite signals over radar means controllers will eventually be able to safely reduce the minimum separation distance between aircraft and increase capacity in the nation's skies. Relying on satellites instead of ground navigational aids will enable aircraft to fly more directly from point A to B. Also, ground control displays could accurately identify hazardous weather and terrains, and provide pilots important flight information, such as temporary flight restrictions, which would improve navigation for UAS operations BVLOS. The difference in GNSS navigation reliability & integrity for manned, unmanned, manual, and automated flight systems must be considered to ensure safe and efficient operation in nominal as well as degraded conditions for the flight environments.

The above methods of navigation use terrestrial or satellite radio navigations systems, which are external to the aircraft. UAS augment those systems with self-reliant navigation functionality such as machine/computer vision-based navigation using sensors such as optical cameras or LIDAR. Computer vision-based systems operate similarly to the way human pilots navigate by using visual cues and landmarks for VFR flight. Vision based systems perform aircraft localization corrections to inertial measurement unit (IMU) predictions. Upon successful detection and association of a landmark using a vision-based system, the pixel coordinates of the detected landmark are measured. Because the global coordinates of the landmarks are known, the absolute location of the aircraft can be estimated based on the location of the landmark's projected image in the airborne 2D image plane with the aid of existing onboard aircraft instrumentation (e.g., IMU, altimeter, airspeed indicator). Vision-based navigation systems increase self-reliance and can be self-contained on the aircraft; therefore, they are much less susceptible to signal interferences, which are discussed in the later section. Vision system are however impacted by environmental effects like rain, fog, snow and low light, and are limited by the line of sight from the sensor to the environment detected. Moreover, matching of the landmarks detected by the system to a map requires that the area be surveyed and updated periodically, and that the area have enough landmarks to yield a high confidence in the derived position. For UAS the use of multiple position, navigation, and timing technologies like GNSS and vision systems can greatly increase the reliability and safety of the system. There currently exists no industry standards for computer vision-based navigation systems.

**Published Standards and Related Materials:** While not specific to UAS, relevant published standards and documents include:

#### FAA

- FAA Advisory Circular 20-165B - Airworthiness Approval of Automatic Dependent Surveillance - Broadcast OUT Systems
- FAA TSO-C16b, Electrically Heated Pitot And Pitot-Static Tubes



- FAA TSO-C54, Stall Warning Instruments
- FAA TSO-C106, Air Data Computer
- FAA TSO-C145e, Airborne Navigation Sensors Using the Global Positioning System (GPS) Augmented by the Satellite Based Augmentation System (SBAS)
- FAA TSO-C146e, Stand-Alone Airborne Navigation Equipment Using the Global Positioning System Augmented (GPS) by the Satellite Based Augmentation System (SBAS)
- FAA TSO-C154c, Universal Access Transceiver (UAT) Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) Equipment Operating on Frequency of 978 MHz
- FAA TSO-C161b, Ground Based Augmentation System Positioning and Navigation Equipment
- FAA TSO-162b, Ground Based Augmentation System Very High Frequency Data Broadcast Equipment
- FAA TSO-C166b, Extended Squitter Automatic Dependent Surveillance - Broadcast (ADS-B) and Traffic Information Service - Broadcast (TIS-B) Equipment Operating on the Radio Frequency of 1090 Megahertz (MHz)
- FAA TSO-C196b, Airborne Supplemental Navigation Sensors for Global Positioning System (GPS) Equipment using Aircraft-Based Augmentation
- FAA TSO-C204a, Circuit Card Assembly Functional Sensors using Satellite-Based Augmentation System (SBAS) for Navigation and Non-Navigation Position/Velocity/Time Output.
- FAA TSO-C205a, Circuit Card Assembly Functional Class Delta Equipment Using the Satellite-Based Augmentation System for Navigation Applications
- FAA TSO-C213 Unmanned Aircraft Systems Control and Non-Payload Communications Terrestrial Link System Radios

#### SAE-ITC

- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 562, Terrain Awareness and Warning System (TAWS) - Analog
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 595, Barometric Altitude Rate Computer (BARC)
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 650, Integrated Modular Avionics Packaging and Interfaces
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 654, Environmental Design Guidelines for Integrated Modular Avionics
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 677, Installation Standards for Low Frequency Underwater Locator Beacon (LF-ULB)
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 680, Aircraft Autonomous Distress Tracking (ADT)
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 813, Embedded Interchange Format for Terrain Databases
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 815, Embedded Interchange Format for Obstacle Databases
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 424-23D2, Navigation System Data Base
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 561-11, Air Transport Inertial Navigation System (INS)
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 594-4, Ground Proximity Warning System
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 660A, CNS/ATM Avionics, Functional Allocation and Recommended Architectures
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 660B, CNS/ATM Avionics Architectures Supporting NextGen/SESAR Concepts
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 681D3, Timely Recovery of Flight Data (TRFD)
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 704-7, Inertial Reference System (IRS)

- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 704A, Inertial Reference System (IRS)
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 705-5, Attitude and Heading Reference System (AHRS)
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 706-4 Mark 5, Subsonic Air Data System (ADS)
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 707-7, Radio Altimeter
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 708-6, Airborne Weather Radar (WXR)
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 708A-3, Airborne Weather Radar with Forward Looking Windshear Detection Capability
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 709-8, Airborne Distance Measuring Equipment (DME)
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 709A-1, Precision Airborne Distance Measuring Equipment (DME/P)
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 710-10 Mark 2, Airborne ILS Receiver
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 711-10 Mark 2, Airborne VOR ILS Receiver
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 712-7, Airborne ADF System
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 714-6 Mark 3, Airborne SELCAL System
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 714A Mark 4, Airborne Selective Calling (SELCAL)
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 718-4 Mark 3, Air Traffic Control Transponder (ATCRBS/MODE S)
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 718A-4 Mark 4, Air Traffic Control Transponder (ATCRBS/Mode S)
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 723-3, Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS)
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 726-1, Flight Warning Computer System (FWCS)
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 731-3, Electronic Chronometer
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 735-2, Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS)
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 735A-1 Mark 2, Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS)
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 735B-2, Traffic Computer TCAS and ADS-B Functionality
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 738-3, Air Data and Inertial Reference System (ADIRS)
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 738A-1, Air Data and Inertial Reference System (ADIRS)
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 743A-6, GNSS Sensor
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 743B-1, GNSS Landing System Sensor Unit (GLSSU)
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 743C, GNSS Landing System Sensor Unit (GLSSU) with VHF Data Broadcast (VDB) Receiver
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 745-2, Automatic Dependent Surveillance (ADS)
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 755-5, Multi-Mode Receiver (MMR) - Digital
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 756-3, GNSS Navigation and Landing Unit (GNLU)
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 760-1, GNSS Navigation Unit (GNU)
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 761-6, Second Generation Aviation Satellite Communication Systems, Aircraft Installation Provisions
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 762-1, Terrain Awareness and Warning System (TAWS)
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 768-2, Integrated Surveillance System (ISS)
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 768A, Second Generation Integrated Surveillance System (2G ISS)
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 7xx, Airborne Weather Radar with Advanced Antenna Technology
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 814 -1, Extensible Markup Language (XML) Encoding and Compression Standard

- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 816-2c1, Embedded Interchange Format For Airport Mapping Database
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 816-3, Embedded Interchange Format for Airport Mapping Database
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 834-7, Aircraft Data Interface Function (ADIF)
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 834-8D2, Aircraft Data Interface Function (ADIF)
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 834AD1, Second Generation Aircraft Data Interface Function (ADIF)
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA/AEEC, Aeronautical Databases (ADB) Subcommittee
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA/AEEC, Flight Management System (FMS)
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA/AEEC, Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS)
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA/AEEC, Navigation Data Base (NDB) Subcommittee
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA/AEEC, Traffic Surveillance

#### RTCA

- [RTCA DO-229, MOPS for Global Positioning System/Wide Area Augmentation System Airborne Equipment](#)
- [RTCA DO-316, MOPS for Global Positioning System/Aircraft Base Augmentation System](#)
- RTCA DO-246, GNSS-Based Precision Approach Local Area Augmentation System (LAAS) Signal-in-Space Interface Control Document (ICD)
- RTCA DO-253, MOPS for GPS Local Area Augmentation System Airborne Equipment

#### SAE International

- [SAE1002](#) U.S. National Grid Standard
- [SAE6857](#) Requirements for a Terrestrial Based Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) System to Improve Navigation Solutions and Ensure Critical Infrastructure Security
- [SAE9990](#) Transmitted Enhanced Loran (eLoran) Signal Standard
- [SAE9990/1](#) Transmitted Enhanced Loran (eLoran) Signal Standard for Tri-State Pulse Position Modulation
- [SAE9990/2](#) Transmitted Enhanced Loran (eLoran) Signal Standard for 9th Pulse Modulation

#### TIA

- ANSI/[TIA-5041](#), future Advanced SATCOM Technologies (FAST) Open Standard Digital – If Interface (OSDI) for SATCOM Systems
- [TIA-1008](#), IP over Satellite (IPoS)
- [TIA-1073.000](#) Satellite Network Modem System (SNMS) General Requirements
- [TIA-1073.001](#) Satellite Network Modem System (SNMS) Network Layer Standard
- [TIA-1073.002](#) Satellite Network Modem System (SNMS) Encryption

**In-Development Standards:** While not specific to UAS, relevant in-development standards include:

- [SAE1004](#) Raw Measurements from Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) Receivers
- [SAE1012](#) Global eLoran User Equipment Interface Standard
- [SAE1012/1](#) Global eLoran User Equipment Interface Standard for Timing

- [SAE1012/2](#) Loran or Enhanced Loran (e)Loran Position, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) Interface Specification for the Embedded Global Positioning System and Inertial Navigation System (EGI)
- [SAE1013](#) Guidelines for Resilient GNSS Receivers
- [SAE1014](#) Standard for Interfacing Resilient GNSS Receivers
- [SAE1015](#) Improving the Accuracy, Availability, Integrity, Continuity, or Coverage of Positioning, Navigation, and/or Timing Solutions Using Raw Measurements from Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) Receivers
- [SAE1016](#) Security and Resilience Recommendations for Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) Users
- [SAE4572](#) Open System Architecture Interface to Enable Simulator Laboratory Testing of Embedded Global Navigation Satellite System and Inertial Navigation System (EGI) Equipment
- [SAE9980](#) Specification of The Transmitted Loran-C Signal
- [SAE9991](#) Receiver Standard for the Transmitted eLoran Signal
- [SAE9992](#) Introduction to the Operation and Use of the Transmitted Enhanced Loran (eLoran) Signal
- [SAE9993](#) A Guideline for Using the Transmitted Enhanced Loran (eLoran) Signal for Timing, Phase, and Frequency
- IEEE P1936.1: Standard for Drone Applications Framework
- EUROCAE Guidelines on the use of multi GNSS for UAS

**Gap A7: UAS Navigation Systems.** There is a lack of standards specifically for UAS navigation. There is a lack of navigation standards in novel environments where aircraft typically do not operate such as in “urban canyons.” Challenging environments may invoke capabilities such as vision-based navigation. Otherwise, UAS could use existing ground infrastructure such as very high frequency (VHF) omnidirectional range (VOR), non-directional beacons (NDB), instrument landing systems (ILS), and satellite infrastructure (GPS), which has vast coverage, and make use of the new enhanced, long-range navigation (eLORAN) standards in development. UAS navigation can leverage many of the same standards used for manned aircraft, but at a smaller scale and lower altitudes.

UAS stakeholders should evaluate their PNT performance requirements (precision, accuracy, timing, robustness, etc.) for their flight profiles. SAE6857 can be used as a point of reference.

**R&D Needed:** Yes. A specific R&D effort geared towards applying tracking innovations in satellite navigation for UAS is needed. Additional R&D effort is needed to further mature, test, and validate vision-based navigation systems.

**Recommendation:** Depending on the operating environments, apply existing navigation standards for manned aviation to UAS navigation and/or develop UAS navigation standards for smaller scale operations and at lower altitudes. Refer to R&D needed. Furthermore, existing navigation practices used by connected/automated vehicle technology should be leveraged to develop integrated feature-based/object-oriented navigation standards to orient the UAS platform in GNSS-deficient areas. Future

standards work should be reviewed to allow for the installation of navigation systems on UAS limited by swap capabilities.

**Priority:** High (Tier 1)

**Organization(s):** SAE, NASA, RTCA, EUROCAE, IEEE

**Status of Progress:** Green

**Update:** Existing manned aviation standards still apply to UAS. Standards are in development.

### **Protection from GNSS Signal Interference Including Spoofing and Jamming**

Every GNSS provides position and timing signals to a GNSS receiver such as those equipped on UAS platforms. There continues to be significant concerns that GNSS satellite signals, like any other navigational signals, are subject to interference, whether intentional or unintentional.

The GNSS receiver measures the time delay for the signal to reach the receiver from the satellite. One type of interference impacting GNSS is multipath of the signals. As the signals from the satellites travel down to earth they can be reflected off buildings, structures, and other objects and then be received by the GNSS receiver. Due to the reflection of the signal it will take longer to reach the receiver than the straight line that is intended. This additional time, delay, caused by environmental interference leads to positioning inaccuracy.

Interference by spoofing degrades the integrity of the GNSS signals by falsifying positions or timing offsets. Interference by jamming (intentional or unintentional) blocks or degrades the GNSS signals; thus making the signals more difficult for the receiver to receive or process, degrading or eliminating the ability to navigate using GNSS alone. The FAA is actively working with other U.S. Federal Agencies to detect and mitigate these effects and make sure that the GNSS and any related augmentation systems are available for safe manned aviation operations. With the proliferation of UAS, the industry and SDOs are encouraged to develop needed standards to address similar approach or fold in specific UAS-related considerations.

As described below, there are several actions that UAS manufacturers and operators can take to protect against interference (multipath, spoofing and jamming).

Interference countermeasures include:

- Ensuring that GNSS receivers simultaneously track multiple constellations (e.g., GPS and Galileo) and track multiple frequencies (L1, L2, & L5). To completely spoof a GNSS receiver, an adversary would have to produce and transmit all possible GNSS signals simultaneously. Multiple GNSS signals also enable better accuracy and mitigation of multipath.
- Filtering out-of-band radio frequencies. This is only effective with signals outside of GNSS frequency bands.

- Using an adaptive antenna array such as a controlled reception pattern antenna (CRPA). CRPAs are very effective at nulling multiple, high-powered jammers and are used by military platforms and weapons that operate in highly-jammed environments.
- Incorporate an IMU. IMUs are impervious to radio-frequency interference. Spoofing an IMU would require fabricating the Earth's gravitational field or vehicle dynamics to cause the IMU to think that it has moved in a way that it has not, which is not likely. However, the system needs to ensure that an IMU is not fed spoofed data taking it off course. An IMU can bridge GNSS positioning gaps for short or long periods depending on the design.
- Networking the GNSS receiver and UAS to services that can alert them of spoofing, jamming, and other interference in their area and report spoofing when/if detected.
- Using forecasting and planning tools to avoid areas of environmental interference or change the mode of operation (speed, altitude, alert limits, air corridor width, etc.) based on the forecasting GNSS performance.

Lower altitude flights may pose a higher risk of GNSS signal interference from magnetic fields or near frequency emissions. Lower altitude flights will experience more interference from multipath.

**Published and In-Development Standards:** See list in preceding section.

**Gap A8: Protection from Global Navigation Satellite Signals (GNSS) Interference Including Spoofing and Jamming.** There are standards in place for spoofing and jamming mitigation for manned aircraft. However, these standards are currently being updated to reflect increasing demands on GNSS systems, ongoing efforts to improve mitigation measures/operational needs, and heightened awareness of nefarious activities using spoofing and jamming technologies. Given the fact that manned aircraft standards are being updated/improved, there is a significant gap with how these standards may be applied to UAS platforms. See the command and control section for related discussion.

**R&D Needed:** Yes. An evaluation of the specific characteristics of current aircraft navigation equipment is needed including technical, cost, size, availability, etc. Higher performance spoofing/jamming mitigations should be developed.

**Recommendation:** There are likely insignificant differences in navigation system protection measures between manned aircraft and UAS, but it is recommended that this be evaluated and documented. Based on this evaluation, standards and/or policy may be needed to enable UAS platforms to be equipped with appropriate anti-spoofing and anti-jamming technologies. Also, operational mitigations are recommended including updating pilot and traffic control training materials to address interference and spoofing.

**Priority:** High (Tier 1)

**Organization(s):** SAE, DOD, NASA, RTCA, EUROCAE, IEEE

**Status of Progress:** Green

**Update:** Existing manned aviation standards still apply to UAS. Standards are in development.

### **6.4.3. Systems Performing Detect and Avoid (DAA) Functions**

UAS of various sizes have available standards that will address the Detect and Avoid capability required to operate in the NAS. RTCA has produced DO-365A which provides a Minimum Operational Performance Standard for Detect and Avoid Systems. The standards for the sensing equipment to provide the detection of non-cooperative traffic is available in DO-366 Air to Air Radar Minimum Operating Performance Standards and DO-381 Ground Based Surveillance Systems Minimum Operating Performance Standards. The standards for the equipment to provide detection of cooperative traffic is available in DO-185 Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System Minimum Operational Performance Standards, DO-260 Minimum Operational Performance Standards for 1090 MHz Extended Squitter Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B) and Traffic Information System Broadcast (TIS-B), and DO-282 Minimum Operational Performance Standards for Universal Access Transceiver.

The use of collision Avoidance systems is prevalent in manned aviation and will be no less prevalent in unmanned aviation. The original generation of Traffic Collision Avoidance Systems (TCAS) is being upgraded with new logic that makes use of offline optimization that increases safety and decreases overall alert rate. This new logic is being deployed in a family of systems named Airborne Collision Avoidance System X (ACAS X). Manned ACAS systems will operate according to the standards of ACAS Xa and ACAS Xo (DO-385), whereas unmanned systems will operate according to ACAS Xu (Publication date autumn of 2020) and ACAS sXu (currently in development). The ACAS Xu variants will coordinate with manned versions of TCAS II, ACAS Xa and ACAS Xo and comply with the requirements of Detect and Avoid Standards defined in DO-365A.

The cost and scale of sensors meeting the initial standards for the design, manufacture, installation, and operation of systems to provide a DAA capability for UAS currently leaves a gap in approvals for smaller civil UAS operations. Small and medium UAS have size, weight, and/or power (SWAP) limitations that prevent implementation of on-board systems to provide a DAA capability as defined by the FAA TSOs (TSO-C211, TSO-C212 and TSO-C213).

The FAA TSOs (TSO-C211, TSO-C212 and TSO-C213) and companion RTCA documents ([DO-362](#), [DO-365A](#), and [DO-366](#)) reference additional equipage assumptions beyond the DAA equipment itself in order to meet the DAA performance requirements, such as air data systems, attitude and heading reference systems, GPS, transponders, etc. These systems are currently required for commercial aircraft and will likely be required for UAS operating in the same airspace, and provide supporting information for the DAA function. The scope of the current TSOs and RTCA documents address the requirements for a DAA capability by UAS operating at altitudes as low as 400 feet. They are currently limited to exclude the visual traffic pattern of an airport and restricted to charted approaches. Further revisions of these documents are expected to address other operational scenarios and sensors better suited to meet smaller aircraft needs, as well as other DAA architectures, including ground-based sensors. The system

performing DAA functions must meet the minimum requirements of TSO-C211. Installation of the system performing DAA functions requires separate approval.

**Table 3: DAA Classes and Articles (ref. FAA TSO-C211, pp. 2-3)**

Class	Equipment <sup>1</sup>	Criticality		DAA Article Designation <sup>2&amp;3</sup>	DAA Equipment Article Name	Function
		Loss of Function	Misleading Information			
1	DAA – Basic	Major	Major	A	Active Surveillance	Air Traffic Control Radar Beacon System (ATCRBS)/Mode S Intruder Detection, TCAS II Mode data, Collision Avoidance coordination data
				B	Unmanned Aircraft (UA) DAA Processor	Track Processing, DAA Alerting <sup>2</sup> and Guidance <sup>2</sup>
				C	Control Station (CS) DAA Processor	DAA Alerting <sup>2</sup> and Guidance <sup>2</sup>
				D	CS DAA Control Panel	DAA Mode Control
				E	CS DAA Traffic Display	Display of Traffic, Alerting, and Guidance Information
2	DAA with TCAS II	Major	Hazardous/ Severe Major (See 3.b.(2)(b))	A	TCAS II, Version 7.1	ATCRBS/Mode S Intruder Detection, TCAS II Resolution Advisories (RA) Status and coordination data, Collision Avoidance System Logic, Hybrid Surveillance
				B	UA DAA Processor	Track Processing, DAA Alerting <sup>2</sup> and Guidance <sup>2</sup>
				C	CS DAA Processor	DAA Alerting <sup>2</sup> and Guidance <sup>2</sup> with TCAS II Integration
				D	CS DAA Control Panel	DAA Mode Control with TCAS II Integration
				E	CS DAA Traffic Display	Display of Traffic, Alerting, Guidance, and RA Information



**Notes (ref. FAA TSO-C211, pp. 2-3):**

- 1) In addition to the articles listed in Table 3, in order for the DAA system to function according to TSO-C211, both Class 1 and Class 2 Equipment will require the integration of an Air-to-Air Radar for Traffic Surveillance (ATAR) to detect non-cooperative aircraft and an Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) In system to receive ADS-B messages. TSO-C212 provides the minimum performance standards (MPS) for ATAR equipment. TSO-C166b provides MPS for ADS-B In equipment for DAA systems. TSO-C166b equipment used with DAA systems must be Class A, 1090 MHz with receive capability. TSO-C154c equipment may also be used in addition to TSO-C166b Class A equipment. However, TSO-C154c equipment may not be used in place of TSO-C166b Class A equipment because TSO-C154c equipment by itself does not meet the ADS-B detection performance requirements for a DAA system.
- 2) Articles can be designated both Class 1 and 2 equipment. Articles A and B are installed on aircraft. Articles C, D, and E contain functions that operate remotely on the ground or in a CS, or, for manned aircraft, may be located in the aircraft. Articles B and C contain DAA alerting and guidance functions that are interchangeable on an unmanned aircraft system platform. They may reside either in the UA or in the CS. See Section 5.a.(3) for installation limitations associated with interchangeability and class designations.
- 3) The requirements for the individual articles are identified in RTCA DO-365, Appendix O. With assistance from the DOD, NASA, and the UAS community, integration of systems and technologies for DAA has made some headway, but not enough for full integration of all sizes of UAS.

**Published Regulations, Standards, and Related Materials:** Published UAS DAA standards, as well as U.S. Federal government and inter-governmental materials (for civil, military, and space applications) relevant to this issue include but are not limited to those listed below. Additional committees, standards and other documents can be found in the [UASSC Reference Document](#).

ICAO:

- Annex 1 – Personnel Licensing, Q1 2016
- Annex 2 – Rules of the Air, Q1 2018
- Annex 8 – Airworthiness of Aircraft, Q1 2018

FAA:

- [14 CFR §91.111, Operating near other aircraft](#)
- [§91.113, Right-of-way rules: Except water operations](#)
- [§91.115, Right-of-way rules: Water operations](#)
- [§91.123, Compliance with ATC clearances and instructions](#)
- [§91.181\(b\), Course to be flown](#)
- Other Rules ([§§91.205, 91.209, 91.215, 91.217, 91.219, 91.223, 91.225, 91.227, 91.411, 91.413](#))
- [§107.37, Operation near aircraft; right of way rules](#)
- [§107.51, Operating limitations for small unmanned aircraft](#)

- Other sUAS Regulations ([§§107.15, 107.23, 107.25, 107.29, 107.31, 107.33, 107.35, 107.39, 107.41](#))
- [Technical Standard Order \(TSO\), TSO-C74d, Air Traffic Control Radar Beacon System \(ATCRBS\) Airborne Equipment, December 17, 2008](#)
- [TSO-C211, DAA Systems, September 25, 2017](#)
- [TSO-C212, Air-to-Air Radar \(ATAR\) for Traffic Surveillance, September 22, 2017](#)
- [TSO-C213, UASs Control and Non-Payload Communications Terrestrial Link System Radios, September 3, 2018](#)
- [TSO-C112e, Air Traffic Control Radar Beacon System/Mode Select \(ATCRBS/Mode S\) Airborne Equipment, September 16, 2013](#)
- [TSO-C118, TCAS Airborne Equipment, TCAS I, August 5, 1988](#)
- [TSO-C118a, TCAS Airborne Equipment, TCAS I, October 27, 2014](#)
- [TSO-C119d, TCAS Airborne Equipment, TCAS II with Hybrid Surveillance, September 5, 2013](#)
- [TSO-C119e, TCAS Airborne Equipment, TCAS II with Hybrid Surveillance, June 30, 2016](#)
- [TSO-C151d, Terrain Awareness and Warning Systems \(TAWS\), August 31, 2017](#)
- TSO-C154c, Universal Access Transceiver (UAT) ADS-B Equipment, December 2, 2009
- TSO-C166b, Extended Squitter ADS-B and Traffic Information, December 2, 2009
- TSO-C195b, Avionics Supporting ADS-B Aircraft Surveillance, September 29, 2014
- [Advisory Circular, AC 107-2, Small UAS \(sUAS\), June 21, 2016](#)
- [UAS Traffic Management \(UTM\) Concept of Operations, FAA v2, March 2, 2020](#)

#### DOD:

- DOD Policy Memo 15-002, Guidance for the Domestic Use of UASs, February 17, 2015
- DOD-NATO, STANAG 4671, UAVs Systems Airworthiness Requirements
- [DOD-NATO, STANAG 4702, Rotary Wing UAS Airworthiness Requirements](#)
- [DOD-NATO, STANAG 4703, Light UAS Airworthiness Requirements](#)
- [07-1-003 UAS Sensor and Targeting, July 27, 2010](#)
- [DOD-NATO, Guidance For The Training Of UAS Operators, April 22, 2014](#)
- [07-2-032 UAS Navigation System Test, US Army, July 27, 2010](#)
- [DOD-NATO, Interoperable C2 Data Link For Unmanned Systems \(IC2DL\) – Operational Physical Layer/Signal In Space Description, November 14, 2016](#)
- DOD-NATO Standard, STANREC AEP-101 Guidance on Sense and Avoid (SAA) for UASs, February 2017
- DOD-NATO, AEP-80, Rotary Wing UASs Airworthiness Requirements, 2014
- [MITRE Technical Report USAF Airborne Sense and Avoid \(ABSAA\) Airworthiness and Operational Approval Approach, Version 1.0, January 31, 2014](#)
- Investigation of Alerting and Prioritization Criteria for SAA, US Army, October 2013
- Top Level SAA Performance Requirements Based on SAA Efficacy, US Army, 2015
- Systems Engineering of SAA Systems, US Army, 2015
- [DOD UAS Airspace Integration, May 28, 2014](#)

#### NASA:

- ADS-B Mixed sUAS and NAS System Capacity Analysis and DAA Performance, April 2018
- An Evaluation of DAA Displays for UAS: The Effect of Information Level and Display Location on Pilot Performance, 2015
- [Implicitly Coordinated DAA Capability for Safe Autonomous Operation of Small UAS](#), 17<sup>th</sup> AIAA Aviation Technology, Integration, and Operations Conference, June 5-9, 2017
- [Safety Considerations for UAS Ground-based DAA](#), SGT/NASA, IEEE-DASC 2016, September 26-29, 2016
- [Various DAA Systems Documents](#)

#### AIAA:

- [AIAA R-103-2004, Terminology for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Remotely Operated Aircraft](#)
- [ANSI/AIAA G-043B-2018, Guide to the Preparation of Operational Concept Documents](#)
- [AIAA G-118-2006, Guide: Managing the Use of Commercial Off the Shelf \(COTS\) Software Components for Mission-Critical Systems](#)
- [AIAA G-010-1993, Guide: Reusable Software: Assessment Criteria for Aerospace Applications](#)
- [AIAA S-117A-2016, Space Systems Verification Program and Management Process](#)
- [ANSI/AIAA S-102.1.4-2009, Performance-Based Failure Reporting, Analysis & Corrective Action System Requirements](#)
- [ANSI/AIAA S-102.1.5-2009, Performance-Based Failure Review Board \(FRB\) Requirements](#)
- [ANSI/AIAA S-102.2.2-2009, Performance-Based System Reliability Modeling Requirements](#)
- [ANSI/AIAA S-102.2.4-2015, Performance-Based Product Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality Analysis Requirements](#)
- [AIAA S-102.2.5-2009, Performance-Based Sneak Circuit Analysis \(SCA\) Requirements](#)
- [ANSI/AIAA S-102.2.11-2009, Performance-Based Anomaly Detection and Response Analysis](#)
- [ANSI/AIAA S-102.2.18-2009, Performance-Based Fault Tree Analysis Requirements](#)

#### ASTM:

- F3442-20, *Detect and Avoid Performance Requirements* (previously WK62668), has been approved and will be published in June 2020. **(New)** This standard is specifically for lower risk applications which are generally those that are designed for low SWAP systems.

#### EUROCAE:

- ED-258 Operational Services and Environment Description for Detect & Avoid [Traffic] in Class D-G airspaces under VFR/IFR

#### RTCA:

- [DO-181E, MOPS for Air Traffic Control Radar Beacon System/Mode Select \(ATCRBS/Mode S\) Airborne Equipment](#), Section 2 as amended by Appendix 2 of the TSO-112e dated September 16, 2013
- [DO-254, Design Assurance Guidance for Airborne Electronic Hardware \(AEH\)](#)

- [DO-289, MASPS for Aircraft Surveillance Applications, December 13, 2006](#)
- [DO-362, with Errata - Command and Control \(C2\) Data Link MOPS \(Terrestrial\), September 22, 2016](#)
- [DO-365A, MOPS for Detect and Avoid \(DAA\) Systems, March 30, 2020 \(New\)](#)
- [DO-366, MOPS for Air-to-Air Radar for Traffic Surveillance, May 31, 2017](#)
- [DO-367, Minimum Operational Performance Standards \(MOPS\) for Terrain Awareness and Warning Systems \(TAWS\) Airborne Equipment](#)
- [DO-381, MOPS for Ground-based Surveillance System \(GBSS\) for Traffic Surveillance, March 30, 2020 \(New\)](#)

SAE:

- [J2735 201603, Dedicated Short Range Communications \(DSRC\) Message Set Dictionary](#)
- [AIR6514, UxS Control Segment \(UCS\) Architecture: Interface Control Document \(ICD\)](#)
- [ARP5707, Pilot Training Recommendations for Unmanned Aircraft Systems \(UAS\) Civil Operations](#)
- [ARP6012A, JAUS Compliance and Interoperability Policy](#)
- [AIR5645A, JAUS Transport Considerations](#)
- [AS5669A, JAUS/SDP Transport Specification](#)
- [AS6091, JAUS Unmanned Ground Vehicle Service Set](#)
- [AS8024, JAUS Autonomous Capabilities Service Set](#)
- [ARP6128, Unmanned Systems Terminology Based on the ALFUS Framework](#)
- [AIR5665B, Architecture Framework for Unmanned Systems](#)
- [ARP94910, Aerospace - Vehicle Management Systems - Flight Control Design, Installation and Test of, Military Unmanned Aircraft, Specification Guide For](#)
- [AIR5664A, JAUS History and Domain Model](#)
- [AS6522, Unmanned Systems \(UxS\) Control Segment \(UCS\) Architecture: Architecture Technical Governance](#)
- [AS6969, Data Dictionary for Quantities Used in Cyber Physical Systems](#)
- [AS6062A, JAUS Mission Spooling Service Set](#)
- [ARP5007A, Development Process - Aerospace Fly-By-Wire Actuation System](#)
- [J2958, Report on Unmanned Ground Vehicle Reliability](#)
- [J2940 201111, Use of Model Verification and Validation in Product Reliability and Confidence Assessments](#)
- [J3016 201806, Taxonomy and Definitions for Terms Related to Driving Automation Systems for On-Road Motor Vehicles](#)
- [J3018 201503, Guidelines for Safe On-Road Testing of SAE Level 3, 4, and 5 Prototype Automated Driving Systems \(ADS\)](#)

The ground vehicle community has developed standards through the following committees:

- [Active Safety Systems Standards Committee](#)
- [Driving Automation Systems Committee](#)

- [Advanced Driver Assistance Systems \(ADAS\) Committee](#)
- [On-Road Automated Driving \(ORAD\) committee](#)
- [Truck and Bus Active Safety Systems Committee](#)
- [Driver Vehicle Interface \(DVI\) Committee](#)

#### SAE ITC:

- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 562, Terrain Awareness and Warning System (TAWS) - Analog
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 815, Embedded Interchange Format for Obstacle Databases
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 762-1, Terrain Awareness and Warning System (TAWS)
- [ARINC 400 Series describes guidelines for installation, wiring, data buses, and databases.](#)
- [ARINC 500 Series describes older analog avionics equipment used on early jet aircraft such as the Boeing 727, Douglas DC-9, DC-10, Boeing 737 and 747, and Airbus A300.](#)
- [ARINC 600 Series are reference standards for avionics equipment specified by the SAE ARINC 700 Series.](#)
- [ARINC 700 Series describes the form, fit, and function of avionics equipment installed predominately on transport category aircraft.](#)
- [ARINC 800 Series comprises a set of aviation standards for aircraft, including fiber optics used in high-speed data buses.](#)
- [ARINC 762-1 Terrain Awareness and Warning System \(TAWS\)](#)
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA/AEEC, Aeronautical Databases (ADB) Subcommittee
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA/AEEC, Flight Management System (FMS)
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA/AEEC, Navigation Data Base (NDB) Subcommittee
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA/AEEC, Traffic Surveillance

#### **In-Development Standards and Related Materials:**

#### ICAO:

- Annex 2 – Rules of the Air
- Annex 3 – Meteorological Service for International Air Navigation
- Annex 6 – Part IV – International Operations – RPAS
- Annex 8 – Airworthiness of Aircraft
- Annex 10 – Volume IV, Part II – DAA Systems
- Annex 11 – Air Traffic Services
- Annex 14 – Aerodromes
- Annex 19 – Safety Management
- Manual on RPAS (Doc 10019)
- Procedures for Air Navigation Services – Air Traffic Management (Doc 4444)
- Procedures for Air Navigation Services – Aircraft Operations – Vol I – Flight Procedures (Doc 8168)

#### DOD:

- [US Army Ground Based Sense and Avoid System \(GBSAA\)](#)
- GBSAA: Enabling Local Area Integration of UASs into the National Airspace System, US Army

#### 3GPP:

- Remote Identification of Unmanned Aerial Systems (ID\_UAS) – Release 16

#### ASTM:

- [ASTM WK62669, Test Method for Detect and Avoid](#). This standard is for testing and validating the DAA capability for low SWAP systems.
- [ASTM WK69690, Specification for Surveillance UTM Supplemental Data Service Provider \(SDSP\) Performance](#)

#### EUROCAE:

EUROCAE WG-105 work on DAA includes the following:

- MASPS for Detect & Avoid [Traffic] in Class A-C airspaces under IFR;
- MASPS for Detect & Avoid [Traffic] in Class A-C airspaces under IFR
- MASPS for Detect & Avoid [Traffic] under VFR/IFR
- MOPS for Detect & Avoid [Traffic] under VFR/IFR
- Operational Services and Environment Description for Detect & Avoid in Very Low Level Operations
- MOPS for Detect & Avoid in Very Low Level Operations
- EUROCAE Guidelines on the use of multi GNSS for UAS

#### IEEE:

- IEEE P1920.2, *Standard for Vehicle to Vehicle Communications for Unmanned Aircraft Systems*

#### IETF:

- [Trustworthy Remote ID](#)
- [DRIP Authentication Formats](#)
- [DRIP Identity Claims](#)

#### ISO:

- ISO/TC 20/SC 16 has Collision Avoidance Ad Hoc group

#### RTCA:

- MOPS for Airborne Collision Avoidance System Xu (ACAS Xu) being developed under SC-147. Designed to support large UAS, it will be assigned a number once it is approved by the Program Management Committee (PMC), scheduled for September 2020.
- MOPS for Airborne Collision Avoidance System sXu (ACAS sXu) being developed under SC-147. Designed to support smaller UAS, it will be assigned a number once it is approved by the Program Management Committee, scheduled for 2022.

- Update to MOPS covering DAA (ATAR DO-365, Rev A – July 2020, DAA MOPS, Rev B – October 2020, Airborne EO/IR Sensor MOPS – January 2021)
- Development of a MOPS and ADD for ACAS sXu. This will be designed to be flexible in adapting to airspace beyond the existing Part 107 restrictions; it will be complementary to the UAS Traffic Management (UTM) concept, but can will also support operations outside of UTM if allowed
- Subject to approval of the RTCA PMC, SC-228 will undertake work to develop:
  - Guidance Material & Considerations for UAS (DO-304A). This guidance material summarizes the operational use case / scenarios to be used by all the working groups in conducting Phase Three. April 2021
  - GBSS MOPS (DO-381A) Revision to include a class of reduced performance consistent with en route DWC requirements. April 2021
  - Guidance material that will regularize the lost link behavior of UAS operating in controlled airspace. April 2022
  - Guidance Material for UAS Navigation Systems - Create standard equivalent level of safety guidance material for Part 91 operations under IFR. April 2022
  - C2 Link MOPS (Terrestrial) (DO-362B) Incorporate changes required to harmonize SATCOM compatibility with EUROCAE Standard. Updates required as a result of initial implementation of A revision. July 2022
  - DAA MOPS (DO-365C) Future revision of the DAA MOPS to accommodate new functionality from completed SPR and/or OSED material. October 2022
  - C2 Link MOPS for LTE Networks Create standard for use of LTE commercial networks for C2 Links used for type certificated UAS. January 2023
  - C2 Link Systems MASPS (DO-377B) Incorporate needed revisions from DAA system changes/additions. Address safety risk requirements for operations in Class E above A airspace and operations on the surface at public use airports. April 2023

SAE:

- [AS7209, Development Assurance Objectives for Aerospace Vehicles and Systems](#)
- [AIR7121, Applicability of Existing Development Assurance and System Safety Practices to Unmanned Aircraft Systems](#)
- [ARP4754B, Guidelines for Development of Civil Aircraft and Systems](#)
- [ARP4761A, Guidelines and Methods for Conducting the Safety Assessment Process on Civil Airborne Systems and Equipment](#)
- [JA7496, Cyber Physical Systems Security Engineering Plan \(CPSSEP\)](#)
- [JA6678, Cyber Physical Systems Security Software Assurance](#)
- [AS6983, Process Standard for Development and Certification/Approval of Aeronautical Safety-Related Products Implementing AI](#)
- [AS6111, JAUS Unmanned Maritime Vehicle Service Set](#)
- [J2924, Engineering Probabilistic Methods - Basic Concepts, Models and Approximate Methods for Probabilistic Engineering Analysis](#)

- [J2925, System Reliability and Integration](#)
- [J2945/2, DSRC Requirements for V2V Safety Awareness](#)
- [J2945/3, Requirements for V2I Weather Applications](#)
- [J2945/4, DSRC Messages for Traveler Information and Basic Information Delivery](#)
- [J2945/5, Service Specific Permissions and Security Guidelines for Connected Vehicle Applications](#)
- [J2945/6, Performance Requirements for Cooperative Adaptive Cruise Control and Platooning](#)
- [J2945/10, Recommended Practices for MAP/SPaT Message Development](#)
- [J2945/11, Recommended Practices for Signal Preemption Message Development](#)
- [J2945/12, Traffic Probe Use and Operation](#)
- [J3092, Dynamic Test Procedures for Verification & Validation of Automated Driving Systems \(ADS\)](#)
- [J3131, Automated Driving Reference Architecture](#)
- [J3164, Taxonomy and Definitions for Terms Related to Automated Driving System Behaviors and Maneuvers for On-Road Motor Vehicles](#)

The ground vehicle community has developed standards through the following committees:

- [Active Safety Systems Standards Committee](#)
- [Driving Automation Systems Committee](#)
- [Advanced Driver Assistance Systems \(ADAS\) Committee](#)
- [On-Road Automated Driving \(ORAD\) committee](#)
- [Truck and Bus Active Safety Systems Committee](#)
- [Driver Vehicle Interface \(DVI\) Committee](#)

**Gap A9: Detect and Avoid (DAA) Capabilities.** Standards are needed to address systems that provide a DAA capability for UAS that do not have the size, weight, and power (SWAP) required by the current DAA TSOs (TSO-C211, TSO-C212 and TSO-C213). Work already has been done and is ongoing to address this gap as noted in the text above and in the update statement below.

**R&D Needed:** Yes

**Recommendation:**

- 1) Complete the above listed in-development standards.
- 2) Encourage the development of standards to address and accommodate systems to provide a DAA capability for UAS that cannot accommodate the current SWAP requirements. This is a necessary first step toward approval for smaller or limited performance systems for DAA and full and complete integration of UAS into the NAS.
- 3) Recommendation that the standards bodies look into the usefulness of Detect and Avoid Track Classification and Filtering for low altitude operations below 1000 feet/400 feet.

**Priority:** High (Tier 1)

**Organization(s):** RTCA, EUROCAE, SAE, SAE ITC ARINC, AIAA, ASTM, DOD, NASA, 3GPP, IETF



**Status of Progress:** Green

**Update:**

- RTCA SC-228, WG-1 Phase 2
- RTCA SC-147/EUROCAE WG-75: They continue their work with the addition of Airborne Collision Avoidance System (ACAS) Xa/Xo, ACAS Xu, and ACAS sXu. ACAS Xu will provide DAA minimum performance standards specifically designed for large UAS. ACAS sXu will provide DAA minimum performance standards specifically designed for smaller UAS.
- ASTM F38.01 has developed WK62668 on DAA performance requirements standard for low and medium risk UAS operations which will be published in June 2020 as F3442-20.
- ASTM F38.01 is developing WK62669 on testing and validating low SWAP systems.
- IETF work on trust in Broadcast Remote ID Messages

#### **6.4.4. Software Considerations and Approval<sup>21</sup>**

The FAA and the aviation industry have established resources and frameworks (regulations, standards, orders, advisory circulars (ACs), etc.) related to software dependability and approval (in some cases referred to as certification) for manned aviation. Many of the existing aerospace software resources apply to unmanned aircraft; however, current standards and regulations related to software considerations and approval do not address control stations and associated equipment. Additionally, COTS software may not meet the “process-specific” intent of FAA regulations, which base approval on how the software development and sustainment processes are documented and if they meet an SDO’s standards or not. Proprietary or closed COTS software may also not allow users to make necessary changes to bring the software into compliance.

Furthermore, aerospace software standards currently expect that software development processes controls, coding standards, and software design provide full traceability of requirements to the software implementation to provide the highest levels of assurance for safety-critical systems. New approaches to aircraft control and decision-making may incorporate machine-learning and/or artificial intelligence technologies that are not well suited to existing assurance methodologies.

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<sup>21</sup> The highly integrated nature of the UAS and its advanced avionics systems and the inseparable interactions and interfaces amongst software, hardware, integrations, human factors, spectrum, etc. are discussed in detail in roadmap section 6.11 on Enterprise Operations: Level of Automation/Autonomy/Artificial Intelligence (AI). The Enterprise Operations section also addresses “System, Software and Hardware Assurance” from the perspectives of the broader assurance topic and inclusive of software. Software dependability as discussed in this section 6.4.4 is a component of the overall development assurance.

## Published Regulations, Standards, and Related Materials:

### FAA:

- Advisory Circular (AC), AC 20-171 Alternatives to RTCA DO-178B for Software in Airborne Systems and Equipment, 1-19-11
- [AC 119-1 Airworthiness and Operational Authorization of Aircraft Network Security Program \(ANSP\), 9-30-15](#)
- [AC 20-115D, Airborne Software Development Assurance Using EUROCAE ED-12\( \) and RTCA DO-178\( \), 7-21-17](#)
- [AC 00-69, Best Practices for Airborne Software Development Assurance Using EUROCAE ED-12\( \) and RTCA DO-178\( \), 7-21-17](#)
- [Order 8110.49A, Software Approval Guidelines, 3-29-18](#)
- [AC 20-156, Aviation DataBus Assurance, 8-4-06](#)
- [AC 43-216 Software Management During Aircraft Maintenance, 12-20-17](#)
- [AC 20-148 Reusable Software Components, 12-7-04](#)

### ASTM:

- [ASTM F3201-16, Standard Practice for Ensuring Dependability of Software Used in Unmanned Aircraft Systems \(UAS\)](#)
- [ASTM F3269-17, Standard Practice for Methods to Safely Bound Flight Behavior of Unmanned Aircraft Systems Containing Complex Functions](#)
- [ASTM F3298-19, Standard Specification for Design, Construction, and Verification of Lightweight Unmanned Aircraft Systems \(UAS\) \(New\)](#)

### RTCA:

- [DO-178C, Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment Certification, 12-13-11](#)
- [DO-254, Design Assurance Guidance for Airborne Electronic Hardware, 4-19-00](#)
- [DO-248C, Supporting Information for DO-178C and DO-278A, 12-13-11](#)
- [DO-330, Software Tool Qualification Considerations, 12-13-11](#)
- [DO-331, Model-Based Development and Verification Supplement to DO-178C and DO-278A, 12-13-11](#)
- [DO-332, Object Oriented Technology and Related Techniques Supplement to DO-178C and DO-278A, 12-13-11](#)
- [DO-333, Formal Methods Supplement to DO-178C and DO-278A, 12-13-11](#)

### SAE:

SAE [AS5506](#), *Architecture Analysis & Design Language (AADL)*, is used primarily now in the aviation domain to do virtual integration of the software and hardware, to verify various requirements, and to automate the integration of the computer system architecture to the verified system model. As a result, adherence to the standard provides a higher level of assurance of correctness. It is being used by several DARPA programs to build highly trusted cyber secure systems, the HACMS and CASE programs, and it

will be required for development on a new family of Army helicopter systems. Its standard architecture specifications are rich in semantics for evaluating embedded real time systems and could be of value through analysis to various certification agencies. However, its use is not standard practice in the industry yet.

- [AS-4UCS Unmanned Systems Control Segment Architecture](#)
  - [AIR6514, UxS Control Segment \(UCS\) Architecture: Interface Control Document \(ICD\)](#)
  - [AS6518, Unmanned Systems \(UxS\) Control Segment \(UCS\) Architecture: UCS Architecture Model](#)
  - [AS6522, Unmanned Systems \(UxS\) Control Segment \(UCS\) Architecture: Architecture Technical Governance](#)
  
- [E-32 Aerospace Propulsion Systems Health Management Committee](#)
  - [\(29 documents as of March 2020\)](#)
  
- [E-36 Electronic Engine Controls Committee](#)  
[For example: AIR4250C, Electronic Engine Control Specifications and Standards](#)
  
- [HM-1 Integrated Vehicle Health Management Committee](#)
  
- [SAE S-18, Aircraft and Sys Dev and Safety Assessment Committee](#)
  - [ARP4754A, Guidelines for Development of Civil Aircraft and Systems](#)
  - [ARP4761, Guidelines And Methods For Conducting The Safety Assessment Process On Civil Airborne Systems And Equipment](#)
  - [AIR6219, Development of Atmospheric Neutron Single Event Effects Analysis for Use in Safety Assessments](#)
  - [ARP5150A, Safety Assessment of Transport Airplanes in Commercial Service](#)
  - [ARP5151A, Safety Assessment of General Aviation Airplanes and Rotorcraft in Commercial Service](#)
  - [AIR6110, Contiguous Aircraft/System Development Process Example](#)
  - [AIR6218, Constructing Development Assurance Plan for Integrated Systems](#)

#### SAE ITC:

- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 613, Guidance for Using the Ada Programming Language in Avionics Systems
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 614, Standard Firmware Loader for Avionics Shops
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 641, Logical Software Part Packaging for Transport
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 645, Common Terminology and Functions for Software Distribution and Loading
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 652, Guidance for Avionics Software Management
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 666, Electronic Distribution of Software
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 827, Electronic Distribution of Software by Crate (EDS Crate)
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 838, Loadable Software Part Definition Format

- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 615-3, Airborne Computer High Speed Data Loader
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 615-4, Airborne Computer High Speed Data Loader
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 615A-3, Software Data Loader Using Ethernet Interface
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 627-2, Programmers Guide for SMART TM Systems Using ARINC 626 ATLAS
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 653P0-2, Avionics Application Software Standard Interface, Part 0, Overview of ARINC 653
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 653P3A-1c1, Avionics Application Software Standard Interface, Part 3A, Conformity Test Specifications for ARINC 653 Required Services
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 653P3Bc1, Avionics Application Software Standard Interface, Part 3B, Conformity Test Specifications for ARINC 653 Extended Services
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 653P4, Avionics Application Software Standard Interface, Part 4, Subset Services
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 653P5-1, Avionics Application Software Standard Interface, Part 5, Core Software Recommended Capabilities
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 665-5, Loadable Software Standards
- SAE-ITC [ARINC IA 667-2, Guidance for the Management of Field Loadable Software](#), 7-1-17
- SAE-ITC [ARINC IA 675, Guidance for the Management of Aircraft Support Data](#), 6-26-17
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 763A Mark 2, Network Server System (NSS) Form and Fit Definition
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 814 -1, Extensible Markup Language (XML) Encoding and Compression Standard
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 826-1, Software Data Loader Using CAN Interface
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 827-1D1, Electronic Distribution of Software by Craft (EDS Crate)
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 843-1, Aircraft Software Common Configuration Reporting
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 851D1, Common Software Ground Systems for e-Enabled Aircraft
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA/AEEC, Aeronautical Databases (ADB) Subcommittee
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA/AEEC, Avionics Application/Executive (APEX) Software Subcommittee
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA/AEEC, Navigation Data Base (NDB) Subcommittee
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA/AEEC, Software Distribution and Loading (SDL) Subcommittee
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA/AMC, Electronic Distribution of Software (EDS) Working Group

DOD:

- MIL-HDBK-516C, Section 15
- MIL-STD-882E, *System Safety Standard Practice, Appendix-B: Software System Safety Engineering and Analysis*, 5-11-12
- DOD-STD-2168, *Defense System Software Quality Program*
- MIL-S-52779, *Software Quality Assurance Program Requirements*

ISO:

- [ISO/IEC/IEEE 90003:2018, Software engineering – Guidelines for the application of ISO 9001:2015 to computer software](#)

#### CMMI Institute:

- Capability Maturity Model Integration (CMMI) software development process standard

#### **In-Development Standards and Related Materials:**

#### RTCA SC-240/EUROCAE WG-117, Topics on Software Advancement<sup>22</sup>:

- DO-xx/ED-xx, Process Standard for Software Considerations in Low Risk Applications, Equipment Certifications and Approvals, expected June 2021
- DO-xx/ED-xx, Process Standard for the Integration of COTS, Open Source and Service History into Software, expected September 2021.

#### ASTM:

- [ASTM WK65056, Revision of F3269 - 17 Standard Practice for Methods to Safely Bound Flight Behavior of Unmanned Aircraft Systems Containing Complex Functions](#)
- [ASTM WK68098, Standard Practice for Ensuring Dependability of Software Used in Unmanned Aircraft Systems \(UAS\)](#), is a work item revision to existing standard F3201-16.

#### SAE:

#### G-31 Electronic Transactions for Aerospace Committee

- [AIR7501, Digital Data Standards in Aircraft Life Cycle](#)
- [ARP6823, Electronic Transactions for Aerospace Systems; An Overview](#)
- [ARP6984, Determination of Cost Benefits from Implementing a Blockchain Solution](#)

#### G-32 Cyber Physical Systems Security Committee

- [JA6678, Cyber Physical Systems Security Software Assurance](#)
- [JA7496, Cyber Physical Systems Security Engineering Plan \(CPSSEP\)](#)

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<sup>22</sup> Per EUROCAE, while the certified UAS category is aligned with the ED-12C / DO-178C document suite for development, and the open category does not have a software development standard needed for use and deployment, the specific category does not currently have a comprehensive compliant development standard identified to provide assurance as to the safe operations of the UAS. The continued release of information on UAS development and UAS operations by EASA provides a need but also an opportunity for a new software development process standard that will be specific to low risk UAS applications and the specific category defined by EASA. Moreover, it is considered that certain applications, e.g., by the general aviation (GA) community, might benefit from a simplified software development methodology.

In addition, the FAS Ad Hoc UAS report recommended the creation of supplemental guidance in the areas of COTS, Open Source and Service History, which could be used as well by other stakeholders performing low-risk operations. EUROCAE WG-117 and RTCA SC-240 will work jointly on this.

#### G-34, Artificial Intelligence in Aviation

- [AS6983, Process Standard for Development and Certification/Approval of Aeronautical Safety-Related Products Implementing AI](#)
- [AIR6987, Artificial Intelligence in Aeronautical Systems: Taxonomy](#)
- [AIR6988, Artificial Intelligence in Aeronautical Systems: Statement of Concerns](#)

#### S-18UAS Autonomy Working Group

- [AIR7121, Applicability of Existing Development Assurance and System Safety Practices to Unmanned Aircraft Systems](#)

#### S-18 Aircraft and Sys Dev and Safety Assessment Committee

- [AS7209, Development Assurance Objectives for Aerospace Vehicles and Systems](#)
- ARP4761A Guidelines and Methods for Conducting the Safety Assessment Process on Civil Airborne Systems and Equipment
- ARP4754B Guidelines for Development of Civil Aircraft and Systems
- AIR6913 Using STPA During Development and Safety Assessment of Civil Aircraft
- AIR6276 USE OF MODELING AND TOOLS FOR AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENT – A STRATEGY FOR DEVELOPMENT ASSURANCE ASPECTS WITH EXAMPLES

#### APMC Avionics Process Management

#### HM-1 Integrated Vehicle Health Management Committee:

- [AIR6900, Applicable Integrated Vehicle Health Monitoring \(IVHM\) Regulations, Policy, and Guidance Documents](#)
- [AIR6904, Data Interoperability for IVHM](#)
- [AIR6915, Implementation of IVHM, Human Factors and Safety Implications](#)
- [AIR8012, Prognostics and Health Management Guidelines for Electro-Mechanical Actuators](#)
- [ARP6290, Guidelines for the Development of Architectures for IVHM Systems](#)
- [ARP6407, Integrated Vehicle Health Management Design Guidelines](#)
- [ARP6883, Guidelines for writing IVHM requirements for aerospace systems](#)
- [ARP6887, Verification & Validation of IVHM Systems and Software](#)

**Gap A10: Software Considerations and Approval.** Standards are needed to address software considerations for UAS operations outside of Part 107, control stations, flight control, navigation elements, associated equipment, and support services in the cloud. The majority of the current resources from manned aviation (standards, regulations, ACs, orders, etc.) are targeted at traditional aircraft and do not address the system of systems engineering used in UAS operations comprising man, machine, the NAS, and integration. UAS standards related to software dependability must properly account for all the unknown risks and potential safety issues (e.g., DAA, cybersecurity) during the software design, development, and assurance processes.

**R&D Needed:** Yes, on assurance methods

**Recommendation:**

- 1) Complete in-development standards work of SAE.
- 2) Develop standards to address software dependability for UAS operating outside of Part 107, control stations, flight control, navigation elements, associated equipment, and support services in the cloud.

**Priority:** High (Tier 1)

**Organization(s):** ASTM, EUROCAE, RTCA, SAE

**Status of Progress:** Green

**Update:**

- RTCA DO-178, DO-278
- RTCA SC-240/EUROCAE WG-117 for UAS and COTS
- SAE A-6A3
- SAE G-32: JA6678, JA7496
- SAE G-34: AS6983, AIR6987, AIR6988
- SAE S18 UAS Autonomy WG/EUROCAE WG-63
- ASTM WK65056, WK68098

### 6.4.5. Flight Data and Voice Recorders for UAS

A flight data recorder (FDR) is a device or devices that uses a combination of data providers to collect and record parameters that reflect the state and performance of an aircraft. A Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) is a device that uses a combination of microphones and other audio and digital inputs to collect and record the aural environment of the cockpit and communications to, from, and between the flight crew members.

FDR, sometimes referred to as the “black boxes,” are a critical piece of safety avionics that are used in the event of a crash, major system failure, and/or other catastrophic event to investigate the root cause of an event. FDR include recordings of voice, data link, and other aircraft data. Many modern FDRs also record Data Link Communications (DLC) Flight Crew Machine Interface Recordings (FCMIR) and voice recordings. Devices that record FDR and CVR data are sometime referred to as a “Combi.” The objective is met by complying with the FDR requirements found in 14 CFR Parts 23, 25, 27, 29, 91, 121, 125, 129, and 135.

A CVR system records the aural environment of the cockpit and communications to, from, and between flightcrew members, as well as Air Traffic Control (ATC). In some cases, the CVR records DLC (ATC to pilot text-based messages) to assist in the investigation of accidents and incidents. The objective is met by complying with the CVR requirements found in 14 CFR Parts 23, 25, 27, 29, 91, 121, 125, 129, and 135.

There are a number of aspects unique to the UAS environment. For example, in the UAS context, flight / telemetry data is available on the control station, there is a data link, etc. In addition to the installation of a FDR or CVR on a UA, there may be operational requirements that may necessitate the installation of other investigative technologies, such as a CVR on or in the CS, or an Electronic Locator Transmitter (ELT) on a UAS carrying passengers.

**Published Regulations, Standards, and Other Documentation for Manned Aviation:** The following is a list of Laws, Regulations, Performance Standards and supporting documents related to Investigative Technology systems:

For FDRs and CVRs:

- 49 USC 1114 Disclosure Availability and Use of Info
- 14 CFR 23.1457 CVR
- 14 CFR 23.1459 FDR
- 14 CFR 25.1457 CVR
- 14 CFR 25.1459 FDR
- 14 CFR 27.1457 CVR
- 14 CFR 27.1459 FDR
- 14 CFR 29.1457 CVR
- 14 CFR 29.1459 FDR
- 14 CFR 91.1045 Additional Equip Rqmts
- 14 CFR 91.609 FDR and CVR
- 14CFR 121.343 Flt Data Recorders
- 14CFR 121.344 DFDR Transport Category
- 14 CFR 121.344a Digital FDRs for 10-19 seats
- 14 CFR 121.346 FDR Filtered
- 14 CFR 121.359 CVR
- 14 CFR 125.225 FDR
- 14 CFR 125.226 DFDR
- 14 CFR 125.227 CVR
- 14 CFR 125.228 FDR Filtered
- 14 CFR 129.20 DFDR
- 14 CFR 129.24 CVR
- 14 CFR 135.151 CVR
- 14 CFR 135.152 FDR
- 14 CFR 135.156 FDR Filtered
- 14 CFR 135.607 Flight Data Monitoring System
- EUROCAE ED-112A 2013 09 01 MOPS for Crash Protected Airborne Recorder Systems
- EUROCAE ED-155 2009 07 01 MOPS for Light Weight Flt Recording Systems
- FAA TSO-C123c 2013 12 19 Cockpit Voice Recorder Equipment
- FAA TSO-C124c 2013 12 19 Flight Data Recorder Equipment



- FAA TSO-C176a 2013 12 19 Cockpit Image Recorder Equipment FAA AC 20-141B 2010 08 17 Airworthiness and Operational Approval of Digital Flight Data Recorder Systems
- FAA AC 20-160A 2016 09 28 Onboard Recording of CPDLC in CVR

For ELTs:

- 47 CFR 2.911-2.926 FCC ELT Labeling Rqmts
- 47 CFR 87.001-525 Aviation Services
- 47 CFR 87.131-199 Aviation Services Tech Rqmts
- 47 CFR 87.185-199 ELTs
- 49 USC 44712 Emergency Locator Transmitters
- 14 CFR 25.1415 Ditching Equipment ELT Rqmt
- 14 CFR 25.1535 ETOPS Approval
- 14 CFR 27.1415 Ditching Equipment ELT Rqmt
- 14 CFR 29.1415 Ditching Equipment ELT Rqmt
- 14 CFR 91.205 ELT Equip Rqmts
- 14 CFR 91.207 ELT
- 14 CFR 91.509 Survival Equip for Over Water Ops
- 14 CFR 91.1029 Flight scheduling and locating requirements
- 14 CFR 121.339 Emerg equip for extended over water ops
- 14 CFR 121.353 Over Uninhabited Areas Comm Carriers
- 14 CFR 125.209 ETOPS
- 14 CFR 135.167 ETOPS
- 14 CFR 135.168 Helo ETOPS
- 14 CFR 135.419 Approved Acft Insp Program
- 14 CFR 135.421 Use of Mfg Mx Program
- FAA Aeronautical Information Manual (AIM)
- RTCA DO-204B MOPS for Acft ELTs
- EUROCAE ED-62B MOPS for Acft ELTs
  - Note DO-204B and ED-62B are harmonized documents
- FAA TSO-C126c 2019 03 07 406 MHz ELTs
- FAA AC 91-44A Chg1 Install and Insp Procedures for ELTs

EUROCAE ED-112a and other noteworthy documents:

- The primary international standard for manned aircraft voice and data recorders is EUROCAE ED-112A, MOPS for Crash Protected Airborne Recorder Systems (CPARS), dated Sept 2013. This document is cited in the U.S. by FAA documents:
  - Technical Standard Order TSO-C123c (Cockpit Voice Recorder Equipment, dated Dec 2013)
  - Technical Standard Order TSO-C124c (Flight Data Recorder Equipment, Dec 2013)
  - Advisory Circular AC 20-186 (Airworthiness and Operational Approval of Cockpit Voice Recorder 16 Systems, July 2016)

- AC 20-160A (Onboard Recording of Controller Pilot Data Link Communication (CPDLC) in Crash Survivable Memory, Aug 2016).
- Additionally, AC-20-141B (Airworthiness and Operational Approval of Digital Flight Data Recorder Systems, Aug 2010) and EUROCAE ED-155, MOPS for Lightweight Flight Recording Systems (July 2009) are referenced in ED-112A.
  - EUROCAE ED-155 may be more applicable for some classes of UAS, but still shares some deficiencies with ED-112A described below.

By way of further analysis, EUROCAE ED-112A describes:

- A minimum size for the CPARS, such that it can be located in a crash site, that is inconsistent with the size and weight of many classes of UAS (i.e., too large/heavy to be feasibly carried), and unnecessary due to the reduced size of wreckage that would be caused by many classes of UAS.
- ED-112A recommends redundancy FDR and CVR systems (cockpit and aft) in CPARS that may not be necessary for many classes of UAS.
- ED-112A requires certain environmental testing for penetration, shock, shear force, tensile force, crush, and others that are unnecessary and inconsistent with the scenarios many classes of UAS will experience in the event of a catastrophic crash (e.g., 6000lbs of shear force; immersion testing of fluids not present on board a UAS (e.g., formaldehyde-based toilet fluids)).
- None of the above referenced standards capture the unique, distributed nature of UAS operations, given that some data will exist on board the aircraft and some will reside in the CS. This suggests that a crash protected recorder system CPARS for a UAS should reside on the aircraft, and a non-crash-protected data recorder system should reside in the CS. An example of this is CVR may be needed in the CS, and not crash protected or installed on the UAS.
- CPDLC may apply to some classes of UAS, particularly large UAS flying in oceanic airspace, but is unnecessary for many classes of UAS.
- MOPS should explicitly state CAA equipage requirements for UAS based on size, weight, CONOPS, airspace access, and/or an ORA or authorized use such as under Part 121 of 14 CFR.

SAE International Standards:

- [SAE AS8039A, Minimum Performance Standard General Aviation Flight Recorder](#), is a performance standard for general aviation flight recorders. It does not prescribe weight or size limits. The standard defines three basic types of flight recorders: voice recorder, flight data recorder, and voice/flight data recorder combination. It specifies requirements for all recorder types except where noted. It covers fixed wing and rotorcraft, ejectable and nonejectable recorders. SAE AS8039 is due for review/revision, which offers an opportunity to make this standard applicable to UAS. Topics covered include:
  - General Requirements
  - Design Considerations

- Minimum Performance Standards in Ambient Environment
- Minimum Performance Standards in Severe Environments
- Crash Survivability

There also exists the three-part J1698 series of standards used on ground vehicles:

- [SAE J1698 201703, Event Data Recorder](#), published 2017-03-17

#### SAE ARINC standards:

- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 591, Quick Access Recorder for AIDS System (QAR)
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 655, Remote Data Concentrator (RDC) Generic Description
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 657, Airborne Recorder File Format
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 817, Avionics Digital Video Bus, Low Data Rate - Uncompressed
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 852, Guidance for Security Event Logging in an IP Environment
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 573-7, Aircraft Integrated Data System Mark 2 (AIDS Mark 2)
- [SAE-ITC ARINC IA 647A-1, Flight Recorder Electronic Documentation \(FRED\)](#), published 2009-07-01
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 681D3, Timely Recovery of Flight Data (TRFD)
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 717-15, Flight Data Acquisition and Recording System
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 747-3, Flight Data Recorder
- [SAE-ITC ARINC IA 757-6, Cockpit Voice Recorder \(CVR\)](#), published 2015-08-01
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 757A-1, Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR)
- [SAE-ITC ARINC IA 767-1, Enhanced Airborne Flight Recorder](#), published 2017-05-29
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA/AEEC, Global Aircraft Tracking (GAT) / Timely Recovery of Flight Data (TRFD) Working Group

**Published Regulations, Standards, and Other Documentation for UAS:** The only documents identified in the UAS operational context are:

- TSO-C213, Unmanned Aircraft Systems Control and Non-Payload Communications Terrestrial Link System Radios
- [ASTM F3228-17, Standard Specification for Flight Data and Voice Recording in Small Aircraft](#)
- [ASTM F3298-19, Standard Specification for Design, Construction, and Verification of Lightweight Unmanned Aircraft Systems \(UAS\)](#), which includes a basic overview of a digital flight data recorder system for lightweight UAS. The standard calls for the equipage of a digital flight recorder system but fails to specify performance criteria or metrics by which such a system should be evaluated or certified. For example, ED-112A provides specific test metrics that a digital flight data recorder system can be evaluated on for crash survivability. Additionally, F3298-19 does not include the recording of voice communication between a remote pilot and (a) additional crew members (e.g., a sensor operator), or (b) ATC or other air navigation service provider (ANSP) personnel.
- [NATO STANAG 4671, UAS Systems Airworthiness Requirements \(USAR\)](#)

- NATO STANAG 4703 Light Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Airworthiness Requirements (AEP-83)

**In-Development Standards:**

- [ASTM WK62670, New Specification for Large UAS Design and Construction](#)
- EUROCAE WG-118, Crash-protected and Lightweight Flight Recorders. This WG shall maintain and enhance the MOPS for airborne flight recorders mandated by operational regulations and ICAO Annex 6 requirements aiming to provide the necessary data for accident investigation and prevention. The WG will develop ED-112B, MOPS for Crash Protected Airborne Recorder Systems, expected mid-2022.

**Gap A11: Flight Data and Voice Recorders for UAS.** Standards are needed for crash protected voice and data recorder systems for UAS.

**R&D Needed:** Yes. Research should be conducted to determine the proper:

- 1) Size requirements, based on the class of UAS, class of airspace, performance characteristics of the aircraft, and other relevant factors.
- 2) Test procedures for crash survival based on the class of UAS and performance characteristics, including, but not limited to: impact shock, shear and tensile force, penetration resistance, static crush, high temperature fire, low temperature fire, deep sea pressure and water immersion, and fluid immersion.
- 3) Method(s) for recording data both on the aircraft and in the CS.
- 4) Minimum data that must be captured (dependent on UAS size and criticality of operation).

**Recommendation:** Revise an existing standard and/or draft a new standard, similar to ED-112A, for a voice and data recorder systems for UAS.

**Priority:** Medium

**Organization(s):** SAE, RTCA, ASTM, IEEE, EUROCAE

**Status of Progress:** Green

**Update:** EUROCAE WG-118: ED-112B

### 6.4.6. Cybersecurity

Cybersecurity is a critical safety concern that must be addressed in the design, construction, and operation of UAS. It is being addressed by various groups as noted below.

The ICAO Working Group on Airworthiness is focused on four primary areas of airworthiness:

- Initial design considerations (i.e., secure-by-design)

- Cybersecurity in production considerations
- Modifications to in-service aircraft
- Aircraft maintenance (with a specific focus on field-loadable software).

RPAS are also within the scope of work, including the C2 link between the CS and the aircraft. The scope of work may change and be reconsidered as the cyber threat landscape continues to evolve.

The ICAO Working Group on Current and Future Air Navigation Systems is focused on (among other areas):

- Airport interactions with air navigation systems
- Initial ATM system design considerations (i.e., secure-by-design)
- Modifications to in-service ATM systems
- ATM system maintenance (with a specific focus on remote maintenance or administration)
- System-wide information management (SWIM) global interoperability
- Air-ground, air-air, and ground-ground links through all appropriate connection means

The scope of work may change and be reconsidered as the cyber threat landscape continues to evolve.

JARUS is currently working on an addendum to the Specific Operations Risk Assessment that augments existing guidance on Operational Safety Objectives and Mitigations to provide appropriate, risk-proportionate cyber safety requirements for various levels of robustness. This work is focused on cyber threats to flight safety and thus is not directly addressing threats to data security and loss of personal identifying information.

RTCA SC216 is also addressing cybersecurity as well as air navigation systems as further described below.

The Aerospace Industries Association (AIA) National Aerospace Standards is currently writing a UAS Cybersecurity standard that will focus on data privacy and ownership for “high” category users such as the federal government. In order to accomplish this task, AIA set up a working group within its Emerging Technology Committee which is made up of AIA members, subject matter experts and federal government partners to write a performance based standard that will ensure that sensitive location, video and other forms of data is both protected and secure.

The SAE International [G-32 Cyber Physical Systems Security Committee](#) is developing technical reports (Standards, Recommended Practices and Information Reports) covering a systems engineering approach to cyber physical systems security that includes analysis of the system operating environment defined by the operational, functional, and architectural systems engineering elements.

#### **Published Regulations, Standards, and Other Documents:**

FAA:

- [14 CFR §107 Operation small Unmanned Aircraft systems](#)

- [14 CFR §107.51, Operating limitations for small unmanned aircraft](#)
- [TSO-C213, Unmanned Aircraft Systems Control and Non-Payload Communications Terrestrial Link System Radios, September 3, 2018](#)
- [TSO-C213, Air Traffic Control Radar Beacon System/Mode Select \(ATCRBS/Mode S\) Airborne Equipment, September 16, 2013](#)
- TSO-C154c, Universal Access Transceiver (UAT) Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) Equipment, December 2, 2009
- TSO-C166b, Extended Squitter Automatic Dependent Surveillance - Broadcast (ADS-B) and Traffic Information, December 2, 2009
- TSO-C195b, Avionics Supporting Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Broadcast (ADS-B) Aircraft Surveillance, September 29, 2014
- [Advisory Circular, AC 107-2, Small UAS \(sUAS\), 6/21/2016](#)
- [UAS Traffic Management \(UTM\) Concept of Operations, FAA v2, March 2, 2020](#)
- [Advisory Circular, AC 20-170, Integrated Modular Avionics Development, Verification, Integration, and Approval Using RTCA DO-297 and Technical Standard Order-C153, November 21, 2013](#)

RTCA:

- [RTCA DO-178C, Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment Certification](#)
- [RTCA DO-254, Design Assurance Guidance for Airborne Electronic Hardware \(AEH\)](#)
- [RTCA DO-326, Airworthiness Security Process Specification](#)
- [RTCA DO-355, Information Security Guidance for Continued Airworthiness](#)
- [RTCA DO-356, Airworthiness Security Methods and Considerations](#)
- [RTCA DO-362, with Errata - Command and Control \(C2\) Data Link Minimum Operational Performance Standards \(MOPS\) \(Terrestrial\), September 22, 2016](#)

ASTM:

- [ASTM F3002-14a, Standard Specification for Design of the Command and Control System for Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems \(sUAS\)](#)
- [ASTM F3411-19, Standard Specification for Remote ID and Tracking](#), published February 2020.  
**(New)**

SAE:

- [SAE AS6969, Data Dictionary for Quantities Used in Cyber Physical Systems](#)
- [SAE J3061 201601, Cybersecurity Guidebook for Cyber-Physical Vehicle Systems](#)

SAE ITC:

- [ARINC IA 811, Commercial Aircraft Information Security Concepts of Operation and Process Framework](#)
- [ARINC IA 852, Guidance for Security Event Logging in an IP Environment](#)
- [ARINC IA 686D7, Roadmap for IPv6 Transition in Aviation](#)
- [ARINC 823P1, DataLink Security, Part 1 - ACARS Message Security](#)
- [ARINC 823P2, DataLink Security, Part 2 - Key Management](#)

- [ARINC 835-1, Guidance for Security of Loadable Software Parts Using Digital Signatures](#)
- [ARINC 842-2, Guidance for Usage of Digital Certificates](#)
- [ARINC 852, Guidance for Security Event Logging in an IP Environment](#)
- ARINC IA/AEEC, Internet Protocol Suite (IPS) for Aeronautical Safety Services
- ARINC IA/AEEC, Software Distribution and Loading (SDL) Subcommittee
- ARINC IA/AMC, Electronic Distribution of Software (EDS) Working Group

#### DOD:

- DOD Policy Memorandum 15-002, Guidance for the Domestic Use of Unmanned Aircraft Systems, February 17, 2015
- [DOD Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap 2017-2042](#)
- DOD-NATO, STANAG 4671, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Systems Airworthiness Requirements
- [DOD-NATO, STANAG 4702, Rotary Wing Unmanned Aircraft Systems Airworthiness Requirements](#)
- [DOD-NATO, STANAG 4703, Light Unmanned Aircraft Systems Airworthiness Requirements](#)
- [07-1-003 Unmanned Aircraft Systems \(UAS\) Sensor and Targeting, July 27, 2010](#)
- [DOD-NATO, Guidance For The Training Of Unmanned Aircraft Systems \(UAS\) Operators, April 22, 2014](#)
- [07-2-032 Unmanned Aircraft Systems \(UAS\) Navigation System Test, US Army, July 27, 2010](#)
- [DOD-NATO, Interoperable Command And Control Data Link For Unmanned Systems \(IC2DL\) – Operational Physical Layer / Signal In Space Description, November 14, 2016](#)

#### NASA:

- [Small Unmanned Aircraft Electromagnetic Interference \(EMI\) Initial Assessment, Jung, Jaewoo, et al., ICNS 2018, April 10-12, 2018](#)

#### NIST:

- [NIST 800-53, Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations](#)
- [NIST Cybersecurity \(CSF\), Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity](#)
- FIPS 140-3 Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules

#### ISO:

- [ISO 80001, Application of risk management for IT-networks incorporating medical devices](#)

#### International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC):

- IEC 62443, Industrial Automation and Control Systems Security

#### UL:

- [UL 2900-1, Software Cybersecurity for Network Connectable Products, Part 1: General Requirements](#)

## **In-Development Standards and Other Documents:**

### ICAO:

- Annex 6 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation – Part IV – International Operations – RPAS
- Annex 8 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation – Airworthiness of Aircraft
- Annex 10 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation – Volume IV, Part II – Detect and Avoid Systems
- Annex 11 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation – Air Traffic Services
- Annex 19 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation – Safety Management
- Manual on RPAS (Doc 10019)
- Procedures for Air Navigation Services – Air Traffic Management (Doc 4444)
- Procedures for Air Navigation Services – Aircraft Operations – Vol I – Flight Procedures (Doc 8168)

JARUS: As noted above, work is underway on a cyber SORA.

### DOD:

- [DOD Unmanned Aircraft Systems \(UAS\) Airspace Integration, May 28, 2014](#)
- *Systems Engineering of SAA Systems, US Army Unmanned Aircraft Systems*, US Army Unmanned Aircraft Systems Common Systems Integration Product Office, Hendrickson, A., 2015b
- DOD-NATO Standard, AEP-80, Rotary Wing Unmanned Aerial Systems Airworthiness Requirements, 2014

AIA: As noted above.

### ASTM:

- [ASTM WK49440, Revision of F3002 - 14a Standard Specification for Design of the Command and Control System for Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems \(sUAS\)](#)
- [ASTM WK65041, New Practice for UAS Remote ID and Tracking](#)
- [ASTM WK56374, New Practice for Aircraft Systems Information Security Protection](#)

### CTA:

- ANSI/CTA-2088.1 *Baseline Cybersecurity Standard for Small Unmanned Aerial Systems*, being developed by CTA R14 WG3

### IETF

- [Secure UAS Network RID and C2 Transport](#)
- [UAS Remote ID](#)
- [Trusted Execution Environment Provisioning \(TEEP\) Architecture](#)
- [Trusted Execution Environment Provisioning \(TEEP\) Protocol](#)



SAE International:

- JA6678, *Cyber Physical Systems Security Software Assurance*
- [AS6983](#), *Process Standard for Qualification of Aeronautical Systems Implementing AI: Development Standard*
- [AIR7121](#), *Applicability of Existing Development Assurance and System Safety Practices to Unmanned Aircraft Systems*
- [JA7496](#), *Cyber Physical Systems Security Engineering Plan (CPSSEP)*
- [SAE Committee G-32](#) is working on a software security standard targeted for completion within two years.

**Gap A12: UAS Cybersecurity.** Cybersecurity needs to be considered in all phases of UAS design, construction, operation, maintenance, training of personnel (pilots, crews, others), including cloud based functions.

**R&D Needed:** Yes

**Recommendation:** Since there exists such a wide spectrum in UAS designs, CONOPS, and operator capabilities, a risk-based process during which appropriate cybersecurity measures are identified is recommended. Explicitly address the need for & efforts directed at assessing/ensuring trustworthiness, esp. of safety critical information & systems that move, store & process it. Explicitly address the need for crypto techniques supporting authenticity, integrity, confidentiality, privacy, etc. & efforts to apply them to UAS.

**Priority:** High (Tier 1)

**Organization(s):** RTCA, EUROCAE, SAE, ASTM, JARUS, AIA, IETF, ICAO IATF

**Status of Progress:** Green

**Update:**

- RTCA SC-216/EUROCAE WG-72 Aeronautical Systems Security
- SAE G-32 (with participation from WG-72, S-18/WG-63, S-18UAS Autonomy WG/WG-63, and G-34): Cyber Physical Systems Security Committee: JA6678, JA7496, JA6801
- ASTM WK56374
- IETF

## 6.5. Electrical Systems

The satisfactory performance of any modern aircraft depends to a high degree on the continuing reliability of electrical systems and subsystems. Improperly or carelessly installed or maintained wiring can be a source of both immediate and potential danger. The continued proper performance of electrical systems including but not limited to wiring, electrical load analysis, etc., depends on the

knowledge and technique of the mechanic who installs, inspects, and maintains the electrical system's wires and cables. Regardless of whether an aircraft is manned or unmanned, important electrical considerations still apply. Therefore, existing best practices and electromagnetic interference testing can be used. Aircraft light colors have also been standardized and are well understood for operation in the NAS. For UAS, the industry is trending toward using higher voltages. For UAM designs that require an electrical wiring interconnection system (EWIS) at  $\geq 600$  V and frequencies exceeding 400 Hz follow recommended guidelines for life testing under operating conditions. A reference document, [AIR7506 - Impact of High Voltage on Wiring](#), is under development by the SAE AE-8D committee. Moreover, SAE AE-8A committee's [AIR6982, Arc Damage Assessment of Arc Plume and Physical Damage](#) allows for the assessment of the damage zone of arc plasma to determine appropriate separation/segregation requirements between an EWIS component and components/structures nearby. Given the criticality of wiring integrity and safety over time, SAE created a dedicated Working Group on "Thermal and Electric Multifunction Insulation Aging Model" to address aging mechanisms of high voltage insulation used in EWIS and other conducting components on board. Most importantly, establishing lifetime models and testing needs pertaining to insulation aging is part of this group's premise. An entry point for high voltage considerations is [AIR6127, Managing Higher Voltages in Aerospace Electrical Systems](#), developed by SAE AE-7C, and the committee has launched other high voltage documents listed below.

**Published Regulations, Standards, and Related Materials:** Additional standards can be found in the [UASSC Reference Document](#).

As noted below, there are few published electrical system standards specific to UAS. The UAS industry has been using existing manned aviation standards and applicable TSOs and regulations for UAS approvals including but not limited to certificates of authorization, section 44807 exemptions, Part 107 waivers, etc., due to a lack of UAS-specific industry standards. Currently, there are no aviation standards for control stations in the areas of electrical systems, wiring, electrical load analysis, lighting, etc.

Published standards, as well as U.S. Federal government and inter-governmental materials relevant to this issue, include but are not limited to those listed below.

#### FAA Regulations/Documents:

The following FAA TSOs may contain companion industry standards:

- TSO-C16b, Electrically Heated Pitot and Pitot-Static Tubes, 1/27/2017
- TSO-C20A-1, Amendment-1, Combustion Heaters, 4/16/1951
- TSO-C20a, Combustion Heaters and Accessories, 1/12/2017
- TSO-C30c, Aircraft Position Lights, 5/12/1989
- TSO-C49b, Electric Tachometer: Magnetic Drag (Indicator and Generator), 5/30/1995
- TSO-C56b, Engine Driven Direct Current Generator / Starter Generators, 6/1/2006
- TSO-C59b, Airborne Selective Calling (SELCAL) Equipment, 6/27/2016
- TSO-C71, Airborne Static ("DC TO DC") Electrical Power Converter (For Air Carrier Aircraft), 6/15/1961
- TSO-C73, Static Electrical Power Inverter, 12/18/1963

- TSO-C77b, Gas Turbine Auxiliary Power Units, 12/20/2000
- TSO-C85b, Survivor Locator Lights, 10/22/2007
- TSO-C88b, Automatic Pressure Altitude Reporting Code-Generating Equipment, 2/6/2007
- TSO-C96a, Anticollision Light Systems, 4/7/1989
- TSO-C104, Microwave Landing System (MLS) Airborne Receiving Equipment, 6/22/1982
- TSO-C141, Aircraft Fluorescent Lighting Ballast/Fixture Equipment, 8/17/1999
- TSO-C142a, Non-Rechargeable Lithium Cells and Batteries, 8/7/2006
- TSO-C142b, Non-Rechargeable Lithium Cells and Batteries, 3/26/2018
- TSO-C178, Single Phase 115 VAC, 400 Hz Arc Fault Circuit Breakers, 3/3/2006
- TSO-C179a, Permanently Installed Rechargeable Lithium Cells, Batteries and Battery Systems, 4/19/2011
- TSO-C179b, Rechargeable Lithium Batteries and Battery Systems, 3/23/2018
- TSO-C184, Airplane Galley Insert Equipment, Electrical/Pressurized, 9/30/2011
- DOT/FAA/TC-13/19 Solid-State Secondary Power Distribution

#### Aircraft Electrical Load Analysis and Power Source Capacity:

- AC 21-99, Aircraft wiring and bonding
- AC 91.U-04, Airworthiness requirements for performance based navigation
- 71 FR 12771, Volume 71 US Federal Register page 12771 - Aircraft Electrical Load and Power Source Capacity Analysis
- AC 43.13-1B, Acceptable Methods, Techniques, and Practices - Aircraft Inspection and Repair
- AC 43.13-2B, Acceptable Methods, Techniques, and Practices – Aircraft Alterations
- AC 21-16G, RTCA Document DO-160 versions D, E, F, and G, Environmental Conditions and Test Procedures for Airborne Equipment
- AC 23.1309-1E, System Safety Analysis and Assessment for Part 23 Airplanes
- AC 25-16, Electrical Fault and Fire Prevention and Protection
- AC 25.1309-1A, System Design and Analysis
- AC 20-184, Guidance on Testing and Installation of Rechargeable Lithium Battery and Battery Systems on Aircraft
- Other regulations, ACs, Orders, Policy Statements, and Special Conditions are at [FAA's Regulatory and Guidance Library website](#)

#### Aircraft Lighting Regulations:

- Regulations: §§23.2530, 25.812, 25.1381, 25.1383, 25.1385, 25.1387, 25.1389, 25.1391, 25.1393, 25.1395, 25.1397, 25.1399, 25.1401, 25.1403, 27.1381, 27.1383, 27.1385, 27.1387, 27.1389, 27.1391, 27.1393, 27.1395, 27.1397, 27.1399, 27.1401
- ACs: AC 25-17A, AC 25.812-1A, AC 25.812-2, AC 20-131A, AC 25-8, AC 25-12, AC 25-15, AC 25-23, AC 20-30B, AC 20-74, AC 25.1419-1A, AC 20-73A, AC 27-1B, AC 29-2C
- Policies: ANM-111-06-001, PS-ACE-100-2010-003, PS-ANM100-01-03A, PS-ANM111-1999-99-2

#### Electrical Systems:

- Regulations: §§23.2500, 23.2515, 23.2520, 23.2525, 25.581, 25.899, 25.1301, 25.1309, 25.1316, 25.1317, 25.1351, 25.1353, 25.1355, 25.1357, 25.1362, 25.1363, 25.1365, 25.1715, 26.11, 27.1301, 27.1309, 27.1316, 27.1317, 27.1351, 27.1353, 27.1357, 27.1361, 27.1365, 27.1367, and other Part 29 regulations
- ACs: AC 20-136B, AC 20-158A, AC 20-173, AC 25-11B, AC 25-8, AC 25-12, AC 25-15, AC 25-16, AC 25-21, AC 25-23, AC 25.981-1C, AC 20-131A, AC 25.672-1, AC 25.899-1, AC 25.1353-1A, AC 25.1357-1A, AC 1362-1, AC 25.1365-1, AC 25.1701-1, AC 27-1B, AC 29-2C
- Policies: ANM-111-05-004, AIR-100-12-110-001, PS-ANM100-1993-00054, AIR-100-12-110-001, AIR-100-2011-02-23, PS-ACE100-2010-001, ANM-01-04, ANM-01-111-165, PS-ANM100-2000-00105, PS-ANM100-2001-00113, PS-ANM100-2001-00114, PS-ANM-25-13, PS-AIR-100-May-4-2010 EAPAS FTS
- FAA Handbook, Chapter 9, Aircraft Electrical System

#### Electrical Wiring Interconnection System (EWIS):

- Regulations: §§25.1701, 25.1703, 25.1705, 25.1707, 25.1709, 25.1711, 25.1713, 25.1715, 25.1717, 25.1719, 25.1721, 25.1723, 25.1725, 25.1727, 25.1729, 25.1731, 25.1733, 26.11
- ACs: AC 25-27A, AC 26-1, AC 120-102A, AC 120-94, AC 25.1701-1, [FAA EWIS Job Aid](#)
- Policies: AIR-100-EWIS-4-6-10, ANM-08-113-001, PS-AIR-100-2007-12-27B, PS-AIR-100-May-4-2010 EAPAS FTS

#### ISO:

- [ISO 1540:2006, Aerospace - Characteristics of aircraft electrical systems](#)

#### DOD:

- [MIL-STD-461G, Department Of Defense Interface Standard: Requirements For The Control Of Electromagnetic Interference Characteristics Of Subsystems And Equipment \(11-Dec-2015\)](#)
- MIL-E-7016F, Analysis of Aircraft Electric Load and Power Source Capacity
- MIL-STD-704F, Aircraft Electric Power Characteristics, 2004
- MIL-STD-7080, Selection and Installation of Aircraft Electric Equipment
- JSSG-2009, DOD Joint Services Specification Guide, Air Vehicle Subsystems, 1998
- MIL-HDBK-516C, Sections 12 and 13
- STANAG 3456, Aircraft Electrical System Characteristics

#### AIAA:

- [Aircraft Electrical System](#)
- [Wiring: Design, Inspection, Maintenance](#)
- [Electrical wiring design](#)
- [EWIS](#)
- [Electric Propulsion Units](#)

## RTCA

- [DO-160G, Environmental Conditions and Test Procedures for Airborne Equipment](#)

## SAE:

### AE-7 Aerospace Electrical Power and Equipment Committee:

- [AS35091A, Receptacles, Electric, Aircraft Storage Battery](#)
- [AS81099A, Electric Devices, Simple, General Specification for](#)

### AE-7A Generators and Controls Motors and Magnetic Devices:

- [AIR34B, Penalties in Performance of Three-Phase, Four-Wire, 400-Cycle Motors Causes By the Opening of One Phase](#)
- [AIR857A, Speed Variation of D-C Motors](#)
- [ARP4255A, Electrical Actuation Systems for Aerospace and Other Applications](#)
- [ARP497B, Precision Control Motors - 400 Cycles](#)
- [ARP826A, Electrical Computing Resolvers](#)
- [AS20708C, Synchros, General Specification For](#)
- [AS8020, Minimum Performance Standards for Engine Driven D.C. Generators/Starter-Generators and Associated Voltage Regulators](#)

### SAE EUROCAE Fuel Cell Task Group

- [AIR6464, EUROCAE/SAE WG80/AE-7AFC Hydrogen Fuel Cells Aircraft Fuel Cell Safety Guidelines](#)
- [AIR7765, Considerations for Hydrogen Fuel Cells in Airborne Applications](#)
- [AS6858, Installation of Fuel Cell Systems in Large Civil Aircraft](#)

### AE-7B Power Management, Distribution and Storage:

- [AIR5561, Lithium Battery Powered Portable Electronic Devices](#)
- [AIR5709A, SAE AE-7 High Temperature Components Survey, 2005](#)
- [ARP5584, Document for Electric Power Management](#)
- [AS4805, Solid State Power Controller, General Standard For](#)
- [AS5625A, Minimum Performance Standards for Static Electric Power Frequency Converters](#)
- [AS6349, Minimum Performance Standard \(MPS\) for an Airborne AC to AC Converter](#)
- [AS8033, Nickel Cadmium Vented Rechargeable Aircraft Batteries \(Non-Sealed, Maintainable Type\)](#)

### AE-7C Systems:

- [AIR6540A, Fundamentals in Wire Selection and Sizing for Aerospace Applications](#)
- [AIR1213A, Radioisotope Power Systems](#)
- [AIR6127, Managing Higher Voltages in Aerospace Electrical Systems](#)
- [AIR6139, Ways of Dealing with Power Regeneration onto an Aircraft Electrical Power System Bus](#)
- [AIR999A, Cryogenically Fueled Dynamic Power Systems](#)
- [ARP4729A, Document for 270 Voltage Direct Current \(270 V DC\) System](#)
- [AS1212A, Electric Power, Aircraft, Characteristics and Utilization of](#)

- [AS1831A](#), *Electrical Power, 270 V DC, Aircraft, Characteristics and Utilization of*
- [AS5698A](#), *Space Power Standard*

#### [AE-7D Aircraft Energy Storage and Charging Committee:](#)

- [AIR6343](#), *Design and Development of Rechargeable Lithium Battery Systems for Aerospace Applications*

#### [AE-7M Aerospace Model Based Engineering:](#)

- [AIR6326](#), *Aircraft Electrical Power Systems, Modeling and Simulation, Definitions*
- [ARP6538](#), *Dynamic Modeling of Aerospace Systems (DyMAS)*

#### [AE-7P Protective and Control Devices](#)

- [\(43 documents as of May 2020\)](#)

#### [AE-8A Elec Wiring and Fiber Optic Interconnect Sys Install:](#)

- [AS50881G](#), *Wiring Aerospace Vehicle* [Note: It applies to UAS too.]
- [AIR6808](#), *Aerospace Vehicle Wiring, Lessons Learned*
- [ARP6216](#), *EWIS Wiring Insulation Breakdown Testing*

#### [AE-8C1 Connectors Committee](#)

- [\(466 documents as of May 2020\)](#)

#### [AE-8C2 Terminating Devices and Tooling Committee](#)

- [\(218 documents as of May 2020\)](#)

#### [AE-8D Wire and Cable Committee](#)

- [\(234 documents as of May 2020\)](#)

#### [A-20A Crew Station Lighting](#)

- [\(26 documents as of May 2020\)](#)

#### [A-20B Exterior Lighting Committee:](#)

- [ARP6336](#), *Lighting Applications for Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) – specific to UAS*
- [ARP6621](#), *Predicting Photometric Degradation of Exterior Aircraft Lights*
- [AIR1276B](#), *Aircraft Flashtube Anticollision Lighting Systems*
- [AIR1106B](#), *Some Factors Affecting Visibility of Aircraft Navigation and Anticollision Lights*
- [ARP693E](#), *Landing and Taxiing Lights - Design Criteria for Installation*
- [ARP991C](#), *Position and Anticollision Lights - Fixed-Wing Aircraft*
- [ARP5637A](#), *Design and Maintenance Considerations for Aircraft Exterior Lighting Plastic Lenses*
- [AS8017D](#), *Minimum Performance Standard for Anticollision Light Systems*
- [AS25050B](#), *Colors, Aeronautical Lights and Lighting Equipment, General Requirements For*

- [ARP6402A](#), *LED Landing, Taxiing, Runway Turnoff, and Recognition Lights*
- [ARP4392](#), *Lighting, Aircraft Exterior, Night Vision Imaging System (NVIS) Compatible*
- [ARP5825A](#), *Design Requirements and Test Procedures for Dual Mode Exterior Lights*
- [AIR5689B](#), *Light Transmitting Glass Covers for Exterior Aircraft Lighting*
- [ARP694C](#), *Aerial Refueling Lights - Design Criteria*
- [ARP5647A](#), *High Intensity Discharge Light Sources*
- [ARP5029B](#), *Measurement Procedures for Short Pulse Width Strobe Anticollision Lights*
- [AS8037C](#), *Minimum Performance Standard for Aircraft Position Lights*
- [ARP4087C](#), *Wing Inspection Lights - Design Criteria*

#### [A-20C Interior Lighting](#)

- [\(15 documents as of May 2020\)](#)

#### AE-2 Lightning Committee:

- [ARP5415B](#), *User's Manual for Certification of Aircraft Electrical/Electronic Systems for the Indirect Effects of Lightning*
- [ARP5672](#), *Aircraft Precipitation Static Certification*
- [ARP5412B](#), *Aircraft Lightning Environment and Related Test Waveforms*
- [ARP5416A](#), *Aircraft Lightning Test Methods*
- [ARP5414B](#), *Aircraft Lightning Zoning*
- [ARP5577](#), *Aircraft Lightning Direct Effects Certification*

#### AE-4 Electromagnetic Environmental Effects (E3) Committee:

- [ARP60493](#), *Guide to Civil Aircraft Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC)*
- [ARP1705C](#), *Coaxial Test Procedure to Measure the RF Shielding Characteristics of EMI Gasket Materials*
- [AIR6236A](#), *In-House Verification of EMI Test Equipment*
- [ARP6248](#), *Stripline Test Method to Characterize the Shielding Effectiveness of Conductive EMI Gaskets up to 40 GHz*
- [AS6451A](#), *Shields, Protective, Aircraft and Missiles*
- [ARP936B](#), *Capacitor, 10 Microfarad for EMI Measurements*
- [ARP935B](#), *Control Plan/Technical Construction File*
- [ARP4242A](#), *Electromagnetic Compatibility Control Requirements Systems*
- [ARP1173A](#), *Test Procedure to Measure the R.F. Shielding Characteristics of E.M.I. Gaskets*
- [ARP1267](#), *Electromagnetic Interference Measurement Impulse Generators; Standard Calibration Requirements and Techniques*
- [AIR1221](#), *Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC) System Design Checklist*
- [AIR1147A](#), *Electromagnetic Interference on Aircraft from Jet Engine Charging*
- [ARP4244A](#), *Recommended Insertion Loss Test Methods for EMI Power Line Filters*
- [ARP1972A](#), *Recommended Measurement Practices and Procedures for EMC Testing*

- [ARP1870A](#), *Aerospace Systems Electrical Bonding and Grounding for Electromagnetic Compatibility and Safety*
- [ARP5583A](#), *Guide to Certification of Aircraft in a High-Intensity Radiated Field (HIRF) Environment*
- [AIR1700A](#), *Upper Frequency Measurement Boundary for Evaluation of Shielding Effectiveness in Cylindrical Systems*
- [AIR1425A](#), *Methods of Achieving Electromagnetic Compatibility of Gas Turbine Engine Accessories, for Self-Propelled Vehicles*
- [AIR1404](#), *DC Resistivity Vs RF Impedance of EMI Gaskets*
- [AIR1394A](#), *Cabling Guidelines for Electromagnetic Compatibility*
- [AIR1255](#), *Spectrum Analyzers for Electromagnetic Interference Measurements*
- [ARP5889](#), *Alternative (Ecological) Method for Measuring Electronic Product Immunity to External Electromagnetic Fields*
- [AIR1423](#), *Electromagnetic Compatibility on Gas Turbine Engines for Aircraft Propulsion*
- [ARP1481A](#), *Corrosion Control and Electrical Conductivity in Enclosure Design*
- [AIR1209](#), *Construction and Calibration of Parallel Plate Transmission Line for Electromagnetic Interference Susceptibility Testing*
- [ARP958D](#), *Electromagnetic Interference Measurement Antennas; Standard Calibration Method*
- [ARP1172](#), *Filters, Conventional, Electromagnetic Interference Reduction, General Specification For*

#### [AS-3 Fiber Optics and Applied Photonics Committee:](#)

- [AS5382A](#), *Aerospace Cable, Fiber Optic*
- [AS5590A](#), *Connectors, Fiber Optic, Advanced, Circular or Rectangular, Plug and Receptacle, Environment Resistant, Removable Termini/Contacts, General Specification For*
- [AS5675](#), *Characterization and Requirements for New Aerospace Fiber Optic Cable Assemblies - Jumpers, End Face Geometry, Link Loss Measurement, and Inspection*

#### [A-6A3 Flight Control and Vehicle Management Systems Committee](#)

- [ARP94910](#), *Aerospace - Vehicle Management Systems - Flight Control Design, Installation and Test of, Military Unmanned Aircraft, Specification Guide For*
- [AIR4094A](#), *Aircraft Flight Control Systems Descriptions*
- [AIR4253B](#), *Description of Actuation Systems for Aircraft With Fly-By-Wire Flight Control Systems*
- [AIR4982A](#), *Aerospace Fly-by-Light Actuation Systems*
- [AIR5273](#), *Actuation System Failure Detection Methods*
- [AIR5428](#), *Utility System Characterization, An Overview*
- [AIR5875](#), *Methodology for Investigation of Flight Control System Anomalies*
- [AIR5992](#), *Descriptions of Systems Integration Test Rigs (Iron Birds) For Aerospace Applications*
- [ARP4895B](#), *Flight Control Actuators - Dynamic Seals, Collection of Duty Cycle Data*
- [ARP5007A](#), *Development Process - Aerospace Fly-By-Wire Actuation System*
- [ARP5764](#), *Aerospace Active Inceptor Systems for Aircraft Flight and Engine Controls*



- [ARP5770](#), *Mechanical Control Design Guide*
- [ARP6001B](#), *Aerospace - Passive Side Stick Unit, General Requirements for Fly-by Wire Transport and Business*
- [ARP6252](#), *Integrated Rudder and Brake Pedal Unit, General Requirements for Fly-By Wire Transport and Business Aircraft*
- [ARP6539](#), *Validation and Verification Process Steps for Monitors Development in Complex Flight Control and Related Systems*

#### [A-6B2 Electrohydrostatic Actuation Committee](#)

- [ARP5879](#), *Aerospace - Test Methodology for Electrohydrostatic Actuators*
- [ARP6025](#), *Duty Cycle Considerations for Electrohydrostatic Actuators*
- [ARP6154](#), *Aerospace Fluid Power Electrohydrostatic Module, Design, Performance and Test Recommendations*

#### [A-6B3 Electro-Mechanical Actuation Committee](#)

- [ARP5384](#), *Specification Guide for Power Drive Units (PDUs)*
- [AIR5713A](#), *In-Service Reliability Data of Continuously Active Ballscrew and Geared Flight Control Actuation Systems*
- [ARP5754](#), *Electromechanical Actuators Specification Guide*
- [ARP4058B](#), *General Specification Guide for Mechanical Geared Rotary Actuators*
- [ARP5812](#), *Actuators, Linear Mechanical, General Specification Guide*
- [ARP5777](#), *Maintenance and Inspection Procedures for Acme Screw Assemblies*
- [ARP5311](#), *Aerospace-Interface Definition for Mechanical Actuation Subsystems*
- [AIR6226](#), *Trimmable Horizontal Stabilizer Actuator Structural Load Path Integrity Monitoring Principles*
- [ARP6131](#), *Maintenance and Inspection Procedures for Rotary and Linear Mechanical Actuators*
- [ARP5724](#), *Aerospace - Testing of Electromechanical Actuators, General Guidelines For*
- [AIR6052](#), *Trimmable Horizontal Stabilizer Actuator Descriptions*

#### [Other SAE documents:](#)

##### Other Electric Aircraft Steering Group (EASG) TC Liaisons:

- Electrical Power & Equipment – AE-7
- Electrical Distribution Systems – AE-8
- Electrical Materials Committee – AE-9
- Aerospace Behavioral Engineering Technology – G-10
- Vertical Flight Committee – G-10V
- Landing Gears – A-5
- Flight Control, Vehicle Management & Actuation Systems – A-6
- Aircraft Instruments – A-4

- Aircraft Environmental Systems – AC-9
- Lightning – AE-2
- Electromagnetic Environmental Effects – AE-4
- Aircraft Lighting – A-20
- Electronic Engine Controls – E-36
- Integrated Vehicle Health Management – HM-1
- Aerospace Propulsion Systems Health Management – E-32
- Aircraft Systems & Systems Integration – AS-1
- Embedded Computing Systems – AS-2
- Fiber Optics and Applied Photonics – AS-3
- Aircraft Ground Support Equipment – AGE-3
- Aircraft & Systems Development and Safety Assessment – S-18
- Avionics Process Management – APMC
- Aerospace Fuel, Inerting & Lubrication Systems – AE-5A

#### SAE-ITC:

- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 428, Considerations for Avionics Network Design
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 609, Design Guidance for Aircraft Electrical Power Systems
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 659, Backplane Data Bus
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 821, Aircraft Network Server System (NSS) Functional Definition
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 831, Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC) Recommended Practice
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 845, Fiber Optic Expanded Beam Termini
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 413A, Guidance for Aircraft Electrical Power Utilization and Transient Protection
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 485P1-3, Cabin Equipment Interfaces, Part 1, Head End Equipment Protocol
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 485P1-4D2, Cabin Equipment Interfaces, Part 1, Head End Equipment Protocol
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 485P2-4, Cabin Equipment Interfaces, Part 2, Physical Layer - In-Seat Protocol
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 485P2-5D1, Cabin Equipment Interfaces, Part 2, Physical Layer - In-Seat Protocol
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 594-4, Ground Proximity Warning System
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 600-20, Air Transport Avionics Equipment Interfaces
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 679D1, Aircraft Server, Communications, and Interface Standard
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 686D7, Roadmap for IPv6 Transition in Aviation
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 720-1, Digital Frequency/Function Selection for Airborne Electronic Equipment
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 725-2, Electronic Flight Instruments (EFI)
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 729-1, Analog and Discrete Data Converter System (ADDCS)
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 777-2, Recorder Independent Power Supply (RIPS)
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 818-3, Avionics Digital Video Bus (ADVB) High Data Rate
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 844P1, Guidance for Target Hardware Design, Part 1, Airborne High Speed Data Loader (ARINC Report 615-3)

- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 844P2, Guidance for Target Hardware Design, Part 2, Airborne High Speed Data Loader (ARINC Report 615-4)
- ARINC AEEC

ASTM:

F37.20 Airplane:

- [F2840-14, Standard Practice for Design and Manufacture of Electric Propulsion Units for Light Sport Aircraft](#)
- [F2245-18, Standard Specification for Design and Performance of a Light Sport Airplane](#) [NOTE: electrical systems are covered in this document although the title does not mention it.]

F38.01 Airworthiness:

- [F3005-14a, Standard Specification for Batteries for Use in Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems \(sUAS\)](#) – specific to UAS

F39.01 Design, Alteration, and Certification of Electrical Systems:

- [F2490-05\(2013\), Standard Guide for Aircraft Electrical Load and Power Source Capacity Analysis](#)
- [F2639-15, Standard Practice for Design, Alteration, and Certification of Aircraft Electrical Wiring Systems](#)

F39.02 Inspection, Alteration, Maintenance, and Repair:

- [F2696-14\(2019\), Standard Practice for Inspection of Aircraft Electrical Wiring Systems](#)
- [F2799-14, Standard Practice for Maintenance of Aircraft Electrical Wiring Systems](#)

F39.04 Aircraft Systems:

- [F3238-17, Standard Specification for Design and Installation of an Infrared \(IR\) Searchlight System \(USA\)](#)

F44.50 Systems and Equipment:

- [F3061/F3061M-17, Standard Specification for Systems and Equipment in Small Aircraft](#)
- [F3227/F3227M-17, Standard Specification for Environmental Systems in Small Aircraft](#)
- [F3228-17, Standard Specification for Flight Data and Voice Recording in Small Aircraft](#)
- [F3229/F3229M-17, Standard Practice for Static Pressure System Tests in Small Aircraft](#)
- [F3230-17, Standard Practice for Safety Assessment of Systems and Equipment in Small Aircraft](#)
- [F3231/F3231M-17, Standard Specification for Electrical Systems in Small Aircraft](#)
- [F3232/F3232M-17, Standard Specification for Flight Controls in Small Aircraft](#)
- [F3233/F3233M-17, Standard Specification for Instrumentation in Small Aircraft](#)
- [F3234/F3234M-17, Standard Specification for Exterior Lighting in Small Aircraft](#)
- [F3235-17a, Standard Specification for Aircraft Storage Batteries](#)
- [F3236-17, Standard Specification for High Intensity Radiated Field \(HIRF\) Protection in Small Aircraft](#)

- [F3309/F3309M-18, Standard Practice for Simplified Safety Assessment of Systems and Equipment in Small Aircraft](#)
- [F3316/F3316M-18, Standard Specification for Electrical Systems for Aircraft with Electric or Hybrid-Electric Propulsion](#)

NASA Documents:

- [Electrical Systems](#)
- [Wiring](#)
- [Electrical Load Analysis](#)
- [Electric Propulsion Units](#)

UL:

- [UL 3030, Standard for Unmanned Aircraft Systems](#) – specific to UAS

**In-Development Standards and Related Materials:** The following manned aviation standards may be applicable to UAS. As noted, there are a few standards specific to UAS.

ASTM:

F38.01 Airworthiness:

- [WK60937](#), *New Specification for Design of Fuel Cells for Use in UASs*
- [WK66135](#), *Revision of F3005 - 14a Standard Specification for Batteries for Use in Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems (sUAS)* – specific to UAS
- [WK68098](#), *Standard Practice for Ensuring Dependability of Software Used in Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS)* is a work item revision to existing standard F3201-16

F39.02 Inspection, Alteration, Maintenance, and Repair:

- [WK55298](#), *Classifying Alterations for In-Service Aircraft under FAA Authority Oversight*

F39.04 Aircraft Systems:

- [WK44921](#), *New Practice for Continued Airworthiness of IR Filter System Installation*
- [WK44922](#), *New Practice for the Operational Use of IR Filter Systems*
- [WK51467](#), *New Specification for Quality Assurance for Manufacturers of Aircraft Systems*

F39.05 Design, Alteration, and Certification of Electric Propulsion Systems:

- [WK47374](#), *New Specification for Design and Manufacture of Electric Propulsion Units for General Aviation Aircraft (Aeroplanes)*
- [WK56255](#), *Design of Electric Propulsion Energy Storage Systems for General Aviation Aircraft*

F44.50 Systems and Equipment:

- [WK58700](#), *Electrical Systems for Aircraft with Electric or Hybrid-Electric Propulsion*
- [WK61550](#), *Simplified High Intensity Radiated Field (HIRF) Protection in Level 1, Level 2, and Level 3 Aircraft*
- [WK60748](#), *Application of Systems-Theoretic Process Analysis to Aircraft*

- [WK56374](#), *Aircraft Systems Information Security Protection*
- [WK52829](#), *Simplified Safety Analysis of Systems & Equipment in Small Aircraft*
- [WK62762](#), *System Level Verification of Software and Airborne Electronic Hardware on Small Aircraft*
- [WK55940](#), *Boundary layer control systems in aerial vehicles*
- [WK61549](#), *Indirect Flight Control Systems in Aircraft*
- [WK63976](#), *Establishing the Net Safety Benefit of Aircraft Systems*

SAE:

[AE-7 Aerospace Electrical Power and Equipment Committee:](#)

- [AIR6511](#), *Safety Consideration for a 48/60 VDC Aircraft distribution system*

[AE-7A Generators and Controls Motors and Magnetic Devices:](#)

- [ARP6505](#), *Electrical Load Characterization and ELA Standardization*
- [AS8441](#), *Minimum Performance Standard for Permanent-Magnet Propulsion Motors and Associated Variable-Speed Drives*

[AE-7B Power Management, Distribution and Storage:](#)

- [AS4805A](#), *Solid State Power Controller, General Standard For*
- [AS6087](#), *ARC Fault Interrupter, 270 VDC*

[AE-7C Systems:](#)

- [AIR6198](#), *Considerations for future more electric aircraft electric power systems*
- [AIR7497](#), *Advanced methods for Wire Selection and Sizing for Aerospace applications*
- [AIR7502](#), *Aerospace Electrical Voltage Level definitions*
- [AIR8445](#), *Aerospace Electrical Power System Stability*
- [AS7499](#), *Aircraft High Voltage DC Power Quality Standard*

[AE-7D Aircraft Energy Storage and Charging Committee:](#)

- [AIR6897](#), *Battery Management Systems for Rechargeable Lithium Batteries Used in Aerospace Applications*
- [AS6968](#), *Connection Set of Conductive Charging for Electric Aircraft*

[AE-7M Aerospace Model Based Engineering:](#)

- [AIR6387](#), *Aircraft electrical power systems. Modeling and simulation. Validation and verification methods.*

[AE-7P Protective and Control Devices](#)

- [\(9 documents as of May 2020\)](#)

[AE-8A Elec Wiring and Fiber Optic Interconnect Sys Install:](#)

- [AIR6808](#), *Aerospace Vehicle Wiring, Lessons Learned*

- [ARP5607B](#), *Legibility of Print on Aerospace Wires and Cables*
- [AS6136A](#), *Conduit, Electrical, Flexible, Shielded, Aluminum Alloy for Aircraft Installations*
- [AS10380A](#), *Coupling Installations, Standard Conduit, Electrical*
- [AS10051A](#), *Hubs, Conduit Connection, Standard Dimensions*
- [AIR6982](#), *Arc Damage Assessment of Arc Plume and Physical Damage*
- [AS7974B](#), *Cable Assemblies and Attachable Plugs, External Electrical Power, Aircraft, General Specification For*
- [AS4461D](#), *Assembly and Soldering Criteria for High Quality/High Reliability Soldering Wire and Cable Termination in Aerospace Vehicles*

#### [AE-8C1 Connectors Committee:](#)

- [\(22 works in progress as of May 2020\)](#)

#### [AE-8C2 Terminating Devices and Tooling Committee:](#)

- [\(40 works in progress as of May 2020\)](#)

#### [AE-8D Wire and Cable Committee:](#)

- [\(23 works in progress as of May 2020\)](#)

#### [AE-9 Electrical Materials Committee:](#)

- [AIR6674](#), *Electrical Insulation Materials in Hybrid Aerospace*
- [AIR7219](#), *Degradation in electrical materials*

#### [A-20B Exterior Lighting:](#)

- [AS8037D](#), *Minimum Performance Standard for Aircraft Position Lights*
- [ARP4087D](#), *Wing Inspection Lights - Design Criteria*

#### [AE-2 Lightning Committee:](#)

- [ARP5416B](#), *Aircraft Lightning Test Methods*
- [ARP6205](#), *Transport Airplane Fuel Tank and Systems Lightning Protection]*
- [ARP5415C](#), *User's Manual for Certification of Aircraft Electrical/Electronic Systems for the Indirect Effects of Lightning*

#### [AE-4 Electromagnetic Compatibility \(EMC\) Committee:](#)

- [ARP5583B](#), *Guide to Certification of Aircraft in a High-Intensity Radiated Field (HIRF)*
- [AIR1209A](#), *Construction and Calibration of Parallel Plate Transmission Line for Electromagnetic Interference Susceptibility Testing*
- [ARP958E](#), *Electromagnetic Interference Measurement Antennas; Standard Calibration Method*

#### [A-6A3 Flight Control and Vehicle Management Systems Committee](#)

- [ARP94910A](#), *Aerospace - Vehicle Management Systems - Flight Control Design, Installation and Test of, Military Unmanned Aircraft, Specification Guide For*
- [ARP5770A](#), *Mechanical Control Design Guide*
- [AIR5875A](#), *Methodology for Investigation of Flight Control System Anomalies*
- [ARP5007B](#), *Development Process - Aerospace Fly-By-Wire Actuation System*
- [AIR6920](#), *ARP4754 Process Framework with Checklists and templates for flight control and vehicle management systems*
- [AIR5273A](#), *Actuation System Failure Detection Methods*

#### [A-6B2 Electrohydrostatic Actuation Committee](#)

- [ARP5879A](#), *Aerospace - Test Methodology for Electrohydrostatic Actuators*
- [ARP7490](#), *Recommended Guidelines for the Specification of Motor Control Electronics for Electrically Powered Actuation*
- [ARP6354](#), *Electrohydrostatic Actuation Thermal Management Considerations*
- [ARP6352](#), *Sizing Considerations for Electrohydrostatic Actuation Pumps and Motors*
- [AIR6353](#), *Electrohydrostatic Actuation Applications on Aircraft Programs*
- [ARP5772](#), *Reservoirs, Hydraulic, Maintenance Free, Electrohydrostatic Actuator (EHA)*

#### [A-6B3 Electro-Mechanical Actuation Committee](#)

- [ARP6131A](#), *Maintenance and Inspection Procedures for Rotary and Linear Mechanical Actuators*
- [AIR6052A](#), *Trimmable Horizontal Stabilizer Actuator Descriptions*
- [AIR8442](#), *Considerations for Prevention of Moisture Damage in Aircraft Electro-mechanical Actuation Equipment*
- [AIR6074](#), *Material Selection and Design Practices for Gear and Jackscrew Actuation Systems.*
- [AIR6016](#), *High Lift Systems Description*

#### [E-40 Electrified Propulsion Committee](#)

- [AIR8678](#), *Architecture Examples for Electrified Propulsion Aircraft*
- [ARP8676](#), *Nomenclature & Definitions for Electrified Propulsion Aircraft*
- [ARP8677](#), *Safety Considerations for Electrified Propulsion Aircraft*

#### ISO:

- ISO/WD 24352, *Technical requirements for light and small unmanned aircraft electric energy system*

#### ASD-STAN:

- [ASD-STAN D05/WG08](#) in-development work related to UAS Lights

**Gap A13: Electrical Systems.** The existing standards from manned aviation need to be scalable to address the entire spectrum of UAS. Unique aspects of UAS electrical systems include: wiring, EWIS, electrical load analysis, aircraft lighting, etc. These areas (electrical systems, wiring, EWIS, etc.) are also not covered for control stations (CSs), auxiliary systems, etc.

UAS such as optionally piloted aircraft carrying cargo and/or passengers need standards for high voltage systems.

**R&D Needed:** Yes

**Recommendation:**

- 1) Complete work on in-development standards.
- 2) Encourage the development of standards that are scalable for UAS to address electrical systems, wiring, EWIS, electrical load analysis, aircraft lighting, etc., for UA, CS, and auxiliary system(s).
- 3) Establish maximum voltage limits for propulsion power transmission cables based on UA power needs and maximum operating altitudes.

**Priority:** High (Tier 3)

**Organization(s):** ASTM, SAE, RTCA, AIAA, NASA, UL, IEC, IEEE, ISO

**Status of Progress:** Green

**Update:** Numerous standards have been published and are in-development that address the entire spectrum of UAS and its operations.

## 6.6. Power Sources and Propulsion Systems

UAS are powered by a wide variety of propulsion systems, including conventional gas turbine engines, reciprocating engines, and piston engines. Newer propulsion systems include batteries, hybrid electric, fuel cells, and novel high speed power systems. Many standards exist for conventional power systems, while new standards are emerging and continue to mature addressing electrical and novel power systems.

The SAE [E-40 Electrified Propulsion Committee](#) recommends standardized nomenclature, defines applicable terms and example architectures, and addresses considerations for performance, airworthiness, safety, aircraft integration, components and interfaces within and between propulsion systems and other aircraft equipment. The SAE [E-39 Unmanned Aircraft Propulsion Committee](#) is developing [AS6971, Test Protocol for UAS Reciprocating \(Intermittent\) Engines as Primary Thrust Mechanism](#).

**Published Regulations, Standards, and Related Materials:** The following manned aviation standards and related materials may be applicable to UAS. As noted below, there are few standards specific to UAS.

FAA:

- 14 CFR Part 33 - Airworthiness Standards: Aircraft Engines
- TSO-C11e, Powerplant Fire Detection Instruments (Thermal and Flame Contact Types), 10/17/1991



- TSO-C56b, Engine Driven Direct Current Generator / Starter Generators, 6/1/2006
- TSO-C71, Airborne Static ("DC TO DC") Electrical Power Converter (For Air Carrier Aircraft), 6/15/1961
- TSO-C73, Static Electrical Power Inverter, 12/18/1963
- TSO-C77b, Gas Turbine Auxiliary Power Units, 12/20/2000
- TSO-C142a, Non-Rechargeable Lithium Cells and Batteries, 8/7/2006
- TSO-C142b, Non-Rechargeable Lithium Cells and Batteries, 3/26/2018
- TSO-C155a, Recorder Independent Power Supply, 06/09/2010
- TSO-C155b, Recorder Independent Power Supply (RIPS), 04/21/2015
- TSO-C173a, Nickel-Cadmium, Nickel Metal-Hydride, and Lead-Acid Batteries, 03/15/2013
- TSO-C174, Battery Based Emergency Power Unit (BEPU), 07/25/2005
- TSO-C179a, Permanently Installed Rechargeable Lithium Cells, Batteries and Battery Systems, 4/19/2011
- TSO-C179b, Rechargeable Lithium Batteries and Battery Systems, 3/23/2018
- TSO-C200a, Airframe Low Frequency Underwater Locating Device (Acoustic) (Self-Powered), 05/03/2016

#### Aircraft Electrical Load Analysis and Power Source Capacity

- 71 FR 12771, Volume 71 US Federal Register page 12771 - Aircraft Electrical Load and Power Source Capacity Analysis
- AC 20-184, Guidance on Testing and Installation of Rechargeable Lithium Battery and Battery Systems on Aircraft

#### [FAA Technical Center Documents on Lithium Batteries](#)

#### [FAA Technical Center Documents on Fuel Cells](#)

#### Open Source Documents:

- [Beam-powered propulsion systems are Laser, Microwave, Electric, Direct Impulse, etc.](#)

#### Royal Aeronautical Society:

- [Fly by Light](#)

#### NASA:

- [Fuel Cells](#)
- [Electric Aircraft](#)
- [Propulsion Systems](#)
- [Power Systems](#)
- [Power Sources](#)
- [Solar Powered Aircraft](#)
- GaAs/Ge Solar Powered Aircraft, NASA/TM-1998-208652
- A Preliminary Study of Solar Powered Aircraft and Associated Power Trains, 1983
- Structural Sizing of a Solar Powered Aircraft, 1984

- [Laser Power Sources](#)
- [Beamed Laser Power for UAVs](#)
- [The Effect of Power System Technology and Mission Requirements on High Altitude Long Endurance Aircraft, NASA CR 194455, 1994](#)
- [Airborne Reconnaissance in the Civilian Sector: Agricultural Monitoring from High-Altitude Powered Platforms, 1983](#)
- Scientific Application of Remotely Piloted Aircraft Measurements of Radiation, Water Vapor, and Trace gases to Climate Studies, 1991

IEEE:

- [Solar-powered unmanned aerial vehicles, IECEC 96. Proceedings of the 31st Intersociety Energy Conversion Engineering Conference, 1996](#)
- [Solar Powered Aircraft](#)
- [Fuel Cells Powered Aircraft](#)
- [Laser Powered Systems on Aircraft](#)
- [Batteries for Aircraft](#)
- [Power Sources for Aircraft](#)
- [Propulsion Systems for Aircraft](#)

DOD:

- MIL-E-7016F, Analysis of Aircraft Electric Load and Power Source Capacity
- MIL-STD-704F, Aircraft Electric Power Characteristics, 2004
- MIL-STD-7080, Selection and Installation of Aircraft Electric Equipment
- MIL-HDBK-516C, Electrical System, 2014
- STANAG 3456, Aircraft Electrical System Characteristics

AIAA:

- Design of Long-Endurance Unmanned Airplanes incorporating Solar and Fuel Cell Propulsion, AIAA 84-1430, 1984
- Solar-Powered Airplane Design for, Long-Endurance, High-Altitude Flight, AIAA Paper 82-0811, 1982
- [Electric Propulsion Units](#)

SAE:

[E-25 General Standards for Aerospace and Propulsion Systems](#)

- [\(960 documents as of March 2020\)](#)

[E-30 Propulsion Ignition Systems Committee](#)

- [\(50 documents as of March 2020\)](#)

[E-32 Aerospace Propulsion Systems Health Management](#)

- [\(29 documents as of March 2020\)](#)

[E-33 In Flight Propulsion Measurement Committee](#)

- [\(10 documents as of March 2020\)](#)

[E-34 Propulsion Lubricants Committee](#)

- [\(20 documents as of March 2020\)](#)

[E-36 Electronic Engine Controls Committee](#)

- [\(11 documents as of March 2020\)](#)

[E-38 Aviation Piston Engine Fuels and Lubricants](#)

- [\(3 documents as of March 2020\)](#)

[AE-6 Starting Systems and Auxiliary Power Committee](#)

- [\(28 documents as of March 2020\)](#)

[EG-1 Aerospace Propulsion Systems Support Equipment](#)

- [\(5 documents as of March 2020\)](#)

[EG-1A Balancing Committee](#)

- [\(13 documents as of March 2020\)](#)

[EG-1B Hand Tools Committee](#)

- [\(20 documents as of March 2020\)](#)

[EG-1B1 Power Tools - Productivity, Ergonomics and Safety](#)

- [\(1 document as of March 2020\)](#)

[EG-1E Gas Turbine Test Facilities and Equipment](#)

- [\(28 documents as of March 2020\)](#)

[AE-7A Generators and Controls Motors and Magnetic Devices:](#)

- [AIR857A](#), *Speed Variation of D-C Motors*
- [AS8020](#), *Minimum Performance Standards for Engine Driven D.C. Generators/Starter-Generators and Associated Voltage Regulators*
- [AIR34B](#), *Penalties in Performance of Three-Phase, Four-Wire, 400-Cycle Motors Causes By the Opening of One Phase*
- [ARP4255A](#), *Electrical Actuation Systems for Aerospace and Other Applications*

#### AE-7B Power Management, Distribution and Storage:

- [AIR5561](#), Lithium Battery Powered Portable Electronic Devices
- [ARP5584](#), Document for Electric Power Management
- [AS4805](#), Solid State Power Controller, General Standard For
- [AS5625A](#), Minimum Performance Standards for Static Electric Power Frequency Converters
- [AS6349](#), Minimum Performance Standard (MPS) for an Airborne AC to AC Converter
- [AS8033](#), Nickel Cadmium Vented Rechargeable Aircraft Batteries (Non-Sealed, Maintainable Type)
- [AIR5709A](#), *SAE AE-7 High Temperature Components Survey, 2005*

#### AE-7C Systems:

- [AIR6540A](#), *Fundamentals in Wire Selection and Sizing for Aerospace Applications*
- [AIR1213A](#), *Radioisotope Power Systems*
- [AIR6127](#), *Managing Higher Voltages in Aerospace Electrical Systems*
- [AIR6139](#), *Ways of Dealing with Power Regeneration onto an Aircraft Electrical Power System Bus*
- [AIR999A](#), *Cryogenically Fueled Dynamic Power Systems*
- [ARP4729A](#), Document for 270 Voltage Direct Current (270 V DC) System
- [AS1212A](#), Electric Power, Aircraft, Characteristics and Utilization of
- [AS1831A](#), *Electrical Power, 270 V DC, Aircraft, Characteristics and Utilization of*
- [AS5698A](#), *Space Power Standard*

#### AE-7D Aircraft Energy Storage and Charging Committee:

- [AIR6343](#), Design and Development of Rechargeable Lithium Battery Systems for Aerospace Applications

#### AE-8A Elec Wiring and Fiber Optic Interconnect Sys Install:

- [AS50881G](#), *Wiring Aerospace Vehicle* [Note: It applies to UAS too.]
- [AS21378A](#), Plugs And Cable Assemblies, External Power, Aircraft, 230/400 VOLT, 400 Hertz
- [AS24122A](#), Wiring Harness – External Power, 115 Volt AC, Single Phase
- [AS24208A](#), Cable And Plug Assembly, External Power 115/200 VOLTS 3 Phase, Single Point Refueling
- [AS25019A](#), Cable Assembly, External Electric Power, Aircraft, 28 VOLT DC, Jet Starting
- [AS7974/2A](#), Cable Assembly, External Power, Aircraft 115/200 VOLT, 400 Hertz Power Distribution Flight Line (For A/E 24A-166A)
- [AS7974/4A](#), Cable Assembly, External Electric Power, Aircraft, Single-Jacketed 115/200 VOLT, 400 Hertz
- [AS7974/5A](#), Cable Assembly, External Electric Power, Aircraft, Single-Jacketed 270 VDC, 90 KW
- [AS7974A](#), Cable Assemblies and Attachable Plugs, External Electrical Power, Aircraft, General Specification For
- [AS90328A](#), Cable Assembly, External Electric Power, Aircraft 115/200 VOLT, 400 Hertz
- [AS90347A](#), Cable Assembly, External Electric Power, Aircraft 28 VOLT DC, Operating Power

## A-6 Aerospace Actuation, Control and Fluid Power Systems

- [A-6A1 Commercial Aircraft](#)
- [A-6A2 Military Aircraft](#)
- [A-6A3 Flight Control Systems and Vehicle Management Systems](#)
- [A-6B1 Hydraulic Servo Actuation](#)
- [A-6B2 Electrohydrostatic Actuation](#)
- [A-6B3 Electro-Mechanical Actuation](#)
- [A-6C1 Contamination & Filtration](#)
- [A-6C2 Seals](#)
- [A-6C3 Fluids](#)
- [A-6C4 Power Sources](#)
  - [AIR744C](#), Aerospace Auxiliary Power Sources
- [A-6C5 Components](#)

## S-18: Aircraft and Systems Development and Safety Assessment:

- [ARP4754A](#), *Guidelines for Development of Civil Aircraft and Systems*
- [ARP4761](#), *Guidelines And Methods For Conducting The Safety Assessment Process On Civil Airborne Systems And Equipment*
- [AIR6219](#), *Development of Atmospheric Neutron Single Event Effects Analysis for Use in Safety Assessments*
- [ARP5150A](#), *Safety Assessment of Transport Airplanes in Commercial Service*
- [ARP5151A](#), *Safety Assessment of General Aviation Airplanes and Rotorcraft in Commercial Service*
- [AIR6110](#), *Contiguous Aircraft/System Development Process Example*
- [AIR6218](#), *Constructing Development Assurance Plan for Integrated Systems*

## Other Electric Aircraft Steering Group (EASG) TC Liaisons:

- Aerospace Propulsion Systems Health Management - E-32
- Aircraft Ground Support Equipment AGE-3

## SAE EUROCAE Fuel Cell Task Group

- [AIR6464](#), *EUROCAE/SAE WG80/AE-7AFC Hydrogen Fuel Cells Aircraft Fuel Cell Safety Guidelines*
- [AS6858](#), *Installation of Fuel Cell Systems in Large Civil Aircraft*

## AS8028, Powerplant Fire Detection Instruments Thermal & Flame Contact Types (Reciprocating and Turbine Engine Powered Aircraft)

## SAE ITC:

- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 611-1, *Guidance for the Design and Installation of Fuel Quantity Systems*
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 703-2, *Thrust Control Computer System (TCCS)*

ASTM:

F37.20 Airplane:

- [F2840-14, Standard Practice for Design and Manufacture of Electric Propulsion Units for Light Sport Aircraft](#)

F37.70 Cross-Cutting:

- [F2538-07a\(2010\), Standard Practice for Design and Manufacture of Reciprocating Compression Ignition Engines for Light Sport Aircraft](#)
- [F2506-13, Standard Specification for Design and Testing of Light Sport Aircraft Propellers](#)

F38.01 Airworthiness:

- [F3005-14a, Standard Specification for Batteries for Use in Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems \(sUAS\)](#) – specific to UAS

F39.01 Design, Alteration, and Certification of Electrical Systems:

- [F2490-05\(2013\), Standard Guide for Aircraft Electrical Load and Power Source Capacity Analysis](#)

F44.50 Systems and Equipment:

- [F3235-17a, Standard Specification for Aircraft Storage Batteries](#)
- [F3316/F3316M-18, Standard Specification for Electrical Systems for Aircraft with Electric or Hybrid-Electric Propulsion](#)

NASA Documents:

- [Electric Propulsion Units](#)

UL:

- [UL 1642, Standard for Safety for Lithium Batteries](#)
- [UL 2271, Standard for Batteries for Use in Light Electric Vehicle \(LEV\) Applications](#)
- [UL 2580, Standard for Batteries in Use in Electric Vehicles](#)
- [UL 2743, Standard for Safety for Portable Power Packs](#)
- [UL 3030, Standard for Unmanned Aircraft Systems](#) – specific to UAS
- [UL 62133, Standard for Secondary Cells and Batteries Containing Alkaline or Other Non-Acid Electrolytes - Safety Requirements for Portable Sealed Secondary Cells, and for Batteries Made From Them, for Use in Portable Applications](#)

**In-Development Standards and Related Materials:** The following manned aviation standards may be applicable to UAS. There are a few standards specific to UAS.

ASTM:

F38.01 Airworthiness:

- [WK60937, New Specification for Design of Fuel Cells for Use in Unmanned Aircraft Systems \(UAS\)](#) – specific to UAS
- [WK66135, Revision of F3005 - 14a Standard Specification for Batteries for Use in Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems \(sUAS\)](#) – specific to UAS

F44.50 Systems and Equipment:

- [WK58700](#), *Electrical Systems for Aircraft with Electric or Hybrid-Electric Propulsion*

F39.05 Design, Alteration, and Certification of Electric Propulsion Systems:

- [WK47374](#), *New Specification for Design and Manufacture of Electric Propulsion Units for General Aviation Aircraft (Aeroplanes)*
- [WK56255](#), *Design of Electric Propulsion Energy Storage Systems for General Aviation Aircraft*

IEC

IEC/TC 105 (Fuel Cell Technologies)

- New Work Item Proposal(s) are coming from China on FCs for unmanned aircraft systems (possibly one for Performance, and one for Safety)

ISO:

ISO/TC 20/SC 16 (Unmanned Aircraft Systems)

- ISO/WD 24352, Technical requirements for light and small unmanned aircraft electric energy system

SAE:

E-39 Unmanned Aircraft Propulsion Committee:

- [AS6971](#), *Test Protocol for UAS Reciprocating (Intermittent) Engines as Primary Thrust Mechanism* – specific to UAS. SAE E-39 has some future work planned for propeller hubs, propeller information report, UAS propulsion system categorization, and ground support equipment.

E-40 Electrified Propulsion Committee

- AIR8678, Architecture Examples for Electrified Propulsion Aircraft
- ARP8676, Nomenclature & Definitions for Electrified Propulsion Aircraft
- ARP8677, Safety Considerations for Electrified Propulsion Aircraft

E-25 General Standards for Aerospace and Propulsion Systems

- [\(60 works in progress as of March 2020\)](#)

E-32 Aerospace Propulsion Systems Health Management

- [\(7 works in progress as of March 2020\)](#)

E-33 In Flight Propulsion Measurement Committee

- [\(3 works in progress as of March 2020\)](#)

E-34 Propulsion Lubricants Committee

- [\(13 works in progress as of March 2020\)](#)

#### E-36 Electronic Engine Controls Committee

- [\(4 works in progress as of March 2020\)](#)

#### EG-1A Balancing Committee

- [\(15 works in progress as of March 2020\)](#)

#### EG-1B Hand Tools Committee

- [\(8 works in progress as of March 2020\)](#)

#### EG-1B1 Power Tools – Productivity, Ergonomics and Safety

- [\(2 works in progress as of March 2020\)](#)

#### EG-1E Gas Turbine Test Facilities and Equipment

- [\(2 works in progress as of March 2020\)](#)

#### AE-7 Aerospace Electrical Power and Equipment Committee:

- [AIR6511](#), *Safety Consideration for a 48/60 VDC Aircraft distribution system*

#### AE-7A Generators and Controls Motors and Magnetic Devices:

- [AS8441](#), *Minimum Performance Standard for Permanent-Magnet Propulsion Motors and Associated Variable-Speed Drives*

#### AE-7B Power Management, Distribution and Storage:

- [AS4805A](#), *Solid State Power Controller, General Standard For*
- [AS6087](#), *ARC Fault Interrupter, 270 VDC*

#### AE-7C Systems:

- [AIR6198](#), *Considerations for future more electric aircraft electric power systems*
- [AIR7497](#), *Advanced methods for Wire Selection and Sizing for Aerospace applications*
- [AIR7502](#), *Aerospace Electrical Voltage Level definitions*
- [AIR8445](#), *Aerospace Electrical Power System Stability*
- [AS7499](#), *Aircraft High Voltage DC Power Quality Standard*

#### AE-7D Aircraft Energy Storage and Charging Committee:

- [AIR6897](#), *Battery Management Systems for Rechargeable Lithium Batteries Used in Aerospace Applications*
- [AS6968](#), *Connection Set of Conductive Charging for Electric Aircraft*

#### AE-7M Aerospace Model Based Engineering:

- [AIR6387](#), *Aircraft electrical power systems. Modeling and simulation. Validation and verification methods.*



#### AE-8A Elec Wiring and Fiber Optic Interconnect Sys Install

- *AS7974B, Cable Assemblies and Attachable Plugs, External Electrical Power, Aircraft, General Specification For*

#### S-18: Aircraft and Systems Development and Safety Assessment:

- [ARP4754B](#), *Guidelines for Development of Civil Aircraft and Systems*
- [ARP4761A](#), *Guidelines And Methods For Conducting The Safety Assessment Process On Civil Airborne Systems And Equipment*
- [AS7209](#), *Development Assurance Objectives for Aerospace Vehicles and Systems*
- [AIR6913](#), *Using STPA During Development and Safety Assessment of Civil Aircraft*
- [AIR6276](#), *Use of Modeling and Tools for Aircraft Systems Development - A Strategy for Development Assurance Aspects with Examples*  
[SAE S-18UAS Autonomy Working Group](#)
- [AIR7121](#), *Applicability of Existing Development Assurance and System Safety Practices to Unmanned Aircraft Systems*

**Gap A14: Power Sources and Propulsion Systems.** Standards are needed for UAS power sources and propulsion systems.

**R&D Needed:** Yes

**Recommendation:**

- 1) Complete work on in-development standards.
- 2) Encourage the development of standards to address UAS power sources and propulsion systems.

**Priority:** High (Tier 3)

**Organization(s):** ICAO, RTCA, SAE, AIAA, ASTM, DOD, NASA, UL, IEC, IEEE, ISO

**Status of Progress:** Green

**Update:** Numerous standards have been published and are in-development that address the entire spectrum of UAS and its operations.

## **6.7. Noise, Emissions, and Fuel Venting**

Design, manufacturing, and operational approvals for manned aviation include requirements relating to noise, emissions, and fuel venting. Such requirements are not currently required for sUAS operating under Part 107 but are nonetheless desirable from a safety perspective. For example, the machines and equipment in a UAS produce noise levels that are not totally addressed by aviation standards and/or regulations. While the operating situation and environment of a UAS are admittedly different from a flight deck or cockpit, there are similar safety concerns. ICAO and its Member States are following up

possible environmental issues from the operation of unmanned aircraft, including remotely piloted aircraft and urban air mobility concepts, aiming at the timely environmental certification of such technologies, as appropriate. ICAO is inviting States and stakeholders to share experiences in responding to aircraft noise issues (see website "[Noise from new aircraft concepts](#)").

**Published Regulations, Standards, and Related Materials:** Existing standards and requirements for noise, emissions, and fuel venting for manned aviation apply to UAS.

There are UAS emissions and fuel venting regulations in 14 CFR part 34 that are applicable when gas turbine (i.e., turboprop, turbofan, or turbojet) engines are utilized with rated thrust greater than 26.7 kilonewtons. While existing Part 36 regulations were not created with UAS in mind, some appendices may be appropriate for testing and certifying certain UAS vehicles. In other cases, a rule of particular applicability may be needed. FAA's Office of Environment and Energy (AEE) office has not yet made a determination regarding any potential need for a Rule of General applicability for UAS, as further research and data collection is needed before such a determination can be made.

The SAE [A-21 Aircraft Noise Measurement Aviation Emission Modeling Committee](#) develops recommended practices for the measurement of aircraft noise and guidance for modeling of both aircraft noise and aviation emissions. A-21 established a Project Working Team to address UAM Noise.

Published noise, emissions, and fuel venting standards, as well as U.S. Federal government and inter-governmental materials relevant to this issue include but are not limited to those listed below.

FAA:

- 14 CFR §21.93(b)(c), Classification of Changes in Type Design
- Part 34, Fuel Venting and Exhaust Emission Requirements for Turbine Engine Powered Airplanes
- Combined Federal Regulations, Chapter 14, Part 36 - Noise Standards: Aircraft Type and Airworthiness Certification, Amdt. 36-31, 2017
- Part 150, Airport Noise Compatibility Planning
- Part 161 - Notice and Approval of Airport Noise and Access Restrictions
- SFAR 27-5, Fuel venting and exhaust emission requirements for turbine engine powered airplanes
- SFAR 88, Fuel Tank System Fault Tolerance Evaluation Requirements
- Advisory Circular (AC), AC 20-133, Cockpit Noise and Speech Interference Between Crewmember
- AC 34-1B, Fuel Venting and Exhaust Emission Requirements for Turbine Engine Powered Airplanes
- AC 36-2C, Measured or Estimated (Uncertificated) Airplane Noise Levels
- AC 36-4D, Noise Standards: Aircraft Type and Airworthiness Certification
- AC 91-36D, Visual Flight Rules (VFR) Flight Near Noise-Sensitive Areas
- AC 150/5020-2, Guidance on the Balanced Approach to Noise Management
- AC 91-35, Noise, Hearing Damage, and Fatigue in General Aviation Pilots

- AC 150/5020-1, Noise Control and Compatibility Planning for Airports
- AC 91-66, Noise Abatement for Helicopters
- AC 91-53A, Noise Abatement Departure Profile
- AC 91-86, Guidance on Carrying Noise Certification Documents On Board Aircraft Operating Outside the United States
- AC 93-2, Noise Levels for Aircraft used for Commercial Operations in Grand Canyon National Park Special Flight Rules Area
- Order 1050.1F, Environmental Impacts: Policies and Procedures
- Order 1100.128, Implementation of Noise Type Certification Standards
- Order 8110.35B, Aircraft Noise Certification Historical Database (RIS 8110.1)
- Order, 1100.128, Implementation of Noise Type Certification Standards
- Order 8110.4C, Type Certification
- Other regulations, ACs, Orders, Policy Statements, Special Conditions are available on the [FAA's Regulatory and Guidance Library website](#).

#### ICAO:

- Annex 2 – Rules of the Air
- Annex 8 – Airworthiness of Aircraft
- [Annex 16, Environmental Protection, Volume I – Aircraft Noise](#)
- [Annex 16, Environmental Protection, Volume II– Aircraft Engine Emissions](#)
- [Annex 16, Environmental Protection, Volume III– Aeroplane CO2 emissions](#)
- Doc 9501 - Environmental Technical Manual, Volume I, Procedures for the Noise Certification of Aircraft, 2018
- Doc 9501 - Environmental Technical Manual, Volume II, Procedures for the Emissions Certification of Aircraft Engines, 2018
- Doc 9501 - Environmental Technical Manual, Volume III, Procedures for the CO2 Emissions Certification of Aeroplanes , 2018
- Annex 18, Safe Transport of Dangerous Goods by Air
- [Noise from new aircraft concepts](#)
- [Aircraft noise](#)
- [Local air quality](#)
- [Climate change](#)

#### AIAA:

- [Aircraft noise](#)
- [Emissions](#)
- [Fuel venting](#)

#### SAE:

- [ARP1256D, Procedure for the Continuous Sampling and Measurement of Gaseous, Emissions from Aircraft Turbine Engines](#)

- [ARP1801A, Measurement of Exterior Sound Level of Specialized Aircraft Ground Support Equipment](#)
- [ARP1846A, Measurement of Far Field Noise from Gas Turbine Engines During Static Operation](#)
- [ARP4721/2, Monitoring Aircraft Noise and Operations in the Vicinity of Airports: System Validation](#)
- [ARP4721/1, Monitoring Aircraft Noise and Operations in the Vicinity of Airports: System Description, Acquisition, and Operation](#)
- [AIR5662, Method for Predicting Lateral Attenuation of Airplane Noise](#)
- [ARP4055, Ground-Plane Microphone Configuration for Propeller-Driven Light-Aircraft Noise Measurement](#)
- [ARP1279, Standard Indoor Method of Collection and Presentation of the Bare Turboshift Engine Noise Data for Use in Helicopter Installations](#)
- [AIR1935, Methods of Controlling Distortion of Inlet Airflow During Static Acoustical Tests of Turbofan Engines and Fan Rigs](#)
- [AIR1672B, Practical Methods to Obtain Free-Field Sound Pressure Levels from Acoustical Measurements Over Ground Surfaces](#)
- [AIR1081, House Noise-Reduction Measurements for Use in Studies of Aircraft Flyover Noise](#)
- [AIR1905A, Gas Turbine Coaxial Exhaust Flow Noise Prediction](#)
- [ARP876F, Gas Turbine Jet Exhaust Noise Prediction](#)
- [AIR4068B, Gas Turbine Emission Probe Factors](#)
- [ARP1179D, Aircraft Gas Turbine Engine Exhaust Smoke Measurement](#)
- [ARP1533C, Procedure for the Calculation of Gaseous Emissions from Aircraft Turbine Engines](#)

#### [A-21 Aircraft Noise Measurement Aviation Emission Modeling](#)

- [\(37 documents as of March 2020\)](#)

#### [E-31B Bleed Air Committee](#)

- [\(2 documents as of March 2020\)](#)

#### [E-31G Gaseous Committee](#)

- [\(5 documents as of March 2020\)](#)

#### [E-31P Particulate Matter Committee](#)

- [\(6 documents as of March 2020\)](#)

#### [AE-5A Aerospace Fuel, Inerting and Lubrication Sys Committee](#)

- [\(32 documents as of March 2020\)](#)

#### [AE-5B Aircraft and Engine Fuel and Lubricant Sys Components](#)

- [\(22 documents as of March 2020\)](#)

#### [AE-5C Aviation Ground Fueling Systems Committee](#)

- [\(7 documents as of March 2020\)](#)

#### [AE-5D Fuel Tank Flammability Reduction Systems Committee](#)

- [\(3 documents as of March 2020\)](#)

#### DOD:

- MIL-V-81356B(AS), Valve, Fuel System Pressurization and Vent, 1992
- [Aircraft noise](#)

#### NASA:

- [Noise](#)
- [Emission](#)
- [Fuel venting](#)

#### **In-Development Standards and Related Materials:**

#### ICAO:

- Future ICAO work on Aircraft Noise
- Annex 2 – Rules of the Air
- Annex 8 – Airworthiness of Aircraft

#### SAE:

#### [A-21 Aircraft Noise Measurement Aviation Emission Modeling](#)

- [ARP4055A](#), Ground-Plane Microphone Configuration for Propeller-Driven Light-Aircraft Noise Measurement
- [ARP1846B](#), Measurement of Far Field Noise from Gas Turbine Engines During Static Operation
- [AIR1935A](#), Methods of Controlling Distortion of Inlet Airflow During Static Acoustical Tests of Turbofan Engines and Fan Rigs
- [AIR1672C](#), Practical Methods to Obtain Free-Field Sound Pressure Levels From Acoustical Measurements Over Ground Surfaces
- [AIR1081A](#), House Noise-Reduction Measurements for Use in Studies of Aircraft Flyover Noise
- [ARP4721/2A](#), Monitoring Aircraft Noise and Operations in the Vicinity of Airports: System Validation
- [ARP4721/1A](#), Monitoring Aircraft Noise and Operations in the Vicinity of Airports: System Description, Acquisition, and Operation
- [ARP6973](#), Aircraft Noise Level Reduction Measurement of Building Facades
- [AIR5715A](#), Procedure for the Calculation of Aircraft Emissions
- [ARP1307C](#), Measurement of Exterior Noise Produced by Aircraft Auxiliary Power Units (APUs) and Associated Aircraft Systems During Ground Operation
- [AIR6183](#), Procedures for the calculation of airplane fuel consumption
- [AIR5766](#), Using Aircraft Position Data to Estimate Aircraft Thrust

E-31B Bleed Air Committee

- [\(1 work in progress as of March 2020\)](#)

E-31G Gaseous Committee

- [\(3 works in progress as of March 2020\)](#)

E-31P Particulate Matter Committee

- [\(3 works in progress as of March 2020\)](#)

AE-5A Aerospace Fuel, Inerting and Lubrication Sys Committee

- [\(15 works in progress as of March 2020\)](#)

AE-5B Aircraft and Engine Fuel and Lubricant Sys Components

- [\(7 works in progress as of March 2020\)](#)

AE-5C Aviation Ground Fueling Systems Committee

- [\(3 works in progress as of March 2020\)](#)

AE-5D Fuel Tank Flammability Reduction Systems Committee

- [\(4 works in progress as of March 2020\)](#)

ISO:

- ISO/NP 5109, Evaluation method for the resonance frequency of multi-copter UAV by measurement of rotor and body frequencies
- ISO/NP 5305, General requirement of noise measurement of lightweight and small multicopter unmanned aircraft systems (UAS)

**Gap A15: Noise, Emissions, and Fuel Venting.** No published standards have been identified that address UAS-specific noise, emissions, and fuel venting standards and requirements.

**R&D Needed:** Yes. Data would be helpful.

**Recommendation:**

- 1) Complete in-development standards.
- 2) Encourage the development of standards to address noise, emissions, and fuel venting issues for UAS. This is a necessary first step toward UAS rulemaking relating to these topics.

**Priority:** High (Tier 3)

**Organization(s):** ICAO, EPA, RTCA, SAE, AIAA, ASTM, DOD, NASA, ISO

**Status of Progress:** Not Started

**Update:**

- SAE A-21 Project Working Team for UAM Noise
- Numerous standards have been published and are in-development that address the entire spectrum of UAS and its operations.

## 6.8. Mitigation Systems for Various Hazards to UAS

Potential hazards that UAS may encounter during operations include: prop/rotor strike, foreign object debris (FOD), bird strikes and ingestion on UAS, icing, hail damage, lightning, atmospheric radiation, power lines, masts, towers, and guy-wires, etc. Standards have a role to play in mitigating potential adverse outcomes associated with these hazards. Prior to UAS operations, standards also have a role to play in mitigating foreign object damage for organizations that design, develop, and provide aviation, space, and defense products and services; and by organizations providing post-delivery support, including the provision of maintenance, spare parts, or materials for their own products and services. Avoidance of airborne collision with other users of the NAS and/or with persons and property on the ground is covered in section 6.4.3 of this roadmap. In addition, some of the hazards associated with UAS will have to be mitigated through CONOPS and Aircraft and System Development Assurance and Safety Assessment. Separation and avoidance are the absolute requirements for any aircraft (manned or unmanned) operating in the NAS.

Most hazards to manned aircraft can occur to unmanned aircraft. Therefore many standards will fall back to the design and construction. There are operational considerations for UAS, though, and there may not be standards or procedures to point back to. Hazardous conditions are affected by SWAP limitations of the aircraft and the CONOPS.

### **Published Regulations, Standards, and Related Materials:**

#### Hazard Mitigation Systems for Bird Strikes, Bird Ingestion, Rain, Hail, Foreign Object Ingestion

- Bird Strikes are covered under 14 CFR §§ 25.631, 25.571(e), 23.2320(b), 29.631, 29.573(c)(3)(d)(1)(iv), 35.36, Advisory Circulars: AC 33.76-1A, AC 150/5200-32B, Policies: PS-ANE-2001-35.31-R0, PS-AIR-33.76-01.
- Bird Ingestions are covered under § 33.76.
- Rain and hail ingestions are covered under § 33.78, AC 20-124.
- Foreign object ingestion – ice is covered under § 33.77.
- Foreign object debris (FOD)
- [Bird Strike exemptions](#)
- [Bird and Wildlife Strikes](#), Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association
- [Wildlife Strike Database and Reporting](#), FAA Wildlife Strike Database
- [Fact Sheet – FAA Wildlife Hazard Mitigation Program](#)

- [UAS Airborne Collision Severity Evaluation](#), National Institute for Aviation Research (NIAR), FAA Center of Excellence (COE) for UAS Research<sup>23</sup>
- [UAS Ground Collision Severity Evaluation](#), NIAR, FAA Center of Excellence for UAS Research<sup>24</sup>

The SAE International [S-12 Powered Lift Propulsion Committee](#) develops and maintains aerospace standards, recommended practices and other SAE technical reports related to the design, performance, installation and operation of propulsion systems for powered-lift aircraft. This committee also includes, but is not limited to, vertical powered lift aircraft as well as the propulsion system/aircraft interface, including: AIR4096 Helicopter Engine Foreign Object Damage

The SAE International [G-14 Americas Aerospace Quality Standards Committee \(AAQSC\)](#) addresses all facets of aerospace quality-design, maintenance, and in-service experience. A longer list of G-14 standards can be found chapter 6.3. Quality Assurance/Quality Control but standards include: [AS9146](#) Foreign Object Damage (FOD) Prevention Program - Requirements for Aviation, Space, and Defense Organizations.

#### Hazard Mitigation Systems for Icing

Ice protection is covered under 14 CFR §§ 25.773, 25.929, 25.1093, 25.1323, 25.1324, 25.1325, 25.1403, 25.1419, 25.1420, O25.1, 23.2165, 23.2540, 27.1093, 29.1093, 29.1419, C29.1, 33.68, B33.1, D33.1.

[ACs](#): AC 25-25A, AC 135-9, AC 120-60B, AC 135-16, AC 120-89, AC 121.321-1, AC 23.1419-2D, AC 20-113, AC 91-74B, AC 120-112, AC 25-28, AC 20-73A, AC 20-147A, AC 20-117, AC 20-29B, AC 20-95B, AC 23.1419-2D

Policies: PS-ANM-25-10, PS-ACE-23-05, [PS-ANE-2003-35-1-RO](#)

The SAE International [AC-9C Aircraft Icing Technology Committee](#) deals with all facets of aircraft inflight icing including ice protection and detection technologies and systems design, meteorological and operational environments, maintenance, regulation, certification, and in-service experience. It has a number of published standards for the manned aviation environment that may be relevant as listed below:

- [AIR1168/4B](#) SAE Aerospace Applied Thermodynamics Manual, Ice, Rain, Fog, and Frost Protection
- [AIR1667A](#) Rotor Blade Electrothermal Ice Protection Design Considerations
- [AIR4015D](#) Icing Technology Bibliography

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<sup>23</sup> The reports embedded in this hyperlink discuss hazard mitigation systems for bird and/or UAS strikes on UAS, UAS strikes on manned aviation including but not limited to persons, property and other users of the national airspace system (NAS), engine ingestion, etc.

<sup>24</sup> The reports embedded in this hyperlink are specific to UAS ground collision severity.



- [AIR4367A](#) Aircraft Inflight Ice Detectors and Icing Rate Measuring Instruments
- [AIR4906](#) Droplet Sizing Instrumentation Used in Icing Facilities
- [AIR5320A](#) Summary of Icing Simulation Test Facilities
- [AIR5396A](#) Characterizations of Aircraft Icing Conditions
- [AIR5666A](#) Icing Wind Tunnel Interfacility Comparison Tests
- [ARP5624](#) Aircraft Inflight Icing Terminology
- [ARP5903](#) Droplet Impingement and Ice Accretion Computer Codes
- [ARP5904](#) Airborne Icing Tankers
- [ARP5905](#) Calibration and Acceptance of Icing Wind Tunnels
- [AS5498A](#) Minimum Operational Performance Specification for Inflight Icing Detection Systems
- [AS5562](#) Ice and Rain Minimum Qualification Standards for Pitot and Pitot-static Probes

The SAE G-12 Aircraft Ground Deicing committee addresses all facets of aircraft ground deicing equipment, design, maintenance, operation, and in-service experience. It provides a focal point for the related activities of the various specialty groups and committees dealing with aircraft ground deicing.

- [G-12 Aircraft Ground Deicing Steering Group](#)
- [G-12ADF Aircraft Deicing Fluids](#)
- [G-12DF Deicing Facilities Committee](#)
- [G-12E Equipment Committee](#)
- [G-12FG Future Deicing Technology Committee](#)
- [G-12HOT Holdover Time Committee](#)
- [G-12M Methods Committee](#)
- [G-12 Runway Deicing Product Committee](#)
- [G-12T Training and Quality Programs Committee](#)

#### Hazard Mitigation Systems for Lightning

Lightning is covered under 14 CFR §§ 25.581, 25.954, 25.1316, 25.1317, 23.2335, 23.2515, 23.2520, 27.610, 27.954, 27.1316, 27.1317, D27.1, 29.954, 29.1316, 29.1317, E29.1, 35.38.

ACs: AC 33.4-3, AC 20-53B, AC 20-136B, AC 20-155A, AC 20-158A

Policies: ANM-111-05-004, PS-ANM100-1993-00054, PS-ANM-25.981-02, PS-ANE-2001-35.31-R0, PS-ACE-23-10, ANM-112-08-002, AIR-100-12-110-001

The scope of the SAE International [AE-2 Lightning Committee](#) covers:

- The natural lightning environment and related environment standards
- Protection of aerospace vehicles from the effects of lightning and other atmospheric electrical environments
- Means of verifying the adequacy of protection measures, and
- Standardized and other atmospheric electrical environments for lightning simulation and test methods

Potentially relevant published standards for manned aviation are listed below:

- [ARP5412B](#) Aircraft Lightning Environment and Related Test Waveforms
- [ARP5414B](#) Aircraft Lightning Zoning
- [ARP5415B](#) User's Manual for Certification of Aircraft Electrical/Electronic Systems for the Indirect Effects of Lightning
- [ARP5416A](#) Aircraft Lightning Test Methods
- [ARP5577](#) Aircraft Lightning Direct Effects Certification
- [ARP5672](#) Aircraft Precipitation Static Certification

#### Hazard Mitigation Systems for Single Event Effects

- DOT/FAA/TC-15/62 Single Event Effects Mitigation Techniques Report
- [SAE AIR6219, Development of Atmospheric Neutron Single Event Effects Analysis for Use in Safety Assessments](#)

Other Documents:

- [ICAO 9854, Global Air Traffic Management Operational Concept](#)
- MIL-STD-882 Department of Defense Standard Practice: System Safety
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 680, Aircraft Autonomous Distress Tracking (ADT)

#### **In-Development Standards/Documents:**

##### Hazard Mitigation Systems for Foreign Object Ingestion

The S-12 Committee has launched the following standards relating to mitigating foreign object powerplant ingestion:

- [AIR4096A](#) Helicopter Engine Foreign Object Damage
- [AIR6980](#) General Considerations for Rotorcraft Inlet Barrier Filter Installations
- [ARP6912](#) Substantiation of Power Available and Inlet Distortion Compliance for Rotorcraft Inlet Barrier Filter Installations

##### Hazard Mitigation Systems for Bird and UAS Strikes

The G-28 Simulants for Impact and Ingestion Testing Committee is developing and maintaining standards for simulating objects (e.g., currently artificial birds) utilized in the development and certification of structures and engines for impact or ingestion. The committee works in conjunction with defense agencies and regulatory authorities to ensure that the standards developed meet regulatory requirements for certification testing. The initial project will focus on the requirements for the manufacture of artificial birds of varying size utilized in development and certification testing. Relevant standards in development include:

- [ARP6924](#) Tests Recommended for Qualifying an Artificial Bird for Aircraft Certification Testing
- [AS6940](#) Standard Test Method for Measuring Forces During Impact of a Soft Projectile on a Rigid Flat Surface

### Hazard Mitigation Systems for Icing

In terms of UAS-specific standards, [SAE AIR6962, Ice Protection for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles](#), is in development within [SAE AC-9C](#). SAE AC-9C has a number of other potentially relevant in-development standards for manned aviation as listed below.

- [AIR1667B](#) Rotor Blade Electrothermal Ice Protection Design Considerations
- [AIR4367B](#) Aircraft Inflight Ice Detectors and Icing Rate Measuring Instruments
- [AIR4906A](#) Particle Sizing Instrumentation for Icing Cloud Characterization
- [AIR6247](#) Guidance on Selecting a Ground-based Icing Simulation Facility
- [AIR6341](#) SLD capabilities of icing wind tunnels
- [AIR6440](#) Icing Tunnel Tests for Thermal Ice Protection Systems
- [AIR6962](#) Ice Protection for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
- [AIR6974](#) Ice Crystal and Mixed Phase Icing Tunnel Testing of Air Data Probes
- [AIR6977](#) Instrumentation for Liquid, Ice and Total Water Content Measurements
- [ARP5624A](#) Aircraft Inflight Icing Terminology
- [ARP5905A](#) Calibration and Acceptance of Icing Wind Tunnels
- [ARP6455](#) Ice Shape Test Matrix Development for Unprotected Surfaces
- [ARP6901](#) Consideration for passive rotorcraft engine/APU induction system ice protection

### Hazard Mitigation Systems for Lightning

Potentially relevant in-development standards for manned aviation within SAE AE-2 are listed below.

- [ARP5414B](#) Aircraft Lightning Zoning
- [ARP5415B](#) User's Manual for Certification of Aircraft Electrical/Electronic Systems for the Indirect Effects of Lightning
- [ARP6205](#) Transport Airplane Fuel Tank and Systems Lightning Protection

**Gap A16: Mitigation Systems for Various Hazards to UAS.** There are no UAS-specific standards in the areas of hazard mitigation systems for bird strikes on UAS, engine ingestion, hail damage, water ingestion, lightning, electrical wiring, support towers, etc.

**R&D Needed:** Yes

**Recommendation:**

- 1) Complete in-development standards.
- 2) Create new standards to include hazard mitigation systems for bird strikes on UAS, engine ingestion, icing, and lightning.

**Priority:** High (Tier 2)

**Organization(s):** Various SAE Committees

**Status of Progress:** Green

**Update:** SAE has a number of standards in development as noted in the text.

## 6.9. Parachutes for Small Unmanned Aircraft

Both the DOD and NASA have used parachute systems as a safety mitigation system for safe recovery of mission critical systems such as drones, airdrop systems (personnel, food, equipment, emergency, etc.), military aircraft, etc. While measures like risk assessments, formal risk management techniques, and operational best practices are still in their infancy, proven physical safety measures like independent certified parachute systems may be the most effective means for CAAs to mitigate hazards. The reliability and performance of parachutes installed on aircraft as a hazard mitigation system has been proven by extensive use and can be applied to civil aviation as a safety enhancement to enable CAA certification for all operations, including UAS OOP.

The only available FAA regulations, “14 CFR part 105, Parachute Operations” and associated documents (AC 105-2E and TSO-C23f), address sport/personnel parachuting and do not address the design and manufacturing aspects of the parachute installed on an aircraft as a hazard mitigation system. The design and manufacturing approvals of the parachute or drag chute installed in an aircraft as a hazard mitigation system have been accomplished through the FAA’s Special Conditions provision in Type Certification.

Parachute or drag chute (drogue parachute) as a normal landing and/or hazard mitigation system in UAS OOP must properly account for anticipated risks and potential safety issues using systems engineering during the design, development, manufacturing, and assurance processes. It should also focus on integration with other users of the NAS. In order for parachute systems to facilitate adoption by a CAA for OOP, a systems approach to integrating with other users of the NAS should be followed.

**Published Regulations, Standards, and Related Materials:** The vast majority of the currently available parachute-related resources (standards, regulations, ACs, orders, etc.) from manned aviation, military, space, and satellite applications do not address the system of systems engineering used in UAS operations comprising man, machine, the NAS, and integration. Recently published is [ASTM F3322-18, Standard Specification for Small Unmanned Aircraft System \(sUAS\) Parachutes](#). ASTM F3389-20, *Test Method for Assessing the Safety of Small Unmanned Aircraft Impacts*, (previously WK56338) has been approved for publication. **(New)**

Published parachute approval standards and regulatory materials that are not specific to UAS (including military and space applications) include the following:

### FAA:

- [14 CFR §91.307, Parachutes and parachuting](#)
- Part 105, Parachute Operations
- TSO-C23f, Personnel Parachute Assemblies and Components
- AC 105-2E, Sport Parachuting

- [Powered Parachute Flying HDBK, FAA-H-8083-29, 2007](#)
- [Various FAA Special Conditions for Type Certification \(parachutes as safety mitigation\)](#)

#### SAE:

- [AS8015B](#), *Minimum Performance Standard for Parachute Assemblies and Components, Personnel*, July 7, 1992
- Parachute material standards (AMS Standards) see [AMS P Polymeric Materials Committee](#) and [AMS P-17 Polymer Matrix Composites Committee](#)

#### Technical Publications:

- [Selection and Qualification of a Parachute Recovery System for Your UAV](#), 2007-01-3928
- [Simulation of Dropping of Cargo with Parachutes](#), TBMG-1688, 2006-05-01
- [Decelerator System Simulation \(DSS\)](#), TBMG-23905, 2016-02-01

#### Parachute Industry Association (PIA):

- TS135v1.4 Performance Standards for Personnel Parachute Assemblies and Components, 2010

#### ASTM:

- [ASTM F2241-14](#), *Standard Specification for Continued Airworthiness System for powered Parachute Aircraft*
- [ASTM F2242-05\(2013\)](#), *Standard Specification for Production Acceptance Testing System for Powered Parachute Aircraft*
- [ASTM F2243-11\(2013\)](#), *Standard Specification for Required Product Information to be Provided with Powered Parachute Aircraft*
- [ASTM F2244-14](#), *Standard Specification for Design and Performance Requirements for Powered Parachute Aircraft*
- [ASTM F2316-12\(2014\)](#), *Standard Specification for Airframe Emergency Parachutes*
- [ASTM F2426-13](#), *Standard Guide on Wing Interface Documentation for Powered Parachute Aircraft*

#### DOD:

- US Navy, Parachute Recovery Systems Design Manual, March 1991
- USAF Parachute HDBK, December 1956
- USAF Recovery Systems Design Guide, December 1978
- USAF Performance of and Design Criteria for Deployable Aerodynamic Decelerators, December 1963
- USAF Parachute HDBK, ATI No. 35532, March 1951
- USAF JSSG-2010-12, Crew Systems Deployable Aerodynamic Decelerator Systems HDBK, October 30, 1998
- US Army, MIL-DTL-7567, Parachutes, Personnel, Detail Manufacturing Instructions For, October 30, 2010

NASA:

- Small Business Innovation Research contracts and deliverables, “NASA Helps Create A Parachute To Save Lives, Planes,” November 20, 2002
- NASA Parachute Recovery System for a Recorder Capsule, February 7, 1966
- Design and Drop Testing of the Capsule Parachute Assembly System Sub-Scale Drop Main Parachute, June 2017
- Orbiter Drag Chute Stability Test in the NASA/Ames 80x120 Foot Wind Tunnel, Sandia National Laboratories, SAND93- 2544, February 1994
- Aerodynamic stability and performance of next-generation parachutes for Mars descent, NASA, March 26, 2013

AIAA:

- AIAA 2007-2512, *Design and Testing of the BQM-167A Parachute Recovery System*, May 2007
- AIAA 2013-1358, *Aerodynamic Characterization of New Parachute Configurations for Low-Density Deceleration*, March 2013
- AIAA 2013-1356, *Aerodynamic Stability and Performance of Next- Generation Parachutes for Mars Descent*
- [ANSI/AIAA S-017B-2015, Aerodynamic Decelerator and Parachute Drawings](#), 2015

**In-Development Standards:**

ASTM:

- [ASTM WK65042, New Specification for Operation Over People](#)

**Gap A17: Parachute or Drag Chute as a Hazard Mitigation System in UAS Operations over People (OOP).** Standards are needed to address parachutes or drag chutes as a hazard mitigation system in UAS operations, particularly OOP, from the perspectives of FAA Type Certification (TC), Production Certificates (PC) and Airworthiness Certificates (AC).

**R&D Needed:** No

**Recommendation:** Complete work on [ASTM WK65042, New Specification for Operation Over People](#).

**Priority:** High (Tier 3)

**Organization(s):** ASTM, AIAA, SAE, PIA, DOD, NASA

**Status of Progress:** Green

**Update:** ASTM F38: F3322

## 6.10. Maintenance and Inspection

Maintenance of an aircraft or its associated equipment is essential to ensuring that which is being maintained is in an equal-to or greater-than condition for which it was originally intended and/or manufactured. Failure to maintain UAS to their originally designed conditions could invariably cause unintended harm and/or risk to the operator, NAS, and or people/property. The lack of definitive maintenance and inspection (M&I) standards for UAS introduces unnecessary risks to the NAS, operator(s), and/or people/property on the ground.

**Published Standards and Related Materials:** In terms of UAS-specific standards and related reports, there are:

### ASTM:

- [ASTM F2909-19, Standard Specification for Continued Airworthiness of Lightweight Unmanned Aircraft Systems \(New\)](#)
- [ASTM F3366-19, Standard Specification for General Maintenance Manual \(GMM\) for a small Unmanned Aircraft System \(sUAS\) \(New\)](#)
- [ASSURE, A.5 UAS Maintenance, Modification, Repair, Inspection, Training, and Certification Considerations Task 4: Draft Technical Report of UAS Maintenance Technician Training Criteria and Draft Certification Requirements, 6 Nov 2017, Final Report](#)
- [ISO 21384-3:2019, Unmanned Aircraft Systems – Part 3: Operational Procedures \(New\)](#)

In terms of general aviation standards, there are in ASTM F39.02:

- [F2696-14\(2019\), Standard Practice for Inspection of Aircraft Electrical Wiring Systems](#)
- [F2799-14, Standard Practice for Maintenance of Aircraft Electrical Wiring Systems](#)

In ASTM F46.02:

- [F3245-17, Standard Guide for Aircraft Electronics Technician Personal Certification](#)

### SAE:

Standards under SAE's [HM-1 Integrated Vehicle Health Management Committee](#) include:

- [AIR6212, Use of Health Monitoring Systems to Detect Aircraft Exposure to Volcanic Events](#)
- [ARD6888, Functional Specification of Miniature Connectors for Health Monitoring Purposes](#)
- [ARP5783, Health and Usage Monitoring Metrics, Monitoring the Monitor](#)
- [ARP6275, Determination of Cost Benefits from Implementing an Integrated Vehicle Health Management System](#)
- [ARP6803, IVHM Concepts, Technology and Implementation Overview](#)
- [AS4831A, Software Interfaces for Ground-Based Monitoring Systems](#)
- [AS5391A, Helicopter Health and Usage Monitoring System Accelerometer Interface Specification](#)
- [AS5392, Health and Usage Monitoring System, Rotational System Indexing Sensor Specification](#)
- [AS5393, Health and Usage Monitoring System, Blade Tracker Interface Specification](#)
- [AS5394, Health and Usage Monitoring System, Advanced Multipoint Interface Specification](#)

- [AS5395, Health and Usage Monitoring System Data Interchange Specification](#)
- [JA6268 201804, Design & Run-Time Information Exchange for Health-Ready Components](#)

Standards under the [G-11M Maintainability, Supportability and Logistics Committee](#) include:

- [AIR4276A, Survey results: Computerization of Reliability, Maintainability and Supportability \(RM&S\) in Design](#)
- [JA1010/1 201105, Maintainability Program Standard Implementation Guide](#)
- [JA1010 201108, Maintainability Program Standard](#)
- [JA1011 200908, Evaluation Criteria for Reliability-Centered Maintenance \(RCM\) Processes](#)
- [JA1012 201108, A Guide to the Reliability-Centered Maintenance \(Rcm\) Standard](#)

Standards under the [E-32 Aerospace Propulsion Systems Health Management Committee](#) include:

- [AIR1828C](#), Guide to Engine Lubrication System Monitoring
- [AIR1871C](#), Lessons Learned from Developing, Implementing, and Operating a Health Management System for Propulsion and Drive Train Systems
- [AIR1900A](#), Guide to Temperature Monitoring in Aircraft Gas Turbine Engines
- [AIR4174A](#), A Guide to Aircraft Power Train Monitoring
- [AIR46B](#), The Preparation and Use of Chromel-Alumel Thermocouples for Aircraft Gas Turbine Engines
- [AIR4985](#), A Methodology for Quantifying the Performance of an Engine Monitoring System
- [AIR5317A](#), A Guide to APU Health Management
- [AIR5871](#), Prognostics for Gas Turbine Engines
- [AIR5909](#), Prognostic Metrics for Engine Health Management Systems
- [AIR65](#), Thermoelectric Circuits and the Performance of Several Aircraft Engine Thermocouples
- [ARP1587B](#), Aircraft Gas Turbine Engine Health Management System Guide
- [ARP1839](#), A Guide to Aircraft Turbine Engine Vibration Monitoring Systems
- [ARP485A](#), Temperature Measuring Devices Nomenclature
- [ARP5120](#), Aircraft Gas Turbine Engine Health Management System Development and Integration Guide
- [ARP5987](#), A Process for Utilizing Aerospace Propulsion Health Management Systems for Maintenance Credit
- [ARP690](#), Standard Exposed Junction Thermocouple for Controlled Conduction Errors in Measurement of Air or Exhaust Gas Temperature

[SAE Life Cycle Logistics Supportability \(LCLS\) Committee](#)

- SAE [TA-STD-0017](#), *Product Support Analysis (PSA)*
- SAE [AS1390](#), *Level of Repair Analysis (LORA)*
- SAE [GEIA-STD-0007](#), *Logistics Product Data (LPD)*



#### SAE-ITC:

- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 614, Standard Firmware Loader for Avionics Shops
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 669, Guidance for Lead-Based Soldering, Repair and Rework
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 671, Guidance for the Transition to Lead-Free Soldering, Maintenance, and Repair
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 673, Guidance for the Use of UHF Radio Frequency Identification (RFID)
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 676, Guidance for Assignment, Accomplishment, and Reporting of Special (Engineering) Investigation for Aircraft Components
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 827, Electronic Distribution of Software by Crate (EDS Crate)
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 847, Product Development Guidance for Maintainability and Testability(PDMaT)
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 849, Data Loading Specifications for Aircraft Components
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 436-1, Guidelines for Electronic Qualification Test Guide
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 602A-2, Test Equipment Guidance
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 602B, Test Equipment Guidance
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 604-1, Guidance for Design and Use of Built-In Test Equipment (BITE)
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 606-1, Guidance for Electrostatic Sensitive Device Utilization and Protection
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 606A, Guidance for Electrostatic Sensitive Utilization and Protection
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 624-1, Design Guidance for Onboard Maintenance System
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 625-3, Industry Guide For Component Test Development and Management
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 625-4D7, Industry Guide for Component Test Development and Management
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 626-3, Standard ATLAS Language for Modular Test
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 627-2, Programmers Guide for SMART TM Systems Using ARINC 626 ATLAS
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 644A, Portable Multi-Purpose Access Terminal (PMAT)
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 663-1, Data Requirements for Avionics Component Maintenance
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 668-1, Guidance For Tool and Test Equipment (TTE) Equivalency

**In-Development Standards:** In terms of UAS-specific standards in development, there are:

#### ASTM:

- [WK60659, New Guide for Lightweight UAS Maintenance Technician Qualification](#)
- [WK62734, New Specification for Specification for the Development of Maintenance Manual for Lightweight UAS](#)

In terms of general aviation standards, there are:

- [WK30359, New Specification for Light Sport Aircraft Manufacturers Continued Operational Safety \(COS\) Monitoring Program](#), under ASTM F37.70
- [WK55298, New Guide for Classifying Alterations for In-Service Aircraft under FAA Authority Oversight](#), under ASTM F39.02

SAE:

Aerospace standards under SAE's [HM-1 Integrated Vehicle Health Management Committee](#) include:

- [AIR6334, A Power Usage Metric for Rotorcraft Power Train Transmissions](#)
- [AIR6900, Applicable Integrated Vehicle Health Monitoring \(IVHM\) Regulations, Policy, and Guidance Documents](#)
- [AIR6904, Data Interoperability for IVHM](#)
- [AIR6915, Implementation of IVHM, Human Factors and Safety Implications](#)
- [AIR8012, Prognostics and Health Management Guidelines for Electro-Mechanical Actuators](#)
- [ARP6290, Guidelines for the Development of Architectures for Integrated Vehicle Health Management Systems](#)
- [ARP6407, Integrated Vehicle Health Management Design Guidelines](#)
- [ARP6883, Guidelines for Writing IVHM Requirements for Aerospace Systems](#)
- [ARP6887, Verification & Validation of Integrated Vehicle Health Management Systems and Software](#)

Aerospace standards under SAE's [E-32 Aerospace Propulsion Systems Health Management Committee](#) include:

- [AIR1871D](#), Lessons Learned from Developing, Implementing, and Operating a Health Management System for Propulsion and Drive Train Systems
- [AIR1900B](#), Guide to Temperature Monitoring in Aircraft Gas Turbine Engines
- [AIR4176B](#), Cost Versus Benefits of Engine Monitoring Systems
- [AIR46C](#), The Preparation and Use of Chromel-Alumel Thermocouples for Aircraft Gas Turbine Engines
- [AIR5871A](#), Prognostics for Aerospace Propulsion Systems
- [AIR7999](#), Diagnostic and Prognostic Metrics for Engine Health Management Systems
- [ARP6835](#), Propulsion System Monitoring for Continued Airworthiness

[AS-3 Fiber Optics and Applied Photonics Committee:](#)

- [ARP5061A](#), Guidelines for Testing and Support of Aerospace, Fiber Optic, Inter-Connect Systems
- [ARP6283](#), In-Service Fiber Optic Inspection, Evaluation and Cleaning, Best Practices, Physical Contact Termini
- [AIR6031](#), Fiber Optic Cleaning

**Gap A18: Maintenance and Inspection (M&I) of UAS.** M&I standards for UAS are needed.

**R&D Needed:** No

**Recommendation:** Complete work on standards in development to address M&I for all UAS.

**Priority:** High (Tier 2)

**Organization(s):** ASTM, ISO, SAE

**Status of Progress:** Green

**Update:** Numerous standards have been published and are in-development that address the entire spectrum of UAS and its operations.

## **6.11. Enterprise Operations: Level of Automation/Autonomy and Artificial Intelligence (AI)**

One of the most challenging issues in manned and unmanned aviation is the incorporation of fully autonomous flights of an enterprise or fleet of aircraft/UAS within the scope of airworthiness approvals such as Type Certificate (TC), Production Certificate (PC), and Airworthiness Certificate (AC). Observability, predictability, and intervention, when required, are the main factors in trusting and accepting fully autonomous flights. There is a lack of consensus on a certification process and a significant research gap in the area of enterprise level automation.

Until the existing regulatory framework [i.e., Parts 25, 27 and 29, Equipment Function and installation (XX.1301, 23.2505) - Equipment, systems, and installations (XX.1309, 23.2510)] is validated for its sufficiency and applicability to enable fully autonomous flights, the UAS community comprising the U.S. government, aviation industry, and other end users must use the existing regulatory framework for certification of the enterprise operations of aircraft/UA.

The scope of this section is to describe enterprise level automation as it relates to the technological and regulatory gaps in the ANSI UASSC Roadmap. It does not address technical terminologies and definitions of words such as autonomous, autonomy, AI, automation. Those terms are or will be covered in the SDOs' standards (such as the published SAE ARP94910, ARP6128, and AIR5665B standards) and various other publicly available documents. However, it must be clarified that there are significant differences between "fully autonomous" and "fully automated" systems. Within those technical definitions, there are implications on pilot priorities and tasking that is beyond the scope of this discussion. It is important for UAS standards development that a consensus be reached on standard, uniform, consistent, harmonized/aligned definitions. It is unclear if current standards on system safety and software such as [MIL-STD-882E](#), [SAE ARP4761](#), [SAE ARP4754A](#), [SAE ARP5150](#), [DO-178C](#), etc. are sufficient to address fully autonomous flights of an enterprise or fleet of UAS from airborne, land and sea launches. Therefore, the S-18UAS Autonomy Working Group/EUROCAE WG-63, the Joint International Committee is developing *AIR7121 Applicability of Existing Development Assurance and System Safety Practices to Unmanned Aircraft Systems*. Similarly, with harmonization and collaboration with S-18/WG-63, S-18UAS Autonomy WG/WG-63, G-32, and WG-72, G-34/WG-114 is developing *AIR6987, Artificial Intelligence in Aeronautical Systems: Taxonomy*; *AIR6988, Artificial Intelligence in Aeronautical Systems: Statement of Concerns*; and [AS6983, Process Standard for Development and Certification/Approval of Aeronautical Safety-Related Products Implementing AI](#); among others, to address the artificial intelligence (AI) in the entire aviation eco-system (including but not limited to ATM/Ground Solutions and Aircraft/UAS). The SAE G-34/WG-114 is addressing AI in line with [Executive Order on Maintaining American Leadership in](#)

[Artificial Intelligence](#). Questions remain whether the existing regulatory framework (XX.1301/1309, 23.2505/2510) needs to be changed or new regulations need to be added to accommodate fully autonomous flights.

The following are some of the challenges/issues related to fully autonomous flights:

- Self-separation/deconfliction between cooperative and non-cooperative aircraft
- Right of way operations/yielding to manned aviation, or least maneuverable flight systems
- ATC management with respect to integration of manned aviation and emergency operations (MEDVAC, distressed aircraft/operators, aerial firefighting, etc.) involving UAS
- Lost link procedures during emergency operations
- Environmental and privacy considerations
- Charting activities such as updating and/or creating new aeronautical charts
- Major airport routings/re-routings especially in Class B/C airspace in close proximity to dense urban areas
- Air routes (existing vs. new ones)
- Mass volume of UAS operations requiring separation, safety, and efficiency in the NAS
- Air traffic flow control (safeguards to not allow aircraft to run out of fuel)
- Will air traffic controllers become the “manager of ATC systems” in the future state of fully autonomous flights of enterprises/fleets of UAS?
- What will be the role of Low Altitude Authorization and Notification Capability (LAANC) in the future state? The current role is limited to Part 107 operations within controlled airspace such as Class-D, C, B, and surface-E.
- Can this technology be also implemented/installed in the manned aviation environment, keeping manned aviation pilots as OPA<sup>25</sup> pilots? Will this incur change in ATC management?
- Short-, intermediate-, and long-term strategies for the integration of autonomous operations based on the development and deployment of technology solutions and community acceptance
- Autonomous UAS will require fail-safe systems to insure safe operations in all of the approved environmental conditions.
- Autonomous UAS flights present an operational risk for other UAS and manned aircraft operations. Will the existing Operational Risk Assessment method and procedures work for fully automated flights of UAS?

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<sup>25</sup> Per FAA Order 8130.34D, an Optionally Piloted Aircraft (OPA) is a manned aircraft that can be flown or controlled by the onboard pilot in command or by another individual from a location not onboard the aircraft.

**Published Laws, Regulations, Standards, and Related Materials:** The below standards and regulations from the U.S. government and other sources can be the starting point for introducing fully autonomous flights.

FAA Regulations/Documents:

- [FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018](#). Sec. 548. Sense of Congress on Artificial Intelligence in Aviation
- [14 CFR §23.2505, Function and installation; §23.2510, Equipment, systems, and installations§XX.1301, Function and installation \(14 CFR parts 25, 27, 29\)](#)
- [§XX.1309, Equipment, systems, and installations \(14 CFR parts 25, 27, 29\)](#)
- [§25.1302, Installed systems and equipment for use by the flightcrew](#)
- [§23.2500, Airplane level systems requirements; §23.2600, Flightcrew interface](#)
- [§21.17\(b\), Designation of applicable regulations for Special Classes of Aircraft§107.35, Operation of multiple small UA; §107.205\(e\), List of regulations subject to waiver](#)
- [§§91.111, 91.113, 91.115, 107.37, 107.51](#)
- [TSO-C211, TSO-C212, TSO-C213](#)
- [LAANC; UAS Traffic Management \(UTM\); NextGen/Modernization of the U.S. NAS](#)
- [FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018 – 5 Year \(2018-2023\)](#)

Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) Documents:

- [Fast Lightweight Autonomy \(FLA\) Program](#)
- [Launch and Recover Multiple Reusable Drones from a C-130](#)
- [OFFensive Swarm-Enabled Tactics \(OFFSET\)](#)

DOD Documents:

- [DOD Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap 2017-2042](#)

NASA Documents:

- [Safe Autonomous Flight Environment for the Notional Last "50 ft" of Operation of "55 lb" Class of UAS, 2017](#)
- [Towards A Computational Framework for Autonomous Decision-Making in UAVs, 2017](#)
- [NASA And MTSI To Develop Framework For Autonomous Aircraft That Can Be Used To Achieve FAA Certification, October 16, 2018](#)
- [Certification Considerations for Adaptive Systems. NASA/CR–2015-218702, NASA](#)

EASA Documents:

- [Artificial Intelligence Roadmap: A human centric approach to AI in aviation](#) (February 2020, version 1.0)
- [Concepts of Design Assurance for Neural Networks \(CoDANN\)](#) (March 31, 2020, version 1.0)

Single European Sky ATM Research (SESAR) Joint Undertaking Documents:

- [The Fly AI Report: Demystifying and Accelerating AI in Aviation/ATM](#) (March 5, 2020)

#### AIAA Documents:

- [Standards for space automation and robotics, Space Programs and Technologies Conference, AIAA SPACE Forum, 1992](#)
- [System Automation of a DA42 General Aviation Aircraft \(AIAA 2018-3984\)](#)

#### ASTM International Documents:

- [TR1-EB, \*Autonomy Design and Operations in Aviation: Terminology and Requirements Framework\*](#) was published in June 2019. This technical report was prepared by Technical Committees F37 on Light Sport Aircraft, F38 on Unmanned Aircraft Systems, F39 on Aircraft Systems, and F44 on General Aviation Aircraft. This work is coordinated by ASTM Task Group AC377 on Autonomy Design and Operations in Aviation.

#### IEEE Documents:

- [Intelligent control for near-autonomous aircraft missions, 2001](#)
- [Autonomous aircraft operations to managed airspace transfer management tool \(T-MAT\)](#)
- [Intelligent systems for autonomous aircraft, 2000](#)
- [A model for types and levels of human interaction with automation, 2000](#)

#### RTCA Documents:

- RTCA DO-344 Volume 2-Appendices F & G - Operational and Functional Requirements and Safety Objectives for UAS Standards, 2013

#### SAE International Documents:

##### S-18, Aircraft and Systems Development and Safety Assessment Committee

- [ARP4754A](#), *Guidelines for Development of Civil Aircraft and Systems*
- [ARP4761](#), *Guidelines And Methods For Conducting The Safety Assessment Process On Civil Airborne Systems And Equipment*
- [AIR6219](#), *Development of Atmospheric Neutron Single Event Effects Analysis for Use in Safety Assessments*
- [ARP5150A](#), *Safety Assessment of Transport Airplanes in Commercial Service*
- [ARP5151A](#), *Safety Assessment of General Aviation Airplanes and Rotorcraft in Commercial Service*
- [AIR6110](#), *Contiguous Aircraft/System Development Process Example*
- [AIR6218](#), *Constructing Development Assurance Plan for Integrated Systems*

##### AS-4JAUS, Joint Architecture for Unmanned Systems Committee

- [AS8024](#), *JAUS Autonomous Capabilities Service Set*
- [AIR5665B](#), *Architecture Framework for Unmanned Systems*
- [ARP6128](#), *Unmanned Systems Terminology Based on the ALFUS Framework*
- [AIR5645A](#), [AIR5664A](#), [ARP6012A](#), [ARP6227](#), [AS5669A](#), [AS5684B](#), [AS5710A](#), [AS6009A](#), [AS6040](#), [AS6057A](#), [AS6060](#), [AS6062A](#), [AS6091](#),

#### AS-4UCS, Unmanned Systems Control Segment Architecture

- [AIR6514, AIR6515, AIR6516, AIR6517, AIR6519, AIR6520, AIR6521, AS6512, AS6513, AS6518, AS6522, AS6969, AS6969 DA](#)

#### A-6A3 Flight Control and Vehicle Management Systems Cmt

- [ARP94910, Aerospace - Vehicle Management Systems - Flight Control Design, Installation and Test of, Military Unmanned Aircraft, Specification Guide For](#)

#### Systems Management Council

- [CRB1](#), Managing the Development of Artificial Intelligence Software

#### Driver Vehicle Interface (DVI) Committee

- [J3077\\_201512](#), Definitions and Data Sources for the Driver Vehicle Interface (DVI)

#### Driving Automation Systems Committee

- [J3114\\_201612](#), Human Factors Definitions for Automated Driving and Related Research Topics

#### G-10U Unmanned Aerospace Vehicle Committee

- [ARP5707](#), Pilot Training Recommendations for Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Civil Operations

#### On-Road Automated Driving (ORAD) committee

- [J3016\\_201806](#), Taxonomy and Definitions for Terms Related to Driving Automation Systems for On-Road Motor Vehicles, 2018

#### SAE ITC ARINC

- [SAE-ITC ARINC IA 680](#), Aircraft Autonomous Distress Tracking (ADT)
- [ARINC 400, ARINC 500, ARINC 600, ARINC 700, ARINC 800 Series](#)

#### Underwriters Laboratories, Inc. Documents:

- [UL 4600, Standard for Evaluation of Autonomous Products](#) published on April 1, 2020 **(New)**

#### Boeing Documents:

- Autonomous Systems - The Future in Aerospace, Boeing Defense, Space & Security, 2017
- [Boeing's MQ-25 brings the combination of refueling, autonomy and seamless carrier deck integration](#)
- [Aurora Flight Sciences activities – UAS Sector - Autonomy](#)
- [Boeing HorizonX activities](#)

#### Lockheed Martin Documents:

- [Anatomy of an Autonomous Mission](#)
- [Autonomous and Unmanned Systems](#)

#### Northrop Grumman Documents:

- [Northrop Grumman's autonomous helicopter](#)

- [Autonomous Systems](#)

#### Various Other Documents:

- [Autonomous UAS: A Partial Solution To America's Future Airpower Needs, Air University, USAF, 2010](#)
- [US Air Force wants autonomous air-to-air collision avoidance system on F-35, 2018](#)
- [Autonomy: The Future of Aerial Combat, 2017](#)
- [Air Force looking at autonomous systems to aid war fighters, 2016](#)
- [US Navy MQ-25 \(Design and Make by Boeing\) for Persistent, Sea-Based Aerial Refueling UAS](#)
- [Human and computer control of undersea teleoperators, Navy, 1978](#)
- [Federal automated vehicles policy, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 2016](#)
- [Developing Safety-Critical Software: A Practical Guide for Aviation Software and DO-178C Compliance, CRC Press, 2013](#)

#### **In-Development Standards and Related Materials:**

##### SAE International Activities/Documents:

##### S-18UAS Autonomy WG / EUROCAE WG-63 (in collaboration with WG-105)

- [AIR7121, Applicability of Existing Development Assurance and System Safety Practices to Unmanned Aircraft Systems](#)

##### SAE S-18/EUROCAE WG-63, Aircraft and System Development and Safety Assessment Committee

- [AS7209, Development Assurance Objectives for Aerospace Vehicles and Systems](#)
- [ARP4754B, Guidelines for Development of Civil Aircraft and Systems](#)
- [ARP4761A, Guidelines And Methods For Conducting The Safety Assessment Process On Civil Airborne Systems And Equipment](#)
- [AIR6913, Using STPA During Development and Safety Assessment of Civil Aircraft](#)
- [AIR6276, Use of Modeling and Tools for Aircraft Systems Development - A Strategy for Development Assurance Aspects with Examples](#)

##### SAE G-32, Cyber Physical Systems Security Committee

- [JA7496, Cyber Physical Systems Security Engineering Plan \(CPSSEP\)](#)
- [JA6678, Cyber Physical Systems Security Software Assurance](#)
- [JA6801, Cyber Physical Systems Security Hardware Assurance](#)

##### SAE G-34 / EUROCAE WG-114, Artificial Intelligence in Aviation Committee

- [AS6983, Process Standard for Development and Certification/Approval of Aeronautical Safety-Related Products Implementing AI](#)
- [AIR6988, Artificial Intelligence in Aeronautical Systems: Statement of Concerns](#)
- [AIR6987, Artificial Intelligence in Aeronautical Systems: Taxonomy](#)

##### AS-4JAUS Joint Architecture for Unmanned Systems Committee

- [AS5710B, JAUS Core Service Set](#)



- [AS6060A, JAUS Environment Sensing Service Set](#)
- [AS6111, JAUS Unmanned Maritime Vehicle Service Set](#)

#### [AS-4UCS Unmanned Systems Control Segment Architecture](#)

- [AS6513A, Unmanned Systems \(UxS\) Control Segment \(UCS\) Architecture: Conformance Specification](#)
- [AS6512A, Unmanned Systems \(UxS\) Control Segment \(UCS\) Architecture: Architecture Description](#)
- [AS6518A, UxS Control Segment \(UCS\) Architecture: UCS Architecture Model](#)
- [AIR6520A, Unmanned Systems \(UxS\) Control Segment \(UCS\) Architecture: Version Description Document](#)
- [AS6522A, UxS Control Segment \(UCS\) Architecture: Architecture Technical Governance](#)
- [AS6969A, Data Dictionary for Quantities Used in Cyber Physical Systems](#)

#### [A-6A3 Flight Control and Vehicle Management Systems Cmt](#)

- [ARP94910A, Aerospace - Vehicle Management Systems - Flight Control Design, Installation and Test of, Military Unmanned Aircraft, Specification Guide For](#)

#### ASTM International Documents:

- [WK63418, New Specification for Service provided under UTM](#) Is being developed by ASTM F38.02
- AC377 Autonomy Design and Operations in Aviation has 2 technical reports in development:
  - TR2-EB, *Developmental Pillars of Increased Autonomy for Aircraft Systems*, is approved/under copy edit for expected publication in August 2020.
  - TR3-EB, *Regulatory Barriers to Autonomy in Aviation*, is expected to reach publication in Q4 2020.

#### **Gap A19: Enterprise Operations: Level of Automation/Autonomy and Artificial Intelligence (AI).**

Neither the current regulatory framework nor existing standards support fully autonomous flights at this time.

**R&D Needed:** Yes

#### **Recommendation:**

- 1) Develop standards and guidelines for the safety, performance, and interoperability of fully autonomous flights, taking into account all relevant factors needed to support the seamless integration of UAS into the NAS. These include: type of aircraft/UA, operators/pilots/crew, air traffic controllers, airspace service suppliers/providers, lost link procedures, human factors/human-machine interactions as well as levels of human intervention, etc.
- 2) Encourage the development of standards to address fully autonomous flights, per the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018 and the needs of the UAS industry and end users.
- 3) Encourage the development of consistent, uniform, harmonized, standardized, and aviation field-acceptable definitions of terms like autonomy, automation, autonomous, AI, machine learning, deep learning, etc. This will lay a foundation for identification of correct and incorrect definitions/terminologies.

**Priority:** High (Tier 2)

**Organization(s):** SAE, SAE ITC ARINC, RTCA, AIAA, ASTM, DOD, NASA, FCC, Aerospace Vehicle Systems Institute (AVSI), UL, ISO/IEC JTC1/SC42

**Status of Progress:** Green

**Update:**

- SAE S-18UAS Autonomy WG/EUROCAE WG-63: AIR7121
- SAE G-34/EUROCAE WG-114: AS6983, AIR6987, AIR6988
- SAE AS-4JAUS: AS8024
- SAE S-18/EUROCAE WG-63: various standards
- Underwriters Laboratories: UL 4600

## 6.12. Blockchain for UAS

Blockchain, probably the best-known type of Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT), readily allows for the introduction of trust into a group or network. A blockchain bundles transactions into blocks that are chained together and broadcasts them to the nodes in the network. DLT is a digital system for recording the transaction of assets in which the transactions and their details are recorded in multiple places at the same time. Unlike traditional databases, distributed ledgers have no central data store or administration functionality. In a distributed ledger, each node processes and verifies every item, thereby generating a record of each item and creating a consensus on each item's veracity. A distributed ledger can be used to record static data, such as a registry, and dynamic data, i.e., transactions. This computer architecture represents a significant revolution in record-keeping by changing how information is gathered and communicated.

Standard technical implementations and architectures are critical to wide deployment of blockchain technologies. In the absence of these, the focus in industry has largely been on specific project applications as opposed to technological innovations. As an example, widely used technologies, such as Hyperledger Fabric, R3's Corda, and Ethereum, all employ different and sometimes incompatible protocols. Translating one to the other can be complicated and risky – that is, these technologies do not easily communicate with one another.

Digital technology will be playing an ever more important role in the aerospace industry. Many organizations are focusing on technologies that enable a broad range of opportunities, including digital thread, digital twin, the Internet of Things, and big data analytics to drive productivity and quality and cost improvements throughout the product lifecycle. The blockchain technology is expected to be critical in shaping a digitally integrated approach to design, manufacturing, operations, supply chain, and maintenance through consensus standards and other documents such as recommended practices and information reports.

## Published Documents:

### U.S. DOT:

- [Blockchain for Unmanned Aircraft Systems](#), 4/15/2020

### SAE International:

#### [G-31 Electronic Transactions for Aerospace Committee](#)

- [AIR6904, Rationale, Considerations, and Framework for Data Interoperability for Health Management within the Aerospace Ecosystem](#)

### International Air Transport Association (IATA):

- [Blockchain in Aviation, Exploring the Fundamentals, Use Cases, and Industry Initiatives](#), 2018

### Blockchain in Transport Alliance (BiTA):

[BiTA](#), an industry consortia comprised primarily from the freight, transportation, logistics and affiliated industries, has published:

- [BiTAS Std 120-2019: LOCATION COMPONENT SPECIFICATION](#)
- [BiTAS Tracking Data Framework Profile](#)

**In-Development Standards and Activities:** SAE G-31 and SAE-ITC are addressing blockchain in the aviation ecosystem (including but not limited to UAS and its operations into the NAS) supporting interoperability and data interchanges. ISO/TC 307 and IEEE are addressing cross-industry blockchain to support interoperability and data interchanges among users, applications and systems in all industry sectors. More detail follows below.

### SAE International Standards:

[G-31 Electronic Transactions for Aerospace Committee](#): Serves as a consensus forum that compliments industry efforts and does not contradict existing standards, to gather, develop, record, and publish expert information on the use and application of groundbreaking digital technologies for aerospace. It comprises of airlines, aircraft manufacturers, component manufacturers, maintenance repair organizations (MRO), regulatory authorities, among others, to establish consensus standards for sharing electronic data within the aerospace community. All aspects of digital data and its use in the aerospace industry will be considered, including accuracy, traceability, security, integrity, regulations, and policies.

### The SAE G-31 committee will:

- Improve digital solutions to store, move, and access product lifecycle data and streamline technical supply chain data
- Enable the ability of different authorized components, systems, IT, software, applications and organizations to securely communicate, exchange data, interpret data, use the information, and derive consistent insight from the data that has been exchanged to derive value
- Enable the data transfer necessary to support maintenance, logistics, operation and engineering

Below are In-development standards:

- [AIR7501, Digital Data Standards in Aircraft Life Cycle](#)
- [ARP6984, Determination of Cost Benefits from Implementing a Blockchain Solution](#)
- [ARP6823, Electronic Transactions for Aerospace Systems; An Overview](#)

[SAE-Industries Technology Consortia \(SAE-ITC\):](#)

ExchangeWell: The ExchangeWell program provides blockchain based digital data management and marketplace services. The current application is in aerospace supply chain, parts qualification ([ASPQP/TS200](#)) and parts exchange but is expanding into additive materials lineage and characterization (AMS-AMDC) and health-ready components ([HRCs](#)). The capability is application independent and therefore applicable to large data pools that would include multiple OEMs, suppliers and vendors. Utilizing the associated security protocols and features, the service manages data separation, as would be found, for example, with the need to keep proprietary data separated from public data, etc.

International Organization for Standardization (ISO): [ISO Technical Committee 307 \(ISO/TC 307\), Blockchain and Distributed Ledger Technologies](#) established in 2016, is working on international standards to support interoperability and data interchanges among users, applications and systems in all sectors. Areas of activity include reference architecture, data definitions, security, privacy and identity. Representation in ISO is on a national member body basis.

IEEE: The IEEE Consumer Electronics Society (CES) has been actively pursuing [blockchain standardization efforts](#) through various activities in multiple industry sectors.

- [IEEE blockchain standards projects](#)

**New Gap A21: Blockchain for UAS.** There are no published industry standards for blockchain in the aviation ecosystem (including but not limited to UAS).

**R&D Needed:** Yes

**Recommendation:** Complete in-development standards and write new standards to address blockchain for UAS.

**Priority:** Medium

**Organizations:** SAE International, SAE-ITC, ISO, IEEE

## 7. Flight Operations Standards: General Concerns – WG2

### 7.1. Privacy

Drone operations and data collection capabilities give rise to a number of concerns related to the protection of personally identifiable information (PII) and privacy for drone operators and/or the general public<sup>26</sup> including:

- Location tracking (license plate readers, thermal imaging, facial recognition) and data profiling
- Government surveillance
- Drones “spying” on/recording people at home or in their yard without their consent
- Unauthorized individuals illegally employing C-UAS measures because of privacy concerns
- Data collection/data management related to tracking UAS operations
- Protecting the privacy and security of the UAS operator in accordance with applicable laws

A February 15, 2015, [Presidential Memorandum: Promoting Economic Competitiveness While Safeguarding Privacy, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties in Domestic Use of Unmanned Aircraft Systems](#) (2015 Presidential Memorandum) mandated that “information must be collected, used, retained, and disseminated consistent with the Constitution, Federal law, and other applicable regulations and policies,” including compliance with the Privacy Act of 1974. Section 1(a) of the 2015 Presidential Memorandum specified that U.S. federal government agencies must “examine their existing UAS policies and procedures relating to the collection, use, retention, and dissemination of information obtained by UAS, to ensure that privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties are protected” prior to deploying new UAS technology and at least every three years. Agencies were directed to update their policies and procedures or issue new ones in accordance with requirements spelled out in the memorandum. Section 1(c) of the 2015 Presidential Memorandum required “state, local, tribal, and territorial government recipients of Federal grant funding for the purchase or use of UAS for their own operations” have policies and procedures relating to the collection, use, retention, and dissemination of information obtained by UAS prior to utilizing the funds. Agencies were directed to make publicly available an annual summary of their UAS operations.

A separate component of the 2015 Presidential Memorandum was the establishment of “a multi-stakeholder engagement process to develop and communicate best practices for privacy, accountability, and transparency issues regarding commercial and private UAS use in the NAS.” NTIA was directed to lead this effort in consultation with other agencies and the private sector. The result of this process, [Voluntary Best Practices for UAS Privacy, Transparency, and Accountability: Consensus, Stakeholder-](#)

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<sup>26</sup> Kaminski, Margot E. [“Enough With the ‘Sunbathing Teenager’ Gambit,”](#) *Slate*. May 17, 2016.

[Drafted Best Practices Created in the NTIA-Convened Multistakeholder Process \(May 18, 2016\)](#), is an informative reference on this topic. It is not intended to replace or take precedence over any local, state, or federal law or regulation; or take precedence over contractual obligations; or serve as a basis for future statutory or regulatory obligations.

At the state and local level, a range of positions on privacy policy exist in jurisdictions around the nation.<sup>27</sup> At the federal level, there is legislation being considered within the U.S. Congress ([S.631 - Drone Aircraft Privacy and Transparency Act of 2017](#)), but it appears that it may not have drone industry support.<sup>28</sup> Developments such as the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) in Europe may impact the policy discussion. On the judicial front, the D.C. Circuit ruled in June 2018 that the Electronic Privacy Information Center lacked standing to compel the FAA to establish privacy rules for drones.<sup>29</sup>

In its [2017 final report](#), the FAA's UAS Identification and Tracking (UAS ID) ARC recommended "the United States government be the sole keeper of any PII collected or submitted in connection with new UAS ID and tracking requirements." The ARC Members also noted that they were unable to fully address the issue of privacy during the UAS ID ARC, thus "[t]he privacy of all individuals (including operators and customers) should be addressed, and privacy should be a consideration during the rulemaking for remote ID and tracking."

Recognizing the desire of some operators to limit the availability of real-time ADS-B position and identification information for specific aircraft, the FAA initiated the Privacy ICAO Address (PIA) program to improve the privacy of certain [eligible aircraft](#) beginning in 2020.

The [FAA's December 31, 2019 NPRM on Remote ID](#) includes a privacy impact assessment.<sup>30</sup> Sections with privacy implications include: "the registration of the UAS with the FAA, the transmission of data from the UAS to Remote ID USS [UAS Service Suppliers], the broadcast of data from standard remote identification UAS to any person capable of receiving broadcasts, the use of PII in the manufacturer's declaration of compliance, and the use of PII in applications to establish FAA-recognized identification areas for UAS flying (NPRM, p. 272)." Privacy concerns would be addressed through mitigation strategies, including but not limited to, restricting the collection and use to relevant and necessary PII and using security measures to protect the PII collected. The FAA would also enter into contractual

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<sup>27</sup> Smith, Max. "[Fairfax Co. delays drones for first responders over privacy concerns](#)," *Fairfax County News*. August 1, 2018.

Frank, Michael. "[Drone Privacy: Is Anyone in Charge](#)," *Consumer Reports*. Last Updated: February 10, 2016.

<sup>28</sup> "[Commercial Drone Alliance Opposes Aircraft Privacy and Transparency Act of 2017](#)," *Commercialdronealliance.org*. March 29, 2017.

<sup>29</sup> "[DC Circuit Denies EPIC's Petition, Will Not Mandate Privacy Rules for Drones](#)," *Epic.org*. June 19, 2018.

<sup>30</sup> [Privacy Impact Assessment for Remote Identification of Unmanned Aircraft Systems NPRM](#).

agreements with the Remote ID USS for additional directions for the “use, protection, and storage” of the PII collected.

**Published Standards and Related Materials:** The Airborne Public Safety Accreditation Commission’s (APSAC) [Standards for Public Safety Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems Programs](#) dated 10/14/17 include brief discussions on privacy, data collection minimization, management of digital media evidence, and retention of PII. The International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) Aviation Committee Recommended Guidelines for the Use of Unmanned Aircraft also touch on privacy. The FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018 also contains several privacy-related provisions.

In November 2019, ISO/TC 20/SC 16/WG 3 published [ISO 21384-3:2019, Unmanned Aircraft Systems – Part 3: Operational Procedures](#). **(New)** It includes brief discussions of data protection and privacy etiquette.

While not UAS-specific, there are a number of international standards related to information security management and the protection of PII that have been developed within [ISO/IEC JTC1/SC 27, IT Security techniques](#). Work tends to focus on privacy enhancing technologies and data protection since “privacy” gets into cultural and social norms which differ around the world. WG5 on *Identity Management and Privacy Technologies* is the home for such work within SC27.

**In-Development Standards:** The IETF is developing technologies for protecting PII in UA Broadcast messages. See [UAS Operator Privacy for RemoteID Messages](#). The IETF’s Trustworthy Remote ID directly supports privacy of UA ID. See: [Trustworthy Remote ID](#), [UAS Operator Privacy for RemoteID Messages](#), and [Secure UAS Network RID and C2 Transport](#).

**Gap O1: Privacy.** UAS-specific privacy regulations are needed as well as standards to enable the privacy framework. Privacy law and rulemaking related to UAS, including topics such as remote ID and tracking, are yet to be clearly defined.

**R&D Needed:** Yes

**Recommendation:** Develop UAS-specific privacy standards as needed and appropriate in response to the evolving policy landscape. Monitor the ongoing policy discussion.

**Priority:** Medium

**Organization(s):** ISO/IEC JTC1/SC 27, ISO/TC 20/SC 16, APSAC, IACP, IETF

**Status of Progress:** Yellow

**Update:** ISO/IEC JTC1/SC 27, ISO/TC 20/SC 16, APSAC, IACP, IETF

## 7.2. Continued Operational Safety (COS)

Continued Operational Safety (COS) is applied continuously to all phases of aviation/aerospace life cycle management (pre-certification, during-certification, and post-certification). Managing operational risk and appropriate risk mitigations in UAS certification and its operations into the NAS, is an essential part of the aviation eco-system. While existing manned aviation standards and regulatory frameworks include COS during the design, development, certification and continued operational safety of the aircraft, there exist some differences and gaps with regard to UAS certification and its operations. Due to those differences, the [SAE S-18UAS Autonomy WG / EUROCAE WG-63](#) is developing [AIR7121, Applicability of Existing Development Assurance and System Safety Practices to Unmanned Aircraft Systems](#), to examine the acceptance by regulators of the applicability of SAE ARP4754 and SAE ARP4761 to UAS and to identify the shortcomings in both recommended practices with regards to the specific technical aspects needed for UAS development.

The [SAE S-18 / EUROCAE WG-63 Aircraft and Systems Development and Safety Assessment Committee](#) brings together qualified specialists for the advancement of aerospace safety and to support effective safety management. It provides a resource for other committees and organizations with common interests in safety and development assurance processes. As of March 2020, S-18 had published 9 documents and 8 are in development. This committee is active in the development of guidelines, including processes, methods and tools, to accomplish safety assessment of airplanes and related systems and equipment. It develops aerospace vehicle and system standards on:

- Safety assessment processes
- Development assurance processes
- Practices for accomplishing in-service safety assessments

Regulators accepted [SAE ARP4761, Guidelines and Methods for Conducting the Safety Assessment Process on Civil Airborne Systems and Equipment](#), as a means of compliance (MOC). It discusses the development of aircraft systems taking into account the overall aircraft operating environment and functions. It includes validation of requirements and verification of the design implementation for certification and product assurance. SAE [AS7209, Development Assurance Objectives for Aerospace Vehicles and Systems](#), is in development to provide a minimum set of development assurance objectives to ensure safety for aircraft and system development. It also provides a basis to emerging technologies where existing techniques are not effective and alternate strategies are not documented in industry guidance.

SAE [ARP5150A, Safety Assessment of Transport Airplanes in Commercial Service](#), describes guidelines, methods, and tools used to perform the ongoing safety assessment process for transport airplanes in commercial service. The process is intended to support an overall safety management program. It is associated with showing compliance with the regulations, and also with assuring a company that it meets its own internal standards. The methods identify a systematic means, but not the only means, to assess ongoing safety.



SAE [ARP5151A, Safety Assessment of General Aviation Airplanes and Rotorcraft in Commercial Service](#), describes a process that may be used to perform the ongoing safety assessment for (1) general aviation airplanes and rotorcraft (GAR), and (2) commercial operators of GAR aircraft. The process is to support an overall safety management program. It is to help a company establish and meet its own internal standards. The process identifies a systematic means, but not the only means, to assess continuing airworthiness.

#### **Published Regulations, Standards, and Guidance Materials:**

##### FAA:

- 14 CFR part 5 Safety Management Systems
- 14 CFR SUBCHAPTER C—AIRCRAFT (Parts 21, 23, 25, 26, 27 , 29 , 31, 33, 34, 35, 36, 39, 43)
- 14 CFR SUBCHAPTER F - AIR TRAFFIC AND GENERAL OPERATING RULES (Parts 91 - 107)
- SUBCHAPTER G - AIR CARRIERS AND OPERATORS FOR COMPENSATION OR HIRE: CERTIFICATION AND OPERATIONS (Parts 110 - 139)
- [Order 8040.6, Unmanned Aircraft Systems Safety Risk Management Policy, 10/4/2019](#)
- [Order 8040-4B - Safety Risk Management Policy, 5/2/2017](#)
- [Safety Management System \(SMS\) Manual, Air Traffic Organization, 2019](#)
- *FAA Risk Management Handbook (FAA-H-8083-2), 2016*
- *Small Airplane Risk Analysis (SARA) Handbook, 9/30/2010*
- *Transport Airplane Risk Assessment Methodology (TARAM) Handbook, 11/4/2011*
- Order 8110.107, *Monitor Safety/Analyze Data (MSAD)*
- *Rotorcraft Risk Analysis Handbook, 6/15/2012*
- *Engine and Propeller Directorate Continued Airworthiness Assessment Process Handbook, 9/23/2010*
- *Continued Airworthiness Assessments Of Powerplant And Auxiliary Power Unit Installations Of Transport Category Airplanes, 9/8/2003*
- Order 4040.26, *Aircraft Certification Service Flight Test Risk Management Program, 1/31/2012*
- Order 8110.54, *Instructions for Continued Airworthiness Responsibilities, Requirements, and Contents, 10/23/2010*

##### SAE International & EUROCAE Standards:

- [SAE S-18/EUROCAE WG-63 Aircraft and System Development and Safety Assessment Committee](#)
  - [ARP5150A, Safety Assessment of Transport Airplanes in Commercial Service](#)
  - [ARP5151A, Safety Assessment of General Aviation Airplanes and Rotorcraft in Commercial Service](#)
  - [ARP4754A, Guidelines for Development of Civil Aircraft and Systems](#)
  - [ARP4761, Guidelines and Methods for Conducting the Safety Assessment Process on Civil Airborne Systems and Equipment](#)
  - [AIR6110, Contiguous Aircraft/System Development Process Example](#)
  - [AIR6218, Constructing Development Assurance Plan for Integrated Systems](#)

- [AIR6219, Development of Atmospheric Neutron Single Event Effects Analysis for Use in Safety Assessments](#)
- [ARP1834B, Fault/Failure Analysis for Digital Systems and Equipment](#)
- [ARP926C, Fault/Failure Analysis Procedure](#)

JARUS Documents:

- [JARUS Recommendations for Unmanned Aircraft Systems \(UAS\) Category A & Category B Operations JAR-DEL-WG2-D.04, 10/28/19](#)
- [JARUS Guidelines on Specific Operations Risk Assessment \(SORA\), Edition 2.0, 30 Jan 2019, JAR-DEL-WG6-D.04](#)

RTCA Document(s):

- [RTCA DO-320, Operational Services and Environmental Definition \(OSED\) for Unmanned Aircraft Systems](#)

IEEE Standard(s):

- [IEEE P1936.1, Standard for Drone Applications Framework](#)

ASTM Standard(s):

- [ASTM F3178-16, Standard Practice for Operational Risk Assessment of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems \(sUAS\)](#)

NFPA Standard(s):

- [NFPA® 2400, Standard for Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems \(sUAS\) Used for Public Safety Operations](#)

ACI Documents:

- [ACI UAS Pilots Code](#)
- [ACI Flight Safety in the Drone Age](#)

**In-Development Standards and Guidance Material:**

SAE International & EUROCAE Standards:

- SAE [S-18UAS Autonomy WG/EUROCAE WG-63](#) (WG-63 collaborating with WG-105)
  - [AIR7121, Applicability of Existing Development Assurance and System Safety Practices to Unmanned Aircraft Systems](#)
- SAE S-18/EUROCAE WG-63 Aircraft and System Development and Safety Assessment Committee
  - [AS7209, Development Assurance Objectives for Aerospace Vehicles and Systems](#)
  - [ARP4754B, Guidelines for Development of Civil Aircraft and Systems](#)
  - [ARP4761A, Guidelines And Methods For Conducting The Safety Assessment Process On Civil Airborne Systems And Equipment](#)
  - [AIR6913, Using STPA During Development and Safety Assessment of Civil Aircraft](#)

- [AIR6276, Use of Modeling and Tools for Aircraft Systems Development - A Strategy for Development Assurance Aspects with Examples](#)

ASTM Standard(s):

- [ASTM WK69335, New Guide for Framework for Using ASTM Standards for UAS](#)

**Gap O2: Continued Operational Safety (COS).** The existing industry standards and regulatory framework related to COS from manned aviation still apply to UAS. However, there exist some gaps unique to UAS certification and its operations.

**R&D Needed:** Yes

**Recommendation:** Complete in-development standards.

**Priority:** High (Tier 1)

**Organization(s):** SAE, EUROCAE, SAE-ITC, RTCA, JARUS, ASTM, IEEE

**Status of Progress:** Green

**Update:** SAE S-18UAS Autonomy WG/WG-63 (with collaboration with WG-105), SAE S-18/EUROCAE WG-63, SAE G-34/EUROCAE WG-114, SAE G-32, SAE AS-4, RTCA SC-240/EUROCAE WG-117, RTCA SC-228, etc. are addressing this standards gap.

### 7.3. Beyond Visual Line of Sight (BVLOS)

Beyond visual line of sight (BVLOS) is required before the full capability of UAS can be realized by the drone industry. BVLOS operations are performed beyond the pilot’s line of sight (as opposed to visual line of sight, or VLOS flights, which are performed within the pilot’s line of sight). FAA’s Part 107 does not currently allow for BVLOS operations. BVLOS or BVLOS (E), meaning extended visual line of sight operations, requires visual observers to track the UAS when it’s not in direct visual range of the pilot operator.

Potential applications that would benefit from BVLOS operations are:

- Package Delivery
- Railroad/Pipeline/Power-line Inspections
- Critical Infrastructure Inspection
- Windmill Inspections
- Agriculture
- Remote Sensing/Mapping/Surveying
- Government/Public Applications
- Search & Rescue

- Firefighting/Public Safety

**Published Standards and Related Documents:**

- [ASTM F3196-18, Standard Practice for Seeking Approval for Beyond Visual Line of Sight \(BVLOS\) Small Unmanned Aircraft System \(sUAS\) Operations](#)
- [ASTM F3411-19, Standard Specification for Remote ID and Tracking](#), published February 2020. **(New)**
- *Unmanned Systems Canada Small RPAS Beyond Visual Line of Sight (BVLOS) Best Practice*
- ASSURE Small UAS DAA Requirements Necessary for Limited BVLOS Operations (2017)
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 562, Terrain Awareness and Warning System (TAWS) - Analog
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 680, Aircraft Autonomous Distress Tracking (ADT)
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 792, Second-Generation Ku-Band and Ka-Band Satellite Communication System
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 839, Function Definition of Airborne Manager of Air-Ground Interface Communications (MAGIC)
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 633-2, AOC Air-Ground Data and Message Exchange Format
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 633-3, AOC Air-Ground Data and Message Exchange Format
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 633-4, AOC Air-Ground Data and Message Exchange Format
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 635-4, HF Data Link Protocols
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 678, Guidance for Distributed Radio Architecture
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 718-4 Mark 3, Air Traffic Control Transponder (ATCRBS/MODE S)
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 718A-4 Mark 4, Air Traffic Control Transponder (ATCRBS/Mode S)
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 719-5, Airborne HF/SSB System
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 723-3, Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS)
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 735-2, Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS)
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 735A-1 Mark 2, Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS)
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 735B-2, Traffic Computer TCAS and ADS-B Functionality
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 741P1-15, Aviation Satellite Communication System, Part 1, Aircraft Installation Provisions
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 741P2-11, Aviation Satellite Communication System, Part 2, System Design and Equipment Functional Description
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 750-4, VHF Data Radio
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 760-1, GNSS Navigation Unit (GNU)
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 762-1, Terrain Awareness and Warning System (TAWS)
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 771-1, Low-Earth Orbiting Aviation Satellite Communication Systems
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 781-8 Mark 3, Aviation Satellite Communication Systems
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 791P1-3 Mark 1, Mark I Aviation Ku-Band and Ka-Band Satellite Communication System, Part 1, Physical Installation and Aircraft Interfaces
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 791P2-1 Mark 1, Aviation Ku-Band and Ka-Band Satellite Communication System, Part 2, Electrical Interfaces and Functional Equipment Description

- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 791P2-2, Mark 1 Aviation Ku-Band and Ka-Band Satellite Communication System, Part 2, Electrical Interfaces and Functional Equipment Description
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 823P1, DataLink Security, Part 1 - ACARS Message Security
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 823P2, DataLink Security, Part 2 - Key Management

#### **In-Development Standards and Related Documents:**

- ASTM has established AC 478 which is developing a BVLOS Strategic Plan for true BVLOS (i.e., those operations requiring a waiver for CFR 91.113) to be published as a Technical Report. The intent is to deconstruct/break down components standards and technologies required for BVLOS.
- [ASTM WK62344, Revision of F3196 - 17 Standard Practice for Seeking Approval for Extended Visual Line of Sight \(EVLOS\) or Beyond Visual Line of Sight \(BVLOS\) Small Unmanned Aircraft System \(sUAS\) Operations](#)
- [ASTM WK63418, New Specification for Service provided under UAS Traffic Management \(UTM\)](#)
- [ASTM WK65041, New Specification for UAS Remote ID and Tracking](#)
- IETF [Secure UAS Network RID and C2 Transport](#)

See also discussion of airworthiness considerations discussed in Chapter 6.

**Gap O3: Beyond Visual Line of Sight (BVLOS).** Although there is an existing BVLOS standard with supplemental revisions in the works and a best practices document, robust BVLOS operations will require a comprehensive DAA solution, Remote ID, and UTM infrastructure to be completely effective. Additional safety measures must be considered such as reduced limits on energy transfer; weight; speed; altitude; stand-off and redundant systems for power; collision avoidance; positioning; loss-of-control automatic soft landing; and methods for two-way communications between the competent operator and worker supervisor(s) or workers to ensure safety of BVLOS operations.

These standards should be addressed in a collaborative fashion. In addition, pilot competency and training is especially critical for BVLOS operations. It is anticipated that appendices for BVLOS will be added to [ASTM F3266-18, Standard Guide for Training Remote Pilots in Command of Unmanned Aircraft Systems \(UAS\) Endorsement](#).

**R&D Needed:** Yes

**Recommendation:** Complete work on aforementioned BVLOS standards and related documents in development and address for future consideration UAS including payloads larger than 55 pounds as defined in Part 107. Research is also required but more to the point connectivity is needed to ensure interoperability or compatibility between standards for BVLOS/DAA/Remote ID/UTM/C2.

**Priority:** High (Tier 1)

**Organization(s):** ASTM, IETF

**Status of Progress:** Green

**Update:** Published and in-development standards are noted in the text.

## 7.4. Operations Over People (OOP)

Manned aircraft routinely fly over people since they comply with a standard airworthiness certification or a special airworthiness certificate (limited, restricted, experimental, etc.). Generally, UAS do not routinely receive certification at this time and require additional mitigations to gain approval for operations over people (OOP). Small UAS may require additional mitigations such as parachutes, risk assessments, and operational procedures.

There are a range of items that a manufacturer or operator of a UAS should take into account when trying to achieve OOP including aircraft design, construction, and risk mitigation devices. Combining safe operations with these considerations will increase the likelihood of achieving approval for OOP from a CAA to accommodate a wide variety of uses.

The recommended mitigations for OOP should vary according to the level and type of risk imposed on the public, which is affected by a wide variety of factors. These include population density under the route of flight, whether the UAS will operate in an access-controlled and protected area, or whether or not the people being flown over are participants in the mission or are non-participants. See also section 8.5 of this roadmap on workplace safety.

As confidence in the reliability of UAS platforms increases, the issues surrounding OOP will become as routine as manned aircraft OOP. See also the Design and Construction section of this document.

### Published Standards and Related Documents:

- ASTM F3389-20, *Test Method for Assessing the Safety of Small Unmanned Aircraft Impacts*, (previously WK56338) has been approved for publication. **(New)** This is a test method to measure the potential for injury when a small unmanned aircraft hits a person on the ground using data from the ASSURE UAS Ground Collision Severity Evaluation Final Report.

Related published standards include:

- [ASTM F3178-16, Standard Practice for Operational Risk Assessment of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems \(sUAS\)](#)
- [ASTM F3322-18, Standard Specification for Small Unmanned Aircraft System \(sUAS\) Parachutes](#)
- [JARUS Specific Operations Risk Assessment \(SORA\)](#)

**In-Development Standards:** Within ASTM F38.01, the following standard is being developed:

- [ASTM WK65042, New Specification for Operation Over People](#), which deals with additional operational considerations when flying over people or populated areas.

**Gap O4: UAS Operations Over People (OOP).** Standards are needed for UAS OOP.

**R&D Needed:** No

**Recommendation:** Complete work on [ASTM WK65042, New Specification for Operation Over People](#).

**Priority:** High (Tier 1)

**Organization(s):** ASTM

**Status of Progress:** Green

**Update:** ASTM F3389-20, ASTM F38 WK65042

## 7.5. Weather

Meteorological weather data is critical to the safe and efficient use of the NAS. Weather data is an important component for flight planning, forecasting, ATM, data link, and overall aircraft operations. Improving the resiliency of the NAS to adverse weather conditions is a near term FAA NextGen objective. However, many UAS CONOPS are unlikely to be adequately covered by existing meteorological data acquisition, reporting, or forecasting methods. See also section 10.3 on UAS flight crew training.

### **Published Standards and Related Materials:**

- [SAE ARP5740, Cockpit Display of Data Linked Weather Information](#) (2015)
- Advisory Circular AC 00-45H, Aviation Weather Services (2016)
- Advisory Circular AC 00-24C, Thunderstorms (2013)
- FMH-1, Surface Weather Observations and Reporting (2005)
- Advisory Circular 23.1419-2D, Certification of Part 23 Airplanes for Flight in Icing Conditions (2007)
- FAA Order JO 7930.2N, Notice to Airmen (2013)
- National Weather Service Policy Directive 10-8 (2016)
- FAA Order JO 7110.0Z, Flight Services (2018)
- ICAO Annex 3, Meteorological Services for International Air Navigation Part I and II (2016)
- World Meteorological Organization (WMO), GRIB-2
- [RTCA DO-369, Guidance for the Usage of Data Linked Forecast and Current Wind Information in Air Traffic Management \(ATM\) Operations](#)

- [RTCA DO28-364, Minimum Aviation System Performance Standards \(MASPS\) for Aeronautical Information/Meteorological Data Link Services](#)
- [RTCA DO-358A, Minimum Operational Performance Standards \(MOPS\) for Flight Information Services - Broadcast \(FIS-B\) with Universal Access Transceiver \(UAT\)](#) was published 6/27/2019. It considers an equipment configuration consisting of the airborne processing and cockpit display of aeronautical and meteorological data known as FIS-B provided by the FAA. It does not address UAS or UAM.
- OGC 15-045r7 OGC MetOcean Application profile for WCS2.1: Part 0 - MetOcean Metadata (2020)
- OGC 15-108r3 OGC MetOcean Application profile for WCS2.1: Part 1 - MetOcean GetCorridor Extension (2020)
- OGC 17-086r3 OGC MetOcean Application profile for WCS2.1: Part 2 - MetOcean GetPolygon Extension (2020)
- OGC 17-089r1 OGC Web Coverage Service (WCS) Interface Standard – Core, version 2.1 (2018)
- EUROCONTROL, FAA, and UCAR, Weather Information Exchange Model (WXXM), version 2.1 (2015)
- [AUVSI Trusted Operator Program™ \(TOP\) training protocols for remote pilots and training organizations](#)

**In-Development Standards and Related Work:** NASA is conducting a bottom-up review of weather capabilities, gaps and research needs that may address R&D needs identified, or new ones not yet identified. NASA funded a \$5.2M+ project, “Real-time Weather Awareness for Enhanced UTM Safety Assurance” via the 2020 NASA ULI Program. ASTM F38 established a Weather Supplemental Data Service Provider Sub-Group to address amending of existing standards and drafting of new standards. [WK73142, Specification for Weather Supplemental Data Service Provider \(SDSP\) Performance](#) is in development in ASTM F38.02. ISO/TC 20/SC 16 has activity on weather related test methods.

**Gap 05: UAS Operations and Weather.** Standards are needed for flight planning, forecasting, and operating UAS (including data link and cockpit/flight deck displays), particularly in low altitude and/or boundary layer airspace.

Gaps have been identified related to two different facets of weather, and the related acquisition and dissemination of weather-related data, especially as it relates to BVLOS operations:

- 1) Weather requirements for flight operations of UAS. For example, to operate in airspace BVLOS, the aircraft must meet certain standards for weather robustness and resiliency, e.g., wind, icing, instrument meteorological conditions (IMC), etc.
- 2) Weather data standards themselves. Currently, published weather data standards by National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), World Meteorological Organization (WMO), ICAO, and others do not have sufficient resolution (spatial and/or temporal) for certain types of UAS operations and have gaps in low altitude and boundary layer airspaces.



Other standardized delivery mechanisms for weather data exist, but the considerations must be made with respect to the computational processing power required on the aircraft or controller to use such data.

Additionally, standards for cockpit displays, data link, avionics, and voice protocols that involve, transmit, or display weather will need to be amended to apply to UAS (e.g., the “cockpit display” in a UAS CS).

**R&D Needed:** Yes. Research should be conducted to determine the following:

- 1) For a given UAS CONOPS, what spatial and temporal resolution is required to adequately detect weather hazards to UAS in real-time and to forecast and flight plan the operation?
- 2) What are the applicable ways to replicate the capability of a “flight deck display” in UAS C2 systems for the purpose of displaying meteorological information (and related data link communications with ATC)?
- 3) To what extent can boundary layer conditions be represented in existing binary data formats?
- 4) To what extent can current meteorological data acquisition infrastructure (e.g., ground-based weather radar) capture data relevant to UAS operations, particularly in low altitude airspace?
- 5) What weather data and data link connectivity would be required to support fully autonomous UAS operations with no human operator in the loop?
- 6) What is the highest temporal resolution currently possible with existing or proposed meteorological measurement infrastructure?
- 7) To what extent do operators need to consider that weather systems have different natural scales in both space and time, depending on whether the weather systems occur in polar, mid-latitude, or tropical conditions?

**Recommendation:** Encourage relevant research, amending of existing standards, and drafting of new standards (where applicable).

**Priority:** High (Tier 2)

**Organization(s):** RTCA, SAE, NOAA, WMO, NASA, universities, National Science Foundation (NSF) National Center for Atmospheric Research (NCAR), ASTM

**Status of Progress:** Yellow

**Update:** NASA, ASTM F38 Weather Supplemental Data Service Provider Sub-Group

## 7.6. Data Handling and Processing

UAS operations involve the use of a range of different sensors to conduct real-time observations to support a variety of operational scenarios/use cases including traffic incident response, wildfire management, pipeline/utilities infrastructure inspection, volcanic ash monitoring, wildlife tracking, and urban planning. All of this information is inherently location-based. Ample standards exist to support

collection, processing, communication/distribution, and application of location-based observations captured from UASs via a variety of sensors; however, varying standards “architectures” will be required to support efficient UAS operations. Further, the ability to capture and process UAS telemetry with sensor observations is critically important to assure proper location referencing of observations.

**Published Standards:** The following data handling and processing standards are relevant:

- [OGC Web Processing Service \(WPS\) 2.0 Interface Standard](#) – allows the insertion of processing algorithms on board the UAS or anywhere in a workflow to support the processing of sensor observations to support the end user, or the next application in a workflow
- [OGC LAS Specification 1.4, OGC Community Standard](#) – represents a standardized file format for the interchange of 3-dimensional point cloud data between data users
- [OGC GML in JPEG 2000 for Geographic Imagery Encoding Standard](#) – defines the use of OGC GML in encoding imagery in JPEG 2000 format
- [OGC Wide Area Motion Imagery \(WAMI\) Best Practice](#) – recommends a set of Web service interfaces for the dissemination of Wide Area Motion Imagery (WAMI) products
- [WXXM – Weather Information Exchange Model \(WXXM\)](#)
- [OGC 12-000, OGC Sensor Model Language \(SensorML\):Model and XML Encoding Standard \(v2\)](#)
- [OGC 12-006, OGC Sensor Observation Service Interface Standard \(v2\)](#)
- [OGC 09-000, OGC Sensor Planning Service Implementation \(v2\)](#)
- [OGC 10-025r1, Observations and Measurements - XML Implementation \(v2\)](#)
- [OGC 15-078r6, OGC SensorThings API Part 1: Sensing \(v1\)](#)
- [OGC 06-103r4, OpenGIS Implementation Standard for Geographic information - Simple feature access - Part 1: Common architecture \(v1.2.1\)](#) (also ISO 19125-1:2004)
- [OGC 07-036r1, OGC Geography Markup Language \(GML\) — Extended schemas and encoding rules \(v3.2\)](#) (also ISO 19136:2007)
- [OGC 12-007r2, KML 2.3 \(v1\)](#)
- [OGC 06-042, OpenGIS Web Map Server Implementation Specification \(v1.3\)](#) (also ISO 19128:2005)
- [OGC 07-057r7, OpenGIS Web Map Tile Service Implementation Standard \(v1\)](#)
- [OGC 09-110r3, OGC Web Coverage Service \(WCS\) 2.0 Interface Standard - Core \(v2\)](#)
- [OGC 09-110r4, OGC Web Coverage Service \(WCS\) 2.0 Interface Standard- Core: Corrigendum \(v2.0.1\)](#)
- [OGC 09-146r6, OGC Coverage Implementation Schema \(v1.1\)](#)
- [OGC GeoTIFF \(v1.1\)](#). Geostationary Earth Orbit Tagged Image File Format (GeoTIFF) is used throughout the geospatial and earth science communities to share geographic image data. GeoTIFF was adopted as an OGC standard in 2019.
- [Motion Imagery Standards Board \(MISB\) standards](#): almost 60 standards under the MISB portfolio directly related to data handling and processing of motion imagery (video streams).
- NATO STANAG 4607, [NATO Ground Moving Target Indicator \(GMTI\) Format - AEDP-07 EDITION 2](#)

- NIST SP800-100, Information Security Handbook
- NIST SP800-171, Compliance Guidelines
- NIST SP800-53 Controls
- NIST SP1500, Big Data Interoperability Framework
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 811, Commercial Aircraft Information Security Concepts of Operation and Process Framework
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 827, Electronic Distribution of Software by Crate (EDS Crate)
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 424-23D2, Navigation System Data Base
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 429P1-19, Digital Information Transfer System (DITS), Part 1, Functional Description, Electrical Interfaces, Label Assignments and Word Formats
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 429P2-17, Digital Information Transfer System (DITS), Part 2, Discrete Word Data Standards
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 429P3-19 Mark 33, Digital Information Transfer System (DITS) - Part 3 - File Data Transfer Techniques
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 429P4, Digital Information Transfer System (DITS), Part 4, Archive of ARINC 429 Supplements
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 663-1, Data Requirements for Avionics Component Maintenance
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA/AEEC, Aeronautical Databases (ADB) Subcommittee
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA/AEEC, Navigation Data Base (NDB) Subcommittee

#### **In-Development Standards:**

- OGC is advancing best practices through its [UxS DWG](#) and through a series of ongoing interoperability pilot activities.
- IEEE P1937.3, *Protocol for the Flight Data Transmission of Civil Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Based on BeiDou Short Message*

**Gap O6: UAS Data Handling and Processing.** Given the myriad of UAS “observation” missions in support of public safety, law enforcement, urban planning, construction, and a range of other applications, and given the diversity of standards applicable to the UAS lifecycle, a compilation of best practices is needed to identify standards-based “architectural guidance” for different UAS operations.

**R&D Needed:** No R&D should be required, as community examples already exist. However, interoperability piloting of recommended architectures with the user community based on priority use cases/scenarios is recommended.

**Recommendation:** Develop an informative technical report to provide architectural guidance for data handling and processing to assist with different UAS operations.

**Priority:** Medium

**Organization(s):** OGC, ISO TC/211

**Status of Progress:** Green

**Update:** As noted in the text, the OGC GeoTIFF standard was adopted as an OGC standard in 2019, and best practices are in development in OGC UxS DWG.

## 7.7. UAS Traffic Management (UTM)

The term “UTM” refers to a set of federated services and an all-encompassing framework for managing multiple UAS operations. In Europe, the idea of “U-space” extends the UTM services to include manned aircraft and new concepts in air mobility. These services are separate, but complementary to those provided by the ATM system, and are based primarily on the sharing of information between operators on flight intent and airspace constraints. UTM can offer services for flight planning, communications, separation, and weather, among others.

UTM is a community-based traffic management system, where the operators and UAS Service Suppliers are responsible for the coordination, execution, and management of all UAS flights, within the regulatory and procedural guidelines established by FAA. This federated set of services enables the management of simultaneous operations by multiple UAS operators, facilitated by third-party support providers through networked information exchanges.

The [FAA UTM ConOps V2.0](#) is focused on UTM operations below 400 feet above ground level (AGL), but introduces increasingly more complex operations within both uncontrolled (Class G) and controlled (Classes B, C, D, E) airspace environments. ConOps V2.0 updates and expands the following:

- operational scenarios, describing more complex operations in denser airspace, including beyond visual line of sight (BVLOS) operations in controlled airspace;
- descriptions of/approaches to several UTM components, including UAS volume reservations (previously referred to as dynamic restrictions), performance authorizations, data archiving and access, USS service categories, UTM/ATM contingency notification, and security aspects associated with UTM operations; and
- new topics including airspace authorization for BVLOS flight within controlled airspace, UTM architecture support to remote identification of UAS operators, and standards development efforts with industry as an integral part of enabling UTM operations.

FAA UTM ConOps V2 describes essential conceptual and operational elements associated with UTM to inform the development of solutions necessary to implement UTM. The ConOps also supports a spiral development approach – maturing the concept through analysis of more complex airspace environments, tested and validated by field demonstrations, including National Aeronautics and Space

Administration (NASA) Technology Capability Level (TCL), FAA UTM Pilot Program (UPP), and UAS Integration Pilot Program (IPP) demonstrations.<sup>31</sup>




Figure 1: UTM Operations in Context of Airspace Classes<sup>32</sup>

<sup>31</sup> Source: FAA's UTM ConOps v2 dated 2 March 2020, Executive Summary, page xi

<sup>32</sup> Source: FAA's UTM ConOps v2 dated 2 March 2020, page 5




Figure 2: Operational Context of UTM Services<sup>33</sup>

Figure 3 depicts a notional UTM architecture that visually identifies at a high level, the various actors and components, their contextual relationships, as well as high level functions and information flows.

<sup>33</sup> Source: FAA's UTM ConOps v2 dated 2 March 2020, page 13




Figure 3: Notional UTM Architecture<sup>34</sup>

### Allocation of Responsibilities

Table 2 summarizes roles and responsibilities of the UAS Operator, USS, and FAA associated with a UTM operation.

<sup>34</sup> Source: FAA's UTM ConOps v2 dated 2 March 2020, page 9

Table 2: Allocation of Responsibilities for UTM Actors/Entities<sup>35</sup>

Function		Actors/Entities		
		✓ = Primary responsibility S = Support		
		UAS Operator	USS	FAA
Separation	UAS from UAS (VLOS and BVLOS)	✓	S	
	VLOS UAS from Low-Altitude Manned Aircraft	✓	S	
	BVLOS UAS from Low-Altitude Manned Aircraft <sup>1</sup>	✓	S	
Hazard/ Terrain Avoidance	Weather Avoidance	✓	S	
	Terrain Avoidance	✓	S	
	Obstacle Avoidance	✓	S	
Status	UTM Operations Status	S	✓	
	Flight Information Archive	✓	S	
	Flight Information Status	✓	S	
Advisories	Weather Information	✓	S	
	Alerts to Affected Airspace Users of UAS Hazard	✓	S	
	Hazard Information (e.g., obstacles, terrain)	✓	S	
	UAS-Specific Hazard Information (e.g., Power-Lines, No-UAS Zones)	✓	S	
Planning, Intent & Authorization	Operation Plan Development	✓	S	
	Operation Intent Sharing (pre-flight)	✓	S	
	Operation Intent Sharing (in-flight)	✓	S	
	Operation Intent Negotiation	✓	S	
	Controlled Airspace Authorization		S	✓
	Control of Flight	✓		
	Airspace Allocation & Constraints Definition		S	✓

<sup>1</sup> Manned aircraft pilots share some responsibility for separation with UAS BVLOS operations (see Section 2.7.1.2).

A UAS Service Supplier (USS) acts as a communications bridge between UAS operators and the local air navigation service provider (ANSP), i.e., air traffic management system. When necessary, a collection of USSs can form a USS Network to collaboratively manage UTM airspace by sharing data and adhering to a

<sup>35</sup> Source: FAA’s UTM ConOps v2 dated 2 March 2020, page 20



standard or set of standards required to participate in a USS Network. The ConOps Appendix D – UTM Services, Table D-1, provides a list of UTM services that have been addressed or identified in this document. This list is not exhaustive. Additional services may be developed as required.<sup>36</sup>

In addition to the USS services listed in Appendix D of FAA UTM ConOps v2.0, there are some foundational UTM requirements that include registration and identification of UAS prior to them being eligible/allowed to participate in UTM and use USS services.

The [Federal Aviation Administration \(FAA\) Extension, Safety and Security Act of 2016](#) (PDF) established the UTM Pilot Program (UPP) to define an initial set of industry and FAA capabilities required to support UTM operations.<sup>37</sup>




Figure 4: UPP High-Level Operational Concept<sup>38</sup>

NASA is leading the development of a UTM system in the United States, while the Single European Sky ATM Research Joint Undertaking (SESAR JU) is advancing the comparable U-space initiative in Europe. It is the desire of CAAs around the world to be able to use UTM/U-space services as mitigations to the risks inherent in UAS operations. However, without standards that define the level to which these services

<sup>36</sup> Appendix D – UTM Services, FAA UTM ConOps V2.0 dated 2 March 2020, pages 65-66

<sup>37</sup> Source: [https://www.faa.gov/uas/research\\_development/traffic\\_management/utm\\_pilot\\_program/](https://www.faa.gov/uas/research_development/traffic_management/utm_pilot_program/)

<sup>38</sup> Source: [https://www.faa.gov/uas/research\\_development/traffic\\_management/utm\\_pilot\\_program/](https://www.faa.gov/uas/research_development/traffic_management/utm_pilot_program/)

are effective, it is impossible to quantify the amount of risk mitigation an operator can claim when using a UTM/U-space service.

**Published Standards:** Despite a large number of top-level strategic discussions on the topic of what UTM and U-space are intended to provide, there are no published standards that define the expected level of performance for any of the services in the proposed ecosystem. That said, there are published data exchange formats (interoperability standards) for limited UTM services such as remote identification and strategic separation that enable the federated UTM ecosystem which have been successfully demonstrated in numerous flight tests events around the world. While interoperability standards, such as a data interface control document (ICD) or application programming interface (API), are necessary standards, additionally the industry needs performance standards. Both interoperability standards and performance standards are needed for each UTM service or function listed in Table 2.

**In-Development Standards and Related Materials:**

- NASA UTM CONOPS below 400 ft AGL (2018)
- EASA Opinion 01-2020 High-level Regulatory Framework for the U-Space (2020)

ASTM: Work includes:

- [WK63418, New Specification for Service provided under UAS Traffic Management \(UTM\)](#)
- [WK69690, Specification for Surveillance UTM Supplemental Data Service Provider \(SDSP\) Performance](#)
- [WK73142, Specification for Weather Supplemental Data Service Provider \(SDSP\) Performance](#)

IEEE: Work includes:

- [IEEE P1939.1, Standard for a Framework for Structuring Low Altitude Airspace for Unmanned Aerial Vehicle \(UAV\) Operations](#)

ISO: ISO/TC 20/SC 16/WG 4 on UAS Traffic Management has been created. Work includes:

- [ISO/TR 23629-1, UAS Traffic Management \(UTM\) -- Part 1: General requirements for UTM -- Survey results on UTM.](#)
- [ISO/WD 23629-5, UAS traffic management \(UTM\) — Part 5: UTM functional structure](#)
- [ISO/CD 23629-7, UAS traffic management \(UTM\) — Part 7: Data model for spatial data](#)
- [ISO/PWI 23629-8, UAS Traffic Management \(UTM\) — Part 8: Remote identification](#)
- [ISO/WD 23629-12, UAS traffic management \(UTM\) — Part 12: Requirements for UTM services and service providers](#)
- [ISO/DIS 21384-3, Unmanned aircraft systems -- Part 3: Operational procedures](#)

EUROCAE: A WG has been established to support UTM standards and will cover at first instance e-identification, geo-fencing, and geo-caging capabilities. The deliverables are planned for publication in Q2/2020.

RTCA: There is no activity.

SAE:

- [G-31 Electronic Transactions for Aerospace Committee](#)
  - AIR7501, Digital Data Standards in Aircraft Life Cycle
  - ARP6823, Electronic Transactions for Aerospace Systems; An Overview
  - ARP6984, Determination of Cost Benefits from Implementing a Blockchain Solution

GUTMA, while not an SDO, has been active in defining the data exchange formats and thus has been contributing to standards in some regards.

While the activity in this area from traditional SDOs has been minimal, there is growing awareness among regulators and JARUS that a performance standard void exists. NASA and the FAA have a Research Transition Team in place and they are also aware that performance-based standards require development. JARUS is taking up a more active role in identifying standards and regulatory gaps associated with UTM/ATM integration in 2020.

**Gap O7: UTM Services Performance Standards.** UTM service performance standards are needed.

**R&D Needed:** Yes. Considerable work remains to develop the various USS services listed as well as testing to quantify the level of mitigation they provide. Only after some level of flight testing to define the “realm of the possible” can the community of interest write performance-based standards that are both achievable and effective in mitigating operational risk.

**Recommendation:** There is quite a lot of work for any one SDO. A significant challenge is finding individuals with the technical competence and flight experience needed to fully address the subject. What is needed is direction to adopt the performance standards and associated interoperability standards evolving from the research/flight demonstrations being performed by the research community (e.g., NASA/FAA RTT, FAA UTM Pilot Project, UAS Test Sites, GUTMA, etc.). Given a draft standard developed by the experts in the field (i.e., the ones actively engaged in doing the research), SDOs can apply their expertise in defining testable and relevant interoperability and performance-based requirements and thus quickly converge to published standards.

**Priority:** High (Tier 2)

**Organization(s):** NASA, ASTM, ISO, IEEE, EUROCAE, JARUS

**Status of Progress:** Green

**Update:** New activity is underway in ASTM, IEEE, ISO, EUROCAE, and JARUS.

## 7.8. UAS Remote Identification (UAS Remote ID)

The FAA maintains a [website](#) that outlines requirements for UAS Remote Identification. It describes how the agency is working with stakeholders regarding UAS Remote Identification as follows below:

## **UAS Remote Identification**

Drones or unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) are fundamentally changing aviation, and the FAA is committed to working to fully integrate drones or UAS into the National Airspace System (NAS). Safety and security are top priorities for the FAA and Remote Identification (Remote ID) of UAS is crucial to our integration efforts.

### **What is Remote ID?**

Remote ID is the ability of a UAS in flight to provide identification information that can be received by other parties.

### **Why Do We Need Remote ID?**

Remote ID would assist the FAA, law enforcement, and Federal security agencies when a UAS appears to be flying in an unsafe manner or where the drone is not allowed to fly.

The development of Remote ID builds on the framework established by the [small UAS registration rule \(PDF\)](#) and the [LAANC capability](#) to lay the foundation of an [Unmanned Aircraft System Traffic Management System \(UTM\)](#) that is scalable to the national airspace.

### **Notice of Proposed Rule Making:**

The Remote Identification proposed rule provides a framework for remote identification of all UAS operating in the airspace of the United States. The rule would facilitate the collection and storage of certain data such as identity, location, and altitude regarding an unmanned aircraft and its control station.

The comment period for FAA's published the notice of proposed rulemaking on remote identification closed on March 2, 2020. The docket number on <https://www.regulations.gov> is **FAA-2019-1100**.

### **Remote ID Cohort:**

The goal of the FAA Remote ID Cohort is to develop the technology requirements applicable to FAA qualified remote ID UAS service suppliers.

### **What's next?**

Remote ID is the next step to enable safe, routine drone operations across our nation. This capability will enhance safety and security by allowing the FAA, law enforcement, and Federal security agencies to identify drones flying in their jurisdiction.


### **What has the FAA done?**

In December 2018, the FAA issued a [Request for Information \(RFI\)](#) to establish an [industry cohort](#) to explore potential technological solutions for Remote ID.

The UAS Identification and Tracking Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC), chartered by the FAA in June 2017, submitted its [report and recommendations \(PDF\)](#) to the agency on technologies available to identify and track drones in flight and other associated issues.<sup>39</sup>

**Published Standards and Related Materials:**

- **ASTM Remote ID Standard Overview:** The ASTM Remote ID Standard, [ASTM F3411-19, Standard Specification for Remote ID and Tracking](#), published February 2020 (**New**), is comprehensive of both broadcast and network remote ID methods. It provides a series of technical options from which regulators can choose and provide an “overlay” (MOC, MOPS, AC, etc.) of options that the regulator would like to be required.




This standard was created with inputs from the FAA UAS ID and Tracking ARC report, and many industry, academic, and public stakeholders.

The scope of the standard is focused on interoperability between broadcasters and receivers and participants in the network remote ID federation.

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
<sup>39</sup> Preceding text taken from FAA UAS Remote Identification webpage [https://www.faa.gov/uas/research\\_development/remote\\_id/](https://www.faa.gov/uas/research_development/remote_id/)), accessed March 19, 2020



The standard has the following points of alignment with the NPRM:

- Made to be compatible with Handheld Devices
- Network and Broadcast are specified
- Broadcast uses unlicensed spectrum
- Superset of \*most\* data elements required by the FAA
- NPRM updates registration requirements to go from 1:Many to 1:1
- The ANSI/CTA 2063-A S/N becomes the “primary key” linking to registration record.
- USS ID option to link to registration info.

The following field mappings illustrate the NPRM synergy with the fields pointed out in the standard.



- Open Source Enablement of the ASTM Remote ID Standard:
  - The Open Drone ID project has evolved to primarily be open source repository and information for implementations of the ASTM Remote ID Standard (including broadcast implementations).  
<https://www.opendroneid.org>  
<https://github.com/opendroneid>
  - The Interuss project provides open source network remote ID implementations of the ASTM Remote ID standard:  
<https://github.com/interuss/dss>
- [ATIS-I-0000060, Unmanned Aerial Vehicle \(UAV\) Utilization of Cellular Services – Enabling Scalable and Safe Operation \(white paper\)](#)
- [ATIS-I-0000069, Support for UAV Communications in 3GPP Cellular Standards \(technical report\)](#).
- 3GPP UAS Remote ID: The normative 3GPP service requirements for “UAS ID” from the North American market were defined by 3GPP SA1 in release 16, and the 3GPP technical solutions will be defined in release 17.
- [ANSI/CTA-2063-A, Small Unmanned Aerial Systems Serial Numbers, September 2019](#) The ASTM Remote ID Standard uses this standard for encoding serial numbers and this standard has been referenced by the FAA NPRM as well as the EU delegated act.

**In-Development Standards and Related Materials:**

- Revision of ASTM F3411 (WK65041)
  - The standard generally applies to aircraft typically operating at lower altitudes.
  - There are minor differences with the NPRM, but the standard will not be updated until issuance of the final rule.

- There is a need to determine what's next for Remote ID in terms of new use cases (e.g., UAM air-to-air, manned aviation conspicuity?) and what new media/mechanisms may be required for those use cases. Aspects include:
  - 1) Strategy on integrating any new NPRM (potential) requirements (or waiting for final rule). Examples include: Ground Station Pressure Alt, Limited Remote ID
  - 2) Evaluation of various Radio Technologies
  - 3) Further characterize technologies in the standard
  - 4) Evaluation of Test Methodologies
  - 5) Setup a Test/Evaluation subgroup
  - 6) Product Certification
- [3GPP WI810049 Release 16, Feasibility Study and Work Item on Remote Identification of Unmanned Aerial Systems](#). Ubiquitous coverage, high reliability and QoS, robust security, and seamless mobility are critical factors in supporting UAS C2 functions. 3GPP SA1 has completed a feasibility study with potential requirements and use cases for remote ID and the services that can be offered based on remote ID. A normative work item to implement these requirements has been approved. The next steps in 3GPP are to complete requirements and protocol specifications to support remote ID of UAS. The ongoing Release 17 3GPP specification work is applicable to both 4G and 5G systems.
- EUROCAE WG-105 SG-32 / UTM E-Identification: Minimum Operational Performance Specification (MOPS) for UAS e-identification
- EUROCAE WG-105 SG-33 / UTM Geo-fencing: Minimum Operational Performance Standard for UAS geo-caging
- ASD-STAN: Developing the CE mark standard for Remote ID. ASTM is currently working with them. ASD-STAN in-development work includes prEN4709-002 Direct Remote ID
- IEEE P1920.2, *Standard for Vehicle to Vehicle Communications for Unmanned Aircraft Systems*
- IETF workgroup on Drone Remote ID Protocols (DRIP):
  - [Trustworthy Remote ID](#)
  - [DRIP Authentication Formats](#)
  - [Crowd Sourced Remote ID](#)

**Gap O8: Remote ID: Direct Broadcast.** Standards are needed for transmitting UAS ID and tracking data with no specific destination or recipient, and not dependent on a communications network to carry the data. Current direct broadcast standards for aviation and telecommunications applications do not specifically address UAS operations, including secure UAS ID, authentication, and tracking capabilities, and specifically when UAS operations are conducted outside ATC.

**R&D Needed:** Yes, to enhance observer trust in UAS ID in an unconnected environment.

**Recommendation:**

- 1) Revise published ASTM F3411 Remote ID standard once UAS Remote ID Rule is finalized.



- 2) Continue development of the Open Source implementations and enablement.
- 3) Continue development of 3GPP specs and ATIS standards to support direct communication broadcast of UAS ID and tracking data with or without the presence of a 4G or 5G cellular network.

**Priority:** High (Tier 1)

**Organization(s):** ASTM, 3GPP, ATIS, IETF

**Status of Progress:** Green

**Update:**

- ASTM F3411-19
- 3GPP WI810049 Release 16
- EUROCAE WG-105
- ASD-STAN
- IEEE P1920.2
- IETF DRIP

**Gap O9: Remote ID: Network Publishing.** Standards are needed for secure UAS ID, authentication, and tracking data transmitted over a secure communications network (e.g., cellular, satellite, other) to a specific destination or recipient. Current manned aviation standards do not extend to the notion of transmitting UAS ID and tracking data over an established secure communications network to an internet service or group of services, specifically the cellular and satellite networks and cloud-based services. Nor do they describe how that data is received by and/or accessed from an FAA-approved internet-based database.

**R&D Needed:** Yes

**Recommendation:**

- 1) Revise the published ASTM F3411 Remote ID standard and other applicable standards once UAS Remote ID Rule is finalized.
- 2) Continue development of 3GPP specs and ATIS standards related to remote ID of UAS and UTM support over cellular or satellite networks.

**Priority:** High (Tier 1)

**Organization(s):** ASTM, 3GPP, ATIS, IETF

**Status of Progress:** Green

**Update:**

- ASTM F3411-19

- 3GPP WI810049 Release 16
- EUROCAE WG-105
- ASD-STAN
- IEEE P1920.2
- IETF DRIP

## 7.9. Geo-fencing

This section describes geo-fencing and the exchange of geo-fence data and actions to be taken by an aircraft and/or operator upon approaching or intersecting a geo-fence. Note that various standardizing bodies have variable terminology for geo-fence, geo-limit, geographical limitation, etc., and consider the “geo-awareness” of the UAS in the context of the terminology.

Operation of UA includes consideration of actions or policies related to boundaries referenced to the Earth. For instance, no-fly zones are typically mapped to specific boundaries relative to the ground and often by altitude above the ground surface. These boundaries are commonly referred to as “geo-fences” and describe a threshold over which an aircraft must take an action (including not to cross that threshold). Geo-fences may be described in a number of ways ranging from a sequence of coordinates to a text description of an outline to a digital representation of geographic information. For UAS operations, the geo-fence should be represented in a consistent and standardized fashion as digital data, which the aircraft and/or operational controls can reference and against which the aircraft location can be inspected.

Geo-fences can be static, time-limited, and/or move/reshape with time. For instance, no-fly zones may be permanent and fixed (such as around a military installation) or defined for a specific amount of time (such as when a dignitary is at a location). Further, a geo-fence may also be established around a moving object (such as an aircraft or a motorcade transporting a dignitary).

Geo-fencing has long been a core function of geographic information systems and is commonly used in the logistics and transportation industries. Geo-fencing is also used (albeit with different nomenclature) in ATC. However, with autonomous UAS or UAS operators often ignorant of restricted airspaces, geo-fences need to be provisioned to the aircraft or control systems and the aircraft or operator should receive appropriate guidance when approaching or crossing a geo-fence.

Geo-fences, particularly as safety-crucial airspace / no-fly zones, have long been defined by aviation authorities. Existing FAA, Eurocontrol, and defense standards allow for the defining of some types of geo-fences. EUROCAE WG-105 (Unmanned Aircraft Systems) is also accessing standardization targets for geo-caging.

**Published Standards and Other Documents:** The following geospatial standards and related guidance are relevant for defining, disseminating, and interacting with geo-fences:

- [OGC 06-103r4](#), *OpenGIS® Implementation Standard for Geographic information - Simple feature access - Part 1: Common architecture v. 1.2.1* (also ISO 19125) - Describes a common model for describing geographic features in encodings and databases
- [OGC 07-036r1](#), *OpenGIS® Geography Markup Language (GML) Encoding Standard v. 3.2.2* - An XML encoding of geographic features, including 3D features
- [OGC 12-007r2](#), *OGC KML v. 2.3* - A simple and widely-implemented encoding of geographic features
- [IETF 7946](#), *The GeoJSON Format* - Another simple and widely-implemented encoding of geographic features
- [OGC 09-025r1](#), *OpenGIS Web Feature Service (WFS) 2.0 Interface Standard* (also ISO 19142) - A service for web-provision of feature data, primarily as GML. Note that OGC has issued a corrigendum (OGC 09-025r2) and that the previous version of WFS (OGC 04-094r1) is more widely implemented.
- [OGC 15-078r6](#), *OGC SensorThings API Part 1: Sensing* – A very simple interface to sensor observations
- [OGC 12-006](#), *OGC® Sensor Observation Service Interface Standard* - Web service of interoperable sensor observations
- [OGC 16-120r3](#), *OGC Moving Features Access* - Methods for retrieving information regarding moving features, including attributes and trajectory. Other related moving features encoding standards (OGC 14-083r2 and OGC 14-084r2) are also relevant.
- OGC 17-069r3, *OGC API – Features – Part 1: Core* – most current OGC standard for serving feature data through a Web API.
- [ISO 21384-3:2019](#), *Unmanned Aircraft Systems – Part 3: Operational Procedures*
- [UAST Safety Enhancement No 1: Airspace Awareness and Geofencing, Out-of-the-Box Protection of High-Risk Airport Locations, May 1, 2020](#)

#### **In-Development Standards and Related Guidance:**

- EUROCAE WG-105 SC-33 / UTM Geo-Fencing
  - ED-270 Minimum Operational Performance Standard for UAS geo-caging
  - ED 269, Minimum Operational Performance Specification for UAS geo-fencing
- ASD-STAN in-development work: prEN4709-003 Geo-Awareness

**Gap O10: Geo-fence Exchange.** Standards have been developed (or are in development) to provide a consistent description of the limits of a geo-fence. Standards also exist to define and encode the geometry for a geo-fence. However, a new standard or a profile of an existing standard is needed to exchange geo-fence data. This standard must encode the attributes of a geo-fence necessary for UAS operators or autonomous systems to respond to the proximity of a geo-fence.

**R&D Needed:** Yes. The encoding mechanism should rely upon existing standards. Investigation is needed to identify which attributes should be included to handle geo-fence interaction. R&D is needed

to trigger unmanned aircraft landing or evasion when approaching/entering/leaving a geo-fenced location (including when it comes into close proximity of manned aircraft).

**Recommendation:** A draft conceptual model should be developed that identifies allowed geometries in 2D, 3D, as well as temporal considerations and which articulates the necessary attributes. Critical to this model is a definition of terminology that is consistent with or maps to other UAS operational standards. The model should consider “active” vs. “passive” geo-fences, the former being geo-fences where a third party intervenes in the aircraft operation, and the latter being geo-fences where the UAS or operator is expected to respond to proximity/intersection. The model should also define geo-fences with respect to the aircraft operational limits, either: 1) the aircraft operates inside a geo-fence and an action occurs when the aircraft leaves that geo-fence, or 2) the aircraft operates outside a geo-fence and an action occurs when the aircraft intersects the geo-fence boundary. The conceptual model can be used to develop one or more standard encodings so that equipment manufacturers can select the ideal format for their hardware (e.g., XML, JSON, binary).

Industry has taken the lead on proposing geo-fencing solutions improving safety on current UAS operations but guidelines from the UAS community (industry+regulator) are needed to harmonize this functionality.

The geo-fence exchange standard must be machine-readable to take advantage of existing geospatial processing code and ensure consistent application of rules against the geo-fence as well as be a format suitable to allow manufacturers to integrate (and update) hard geo-fence limitations into UAS firmware.

**Priority:** High (Tier 2)

**Organization(s):** OGC, ISO/TC 20/SC 16, EUROCAE, ICANN, IETF

**Status of Progress:** Green

**Update:**

- EUROCAE WG-105 SG-33 / UTM Geo-fencing
- Standards are in development

**Gap O11: Geo-fence Provisioning and Handling.** There is a need for standards and a guiding best practices document to inform manufacturers of the purpose, handling, and provisioning requirements of geo-fences.

**R&D Needed:** Yes. The proposed geo-fence exchange standard discussed earlier will suffice for the geo-fence content. Standards will be required to translate regulatory guidance into provisioning/unprovisioning rules as well as interpretation of aircraft behavior when encountering a geo-fence. There are many existing methods to deploy such data to hardware.

**Recommendation:** Create a best practices document on geo-fence provisioning and handling and standards describing circumstances under which geo-fence provisioning must occur as well as for autonomous and remote pilot behavior. These documents should include specific guidance on when geo-fences must be provisioned to an aircraft, conditions under which geo-fences may be unprovisioned, and how an aircraft must behave when approaching or crossing a geo-fence. For a passive geo-fence boundary, behavior is governed based on the attributes contained in the geo-fence data, such as: not entering restricted airspace, notifying the operator to turn off a camera, changing flight altitude, etc. For active geo-fences, the documents should detail the types of third party interventions. These best practices may not need to be expressed in a separate document, but rather could be provided as content for other documents for control of aircraft operations, such as UTM. Ideally, the geo-fence provisioning standards will integrate with regulatory systems such as the FAA-USS to support the safe, seamless, and timely management of the overall system.

**Priority:** Medium

**Organization(s):** OGC, RTCA, EUROCAE

**Status of Progress:** Not Started

**Update:**

- EUROCAE WG-105 SG-33 / UTM Geo-fencing
- Standards are in development

## 7.10. Recreational Operations

The FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018 established the Exception for Limited Recreational Operations of Unmanned Aircraft (49 U.S.C. 44809). The FAA refers to individuals operating under that statutory exception as “recreational flyers.”

The FAA maintains a [website](#) that outlines safety requirements for recreational flyers and modeler community-based organizations. It describes how the agency is working with stakeholders to develop test administration requirements for online aeronautical knowledge and safety tests.

**Published Regulations, Standards, and Related Documents Include but Are Not Limited to:**

- 49 U.S. Code § 44809 *Exception for limited recreational operations of unmanned aircraft*
- [FAA AC 91-57B - Exception for Limited Recreational Operations of Unmanned Aircraft](#) (May 31, 2019)
- 14 CFR part 107 *Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems*
- 47 CFR part 97 provides standards and needed qualifications for the pilot(s) / operator(s) using remote control or FPV transmission frequencies in the Amateur Radio Service, and requiring a minimum of a Federal Communication Commission Technician Class Amateur Radio (HAM) License.
- The American Radio Relay League (ARRL) which is the National Association for Amateur Radio. 225 Main Street, Newington, CT, 06111, [www.arrl.org](http://www.arrl.org), [hq@arrl.org](mailto:hq@arrl.org). They publish and maintain

recommended national band plans for all Amateur Radio frequencies that generally are adopted regionally within the United States.

- Academy of Model Aeronautics Doc # 105, Academy of Model Aeronautics National Model Aircraft Safety Code
- Academy of Model Aeronautics Doc # 510-A, B, C, I, D, F, Q. All relate to the waiver process, operation, design, construction, and operation of turbine and pulse jet engines in model aircraft.
- Academy of Model Aeronautics Doc # 520-A, [AMA Large Model Airplane Program \(over 55 lbs.\) Requirements and Inspector Information](#)
- [Academy of Model Aeronautics Doc # 535-A](#), Guidelines for Bylaws for Chartered Clubs. Outlines a club grievance procedure that provides a mechanism to enforce existing safety rules by providing a progressive disciplinary system when needed. Multiple grievances against a member can lead to suspension of flying privileges, and ultimately expulsion from the club. Safety grievances are recorded in club records.
- Academy of Model Aeronautics Doc # 535-B, Flying Site Safety and Operational Rules. Provides generic sample of a set of rules designed to supplement the required current Official AMA National Model Aircraft Safety Code.
- Academy of Model Aeronautics Doc # 540-D, “See and Avoid” Guidance. Includes reporting instructions for near miss incidents involving manned aircraft.
- Academy of Model Aeronautics Doc # 550, Unmanned Aircraft Operation Utilizing First-Person View. Outlines FPV operations, requirements, limitations, and privacy protection safeguards.
- Academy of Model Aeronautics Doc # 551, Radio Controlled Model Aircraft Operation Utilizing “First Person View” Systems for Indoor Flying of Ultra-Micro and Micro-Aircraft
- Academy of Model Aeronautics Doc # 560, Radio-Controlled small/micro Unmanned Aircraft Systems/Model Aircraft (m/sUAS) Operations Utilizing Failsafe, Stabilization, Autopilot, Ground-Station, Cameras/Sensors
- Academy of Model Aeronautics Doc # 590, FCC Requirements for Model Aircraft Operations
- Academy of Model Aeronautics Doc # 903, Suggested Duties for Club Officers. Recommends duties for a Safety Coordinator, to include, safety audits, establishing a club emergency action plan to handle serious accidents/incidents, reviews emergency procedures annually with club members, and serves as a mentor.
- Academy of Model Aeronautics Doc # 921, AMA Guide for Introductory Pilot Instructor Selection Criteria and Flight Proficiency Demonstration. Includes a checklist of proficiencies introductory AMA pilots must be able to demonstrate.
- Academy of Model Aeronautics Membership Manual 2018

**In-Development Regulations, Standards, and Other Activity:** As set forth in [FAA AC 91-57B - Exception for Limited Recreational Operations of Unmanned Aircraft](#) (May 31, 2019), “Upcoming Guidance” includes the following:

7.2.1 CBO Requirements and Procedures. The FAA intends to provide further information on how organizations can be recognized by the FAA as official CBOs.

7.2.2 Basic Aeronautical Training and Test (BATT). The FAA is developing a training module with an accompanying test to provide basic aeronautical education to all recreational flyers and enhance the safety of the NAS through greater education and awareness. The training and test will be developed in consultation with stakeholders. The FAA expects to provide the training module and test to recognized CBOs for online administration to their members and also to the general public.

No voluntary standards gaps have been identified at this time.

## 7.11. Design and Operation of Aerodrome Facilities for UAS

ICAO Annex 14 Volume I defines an aerodrome as “a defined area on land or water (including any buildings, installations and equipment) intended to be used either wholly or in part for the arrival, departure and surface movement of aircraft.”

UAS will rely heavily on a broad ecosystem of passenger accommodation facilities, skilled personnel, ground support equipment and services in order to create an efficient system. Similar requirements exist for the emerging optionally-piloted aircraft (OPA) and “flying taxis” of urban air mobility.

The FAA National Airspace Forecast 2019-2039<sup>40</sup> predicts there will be over 835,000 registered non-model UAS by 2023.<sup>41</sup> With the predicted expansion of Part 135 UAS operations, the need for standards for fixed location will become more relevant for all complexities of the UAS.

Existing industry standards from SDOs such as RTCA, SAE, SAE-ITC, EUROCAE, IEEE, ASTM, NFPA, American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials (AASHTO) etc., and regulatory frameworks from manned aviation, ATM, UTM, airports, ground infrastructures, etc. still apply to some aerodromes. Existing standards for airport operations such as aircraft deicing application and fluid collection (SAE G-12), snow removal (SAE G-15), and ground support equipment (SAE AGE-3) may apply. Existing civil engineering standards for the construction of airports may also apply (e.g. ASTM, AASHTO, NFPA, standards and test methods for building materials such as cement, asphalt, tar, soil, steel reinforcement, drains, pipes, electric codes, etc.). Additionally, local municipalities may have their own requirements for integration within existing infrastructure services that would be in coordination with urban planning.

**Published Standards and Other Documents:** No published standards on aerodromes specifically for UAS have been identified. Various SDOs and organizations involved in airports, runways, heliports, and

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<sup>40</sup> FAA Aerospace Forecast 2019-2039, page 48. A Copy of this forecast can be found here: [https://www.faa.gov/data\\_research/aviation/aerospace\\_forecasts/media/FY2019-39\\_FAA\\_Aerospace\\_Forecast.pdf](https://www.faa.gov/data_research/aviation/aerospace_forecasts/media/FY2019-39_FAA_Aerospace_Forecast.pdf)

<sup>41</sup> Ibid. page 43, footnote 12 defines non-model UASs as those *not* used by hobbyists.

ground infrastructure have published numerous standards and other documents. Some of these can be found in the [UASSC Reference Document](#).

**In-Development Standards:** Various SDOs and organizations involved in airports, heliports, and ground Infrastructure have standards and other documents in-development. Some of these can be found in the [UASSC Reference Document](#). For aerodromes specifically for UAS the following work is taking place:

- [ASTM WK59317, New Specification for Vertiport Design](#)
- ISO/NP 5015-2, Unmanned aircraft systems — Part 2: Operation of vertiports for unmanned aircraft (UA) (proposed in ISO/TC20/SC16)

**New Gap O12: Design and Operation of Aerodrome Facilities for UAS.** Standards do not exist for special cases of UAS-only infrastructure. Existing standards should be evaluated for addressing special considerations for UAS. Numerous standards apply to mixed use infrastructure (manned and UAS).

**R&D Needed:** Yes

**Recommendation:** Complete work on standards in development. Look at how existing standards for dual-use (manned and unmanned) ground infrastructure (airports, heliports) can be applied in the UAS context for unmanned-only locations.

**Priority:** High (Tier 2)

**Organization:** ASTM, ISO, SAE, NFPA, AASHTO

## 7.12. UAS Service Suppliers (USS) Process and Quality

Most of the existing aviation process and quality standards are either geared toward airborne systems or government purchases. The safety and security of UASs are increasingly relying on software systems that are installed in cloud-based service architectures accessed through the internet. To handle the expanding UAS market, aviation authorities are relying on companies to provide the federated solutions through the use of UAS Service Suppliers (USS). The envisioned use of USS has grown from LAANC to now at least UTM and Remote Identification USS. Other USS functions are expected to be identified as the use of UAS and automation expands (e.g., flight clearance, weather information, etc.).

The LAANC-USS process and quality checks are currently the FAA performance tests of the software before it is registered on the FAA web page and given access credentials. Government and industry groups have focused on the performance and interface standards for UTM and remote identification. Industry now needs to coalesce on the process and quality requirements. Given the lack of industry accepted standards, the USS companies may have process and quality standards that are inconsistent with the level of safety and security needed for a given type of USS.



USSs and supporting secondary data service providers (SDSPs) will be supporting a wide range of functions with differing safety and security implications. As a result, multiple categories of assurance are needed. For high criticality functions such as the deconfliction algorithms of a UTM-USS operating in controlled airspace with heavy air traffic, a high level of assurance is needed. A different UTM-USS only operating in a class G rural area with few aircraft may not need the same assurance. For USSs when the pilot is involved in the process (such as LAANC), an even lower level of assurance may be adequate.

In addition to the minimum criteria for USS acceptability based on the safety and security assurance levels, there are other requirements that are common to USS such as: privacy, data protection, availability, continuity, updates, maintenance, version compatibility, operator training, oversight, etc. Companies that develop multiple USS functions (e.g., UTM, remote identification, LAANC, etc.) don't want to deal with conflicting process and quality standards. There needs to be a clear framework on how to apply process and quality assurance to USS. Such a framework should call out existing standards that are tailored to be relevant to UTM USS process and quality assurance. For example, DO-278A for software levels, SORA Cyber Annex for security.

The following are existing and in-development standards that must be reviewed and tailored for applicability based on the USS function's safety and security impact.

**Published Standards and Related Documents:** Most of the currently published standards and related documents do not take into account the federated nature of the USS. They have been largely used by government or industry to obtain single-source aviation products with the end operator responsible for the operations and maintaining quality control. With the federated USS approach, the UAS pilot may have no insight or ability to perform quality oversight. Also, many of the standards are for high criticality systems, so they need to be scaled for low and medium risk USS.

#### EUROCAE/RTCA:

- EUROCAE ED-109A, Software Integrity Assurance Considerations for Communication and Navigation and Surveillance and Air Traffic Management (CNS/ATM) Systems, dated January 2012, and DO-278, Guidelines for Communication, Navigation, Surveillance, and Air Traffic Management (CNS/ATM) Systems Software Integrity Assurance
- EUROCAE ED-215, Software Tool Qualification Considerations, dated January 2012, and RTCA DO-330, Software Tool Qualification Considerations, dated December 13, 2011.
- EUROCAE ED-218, Model-Based Development and Verification Supplement to ED-12C and ED-109A, dated January 2012, and RTCA DO-331, Model-Based Development and Verification Supplement to DO-178C and DO-278A, dated December 13, 2011.
- EUROCAE ED-217, Object-Oriented Technology and Related Techniques Supplement to ED-12C and ED-109A, dated January 2012, and RTCA DO-332, Object-Oriented Technology and Related Techniques Supplement to DO-178C and DO-278A, dated December 13, 2011.
- EUROCAE ED-216, Formal Methods Supplement to ED-12C and ED-109A, dated January 2012 and RTCA DO-333, Formal Methods Supplement to DO-178C and DO-278A, dated December 13, 2011.

ISO/TC 20/SC 16:

- [ISO/TR 23629-1, UAS Traffic Management \(UTM\) -- Part 1: General requirements for UTM -- Survey results on UTM](#)

SAE:

- [ARP9005A](#), Aerospace Guidance for Non-Deliverable Software, Jun 27, 2016
- [ARP9009A](#), Aerospace Contract Clauses, Jun 21, 2017
- [ARP9034A](#), A Process Standard for the Storage, Retrieval and Use of Three-Dimensional Type Design Data, Apr 21, 2015
- [ARP9090A](#), Requirements for Industry Standard e-Tool to Collaborate Quality Assurance Activities Among Customers and Suppliers, Feb 06, 2014
- [ARP9107A](#), Direct Delivery Authorization Guidance for Aerospace Companies, Nov 09, 2017
- [ARP9114A](#), Direct Ship Guidance for Aerospace Companies, Feb 06, 2014
- [ARP9134A](#), Supply Chain Risk Management Guideline, Feb 06, 2014
- [ARP9136](#), Aerospace Series - Root Cause Analysis and Problem Solving (9S Methodology), Nov 08, 2016
- [ARP9137](#), Guidance for the Application of AQAP 2110 within a 9100 Quality Management System, May 06, 2010
- [AS9003A](#), Inspection and Test Quality Systems, Requirements for Aviation, Space, and Defense Organizations, Jul 31, 2012
- [AS9017](#), Control of Aviation Critical Safety Items, Mar 17, 2017
- [AS9100D](#), Quality Management Systems - Requirements for Aviation, Space, and Defense Organizations, Sep 20, 2016
- [AS9101E](#), Quality Management Systems - Audit Requirements for Aviation, Space, and Defense Organizations, Oct 31, 2016
- [AS9102B](#), Aerospace First Article Inspection Requirement, Oct 06, 2014
- [AS9103A](#), Aerospace Series - Quality Management Systems - Variation Management of Key Characteristics, Aug 16, 2012
- [AS9104/1](#), Requirements for Aviation, Space, and Defense Quality Management System Certification Programs, Jan 31, 2012
- [AS9104/2A](#), Requirements for Oversight of Aerospace Quality Management System Registration/Certification Programs, Jun 13, 2014
- [AS9104/3](#), Requirements for Aerospace Auditor Competency and Training Courses, Mar 29, 2007
- [AS9110C](#), Quality Management Systems – Requirements for Aviation Maintenance Organizations, Nov 04, 2016
- [AS9115A](#), Quality Management Systems - Requirements for Aviation, Space, and Defense Organizations - Deliverable Software (Supplement to 9100:2016), Feb 01, 2017
- [AS9116](#), Aerospace Series - Notice of Change (NOC) Requirements, Oct 30, 2014
- [AS9117](#), Delegated Product Release Verification, Mar 29, 2016

- [AS9120B](#), Quality Management Systems – Requirements for Aviation, Space, and Defense Distributors, Nov 01, 2016
- [AS9131D](#), Aerospace Series - Quality Management Systems - Nonconformity Data Definition and Documentation, May 31, 2019
- [AS9132B](#), Data Matrix Quality Requirements for Parts Marking, May 19, 2015
- [AS9133A](#), Qualification Procedure for Aerospace Standard Products, Apr 20, 2016
- [AS9138](#), Aerospace Series - Quality Management Systems Statistical Product Acceptance Requirements, Jan 20, 2018
- [AS9145](#), Aerospace Series – Requirements for Advanced Product Quality Planning and Production Part Approval Process, Nov 08, 2016
- [AS9162](#), Aerospace Operator Self-Verification Programs, Nov 08, 2016

### **In-Development Standards:**

#### EUROCAE WG-117/SC-240:

- Software Considerations in Low Risk Applications, Equipment Certifications and Approvals
- Integration of COTS, Open Source and Service History into Software

#### ISO/TC 20/SC 16:

- ISO/WD 23629-5 UAS traffic management (UTM) — Part 5: UTM functional structure
- ISO/CD 23629-7 UAS traffic management (UTM) — Part 7: Data model for spatial data
- [ISO/WD 23629-12 UAS Traffic Management \(UTM\) — Part 12: requirements for UTM services and service providers](#)

#### SAE:

#### [SAE G-14 Americas Aerospace Quality Standards Committee \(AAQSC\)](#)

- [ARP9005B](#), Aerospace Guidance for Non-Deliverable Software
- [ARP9114B](#), Direct Ship Guidance for Aerospace Companies
- [ARP9137A](#), Guidance for the Application of AQAP 2110 within a 9100 Quality Management System
- [AS9003B](#), Inspection and Test Quality Systems, Requirements for Aviation, Space, and Defense Organizations
- [AS9018](#), ICOP Interaction Process for Customer Identified Major QMS Nonconformities
- [AS9101G](#), Quality Management Systems - Audit Requirements for Aviation, Space, and Defense Organizations
- [AS9102C](#), Aerospace First Article Inspection Requirement
- [AS9103B](#), Aerospace Series - Quality Management Systems - Variation Management of Key Characteristics
- [AS9104/1A](#), Requirements for Aviation, Space, and Defense Quality Management System Certification Programs
- [AS9104/2B](#), Requirements for Oversight of Aerospace Quality Management System Registration/Certification Programs

- [AS9104/3A](#), Requirements for Aerospace Auditor Competency and Training Courses
- [AS9116A](#), Aerospace Series - Notice of Change (NOC) Requirements
- [AS9147](#), Unsalvageable Parts Initiative
- [AS9163](#), Certificate of Conformance Requirements

**New Gap O13: UAS Service Suppliers (USS) Process and Quality.** The airborne standards discussed in Chapter 6 don't address the process and quality requirements needed for the 24/7 cloud-based operations associated with UAS Service Suppliers (e.g., security, privacy, health monitoring, etc.). Non-aviation cloud-based standards and initial UTM standards (e.g., RID and UTM) don't address the safety and consistency requirements needed for the NAS. Standards are needed to ensure adequate process assurance and quality for the cloud-based USS that are providing functions with safety and security considerations. The standards need to define multiple levels of assurance given the varying function, end user vehicle, and operational environment. However, for a given USS function, end user vehicle, and operational environment, the assurance level should be consistent across all USS providers of that function. See also sections 7.7 on UTM and 7.8 on Remote ID.

**R&D Needed:** No

**Recommendation:**

- Develop a USS quality standard, with multiple classification levels, that includes tailoring of existing software, security, and quality standards related to a USS and any cloud-specific process aspects (e.g., external verification, audits, version compatibility checks)
- Develop a standard that maps the appropriate classification level for each planned UTM/USS service coupled with the end user vehicle and operational environment. This may be included in the USS quality standard.

**Priority:** High (Tier 2)

**Organization(s):** ASTM, EUROCAE, ISO, RTCA, SAE

## 8. Flight Operations Standards: Infrastructure Inspections, Environmental Applications, Commercial Services, Workplace Safety – WG3<sup>42</sup>

### 8.1. Vertical Infrastructure Inspections

#### 8.1.1. Power Plants and Industrial Process Plants

Owner operators are utilizing sUAS to perform inspections of assets (structures) within power plants and industrial process plants such as refineries, chemical plants, pharmaceutical, food, and other bulk production facilities. These inspections can be camera and visual based or utilize other technologies while the UAS is flying in close proximity to an asset or when the UAS places a sensor or other device in physical contact to the asset.

**Published Standards:** No published UAS standards have been identified.

**In-Development Standards:** The ASME Mobile Unmanned Systems (MUS) Standards Committee is currently developing a standard that would provide requirements for the safe and reliable use of UAS to perform inspections of various assets within power plants and industrial process plants. UAS can be used for internal and external inspection as well as both VLOS and BVLOS scenarios. The standard will provide guidelines on how to perform UAS visual and physical contact touch-based inspections that achieve quality data and repeatable results. The goal of the committee is to address operation of a UAS using other NDE methods, e.g., infrared, ultrasonic, gas detection, radiographic, lidar, etc.

Five case studies are being developed in conjunction with the ASME standard, two of which are external inspection case studies: visual inspection of a nuclear containment dome and a stack. Renewable energy inspection case studies, e.g., solar, wind, and hydropower, are being considered. The guidelines being developed in this standard provide the basis of using a UAS safely and reliably and can be applied to inspect most critical assets, e.g., piping, pipelines, railroads, transmission lines, etc. The inspection criteria will differ depending upon the asset being inspected and will include Vertical Infrastructure Inspections standards such as those promulgated by NACE International, SSPC: the Society for Protecting

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<sup>42</sup> In addition to the topics listed below, ASSP is looking at the use of drones for construction and demolition operations (see 4.4).

Coatings, the American Petroleum Institute (API), the Engineering Equipment and Materials Users Association (EEMUA) and others.

**Gap I1: UAS Inspections of Power Plant and Industrial Process Plant Assets.** No published standards have been identified for inspections of power plant and industrial process plant assets using UAS.

**R&D Needed:** No.

**Recommendation:** Develop standards for power plant inspections using UAS

**Priority:** High (Tier 3)

**Organization(s):** ASME BPV Committee on Nondestructive Examination (V) and ASME Mobile Unmanned Systems (MUS) Standards Committee

**Status of Progress:** Green

**Update:** As noted in the text, ASME is developing a standard on the use of UAS to perform inspections of power plant and industrial process plant assets.

### 8.1.2. Cranes

UAS can be used to safely conduct certain “at height” crane inspections, reducing hazards to crane personnel and saving time and money as compared to traditional means. Some of the issues that will come into play include: regulatory body requirements, the location of the crane (e.g., on the ground, on top of a building, in a waterway), inspection operation proximity to fixed structures and electrical power distribution systems, and the necessary flight paths of the drone to accomplish the inspections.

**Published Standards:** No published standards for crane inspections using UAS have been identified. The [ASME B30 Standards Committee](#) maintains safety standards for the crane industry.

**In-Development Standards:** The ASME B30.32 subcommittee is developing [ASME B30.32-20XX, Unmanned Aircraft Systems \(UAS\) used in Inspection, Testing, Maintenance, and Lifting Operations](#). The standard will provide requirements and recommendations that address the safety relevant to UAS to support inspecting, maintaining, and operating cranes, and other material handling equipment. It will also provide UAS and material handling equipment designers, owners, and operators a clear and consistent set of recommendations to help prevent accidents and injuries.

**Gap I2: Crane Inspections.** Standards are needed to establish requirements for the use of UAS in the inspection, testing, maintenance, and operation of cranes and other material handling equipment covered within the scope of ASME’s B30 volumes.

**R&D Needed:** No

**Recommendation:** Complete work on draft [B30.32-20XX, Unmanned Aircraft Systems \(UAS\) used in Inspection, Testing, Maintenance, and Lifting Operations](#) to address crane inspections using UAS.

**Priority:** Medium

**Organization(s):** ASME

**Status of Progress:** Green

**Update:** Work continues on development of the draft B30.32 standard.

### 8.1.3. Building Facades

In the U.S., there are 12 cities with facade ordinances requiring periodic inspection of building facades or their appurtenances. This amounts to approximately 30,000 buildings requiring periodic inspection. UAS are being applied in many areas for construction, building, and architecture for pre-project, in progress, and post-project activity. Use cases include the following:

- Inspections conducted in dense urban environments: wind and navigation challenges
- Inspections using thermal sensors for leak detection
- Inspections using penetrating radar for deterioration, cavity detection
- Collection of data for building information modeling
- Inspections for change detection of building facade conditions
- Documentation of deficiencies such as, cracking, spalls, and member deflection. Deterioration mechanisms that result in possible changes in material properties, such as corrosion of steel reinforcement, thermal damage, and concrete reactions like alkali-aggregate.

**Published Standards:** There are no known published standards for vertical inspections of building facades with a drone. However, there are published standards for building inspections, including:

- [ASTM E1825-17, Standard Guide for Evaluation of Exterior Building Wall Materials, Products, and Systems](#). This guide may be used by design professionals and others in the building construction industry to provide factual support for professional judgment of materials, products, or systems during the design development of new and remedial exterior building wall construction.
- [ASTM E2128-17, Standard Guide for Evaluating Water Leakage of Building Walls](#). This guide describes methods for determining and evaluating causes of water leakage of exterior walls.
- [ASTM E2270-14, Standard Practice for Periodic Inspection of Building Facades for Unsafe Conditions](#). This standard practice is intended to establish the minimum requirements for conducting periodic inspections of building facades to identify unsafe conditions that could cause harm to persons and property.

- [ASTM E2947-16a, Standard Guide for Building Enclosure Commissioning](#). This guide provides recommendations for the enclosure commissioning process from its project planning through design, construction, occupancy, and operation phases.
- [ASTM E3036-15, Standard Guide for Notating Facade Conditions in the Field](#). This guide consists of symbols and notations pertaining to documenting deficient conditions observed during facade inspections.
- [ACI 562-16, Code Requirements for Assessment, Repair, and Rehabilitation of Existing Concrete Structures and Commentary](#). This code provides minimum requirements for assessment, repair, and rehabilitation of existing structural concrete buildings, members, systems, and where applicable, non-building structures.
- [ACI 201.1R-08, Guide for Conducting a Visual Inspection of Concrete in Service](#). This guide provides terminology to perform and report on the visual condition of concrete in service. It includes a checklist of the many details that may be considered in making a report and descriptions for various concrete conditions associated with the durability of concrete.

**In-Development Standards:** There's one known standard in development for vertical visual (i.e., optical) inspections with a drone. There are no standards being developed for other sensors that do not use the visible light spectrum, such as radar or thermal.

- [ASTM WK58243, Visual Inspection of Building Facade using Drone](#), developed by Committee E06 on Performance of Buildings, Subcommittee E06.55, Performance of Building Enclosures. This standard consists of guidelines for utilizing drones with cameras to document facade conditions with video and still photography. The purpose of this standard is to establish procedures and methodologies for conducting visual inspections of building facades via drone, and documenting such inspections. Work on this standard was initiated in March 2017.

Related building inspection standards in development include the following:

- [ASTM WK43980, New Guide for Assessing Building or Structure Designs for Sliding or Falling Ice and Snow Hazard Potential](#). The guide is intended to establish procedures and methodologies for the review and assessment of building or structure designs, with respect to their anticipated performance when exposed to winter weather; and the potential for danger to people or property due to ice and snow accretion that can release from the building or structure surface.
- [ASTM WK62463, New Practice for Protection of Public and Property During High-rise Construction](#). The intent of this practice is to provide protection for public and property exposed to falling debris materials, etc. during construction of high-rise building over 15 stories.

**Gap I3: Inspection of Building Facades using Drones.** There are no known published standards for vertical inspections of building facades and their associated envelopes using a drone.

A standard is needed to provide building professionals and remote pilots with a methodology for documenting facade conditions utilizing a sensor mounted to a drone. This should include best practices



for the operation of the drone and establish an approach to sensing a building facade, preserving the data, and utilizing data recorded for reporting purposes.

The standard should consider the safe operating distance from a building, which may vary depending on the construction material of the facade, and the size and height of the building. It should also take into account FAA requirements that apply to operational navigation (visual and beyond line of sight) and OOP.

In addition, the standard should consider the relationship between the licensed design professional and the remote pilot if they are not one-in-the-same. For example, the local jurisdiction authority may stipulate that only a licensed design professional may qualify the inspection results. The remote pilot may help document the inspection findings, but might not be qualified to provide analysis.

**R&D Needed:** Yes, for navigation systems to mitigate potential GPS reception loss while operating in close proximity of structures that might obstruct GPS transmission signals.

**Recommendation:** Expand work on [ASTM WK58243, Visual Inspection of Building Facade using Drone](#) to include non-visual sensors, such as radar and thermal.

**Priority:** Medium

**Organization(s):** ASTM

**Status of Progress:** Green

**Update:** As noted, standards are in development.

#### **8.1.4. Low-Rise Residential and Commercial Buildings**

UAS inspections of single-family homes, duplexes, and 3-4 story condos, as well as one- and two-story commercial buildings, are becoming more common. This is in part because of the need to inspect areas difficult to access in a safe manner. Drones provide inspectors a safe and accessible means of evaluating issues relating to grading, drainage, septic systems, site lines, roofing, HVAC systems, etc., in both hot and cold environments. Selecting the appropriate aircraft and software and determining the means by which data is delivered to the client are key considerations for these missions.

Almost all of these inspections are done in VLOS in a confined space within the property boundaries whether it be residential or commercial. The drone is typically operating at about 100-150 feet above the structure. Alerting neighbors of the imminent inspection is a standard practice.

**Published Standards:** None identified specific to conducting inspections of low-rise residential and commercial buildings. See the section on building facade inspections for other potentially relevant published and in-development work not specific to the use of drones.

**In-Development Standards:** The American Society of Home Inspectors (ASHI) is considering the development of a document addressing both residential and commercial inspections using UAS. Potentially relevant in-development standards include [ASTM WK58243, New Guide for Visual Inspection of Building Facade using Drone](#).

**Gap I4: Low-Rise Residential and Commercial Building Inspections Using UAS.** There is a need for a set of best practices or a standard operating procedure (SOP) to inform industry practitioners how to conduct low-rise residential and commercial inspections using UAS.

**R&D Needed:** No

**Recommendation:** Develop a guide or SOP for low-rise residential and commercial inspections using UAS. The document should consider safe operating distance from the building, which may vary depending on the construction material of the facade, and the size and height of the building. It should also take into account FAA requirements that apply to operational navigation (visual and beyond line of sight whether day or night), and OOP.

**Priority:** Medium

**Organization(s):** ASHI, ASTM

**Status of Progress:** Unknown

**Update:** No update provided at this time.

### 8.1.5. Communications Towers

Inspections of communications towers using UAS are needed to improve safety for tower technicians, ground personnel, and the general public with respect to flight operations of UAS in the NAS surrounding these vertical structures.

**Published Standards and Regulations:** NATE, The Communications Infrastructure Contractors Association, has published a best practices document entitled *sUAS Operations Best Practices Advisory* and a UAS Operations Resource Document titled *Unmanned Aerial Systems Operations around Vertical Communications Infrastructure (2nd Edition, January 2017)* which are freely available to the public on their website's [UAS Operations Portal](#).

The intended focus of these documents are on UAS operations around wireless infrastructure, cellular towers, broadcast towers, and utility structures. These documents intend to improve UAS operations by suggesting additional items to consider above and beyond the established FAA, federal, state, and local requirements as well as provide a resource to help standardize training requirements and operator processes. The operational suggestions in these documents are in support of all FAA regulations in this arena.

Other related standards and regulations include:

- [ANSI/TIA-222-H](#) Structural Standard For Antenna Supporting Structures, Antennas and Small Wind Turbine Support Structures
- [ANSI/TIA-322](#) Loading, Analysis, and Design Criteria Related to the Installation, Alteration and Maintenance of Communication Structures
- TIA satellite standards
- [FCC Tower and Antenna Siting](#) – FCC regulations on antenna structure registration, marking and lighting requirements
  - [Antenna Structure Painting and Lighting Requirements](#)

**In-Development Standards:** No in-development standards have been identified.

More research is needed to determine the nature and schedule for the development of such standards and what, if any, gaps are to be identified. More research is also needed to determine if other SDOs are working on standards in this arena.

The Telecommunications Industry Association (TIA) TR-14 UAS working group is looking to augment the legacy processes for tower work performed with UAS. Rationales include:

#### **New Construction/Asset Modification**

- Establish a baseline configuration for future asset management
- Leverage real time data acquisition to enhance field services and streamline work flows
- Improve planning with better data

#### **Damage Assessments/Downtime Reduction**

- Utilizing UAS increases safety and efficiency which reduces downtime. It also dramatically reduces time on site as compared to using traditional climbing methods.

#### **Field Services and Enhanced Safety**

- Establish the use of enhanced 3D modeling, versus traditional 2D drawing deliverables
- Provide more complete datasets resulting in faster project cycles
- Improve planning with better data
- Perform climb path assessment (safety climb cable, climb obstructions)

## **8.2. Linear Infrastructure Inspections**

### **8.2.1. Bridges**

Historically, bridge inspections have been performed primarily with visual inspection by walking around the bridge, or using an aerial work platform (AWP), an under-bridge “snooper” bucket, ladders, or ropes. The choice of apparatus used depends on the bridge type, size, and location, the access needed, and whether there is traffic that needs to be diverted. Implementation of non-destructive evaluation (NDE)

techniques by bridge inspectors has helped meet some data needs. UAS are proving to offer a safer, faster, more cost-effective alternative for performing bridge inspections.<sup>43</sup> They are being applied in many areas as a tool for collecting data to assess bridge conditions. Use cases include the following:

- Documentation of deficiencies during initial, routine, in-depth, fracture critical member inspections, including: delamination, crack detection and propagation, spalls, and member deflection
- Imaging difficult-to-reach areas that would ordinarily require specialized equipment
- Collection of data for building information modeling (BIM) for bridges
- Inspections for detecting changes in material conditions
- Documentation of deterioration mechanisms that contribute to changes in material properties, such as corrosion of steel reinforcement, thermal damage, and concrete reactions (e.g., alkali-aggregate)
- Assessing movement of bridge components due to hazards such as bridge scour
- Conducting non-destructive evaluation (NDE) measurements including ultrasonic thickness (UT/UTT “wall thickness”), dry film thickness (DFT “paint thickness”) and other NDE measurements.

**Published Regulations, Standards, and Related Materials:** There are no known published standards for conducting bridge inspections with a UAS. However, there are published standards for general bridge inspections.

- Title 23, Code of Federal Regulations, part 650, Subpart C, *National Bridge Inspections Standards*. These regulations set the national standards for the safety inspection and evaluation of all highway bridges. They include regulations for definitions, bridge inspection organization, personnel qualifications, inspection frequency, and inspection procedures.
- American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials (AASHTO), *Manual for Condition Evaluation of Bridges*. Per 23 CFR Part 650.317, bridges are to be inspected using these procedures. The manual offers assistance to bridge owners at all phases of bridge inspection and evaluation.
- Federal Highway Administration’s (FHWA), *Bridge Inspector’s Reference Manual (BIRM)*. The BIRM is a comprehensive manual on programs, procedures, and techniques for inspecting and evaluating a variety of in-service highway bridges.

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<sup>43</sup> - Wells, J. and Lovelace, B., 2018. Improving the Quality of Bridge Inspections Using Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) (No. MN/RC 2018-26). Minnesota Department of Transportation, [Report No. MN/RC 2018-26](#). 345 pgs.  
- Brooks, Colin and Cook, Steven J. 2018. Unmanned aerial vehicles assess highways and bridges faster with reduced cost and risk. Michigan Department of Transportation [Research Spotlight SPR-1674](#).  
- [2019 AASHTO UAS/Drone Survey of All 50 State DOTs](#).

- FHWA, *Recording and Coding Guide for the Structure Inventory and Appraisal of the Nation's Bridges*. This publication provides more thorough and detailed guidance in evaluating and coding specific bridge data.
- AASHTO, *Load and Resistance Factor Design (LRFD) Bridge Design Specifications*. The provisions of these specifications are intended for the design, evaluation, and rehabilitation of both fixed and movable highway bridges.
- AASHTO, *Guide Manual for Bridge Element Inspection*. The goal of this manual is to completely capture the condition of bridges in a simple way that can be standardized across the nation while providing the flexibility to be adapted to both large and small agency settings.
- Additionally, most states have a local bridge inspection manual, with updates for element-level inspection. For example, Michigan DOT has the *Michigan Bridge Element Inspection Manual*, revised in 2017, and New York DOT has the *Bridge Inspection Manual*, revised in January 2016.

**In-Development Standards and Related Activity:** In-development standards and related activity include:

- [ASTM WK58243, Visual Inspection of Building Facade using UAS](#). Developed by Committee E06 on Performance of Buildings, Subcommittee E06.55, Performance of Building Enclosures. Work on this standard was initiated in March 2017.
- [The Steel Bridge Research, Inspection, Training, and Engineering Center at Purdue University](#) has started the development of a UAS Validation Center that will include testing that UAS-collected data has sufficient resolution to meet infrastructure inspection needs, including for bridges.
- The [FHWA has established a program in its Office of Infrastructure](#) under the Every Day Counts (EDC) program to help understand and share the benefits of UAS for highway, bridge, and construction inspection.
- On November 12, 2019, the FHWA released a [notice of proposed rulemaking \(NPRM\)](#) proposing to update the National Bridge Inspection Standards (NBIS) to address Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act (MAP-21) requirements, incorporate technological advancements including the use of unmanned aerial systems, and address ambiguities identified since the last update to the regulation in 2009.

**Gap 15: Bridge Inspections.** Standards are needed for conducting bridge inspections using a UAS to provide state Department of Transportation agencies and bridge owners with a methodology for documenting bridge conditions utilizing sensors mounted to a UAS. This should include best practices for the operation of the UAS and establish an approach to sensing a bridge structure, preserving the data, and utilizing data recorded for reporting and modeling purposes. All bridge types should be considered, including rail, road, and pedestrian. The role of UAS in assisting with fracture critical inspections, which usually require an inspector to be able to touch the fracture critical element, should be considered. Bridge owners and operators should use sUAS that make physical contact for touch-based fracture and other touch-based inspections when possible to mitigate the risk of workers at elevation.

The standards should address safety and operator training. They should also take into account FAA requirements that apply to operational navigation (visual and beyond line of sight) and OOP (to include

vehicular traffic), including short-term travel over people and traffic. In addition, the standards should consider the relationship between the qualified bridge inspector and the remote pilot if they are not one-and-the-same. The remote pilot may help document the inspection findings, but might not be qualified to provide an analysis. Recommendations on how to coordinate their work to maximize the value of UAS-enabled inspections should be part of new standards.

**R&D Needed:** Yes, for navigation systems to mitigate potential GPS reception loss, magnetic compass biases, imprecise barometric pressure and other data points critical for safe flight of a UAS while in close proximity to structures. R&D is also needed on the role of collision avoidance systems.

**Recommendation:** Develop standards for bridge inspections using a UAS

**Priority:** Medium

**Organization(s):** AASHTO, ASTM, state DOTs

**Status of Progress:** Yellow

**Update:** ASTM WK58243

## 8.2.2. Railroads

Rail transport is essential to the movement of passengers (traditional, high-speed, and light transit) and freight across the country over short and long distances. Rail transport is arguably the most dependable mode of transport given the minimal service impact from weather conditions and the fixed routes and reliable schedules.

Railroads perform regular inspections of their track, rolling stock, signals, and other systems to ensure safe and efficient operations. The industry employs manual, automated, and autonomous technologies for inspection tasks, and is generally eager to advance the state-of-the-art of inspection technology to improve performance. The Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), Office of Research, Development, and Technology (RD&T) actively supports the development of new technologies to improve the effectiveness, efficiency, and safety of the rail industry and UAS is an emerging technology that may have a significant, positive, impact on the quality, safety, and efficiency of railroad operations. The rail industry and FRA, in collaboration with FAA, are exploring use cases for UAS technology to advance rail safety. These use cases extended beyond systems inspection and include the use of UAS for safety and security activities, including trespasser detection, rail property and asset mapping, natural and man-made disaster response, and civil construction projects.

**Published Standards:** There are no known published standards concerning the specific application of UAS for railroad inspections.

**In-Development Standards:** SAE is planning a future work item. ASME is developing requirements for using UAS for inspection – see section 8.1.1. ASTM AC478 is working on BVLOS generally but not specific to railroad inspections.

**Gap I6: Railroad Inspections: Rolling Stock Inspection for Transport of Hazardous Materials (HAZMAT).**

Standards are needed to address rolling stock inspections for regulatory compliance of transporting HAZMAT. Considerations for BVLOS and nighttime operations are critical. OSHA standards (29 C.F.R. 1910) related to personal protective equipment (PPE) need to be factored in. SDOs should consult/engage with the rail industry in the development of such standards.

**R&D Needed:** Yes. Current inspection procedures are likely more hands-on when in close proximity of HAZMAT containers, so using UAS to reduce the inspector’s exposure is similar to other inspection use cases. There are many on-going R&D activities for UAS inspection applications.

**Recommendation:** It is recommended that guidance be developed for performing inspections of HAZMAT rolling stock that incorporates OSHA and FRA requirements.

**Priority:** Low

**Organization(s):** SAE, OSHA, ASME

**Status of Progress:** Unknown

**Update:** No update provided at this time.

**Gap I7: Railroad Inspections: BVLOS Operations.** Standards are needed to address BVLOS operations for railroad inspection. See section 7.3 on BVLOS.

**R&D Needed:** Yes. Research to develop underlying technologies for BVLOS at low altitudes.

**Recommendation:** It is recommended that standards be developed that define a framework for operating UAS BVLOS for rail system infrastructure inspection. This may include the need to identify spectrum used for BVLOS railroad inspections.

**Priority:** High (Tier 3)

**Organization(s):** SAE, ASTM AC478 BLOS, American Public Transportation Association (APTA), American Railroad Engineering and Maintenance-of-Way Association (AREMA), ASME

**Status of Progress:** Green

**Update:** As noted above and in the text.

**Gap I8: Railroad Inspections: Nighttime Operations.** Standards are needed to address nighttime operations for railroad inspections. Railroads operate 24/7, which poses significant hurdles for leveraging UAS technology for rail system infrastructure inspections. The majority of inspections occur during daytime, but incident inspections can occur at any time of day or under poor visibility conditions and, hence, may have OSH considerations.

**R&D Needed:** Yes. Current R&D activities for operating UAS at night are unknown. Exposing UAS technology and operators to nighttime operations is necessary to encourage the maturation of the technology and processes.

**Recommendation:** It is recommended that standards be developed that define a framework for operating UAS at night.

**Priority:** Low

**Organization(s):** SAE, ASTM AC478 BLOS, APTA, AREMA

**Status of Progress:** Unknown

**Update:** No update provided at this time.

### 8.2.3. Power Transmission Lines, Structures, and Environs

UAS performing inspections of power transmission lines, structures, and environs operate in a high-risk environment due to the close proximity to high voltage assets along with the potential for electromagnetic interference issues to UAS craft control signals. Contact with energized equipment could result in catastrophic failure of the UAS and/or the asset it contacts. NERC CIP-14-01 from the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) has requirements for protecting national critical infrastructure, though UAS are not covered. A variety of power and telecommunication assets are shared in these transmission corridors, including: transmission power assets, distribution power assets, telephone assets, fiber assets, and cable assets. Manned aircraft also operate above and below powerlines. A UAV flying BVLOS while conducting a powerline inspection could encounter a manned aircraft, emphasizing the importance of situational awareness of the airspace.

**Published UAS Standards and Documents:** No published voluntary consensus standards for UAS have been identified for this topic. However, Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) has published [An Early Survey of Best Practices for the Use of Small Unmanned Aerial Systems by the Electric Utility Industry](#) which may be relevant to future standards work. The report notes that vegetation encroachment is a leading cause of power interruption.



**Relevant Standards and Regulations for General Industry Include:** [NERC CIP -14-01, Physical Security](#).

“This Reliability Standard addresses the directives from the [Federal Energy Regulatory Commission] FERC order issued March 7, 2014, Reliability Standards for Physical Security Measures, 146 FERC ¶ 61,166 (2014), which required NERC to develop a physical security reliability standard(s) to identify and protect facilities that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in widespread instability, uncontrolled separation, or cascading within an interconnection.” OSHA provides clearance distance limits within which anyone who is not a trained lineman is not supposed to enter.

**In-Development Standards:**

- IEEE WG on Management of Existing Overhead Lines
- [IEEE P2821, Guide for Unmanned Aerial Vehicle-based Patrol Inspection System for Transmission Lines](#)
- ASME is developing requirements for using UAS for inspection – see section 8.1.1.
- SAE G-30 UAS Operator Qualifications & G-10U Unmanned Aerospace Vehicle has identified this subject for possible future work.

**Gap I9: Inspection of Power Transmission Lines, Structures, and Environs Using UAS.** No standards have been identified that specifically address the qualifications of UAS pilots or specifications of a UAS to operate near energized equipment to meet Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) physical and cyber security requirements. (See also section 6.4.6 on cybersecurity.) Nor have any standards been identified that specifically address the qualifications of UAS pilots to operate around transmission and distribution equipment. This equipment may include telephone, fiber, and cable assets, as well as natural gas and pipeline assets. A standard is needed to address these issues as well as operational best practices and training in how to conduct a safe inspection of power transmission lines, structures, and environs using drones. See also section 10.3 on UAS flight crew.

**R&D Needed:** Yes. There is a need to study acceptable methods of airspace deconfliction around electrical equipment and infrastructure. Identifying appropriate data to collect and study relevant airspace activity around electrical equipment is recommended.

Understanding the impact of electromagnetic interference around different types of high voltage lines can help identify what mitigation techniques are needed. Further study should be undertaken regarding the effects of magnetic field interference on UAS C2 signals and communications when in the proximity of energized high voltage electrical transmission, distribution, or substation equipment.

Acceptable C2 link methods for BVLOS operation exist, but establishing the equipment and techniques for managing autonomous operations during disruptions in connectivity can help spur further acceptable BVLOS practices.

Different DAA techniques exist internationally and in the U.S. Studying their effectiveness in the U.S. NAS is needed.

**Recommendation:** Develop standards related to inspections of power transmission lines, structures, and environs using UAS. Review and consider relevant standards from other organizations to determine manufacturer requirements. As part of the standard, include guidelines on aircraft performance requirements and safe pilot and autonomous flight operations in proximity to energized equipment, for example, to avoid a scenario where arcing occurs.

**Priority:** High (Tier 3)

**Organization(s):** SAE, IEEE, Department of Energy (DOE), North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC), FERC, ORNL, ASTM, ASME

**Status of Progress:** Green

**Update:** As noted, ASME has some relevant work and SAE is contemplating future work. The ASTM F38 Executive Committee gap analysis viewed this as a low priority for F38, with no action at this time.

#### **8.2.4. Implementing UAS for Hydrocarbon Pipeline Inspections**

Unmanned aircraft systems present an opportunity for pipeline operators to more frequently and safely inspect hydrocarbon infrastructure. Currently, operators use manned fixed wing, rotary aircraft, or other methods to perform required routine regulatory pipeline inspection. In the U.S., the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) of the Department of Transportation mandates inspection intervals in 49CFR §192.705, 192.706 – Natural Gas Transmission Pipelines and §195.412 – Hazardous Liquids Pipelines.

The National Petroleum Council, a federally chartered advisory committee to the U.S Secretary of Energy, recently released a draft analysis of the current hydrocarbon transportation infrastructure entitled [Dynamic Delivery – America’s Evolving Oil and Natural Gas Transportation Infrastructure](#). The report notes how the emergence of remote sensing technologies and geospatial analytics will assist the oil and gas industry in the management of pipeline asset integrity. The use of UAS will enable monitors to cover larger areas more cost effectively and improve the response time and response quality mitigation.

Unmanned systems could perform routine automated flights to collect data and detect issues that a pilot or observer may have difficulty evaluating via a simple visual inspection such as leak/ emissions detection, third party encroachment, geohazard monitoring and management, pipeline anomaly screening which may indicate corrosion or metal loss, changes in population density, and changes in landscape canopy or elevation over time which may indicate shifts in pipelines. Additionally, more frequent data collection at lower altitudes could help with advanced engineering decisions, change with respect to pipeline class and High Consequence Area (HCA) locations, as well as with record keeping for aging infrastructure. Other areas for which UAVs could be applied for the industry are in safety and security of pipelines and associated facilities, as well as coordination of emergency response and shutdown during natural or manmade hazardous events.

While this section primarily focuses on the use of UAV for hydrocarbon infrastructure inspection to meet regulatory requirements, the concepts may also be applicable for UAS inspections conducted for underground and aboveground pipelines that transport other materials such as water and sewage.

**Published Standards:** There are no published standards related to the utilization of UAS for pipeline inspections. However, the American Petroleum Institute (API) has published numerous pipeline inspection standards which do not currently incorporate the usage of UAS. There may be an opportunity to revise these documents to enable inspections to be performed by UAS. In addition, API has published the [API Guide to Developing an Unmanned Aircraft Systems Program](#) which provides guidance and considerations for the oil and natural gas industry to assist organizations in the development of internal UAS programs. [ASTM F3196-18, Standard Practice for Seeking Approval for Beyond Visual Line of Sight \(BVLOS\) Small Unmanned Aircraft System \(sUAS\) Operations](#) is applicable for BVLOS operations.

**In-Development Standards:** API currently does not have any formal standards under development for UAS to be used in pipeline inspections. However, anyone is permitted to submit a [Request for Interpretation](#) to ask if UAS can be used to meet the criteria of any existing API standards. One area of potential interest is the usage of UAS to perform welding inspections in API 1104 Welding of Pipelines and Related Facilities.

NACE International has two standard practices under development related to UAS applications for pipeline inspections: SP21435 Drone-Based Condition Monitoring of Below and Above Ground Pipeline Integrity Threats and SP21436 Large Standoff Magnetometry (LSM) Inspection of Pipelines. While the LSM document primarily addresses the sensor technology utilized as an above ground, non-intrusive screening tool to identify stress concentration in pipelines, it is likely that the screening inspection will be conducted via a UAS platform.

ASME is developing requirements for using UAS for inspection – see section 8.1.1.

**New Gap I13: Inspection of Pipelines and Operating Facilities - BVLOS Operations.** Standards are needed to address BVLOS operations for pipeline inspection.

**R&D Needed:** No.

**Recommendation:** Develop standards that define a framework for operating UAS BVLOS for pipeline inspection as well as standards that describe best practices and use cases for the pipeline industry. Request API to review their portfolio of pipeline inspection standards to determine if revisions to enable inspections performed by UAS could be incorporated. Complete NACE SP21435 on monitoring of pipeline integrity threats.

**Priority:** Medium

**Organization(s):** API, NACE, Pipeline Research Council International (PRCI) (R&D), California Energy Commission (R&D), ASME, ASTM F38

**New Gap I14: Inspection of Pipelines and Operating Facilities – Sensor Validation & Use.** Standards are needed for minimum testing to validate sensors on UAS platforms at varying flight altitudes utilized for pipeline inspections. Standards are needed to provide a methodology for documenting pipeline conditions utilizing sensors mounted to a UAS. This should include best practices for the operation of the UAS and establish an approach to sense and avoid surrounding infrastructure within facilities, safeguarding the data, and utilizing data recorded for reporting and modeling purposes. The standards should address safety and operator training. They should also consider FAA requirements that apply to operational navigation (visual and beyond line of sight).

**R&D Needed:** Yes, for validation of sensor quality and accuracy on varying platforms (long-range and short-range UAVs) for risks associated with:

- Environmental changes (i.e., ground movement, water saturation, slip / subsidence / sinkhole / erosion)
- Third-party threats
- Active loading on pipelines (i.e., equipment crossing right of way (ROW), equipment on ROW, material on ROW)
- Waterways (i.e., boat anchorage, dredging, levee construction / maintenance)
- Structures (i.e., building construction, fence installation, non-permanent structure on ROW)
- Pipeline monitoring (i.e., exposure (pipe), pipeline construction / maintenance, possible leak / lost gas, slip / subsidence / sinkhole / erosion / metal loss / corrosion)
- Earthwork (i.e., clearing, drainage, excavation, mining activity)
- Forestry (i.e., logging activity, portable sawmill operations)

**Recommendation:** Develop standards for validating sensor quality and accuracy on UAS platforms utilized for pipeline inspections. Request API to review their portfolio of pipeline inspection standards to determine if revisions to enable inspections performed by UAS could be incorporated. Complete NACE SP21435 and NACE SP21436 standard practices.

**Priority:** Medium

**Organization(s):** API, NACE, PRCI (R&D), California Energy Commission (R&D), ASME

## 8.2.5. Implementing UAS in Airport Operations

UAS usage in legitimate airport operations encompass multiple potential tasks. The tasks are in various stages of development. The potential use of drones in airport operations covers several maintenance tasks resulting in time and labor savings. At the same time, a primary risk in the usage of UAS in airport operations is proximity to operating aircraft and the lack of coordination with other airport activities.

“As the drone industry and its enabling technologies mature, more and more legitimate drones will find their way on to airports in roles that offer similar operational and cost benefits. Commercial package delivery capabilities can be used to move spare parts from off site warehouses to maintenance hangars. Transport asset tracking and management capabilities can be used for security monitoring and management of the large fleet of vehicles used to service aircraft and move materials.”<sup>44</sup>

### **Potential UAS usage in Airport Operations**

- Red green blue (RGB) and thermal inspection of aircraft to inspect for structural damage, assess paint quality, including both visual and contact non-destructive evaluation (NDE) such as DFT “paint thickness” and other NDE measurements, marking, and signs of lightning strikes. This could take place at the gate or, in the case of more comprehensive maintenance inspections, at a maintenance hardstand on the tarmac or in the hangar.
- Bird or other wildlife control and monitoring
- Runway, taxiway, and apron inspection
- Navigational aids, approach lighting systems, and antennae structures inspections
- Aerodrome structures inspection utilizing RGB and thermal technology
- Runway Integrity Surveys. Drones could be used to provide 3D maps of runways in a very short space of time for routine maintenance to a very high accuracy level. Detecting problems with runway integrity at an early stage will lead to efficiency savings in the long term.
- Perimeter Security. Drones can be used to provide support to manned guarding via a control center to react to threats quickly and act as a visual deterrent. Tethered drones can stay in the air for extended periods.
- Foreign Object Detection. Drones can be used to provide aerial detection of foreign objects, alleviating the need to shut down a runway as currently happens if this is done by eye and freeing up valuable runway slots.
- Weather measurements above ground level. Zurich Airport is testing a configuration of multiple weather instrumented drones around Zurich Airport to improve short range forecasts around the airport. Results thus far are showing added value.

### **Published Regulations, Standards, and Guidance Material:**

- [CFR Part 14 Section 107.43 Operation in the vicinity of airports](#)
- [DOT/FAA/CT-94/11 Emerging Nondestructive Inspection for Aging Aircraft October 1994](#)
- FAA [Advisory Circular 107-2](#), Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems (sUAS)

**In-Development Regulations, Standards, and Guidance Material:** No standards in development have been identified specific to UAS usage in airport operations. See section 6.8 on mitigation systems for various hazards to UAS.

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<sup>44</sup> [Hall, Philip, \*Worker Drones. Future Airport, Issue 2 2019 pp. 49,51,52.\*](#)

**New Gap I15: UAS in Airport Operations.** Standards are needed for UAS usage in airport operations.

**R&D Needed:** Yes

**Recommendation:** Develop standards for the application of UAS in airport operations

**Priority:** Medium

**Organization(s):** Standards bodies publishing UAS standards and/or regulators

## 8.3. Environmental Applications

### 8.3.1. Environmental Monitoring

UAS offer significant potential to assist researchers and resource managers in monitoring and protecting the air, ocean and coastal environments, terrestrial habitats, land and water resources, and variety of fauna and flora species.

UAS are emerging as an effective tool for environmental monitoring<sup>45</sup> and enforcement because of their ability to reach areas that would otherwise be inaccessible or cost-prohibitive. Additionally, they have the potential to supplement or replace current conventional means by their ability to collect data via a variety of onboard sensors, upload data from terrestrial sensor arrays, and enable near real time data processing capabilities. For example, UAS are proposed as a viable alternative to manned aircraft for some aerial wildlife surveys.

Environmental monitoring at local, regional, national, and global levels plays a central role in diagnosing weather, climate, and management impacts on natural and agricultural systems, enhancing the understanding of hydrological processes, optimizing the allocation and distribution of land and water resources, and assessing, forecasting and even preventing natural disasters. Environmental monitoring applications include:

- **Weather monitoring** – including collecting wind, temperature, and moisture readings/data to improve micro-weather detection and to improve micro-weather predictions. See also the section of this document dealing with weather in chapter seven.
- **Air quality monitoring** – including sampling, detection, and monitoring programs for air contamination

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<sup>45</sup> Source: [Wikipedia Environmental Monitoring page](#).

- **Soil quality monitoring** – including sampling and monitoring programs for soil contamination, erosion, and salinity
- **Water quality monitoring** – including sampling, detection, and monitoring programs for water contamination, where impact parameters include chemical, biological, radiological, and microbiological populations
- **Fauna monitoring** – including monitoring programs for species population, health, movement, and poaching activity
- **Flora monitoring** – including sampling and monitoring programs for species population, health, and location

The wide range of technically capable and inexpensive COTS UAS and sensor accessories currently available are already enabling the advanced design of environmental monitoring programs that can utilize a wide range of environmental monitoring data management systems and environmental sampling methods, including<sup>46</sup>:

- Judgmental sampling
- Simple random sampling
- Stratified sampling
- Systematic and grid sampling
- Adaptive cluster sampling
- Grab samples
- Semi-continuous monitoring and continuous
- Passive sampling
- Remote surveillance
- Remote sensing
- Bio-monitoring

At the same time as COTS UAS become more prevalent and user-friendly, they pose a unique challenge to the environment and its inhabitants. Mitigating adverse impacts of UAS uses in environmental monitoring through policy, regulation, and best practices/guidelines will protect the environment and improve society's perceptions of the industry. Through the thoughtful exercise of responsible practices, most environmental issues are manageable. However, the policy and regulatory framework continues to lag behind the rapidly expanding use of the technology.

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<sup>46</sup> See [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Environmental\\_monitoring#Sampling\\_methods](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Environmental_monitoring#Sampling_methods) for a definition of each method.

**Published Standards and Related Materials:** No published standards have been identified specifically related to the use of UAS for environmental monitoring applications. However, substantial best practice guidance exists, for example:

- Baxter, Robert A. and Bush, David H. "[Use of Small Unmanned Aerial Vehicles for Air Quality and Meteorological Measurements](#)," Proceedings of the 2014 National Ambient Air Monitoring Conference.
- Hodgson, Jarrod C. and Koh, Lian Pin. "[Best practice for minimising unmanned aerial vehicle disturbance to wildlife in biological field research](#)," *Current Biology Magazine*. 23 May 2016. R404-R405.
- Manfreda, Salvatore, et al. "[On the Use of Unmanned Aerial Systems for Environmental Monitoring](#)," *Remote Sens.* 10, No. 4, 641, 20 April 2018.
- [Oceans Unmanned Eco-Drone Best Practices Portal](#)
- OFCM Exploratory Mini-Workshop Summary Report FCM-R32-2011 "[Utilization of Unmanned Aircraft Systems for Environmental Monitoring](#)," Office of the Federal Coordinator for Meteorological Services and Supporting Research, Washington, DC. May 2011.
- Quevenco, Rodolfo. "[Using Unmanned Aerial Vehicles for Environmental Monitoring](#)," International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Division of Public Information; Development as Part of IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety, 17 May 2013.
- Simpson, Joanna, et al. "[Drones and Environmental Monitoring](#)," *Environmental Law Reporter*, Issue 2-2017: 47 ELR10101, Environmental Law Institute, Washington, DC.
- "[Unmanned aerial vehicles for environmental applications](#)," *International Journal of Remote Sensing*, 38:8-10, 2029-2036. Published online: 17 March 2017.
- Villa, Tommaso Francesco et al. "[An Overview of Small Unmanned Aerial Vehicles for Air Quality Measurements: Present Applications and Future Perspectives](#)," Ed. Assefa M. Melesse. *Sensors (Basel, Switzerland)* 16.7 (2016): 1072. PMC. Web. 30 Aug. 2018.
- Watts, Adam C., et al. "[Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems for Low-Altitude Aerial Surveys](#)," *The Journal of Wildlife Management*. Sep. 2010. Vol. 74, Issue 7, pg(s) 1614-1619.

**In-Development Standards:** No standards in development have been identified specifically related to this issue.

No UAS standards gap has been identified. By way of further explanation, in considering the above environmental monitoring applications – and whether a specific standard is required to cover them – several important aspects need to be noted:

- UAS can be used effectively in support of environmental monitoring on both a small and large scale. Operations are usually conducted at low altitudes and over wide and unpopulated areas, where the general public is not exposed to the operation and its associated risks (i.e., no public safety and/or privacy issues).



- UAS operations in support of wide area environmental monitoring applications are primarily conducted BVLOS and are similar in operational context to UAS low-altitude aerial surveys/inspections, for which standards either already exist or are in development.
- Each use case will have different requirements, including regulatory (such as 14 CFR part 137 or 14 CFR part 107 approvals) and company CONOPS, for which specialized standards could not be realistically developed.
- For use cases where the UAS is to be operated at higher altitudes and/or under ATC, standards for manned aviation conducting similar operations should apply.
- While no published or in-development standards have been identified related to the use of UAS for environmental monitoring applications, best practices are available through published articles and non-profit environmental organizations, including several specifically relating to the use of UAS.

A specific standard for UAS environmental monitoring operations is not required. Environmental monitoring should be covered by standards being developed for UAS BVLOS operations and UAS low-altitude aerial surveys/inspections. However, if it is determined that a more robust, focused standard or guideline is needed to improve the efficiency and safety of UAS operations for environmental monitoring applications, then environmental organizations, natural resource agencies, non-profits, and drone and sensor manufacturers should come together to develop such a document. Any standards, best practices, or guidelines need to comply with statutes such as the National Marine Sanctuaries Act (NMSA), the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA), and the Endangered Species Act (ESA).

### **8.3.2. Pesticide Application**

The application of pesticides (herein meant to include herbicides, insecticides, fungicides and other types of chemistries) is an important tool in food and fiber production as well as public health vector management but it is necessary to perform applications in a safe and sustainable way. Currently, in the U.S., it is legally required that pesticide label requirements are followed and these strongly influence application system design.

Aerial application is a dangerous activity due to the inherent hazards of near-surface flight. Low altitude flights reduce decision/response time margins of error and potentially involve encounters with surface obstacles.

The practice of aerial spraying using UAS is operational in parts of the U.S. as well as internationally. As an example, Japan has been using remotely piloted aircraft in intensive agriculture for the past 25 years. The average farm size in Japan is 3.7 acres and UAVs generally have payload capacity of under 10 gallons. Given current UAS payload restrictions, manned aircraft have an approximate capacity of between 300 and 800 gallons, making them more suitable for the larger farms, which average 443 acres

in the U.S.<sup>47</sup> Waivers have been obtained from FAA increasing payload and UAS spraying is increasing in the US.

Pesticide application scenarios include broadcast application as well as spot spraying. Some of the use cases imply the ability to identify, map, and return to a given location. In this sense, some level of remote sensing and identification may be utilized for certain missions.

**Published Standards and Other Documents:** ISO/TC 23/SC 6, Equipment for Crop Protection, includes WG 20 on Aerial Sprayers and WG 25 on Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Spraying Systems. While international standards exist for many types of sprayers, standards specifically dealing with UAS do not yet exist but they are now being considered by WG 25. A standard recently was developed under the Vienna Agreement between ISO/TC 23/SC 6 and CEN/TC 144, Tractors and machinery for agriculture and forestry (and in support of European legislation on safety of machinery and/or sustainable use of pesticides). [ISO 16122-5, Agricultural and forestry machines – Inspection of sprayers in use – Part 5: Aerial spray systems](#) was published in April 2020. While it deals with operations with the pilot in-cockpit, it is potentially relevant for UAS operations. In addition, 14 CFR Part 137, agricultural aircraft operations, is applicable to enable pesticide application.

Multiple research studies have been done on this topic including the following though this list is not exhaustive: [Qualitative Evaluation of Unmanned Aircraft Visibility during Agricultural Flight Operations](#), conducted in 2015 by the Colorado Agricultural Aviation Association in conjunction with the Think Before You Launch (TBYL) safety coalition, and another study from the American Society of Agricultural and Biological Engineers (ASABE) that looks at pesticide drift when applied by a UAV: [Prediction of Aerial Spray Release from UAVs](#).

**In-Development Standards:** A prior work item, ISO/FDIS 16119-5, *Agricultural and forestry machinery – Environmental requirements for sprayers – Part 5: Aerial spray systems*, has been removed from both the ISO and CEN work programmes. A replacement new work item is currently under vote with ballots closing in June 2020. The current recommendation is to approve it and send it directly to the draft international standard (DIS) stage for an 18-month track.

In addition, the ISO member from Japan has submitted four Japanese standards as reference material for ISO/TC 23/SC6/WG 25's development of international standards for UAS spraying systems:

- ISO/TC 23/SC 6/WG 25 N 10 JAPAN 1, The inspection procedures for Multicopter and Spraying equipment for Multicopter
- ISO/TC 23/SC 6/WG 25 N 11 JAPAN 2, Guidelines for the usage of UAs for aerial spraying etc.

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<sup>47</sup> [https://www.nass.usda.gov/Publications/Todays\\_Reports/reports/fnlo0419.pdf](https://www.nass.usda.gov/Publications/Todays_Reports/reports/fnlo0419.pdf)

- ISO/TC 23/SC 6/WG 25 N 12 JAPAN 3, Performance validation standards for industrial multicopter and its spraying equipment
- ISO/TC 23/SC 6/WG 25 N 13, Japan's safety rules on Unmanned Aircraft Japan Civil Aviation Bureau April 2016

The current roadmap of ISO/TC 23/SC 6/WG 25 envisions splitting a proposed standard, ISO/WD 23117, on unmanned aerial spraying systems, into 4 parts.

- Part 1- Environmental Requirements. This new work item proposal (NWIP) is to be voted on in April 2020. It is expected to pass through to the committee draft (CD) stage with a target date for publication in 2022. This part will cover general/ broad environmental requirements for unmanned aerial spraying systems.
- Part 2- Test Methods to Assess the Horizontal Transverse Spray Deposition. This has been put forward as a preliminary work item (PWI), with a vote due in April 2020.
- Part 3- Measurement Methods of Droplet Deposition into Crop. Still in preliminary stages.
- Part 4- Field Measurement Method of Spray Drift. Still in preliminary stages.

In terms of U.S. domestic activity, the American Society of Agricultural and Biological Engineers (ASABE) has three technical WGs that are discussing UAS and spraying. The first group was initiated in 2016 and is titled Unmanned Aerial Systems; the second is a long-standing committee on Precision Agriculture; and the third is the Aerial Application Sub-committee of the Committee on Liquid Application Systems (23/06/02). Of these, the Precision Agriculture and Liquid Applications sub-committees have extensive experience with standards development. There is also an effort in the preliminary stages to develop a standard for UAS spraying initiated out of 23/06/02.

**Gap I10: Pesticide Application Using UAS.** Standards are needed to address pesticide application using UAS. Issues to be addressed include communication and automated ID, treatment efficacy (treatment effectiveness), operational safety, environmental protection, equipment reliability, and integration into the national air space, as further described below.

- **Communication.** As pesticide application occurs in near-ground air space, it is also the domain of manned aerial application aircraft. Automated ID and location communication is critical in this increasingly crowded, near surface airspace.
- **Treatment Efficacy and Drift Mitigation.** Assumptions that spraying patterns and efficacy are similar to heavier, existing manned aircraft are incorrect for lighter, multi-rotor UAS. Equipment standards for differing size and rotor configurations may be needed.
- **Operational Safety and Environmental Protection.** Safety to operators, the general public, and the environment are critical. Transporting hazardous substances raises further safety and environmental concerns. As noted, UAS operate in low altitude air space with various surface hazards including humans and livestock. Standards for safety need to be developed based on the FAA's models of risk as a function of kinetic energy. See also section 9.2 on HAZMAT.

- **Equipment Reliability.** Aviation depends on reliability of the equipment involved. Failure at height often results in catastrophic damage and represents a serious safety hazard. Reliability of equipment and specific parts may also follow the FAA’s risk curve, though catastrophic failure and damage of expensive equipment that is not high kinetic energy (precision sprayers, cameras, etc.) may require higher standards of reliability due to the potential for large economic loss due to failure.
- **Airspace Integration.** This is tied to automated ID and location communication so that other aircraft can sense the spraying UAS and avoid collisions. Detailed flight plans are probably not necessary and controlled airspace restrictions are already in place.

**R&D Needed:** Yes. Mostly engineering development, demonstration, and performance including factors unique to UAS which could impact off-target drift. There is some indication that treatment efficacy and drift mitigation does not meet expectations in some scenarios.

**Recommendation:** Develop standards for pesticide application using UAS. Organizations such as NAAA, USDA Aerial Application Technology Research Unit (AATRU), ASABE, and ASSURE should be consulted in conjunction with such standards development activities.

**Priority:** High (Tier 3)

**Organization(s):** ISO/TC 23/SC 6, CEN/TC 144, ASABE

**Status of Progress:** Green

**Update:** As noted in the text, standards development is underway by ISO and CEN with respect to aerial application by manned aircraft that has potential relevance to UAS.

### 8.3.3. Livestock Monitoring and Pasture Management

One of the many applications of UAS in the agricultural sector is the growing use of UAS by farmers and ranchers to monitor livestock and manage pastures.

Traditionally, farmers and ranchers have used various means to monitor the location, number, and well-being of their herds. Until now, those means have required significant investment in labor and time, or, more recently, expensive infrastructure and/or equipment particularly where large-area operations (measured in square miles) are involved. The days where livestock monitoring on large land holdings was conducted by people on horseback over several days have almost disappeared. Horses have given way to off-road vehicles and helicopters, and experiments with installing wide area remote sensor/observing networks have so far proven to be limited in application and problematic in operation.

The wide range of COTS UAS and accessories now available offers farmers and ranchers a relatively easier and cost-effective way to monitor livestock holdings and manage pastures, irrespective of the size of their operations. Farmers engaged in small-area livestock operations (typically measured in acres), such as an alpaca farm or a horse stud, might find it efficient/convenient to conduct routine UAS VLOS

video operations to quickly check on the status of livestock, fences, gates, and water points. Ranchers, on the other hand, such as those operating cattle spreads, have similar requirements but on a much larger scale, and UAS BVLOS operations offers them a potentially viable alternative to their current means.

**Published Standards and Related Materials:** No published standards have been identified specifically related to the use of UAS for livestock monitoring and pasture management.

There are several published standards relating to the use of manned aircraft in support of agricultural operations (e.g., crop-spraying, livestock mustering), and these may also apply to UAS applications for precision agricultural operations, including livestock monitoring and pasture management. Some regulatory and best practice guidance on the use of UAS in agricultural aircraft operations also exist, for example:

- DOT, FAA Notice on National Policy [N 8900.433 - Part 137 Guidance and Advisory Circular Update](#), Effective Date: August 21, 2017. Cancellation Date: August 21, 2018. This notice provides guidance to FAA aviation safety inspectors (ASI) concerning 14 CFR part 137 operators. The intent of the notice is to clarify former issues found in guidance and to include information on the use of UAS in agricultural aircraft operations. **Background:** In May 2015, a U.S. corporation was granted an exemption to operate a UAS in the NAS for agricultural aerial application operations. The same corporation later became the first part 137 UAS (55 pounds or more) certificated operator in the United States. In August 2016, a new rule, 14 CFR part 107, became effective allowing commercial operations of small UAS in the NAS. These significant events warranted the General Aviation and Commercial Division (AFS-800) to update all associated part 137 guidance in FAA Order 8900.1 and AC 137-1, Certification Process for Agricultural Aircraft Operators, for UAS inclusion.
- Barbedo, Jayme G.A., et al. "[Perspectives on the use of unmanned aerial systems to monitor cattle](#)," *Sage Journal Outlook on Agriculture*. First published online: June 24, 2018.
- Hayhurst, Kelly J., et al. "[Safety and Certification Considerations for Expanding the Use of UAS in Precision Agriculture](#)," Proceedings of the 13th International Conference on Precision Agriculture, July 31 – August 3, 2016, St. Louis, Missouri, USA.
- Smith, Gayle "[Drones, smart ear tags & cameras: The case for using technology in ranching](#)," *Beef Magazine*, September 01, 2016.
- Sylvester, Gerard (ed). "[E-Agriculture in Action: Drones for Agriculture](#)," Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations and International Telecommunication Union. Bangkok, 2018.
- Watts, Adam C., et al. "[Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems for Low-Altitude Aerial Surveys](#)," *The Journal of Wildlife Management*. December 13, 2010. Volume 74, Issue 7: 1614-1619. 2010.

**In-Development Standards:** No standards in development have been identified specifically related to this issue.

No UAS standards gap has been identified. By way of further explanation, in considering the above scenarios – and whether a specific standard is required for them – several important aspects need to be noted:

- UAS agricultural operations in the United States are required by the FAA to be conducted by 14 CFR part 137 or 14 CFR part 107 operators.
- UAS agricultural operations are usually conducted within the boundaries of a private or commercial property where the general public is not exposed to the UAS operation and its associated risks (i.e., no public safety and/or privacy issues).
- Livestock monitoring and pasture management are examples of where UAS can be used effectively in support of precision agriculture, both on a small or large scale.
- UAS operations in support of precision agriculture are primarily conducted BVLOS and similar in operational context to UAS low-altitude aerial surveys/inspections, for which standards either already exist or are in development.
- Every type of aerial survey/inspection will have different requirements, both regulatory (such as 14 CFR part 137 or 14 CFR part 107 approvals) and company CONOPS for which specialized standards could not be realistically developed (e.g., for environmental surveys/inspections).

Therefore, a specific standard for UAS operations for livestock monitoring and pasture management is not required. These applications should be covered as examples in the standards being developed for UAS BVLOS operations and UAS low-altitude aerial surveys/inspections, or a standard that encompasses UAS uses in agriculture (which could be adopted from existing standards for manned agricultural aircraft operations).

There are many published best practices for precision agriculture available, including several specifically relating to the use of UAS to monitor livestock. However, if it is determined that a more robust, focused standard or guideline is needed to improve the efficiency and safety of operations for livestock monitoring and pasture management, then agricultural associations and drone and sensor manufacturers should come together to develop such a document.

## 8.4. Commercial Services

There is a growing desire to expand UAS operations in order to increase transport services of goods and enable transport of people for commercial purposes. Such services operate within a larger framework that is generically built upon the following pillars:

- Operational Vehicle Capabilities – to include such capabilities as BVLOS, automated take-off/landing, waypoint following, obstacle detection and avoidance, aircraft tracking, identification, detection and avoidance, as well as V2V and V2I communication;
- Infrastructure Capabilities – to include such capabilities as take-off/landing locations, emergency landing locations, fueling/recharge, inter-modal transfers;

- Management Services – to include such capabilities as security, fleet management, maintenance/repair, training, airspace management, reservation/manifest management; and
- Practices – to include such provisions as engineering and development, verification/validation, certification, licensing, insurance/liability, inspection, forensics.

Commercial services are expected to utilize UAS of varying size, weight, performance, propulsion type, payload capacity, etc. Such aircraft will operate and cooperate within the framework identified above and will coordinate with existing and future manned and unmanned vehicles, fleet and airspace management systems. Within this context, commercial services are subdivided into the movement of goods and people and the provision of airborne services as described in the following sections.

#### **8.4.1. Commercial Package Delivery via UAS**

A number of commercial, service-oriented companies are interested in using UAS to increase product distribution, reduce product delivery times and achieve corresponding potential cost savings. Commercial package delivery in this context means the delivery segment of a package to its final destination (i.e., the last mile). Delivery can be directly to a recipient’s desired/selected location from the point of origin or distribution centers (fixed or mobile). These delivery locations may be in urban, suburban, and rural areas. As further described below, the standards and regulatory framework supporting UAS capabilities need to evolve before such operations can become ubiquitous.

The following concepts are not standardized:

- How is the package carried in or on the aircraft? For example, an integrated cargo compartment, clamping arrangement, an underslung load, or some other configuration?
- Which types of materials (hazardous and non-hazardous) can be delivered and how?
  - Will the contents of the package remain protected if accidentally released from operational flight altitudes?
  - Will the contents of the package remain protected if the UAS is involved in an accident?
  - Has the operator analyzed specific flight paths, to prevent accidental release over densely populated areas, sensitive infrastructure, etc.?
  - Has the operator conducted a risk analysis and implemented appropriate risk mitigations?
  - Have the operator and other stakeholders involved in the operation of the UAS and the surroundings of the launch and recovery areas conducted a joint analysis of the hazards and risks with UAS operations (i.e., developed a SORA)?
- What are the mechanisms and procedures for releasing the package at the delivery point? Does it require human intervention?
- How do operators or highly and fully automated agents determine that the nominated delivery point is safe for both the drones to land and the package that is being delivered? Will the industry develop standards and standard practices for regulated delivery zones?

- How will safety features or algorithms be tested and evaluated? Will this be a continuous recertification and evaluation process? How will different operating conditions (like weather or congested environments) be certified?
- How dynamic will delivery zones be? Will no-fly zones be continuously updated based on surroundings (for example, via a GPS navigational app for routes if there is construction)? Or will platforms have some sort of onboard sensing and logic to update routes on the fly? If so, how will these algorithms be tested, standardized, and validated?

**Published Laws, Regulations, Standards, and Other Documents:** Published laws, regulations, standards and committees that have developed relevant standards include:

- [FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018](#), Sec. 548. Sense of Congress on Artificial Intelligence in Aviation
- 14 CFR Part 133, Rotorcraft External-Load Operations
- SAE-ITC [ARINC IA 633-3, AOC Air-Ground Data and Message Exchange Format](#)
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA/AEEC, Aeronautical Operational Control (AOC) Subcommittee

SAE International's [AGE-2 Air Cargo Committee](#). The official scope of the Committee includes all aspects of air cargo and associated equipment that require interface and/or compatibility with aircraft; and thus its objectives are to: (a) Promote the study and discussion of design, development, and application of and research problems relating to aircraft cargo equipment and systems, (b) Develop and maintain technical standards, specifications and reports related to the design, performance, application and maintenance of the equipment and systems identified in subparagraph (a), and (c) Coordinate and harmonize standardization efforts with other bodies as applicable to support the global aerospace community. There are currently 63 [published AGE-2 documents](#). Some notable ones include:

- [AIR4899A](#), *Cargo Compartments Maximum Package Size Calculation Methodology*
- [AIR1490C](#), *Environmental Degradation of Textiles*
- [AS1677D](#), *General Requirements for Noncertified Cargo/Baggage Containers*
- [AIR4359A](#), *Effects of Hanging Loads (e.g., GOH) on ULD Performance*

**In-Development Standards:**

- [ASTM WK62344, Revision of F3196 - 17 Standard Practice for Seeking Approval for Extended Visual Line of Sight \(EVLOS\) or Beyond Visual Line of Sight \(BVLOS\) Small Unmanned Aircraft System \(sUAS\) Operations](#)
- [SAE AIR7121, Applicability of Existing Development Assurance and System Safety Practices to Unmanned Aircraft Systems](#)
- [SAE AS7209, Development Assurance Objectives for Aerospace Vehicles and Systems](#)
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA/AEEC, Aeronautical Operational Control (AOC) Subcommittee



**Gap I11: Commercial Package Delivery via UAS.** Standards are needed to enable UAS commercial package delivery operations.

**R&D Needed:** Yes

**Recommendation:**

- 1) Complete work on ASTM WK62344 and SAE AIR7121. Review small UAS oriented standards for scaling into larger UAVs (those that exceed Part 107 and have Part 135 applicability).
- 2) Write new standards to address commercial package delivery UAS and its operations.

**Priority:** High (Tier 3)

**Organization(s):** ASTM, SAE, RTCA, EUROCAE, SAE ARINC

**Status of Progress:** Green

**Update:** Relevant standards in development are noted above.

## 8.4.2. Commercial Cargo Transport via UAS

A number of companies including but not limited to air cargo operators, are interested in using UAS to increase product distribution, reduce product delivery times, optimize air cargo operations, and achieve corresponding potential cost savings while maintaining safety and security of air cargo operations. Industry consensus standards are needed to support this evolving use of UAS and related technologies. Commercial cargo transport by UAS is distinctly different to commercial package delivery (section 8.4.1), which is the delivery segment of a package to its final destination (i.e., the last mile). Commercial cargo transport in this context means the delivery segment of a consolidated amount of goods (i.e., many items, usually regarded as freight in sea, rail, and road transport) from one major distribution center to another, such as air cargo/freight terminals at airports. Commercial cargo transport operations by UAS would typically be conducted over large distances by large aircraft capable of carrying bulky and heavy consignments.

**Published Laws, Regulations, Standards, and Other Documents:** Published laws, regulations, standards and committees that have developed relevant standards include:

- [FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018](#), Sec. 548. Sense of Congress on Artificial Intelligence in Aviation
- [FAA 14 CFR Sec. 27.865, External loads](#)
- [FAA 14 CFR Sec. 29.865, External loads](#)
- [FAA 14 CFR part 133](#)
- [FAA AC 133-1B, Rotorcraft External-Load Operations, 05/31/2017](#)
- [ASME B30.12 -2011 Handling Loads Suspended From Rotorcraft](#)
- [SAE AGE-2 Air Cargo Committee](#)

- [AS1825C](#), *Methodology of Calculating Aircraft Cargo Volumes*
- [AIR4899A](#), *Cargo Compartments Maximum Package Size Calculation Methodology*
- [AS36100B](#), *Air Cargo Unit Load Devices - Performance Requirements and Test Parameters*
- [AS36101A](#), *Air Cargo Unit Load Devices - Load Distribution Model*
- [AS36102B](#), *Air Cargo Unit Load Devices – Testing Methods*
- [ARP36103A](#), *Air Cargo Unit Load Devices - Center of Gravity Control Methods*
- [ARP36104A](#), *Air Cargo Pallets and Nets Compatibility*
- [AIR36105B](#), *Air Cargo Unit Load Devices - Reference Documents*
- [AIR36106A](#), *Air Cargo Unit Load Devices - Use of Airworthiness Reference Documents*
- [AIR36107A](#), *AS36100 Background and Development*
- [AIR36108](#), *AS36100 Background and Development Record*
- [AS4041B](#), *Air Mode General Purposes Containers*
- [AIR1490C](#), *Environmental Degradation of Textiles*
- [AIR1673B](#), *Aircraft Cargo Door Opening/Sill Details for Ground Support Equipment Interface*
- [AIR1869C](#), *Wide-Body and Standard-Body Aircraft Lower Deck Cargo Compartment ULD Capacities*
- [AS5896](#), *Certified Containers for Lower Deck Compartments*
- [AS1677D](#), *General Requirements for Noncertified Cargo/Baggage Containers*
- [AIR4359A](#), *Effects of Hanging Loads (e.g., GOH) on ULD Performance*
- [ARP1334C](#), *Ground Equipment Requirements for Compatibility With Aircraft Unit Load Devices*
- [AIR4165B](#), *General Requirements for Powered Drive Units (PDUs) in Aircraft Cargo Systems*
- [ARP1372C](#), *Minimum Requirements for Air Cargo Unit Load Device, Ground Handling and Transport Systems*
- [ARP1409C](#), *Aircraft On Board Weight and Balance System Requirements*
- [ARP1523C](#), *Air Mode Insulated Containers - Thermal Efficiency Requirements*
- [ARP1554D](#), *Vehicle Transport Unit Load Device (ULD)*
- [ARP1621C](#), *ULD for Aircraft Transportation of Horses*
- [ARP1757B](#), *Symbology for Standardization of Cargo Handling Systems*
- [ARP4049A](#), *Cargo Restraint on Aircraft Passenger Seats - Main Passenger Cabin*
- [ARP4769B](#), *Crew Rest Container for Main Deck or Lower Deck*
- [ARP5486](#), *Air Cargo Pallets - Utilization Guidelines*
- [ARP5492A](#), *Aircraft Cargo Systems - Missing Restraint Limitations Layouts*
- [ARP5595B](#), *Cargo Restraint Straps – Utilization Guidelines*
- [ARP5596B](#), *Cargo Shoring Guidelines*
- [ARP5741](#), *Air Mode Active Containers Conditioning Performance*
- [ARP6287](#), *Environmental Degradation of Composite Materials*
- [AS1130G](#), *Air and Air/Surface (Platform) Cargo Pallets*
- [AS1131C](#), *Air and Air/Surface (Platform) Cargo Pallet Nets*

- [AS1491A](#), *Interline Air Cargo Pallets*
- [AS1492B](#), *Interline Air Cargo Pallet Nets*
- [AS1988B](#), *Air Cargo Pallet Extensions*
- [AS21234A](#), *Fitting, Tiedown, Cargo Ring (5000 Lb) and Seat Stud, Type I*
- [AS21235A](#), *Fitting, Tiedown, Cargo Ring (10 000 Lb) and Seat Stud, Type II*
- [AS21236A](#), *Ring, Cargo Tiedown (10 000 Lb), Type III*
- [AS21237A](#), *Ring, Cargo Tiedown (25 000 Lb), Type IV*
- [AS33601A](#), *Track and Stud Fitting for Cargo Transport Aircraft, Standard Dimensions For*
- [AS5385D](#), *Cargo Restraint Straps - Design Criteria and Testing Methods*
- [AS6163](#), *Temperature Controlled Container - Performance Requirements and Test Parameters*
- [AS6453](#), *Fire Containment Cover - Design, Performance, and Testing Requirements*
- [AS6480B](#), *Tie Down, Cargo, Aircraft, Type C-2*
- [AS6554A](#), *Cargo Stopper Devices*
- [AS7092B](#), *Fittings, Cargo Tiedown, Aircraft*
- [AS832G](#), *Air/Surface (Intermodal) General Purpose Containers*
- [AS8905A](#), *Fittings and Cargo Rings, Tie-Down, Aircraft Floor*
- [SAE AGE-4 Packaging, Handling and Transportability Committee](#)
- [S-18 Aircraft and Systems Development and Safety Assessment Committee](#)
- [RTCA Committees](#)
  - RTCA [SC-206, Aeronautical Information and Meteorological Data Link Services](#)
  - RTCA [SC-214, Standards for Air Traffic Data Communication Services](#)
  - RTCA [SC-216, Aeronautical Systems Security](#)
  - RTCA [SC-217, Aeronautical Databases](#)
  - RTCA [SC-222, AMS\(R\)S](#)
  - RTCA [SC-223, Internet Protocol Suite \(IPS\) and AeroMACS](#)
  - RTCA [SC-227, Standards of Navigation Performance](#)
  - RTCA [SC-228, Minimum Performance Standards for Unmanned Aircraft Systems](#)
  - RTCA [SC-229, 406 MHz Emergency Locator Transmitters \(ELTs\)](#)
  - RTCA [SC-230, Airborne Weather Detection Systems](#)
  - RTCA [SC-231, Terrain Awareness Warning System \(TAWS\)](#)
  - RTCA [SC-236, Standards for Wireless Avionics Intra-Communication System \(WAIC\) within 4200-4400 MHz](#)
  - RTCA [SC-237, Helicopter Terrain Awareness Warning System \(HTAWS\)](#)
  - RTCA [SC-239, Low Range Altimeter](#)
- SAE ITC [AEEC \(ARINC\) Standards](#)
- SAE-ITC [ARINC IA 633-3, AOC Air-Ground Data and Message Exchange Format](#)
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA/AEEC, Aeronautical Operational Control (AOC) Subcommittee
- [EUROCAE Working Groups](#)

**In-Development Standards and Related Activity:** In-development standards and committees that are developing relevant standards and documents include:

- [SAE AGE-2 Air Cargo Committee](#)
  - [AIR1869D](#), *Wide-Body and Standard-Body Aircraft Lower Deck Cargo Compartment ULD Capacities*
  - [ARP5741A](#), *Air Mode Active Containers Conditioning Performance*
  - [ARP6905](#), *Recommended Practise for the Operation and Use of Fire Containment Covers*
  - [AS1491B](#), *Interline Air Cargo Pallets*
  - [AS1492C](#), *Interline Air Cargo Pallet Nets*
  - [AS36100C](#), *Air Cargo Unit Load Devices - Performance Requirements and Test Parameters*
  - [AS6453A](#), *Fire Containment Cover - Design, Performance, and Testing Requirements*
  - [AS7353](#), *Air Cargo Equipment Tracking Device - Performance and Test Requirements*
  - [AS8992](#), *Fire Resistant Container - Design, Performance and Testing Requirements*
  - [AS8995](#), *Air Cargo Lashing Line*
- [SAE AGE-4 Packaging, Handling and Transportability Committee](#)
- [SAE G-27 Lithium Battery Packaging Performance](#) Committee
- SAE [AS6342](#) Minimum Operation Performance Standard for Helicopter Hoist
- [S-18 Aircraft and Systems Development and Safety Assessment Committee](#)
  - [ARP4754B](#), *Guidelines for Development of Civil Aircraft and Systems*
  - [ARP4761A](#), *Guidelines And Methods For Conducting The Safety Assessment Process On Civil Airborne Systems And Equipment*
  - [AS7209](#), *Development Assurance Objectives for Aerospace Vehicles and Systems*
  - [AIR6913](#), *Using STPA During Development and Safety Assessment of Civil Aircraft*
  - [AIR6276](#), *Use of Modeling and Tools for Aircraft Systems Development - A Strategy for Development Assurance Aspects with Examples*
- [S-18UAS Autonomy Working Group](#)
  - [SAE AIR7121](#), *Applicability of Existing Development Assurance and System Safety Practices to Unmanned Aircraft Systems*
- [SAE AS7209](#), *Development Assurance Objectives for Aerospace Vehicles and Systems*
- [RTCA Committees](#)
  - RTCA [SC-206](#), *Aeronautical Information and Meteorological Data Link Services*
  - RTCA [SC-214](#), *Standards for Air Traffic Data Communication Services*
  - RTCA [SC-216](#), *Aeronautical Systems Security*
  - RTCA [SC-217](#), *Aeronautical Databases*
  - RTCA [SC-222](#), *AMS(R)S*
  - RTCA [SC-223](#), *Internet Protocol Suite (IPS) and AeroMACS*
  - RTCA [SC-227](#), *Standards of Navigation Performance*
  - RTCA [SC-228](#), *Minimum Performance Standards for Unmanned Aircraft Systems*
  - RTCA [SC-229](#), *406 MHz Emergency Locator Transmitters (ELTs)*
  - RTCA [SC-230](#), *Airborne Weather Detection Systems*

- RTCA [SC-231, Terrain Awareness Warning System \(TAWS\)](#)
- RTCA [SC-236, Standards for Wireless Avionics Intra-Communication System \(WAIC\) within 4200-4400 MHz](#)
- RTCA [SC-237, Helicopter Terrain Awareness Warning System \(HTAWS\)](#)
- RTCA [SC-239, Low Range Altimeter](#)
- SAE ITC [AEEC \(ARINC\) Standards](#)
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA/AEEC, Aeronautical Operational Control (AOC) Subcommittee
- [EUROCAE Working Groups](#)
  - EUROCAE WG 118 FDR/CVR MOPS
- [SAE CMH-17 Handbook](#)

**New Gap I16: Commercial Cargo Transport via UAS.** Additional standards may be needed to enable UAS commercial cargo transport and operations.

**R&D Needed:** Yes. Review existing standards used for traditional commercial cargo transport and determine gaps that are unique to UAS.

**Recommendation:** Complete work on in-development standards. Engage with industry to determine intent for future services (e.g., replace short haul rail and road freight with small general aviation aircraft cargo operations).

**Priority:** Medium

**Organization(s):** SAE, RTCA, EUROCAE, SAE, ARINC, ASME, ASTM

### 8.4.3. Commercial Passenger Air Taxi Transport via UAS (short-haul flights carrying few passengers)

Commercial passenger air taxi transport, a service that conceptually falls under intra-city urban air mobility (UAM), or on-demand mobility (ODM), is not a new capability. It is a subset of what is now being referred to more broadly as advanced air mobility (AAM) which encompasses urban, rural, and inter-city mobility.<sup>48</sup>

Helicopter passenger transport services are in common use to shuttle people through urban (i.e., intra-city) and other short-haul environments (e.g., from a city location to an airport terminal). UAS bring the potential for satisfying an increased customer demand with a reduced number of pilots by including automated capabilities on the aircraft and eventually removing an on-board pilot. In the shorter term,

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<sup>48</sup> See <https://nari.arc.nasa.gov/aam>

however, it will actually increase the pilot demand, as the first phase would include pilots on board these air taxis.

At its broadest, the concept of intra-city commercial passenger transport by UAS encompasses flight operations within city centers, between city centers and their suburbs, between edge/satellite cities and urban centers or other edge/satellite cities, and as transportation to large airports to connect to the airline system. These flights may be operated using a variety of different operational models, including (extremely) thin haul scheduled airline service, transit style or “air metro” operations that fly a set route with stops like a city bus, airport shuttle service, and the on-demand air taxi model that has received much popular attention in recent years.

It is important to note that passengers engaged in these services are separate and distinct from the personnel identified in sections 10.3 (UAS Flight Crew) and 10.4 (Additional Crew Members). This section pertains to the commercial services rendered to the customers and passengers. As such, aircraft and operational standards related to this group represent a new area of focus for the industry.

The standards associated with these services can reasonably be expected to parallel existing piloted aviation in urban environments with tailoring and modifications that use highly automated services instead of a full-time on-board or remote pilot. Over time, the expectation is that these autonomous aircraft will make increased use of artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning techniques, not only in a flight support capacity but eventually in-flight control itself.

Infrastructure considerations (e.g., vertiports/skyports), environmental impacts (e.g., noise), and training for associated personnel are all active areas of development for both the UAM industry and its associated standards. See roadmap sections 7.11 on design and operation of aerodrome facilities for UAS, 6.7 on noise, emissions, and fuel venting, 10.3 on UAS flight crew, and 10.4 on additional crew members.

Many of the technologies such as distributed electric propulsion and detect and avoid capabilities that enable UAS are also central to the next generation of passenger carrying aircraft (e.g., eVTOL aircraft) that are being developed for use in UAM, AAM, and other emerging commercial passenger air transportation models. Many standards written for manned aircraft apply to UAS and some standards originally written for UAS may be appropriate (with modifications) for UAM and AAM applications.

**Published Laws, Regulations, Standards, and Other Documents:** Published laws, standards and committees that have developed relevant standards include:

- [FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018](#), Sec. 548. Sense of Congress on Artificial Intelligence in Aviation
- ASTM Committees
  - [F38 Unmanned Aircraft Systems](#)
  - [F39 Aircraft Systems](#)
  - [F44 General Aviation](#)

- D30 Composite Materials
- SAE Committees
  - SAE [Aircraft SEAT Committee](#)
  - SAE [AGE-3 Aircraft Ground Support Equipment Committee](#)
  - SAE [A-10 Aircraft Oxygen Equipment Committee](#)
  - SAE [AC-9 Aircraft Environmental Systems Committee](#)
  - SAE [AC-9C Aircraft Icing Technology Committee](#)
  - SAE [A-21 Aircraft Noise Measurement Aviation Emission Modeling](#)
  - SAE [AE-7A Generators and Controls Motors and Magnetic Devices](#)
  - SAE [AE-7C Systems](#)
  - SAE [AE-7D Aircraft Energy Storage and Charging Committee](#)
  - SAE [S-9A Safety Equipment and Survival Systems Committee](#)
  - SAE [S-9B Cabin Interiors and Furnishings Committee](#)
  - SAE [G-32 Cyber Physical Systems Security Committee](#)
  - SAE [G-34 Artificial Intelligence in Aviation](#)
  - SAE [HM-1 Integrated Vehicle Health Management Committee](#)
  - SAE [S-18 Aircraft and Sys Dev and Safety Assessment Committee](#)
  - SAE [S-18UAS Autonomy Working Group](#)
  - SAE [A-4 Underwater Locator Device Working Group](#)
  - SAE CMH-17 Handbook
- SAE ITC [AEEC \(ARINC\) Standards](#)
  - SAE-ITC ARINC IA 648, Cabin Passenger Seat Production Testing
  - SAE-ITC ARINC IA 820, Cabin Architecture for Wireless Distribution System
  - SAE-ITC ARINC IA 831, Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC) Recommended Practice
  - SAE-ITC ARINC IA 833, Cabin Universal Wireless Distribution System (UWDS)
  - SAE-ITC ARINC IA 836, Cabin Standard Enclosures - Modular Rack Principle (MRP)
  - SAE-ITC ARINC IA 837, Design Guidelines for Aircraft Cabin Human Machine Interfaces
  - SAE-ITC ARINC IA 435-1, Guidance for Cabin Training Devices
  - SAE-ITC ARINC IA 485P1-4D2, Cabin Equipment Interfaces, Part 1, Head End Equipment Protocol
  - SAE-ITC ARINC IA 485P2-5D1, Cabin Equipment Interfaces, Part 2, Physical Layer - In-Seat Protocol
  - SAE-ITC ARINC IA 628 Part 4B, Cabin Equipment Interfaces (CEI), Part 4B, Cabin Management and Entertainment System - Cabin Distribution System (CDS) - Star Wiring
  - SAE-ITC ARINC IA 628 Part 6, Cabin Equipment Interfaces (CEI) Part 6 Fiber Optic Cable Assembly General Specification
  - SAE-ITC ARINC IA 628P0-4, Cabin Equipment Interfaces, Part 0, Cabin Management and Entertainment System - Overview
  - SAE-ITC ARINC IA 628P1-8D2, Cabin Equipment Interfaces, Part 1, Peripherals
  - SAE-ITC ARINC IA 628P2-10, Cabin Equipment Interfaces, Part 2, Cabin Management and Entertainment System - Seat Interfaces

- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 628P3-2, Cabin Equipment Interfaces (CEI), Part 3, In-Flight Entertainment Systems (IFES) to Aircraft System Interfaces
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 628P4C, Cabin Equipment Interfaces (CEI), Part 4C, Cabin Management and Entertainment System - Cabin Distribution System - 2nd Generation - Daisy Chain
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 628P5-4D2, Cabin Equipment Interfaces, Part 5, Cabin Electrical Equipment and Wiring Installation Guidelines
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 628P7-2, Cabin Equipment Interfaces (CEI), Part 7, Cabin Equipment Cooling General Specification
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 628P8-1, Cabin Equipment Interfaces, Part 8, In-Flight Entertainment (IFE) Equipment Standard Availability Measurement Guidelines
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 628P9-5, Cabin Equipment Interfaces (CEI), Part 9, Cabin Interface Network (CIN)
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 746-6, Cabin Communications Systems (CCS)
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 800P1, Cabin Connectors and Cables, Part 1, Description and Overview
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 800P2-2D2, Cabin Connectors and Cables, Part 2, Specification of Connectors, Contacts, and Backshells
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 800P3-1, Cabin Connectors and Cables, Part 3, Specification of Cables
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 800P4-1D2, Cabin Connectors and Cables, Part 4, Standard Test Methodology
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 808A, Third Generation Cabin Network (3GCN+) Cabin Distribution
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 809A, Third Generation Cabin Network (3GCN+) Seat Distribution System
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 836A, Cabin Standard Enclosures
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 854D4, Cabin Equipment Network Bus
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA/AEEC, Cabin Systems Subcommittee (CSS)
- RTCA
  - DO-204B Minimum Operational Performance Standards for Aircraft Emergency Locator Transmitters 406 MHz
- EUROCAE
  - ED-62B Minimum Operational Performance Standards for Aircraft Emergency Locator Transmitters 406 MHz
  - ED-112A Minimum Operational Performance Specifications for Crash Protected Airborne Recorder Systems
  - ED-237 Minimum Aviation System Performance Specification for Criteria to Detect In-Flight Aircraft Distress Events to Trigger Transmission of Flight Information

**In-Development Standards and Related Activity:** In-development standards and committees that are developing relevant standards and documents include:

- ASTM Committees
  - [F38 Unmanned Aircraft Systems](#)
  - [F39 Aircraft Systems](#)



- [F44 General Aviation](#)
- SAE [JA3163](#) Taxonomy and Definitions for Terms Related to Shared Mobility and Enabling Technologies, including a definition of UAM, being developed by aerospace stakeholders in the SAE [Shared and Digital Mobility Committee](#)
- SAE [AS6968](#) Connection Set of Conductive Charging for Electric Aircraft
- SAE [ARP4721/1A](#) Monitoring Aircraft Noise and Operations in the Vicinity of Airports: System Description, Acquisition, and Operation
- SAE [ARP4721/2A](#) Monitoring Aircraft Noise and Operations in the Vicinity of Airports: System Validation
- Revising SAE AIR1845A Procedure for the Calculation of Airplane Noise in the Vicinity of Airports
- [SAE AIR7121, Applicability of Existing Development Assurance and System Safety Practices to Unmanned Aircraft Systems](#)
- [SAE AS7209, Development Assurance Objectives for Aerospace Vehicles and Systems](#)
- [SAE International Committees](#)
  - SAE [Aircraft SEAT Committee](#)
  - SAE [AGE-3 Aircraft Ground Support Equipment Committee](#)
  - SAE [A-10 Aircraft Oxygen Equipment Committee](#)
  - SAE [AC-9 Aircraft Environmental Systems Committee](#)
  - SAE [AC-9C Aircraft Icing Technology Committee](#)
  - SAE [A-21 Aircraft Noise Measurement Aviation Emission Modeling](#)
  - SAE [AE-7A Generators and Controls Motors and Magnetic Devices](#)
  - SAE [AE-7C Systems](#)
  - SAE [AE-7D Aircraft Energy Storage and Charging Committee](#)
  - SAE [S-9A Safety Equipment and Survival Systems Committee](#)
  - SAE [S-9B Cabin Interiors and Furnishings Committee](#)
  - SAE [G-32 Cyber Physical Systems Security Committee](#)
  - SAE [G-34 Artificial Intelligence in Aviation / EUROCAE WG-114](#)
  - SAE [HM-1 Integrated Vehicle Health Management Committee](#)
  - SAE [S-18 Aircraft and Sys Dev and Safety Assessment Committee](#)
  - SAE [S-18UAS Autonomy Working Group](#)
  - [SAE CMH-17 Handbook](#)
- SAE ITC [AEEC \(ARINC\) Standards](#)
  - SAE-ITC ARINC IA/AEEC, Cabin Systems Subcommittee (CSS)
- [EUROCAE Working Groups](#)
  - EUROCAE WG 118 FDR/CVR MOPS

**New Gap I17: Commercial Passenger Air Taxi Transport via UAS (short-haul flights carrying few passengers and/or cargo).** Standards are needed to support commercial short haul transport via UAS covering areas such as aircraft automation, passenger cabin interiors and furnishings, safety equipment and survival, etc.

**R&D Needed:** Yes

**Recommendation:**

- 1) Complete work on in-development standards. Complete work on use of AI and non-deterministic techniques on autonomous, non-piloted UAS. Develop safety and operations standards applicable to non-piloted UAS carrying passengers.
- 2) Consult the NASA AAM ConOps and write standards to address commercial passenger air taxi transport via UAS.

**Priority:** High (Tier 1)

**Organization(s):** ASTM, RTCA, SAE, EUROCAE

#### **8.4.4. Commercial Passenger Transport via UAS (long-haul flights carrying many passengers)**

A number of companies are interested in using unmanned aircraft to provide commercial passenger services. Initially, operations would consist of small short haul flights, carrying a few passengers (e.g., intra-city services, such as from the airport to the city center or from one city location to another). Over time, these operations might evolve to larger, longer haul flights with more passengers, such as inter-city shuttle services. The standards and regulatory framework supporting commercial passenger transport operations that include but are not limited to 14 CFR Part 25, 29, 91, 119, 121, 125, 135, and 136, may have to be amended to include the development of performance requirements for communication, navigation and surveillance (CNS), and UAS traffic management (UTM). These performance requirements need to take into account future highly integrated systems (HIS). A HIS is a set of previously independent systems (e.g., communication-navigation, flight instruments) that are now inter-connected both functionally and architecturally.

Focus should be given on the scalability issues and technology opportunities to achieve more scalable operations.

- Advanced Interval Management
- CAT IIIC Operations
- Broadband IP
- 4D Conflict Resolution
- 4-D Flight Management System (4-D FMS)
- ADS-B with Interval Management Capability

Current aircraft to ground systems communications are limited to mechanisms such as voice, automated data surveillance transponders, controller-pilot data link communications, and data communication solutions. These systems limit the use of data exchange and trajectory sharing amongst systems and create a hurdle to evolution towards a full, trajectory-based operations (TBO) environment.

Commercial passenger transport UAS may use elements of existing instrument flight rules (IFR) and visual flight rules (VFR), and they will likely require new standards to seamlessly and efficiently conduct the flight. New standards are needed to achieve scalability for this type of operation and provide a link between the rules and technology, which will require further maturation, verification, and validation.

The standards needed to accomplish commercial passenger transport operations with UAS are those that support 14 CFR Part 25, 29, 91, 119, 121, 125, 135, and 136. These rules apply to manned aviation. Updates are needed to enable UAS for commercial passenger transport operations. Transport airplanes are currently certified to 14 CFR 25 and typically operate under 14 CFR 121 operating rules today. Developments are underway to initially use UAS to transport cargo with the expectation of transporting people in the long term.

UAS designers/manufacturers will need to consider the operational regulations in order to comply with the design of specific systems such as DAA, cybersecurity, AI, etc., based on the ConOps and operational risk assessment (ORA), and to follow the design processes set forth in published standards such as SAE ARP4754A, SAE ARP4761, and in-development standards such as SAE AIR7121, *Applicability of Existing Development Assurance and System Safety Practices to Unmanned Aircraft Systems*.

**Published Laws, Regulations, Standards, and Other Documents:** Published laws, standards and committees that have developed relevant standards include:

- [FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018](#), Sec. 548. Sense of Congress on Artificial Intelligence in Aviation
- [RTCA DO-264](#), Guidelines for Approval of the Provision and Use of Air Traffic Services Supported by Data Communications
- [SAE ARP4754A](#), Guidelines for Development of Civil Aircraft and Systems
- [SAE ARP4761](#), Guidelines and Methods for Conducting the Safety Assessment Process on Civil Airborne Systems and Equipment
- [SAE AIR6219](#), Development of Atmospheric Neutron Single Event Effects Analysis for Use in Safety Assessments
- [SAE ARP5150A](#), Safety Assessment of Transport Airplanes in Commercial Service
- [SAE ARP5151A](#) Safety Assessment of General Aviation Airplanes and Rotorcraft in Commercial Service
- [RTCA Committees](#)
  - RTCA [SC-206, Aeronautical Information and Meteorological Data Link Services](#)
  - RTCA [SC-214, Standards for Air Traffic Data Communication Services](#)
  - RTCA [SC-216, Aeronautical Systems Security](#)
  - RTCA [SC-217, Aeronautical Databases](#)
  - RTCA [SC-222, AMS\(R\)S](#)
  - RTCA [SC-223, Internet Protocol Suite \(IPS\) and AeroMACS](#)
  - RTCA [SC-227, Standards of Navigation Performance](#)
  - RTCA [SC-228, Minimum Performance Standards for Unmanned Aircraft Systems](#)
  - RTCA [SC-229, 406 MHz Emergency Locator Transmitters \(ELTs\)](#)

- RTCA [SC-230, Airborne Weather Detection Systems](#)
- RTCA [SC-231, Terrain Awareness Warning System \(TAWS\)](#)
- RTCA [SC-236, Standards for Wireless Avionics Intra-Communication System \(WAIC\) within 4200-4400 MHz](#)
- RTCA [SC-237, Helicopter Terrain Awareness Warning System \(HTAWS\)](#)
- RTCA [SC-239, Low Range Altimeter](#)
- [SAE International Committees](#)
  - SAE [Aircraft SEAT Committee](#)
  - SAE [AGE-3 Aircraft Ground Support Equipment Committee](#)
  - SAE [A-10 Aircraft Oxygen Equipment Committee](#)
  - SAE [AC-9 Aircraft Environmental Systems Committee](#)
  - SAE [AC-9C Aircraft Icing Technology Committee](#)
  - SAE [A-21 Aircraft Noise Measurement Aviation Emission Modeling](#)
  - SAE [S-9A Safety Equipment and Survival Systems Committee](#)
  - SAE [S-9B Cabin Interiors and Furnishings Committee](#)
  - SAE [G-32 Cyber Physical Systems Security Committee](#)
  - SAE [G-34 Artificial Intelligence in Aviation](#)
  - SAE [HM-1 Integrated Vehicle Health Management Committee](#)
  - SAE [S-18 Aircraft and Sys Dev and Safety Assessment Committee](#)
  - SAE [AEEC \(ARINC\) Standards](#)
  - SAE [S-18UAS Autonomy Working Group](#)
  - SAE [A-4 Underwater Locator Device Working Group](#)
  - [SAE CMH-17 Handbook](#)
- SAE ITC [AEEC \(ARINC\) Standards](#)
  - SAE-ITC ARINC IA 648, Cabin Passenger Seat Production Testing
  - SAE-ITC ARINC IA 820, Cabin Architecture for Wireless Distribution System
  - SAE-ITC ARINC IA 831, Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC) Recommended Practice
  - SAE-ITC ARINC IA 833, Cabin Universal Wireless Distribution System (UWDS)
  - SAE-ITC ARINC IA 836, Cabin Standard Enclosures - Modular Rack Principle (MRP)
  - SAE-ITC ARINC IA 837, Design Guidelines for Aircraft Cabin Human Machine Interfaces
  - SAE-ITC ARINC IA 435-1, Guidance for Cabin Training Devices
  - SAE-ITC ARINC IA 485P1-4D2, Cabin Equipment Interfaces, Part 1, Head End Equipment Protocol
  - SAE-ITC ARINC IA 485P2-5D1, Cabin Equipment Interfaces, Part 2, Physical Layer - In-Seat Protocol
  - SAE-ITC ARINC IA 628 Part 4B, Cabin Equipment Interfaces (CEI), Part 4B, Cabin Management and Entertainment System - Cabin Distribution System (CDS) - Star Wiring
  - SAE-ITC ARINC IA 628 Part 6, Cabin Equipment Interfaces (CEI) Part 6 Fiber Optic Cable Assembly General Specification
  - SAE-ITC ARINC IA 628P0-4, Cabin Equipment Interfaces, Part 0, Cabin Management and Entertainment System - Overview
  - SAE-ITC ARINC IA 628P1-8D2, Cabin Equipment Interfaces, Part 1, Peripherals

- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 628P2-10, Cabin Equipment Interfaces, Part 2, Cabin Management and Entertainment System - Seat Interfaces
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 628P3-2, Cabin Equipment Interfaces (CEI), Part 3, In-Flight Entertainment Systems (IFES) to Aircraft System Interfaces
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 628P4C, Cabin Equipment Interfaces (CEI), Part 4C, Cabin Management and Entertainment System - Cabin Distribution System - 2nd Generation - Daisy Chain
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 628P5-4D2, Cabin Equipment Interfaces, Part 5, Cabin Electrical Equipment and Wiring Installation Guidelines
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 628P7-2, Cabin Equipment Interfaces (CEI), Part 7, Cabin Equipment Cooling General Specification
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 628P8-1, Cabin Equipment Interfaces, Part 8, In-Flight Entertainment (IFE) Equipment Standard Availability Measurement Guidelines
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 628P9-5, Cabin Equipment Interfaces (CEI), Part 9, Cabin Interface Network (CIN)
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 746-6, Cabin Communications Systems (CCS)
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 800P1, Cabin Connectors and Cables, Part 1, Description and Overview
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 800P2-2D2, Cabin Connectors and Cables, Part 2, Specification of Connectors, Contacts, and Backshells
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 800P3-1, Cabin Connectors and Cables, Part 3, Specification of Cables
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 800P4-1D2, Cabin Connectors and Cables, Part 4, Standard Test Methodology
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 808A, Third Generation Cabin Network (3GCN+) Cabin Distribution
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 809A, Third Generation Cabin Network (3GCN+) Seat Distribution System
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 810-5, Definition of Standard Interfaces for Galley Insert (GAIN) Equipment, Physical Interfaces
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 812A-2, Standard Data Interface for GAIN Equipment, CAN Communications
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 812AP1-1, Standard Data Interferes for Galley Insert (GAIN) Equipment, Part 1, CAN Communications
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 812AP2, Standard Data Interfaces for Galley Insert (GAIN) Equipment, Part 2, CAN Communications Verification and System Test Guidance
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 836A, Cabin Standard Enclosures
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 854D4, Cabin Equipment Network Bus
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA/AEEC, Cabin Systems Subcommittee (CSS)
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA/AEEC, Galley Insert (GAIN) Subcommittee
- [EUROCAE Working Groups](#)
  - EUROCAE WG 118 FDR/CVR MOPS

**In-Development Standards and Related Activity:** In-development standards and committees that are developing relevant standards and documents include:

- SAE [AIR7121](#) Applicability of Existing Development Assurance and System Safety Practices to Unmanned Aircraft Systems
- SAE [AS7209](#) Development Assurance Objectives for Aerospace Vehicles and Systems
- SAE [ARP4754B](#) Guidelines for Development of Civil Aircraft and Systems
- SAE [ARP4761A](#) Guidelines and Methods for Conducting the Safety Assessment Process on Civil Airborne Systems and Equipment
- SAE [AIR6913](#) Using STPA During Development and Safety Assessment of Civil Aircraft
- SAE [AS6968](#) Connection Set of Conductive Charging for Electric Aircraft
- [RTCA Committees](#)
  - RTCA [SC-206, Aeronautical Information and Meteorological Data Link Services](#)
  - RTCA [SC-214, Standards for Air Traffic Data Communication Services](#)
  - RTCA [SC-216, Aeronautical Systems Security](#)
  - RTCA [SC-217, Aeronautical Databases](#)
  - RTCA [SC-222, AMS\(R\)S](#)
  - RTCA [SC-223, Internet Protocol Suite \(IPS\) and AeroMACS](#)
  - RTCA [SC-227, Standards of Navigation Performance](#)
  - RTCA [SC-228, Minimum Performance Standards for Unmanned Aircraft Systems](#)
  - RTCA [SC-229, 406 MHz Emergency Locator Transmitters \(ELTs\)](#)
  - RTCA [SC-230, Airborne Weather Detection Systems](#)
  - RTCA [SC-231, Terrain Awareness Warning System \(TAWS\)](#)
  - RTCA [SC-236, Standards for Wireless Avionics Intra-Communication System \(WAIC\) within 4200-4400 MHz](#)
  - RTCA [SC-237, Helicopter Terrain Awareness Warning System \(HTAWS\)](#)
  - RTCA [SC-239, Low Range Altimeter](#)
- [SAE International Committees](#)
  - SAE [Aircraft SEAT Committee](#)
  - SAE [AGE-3 Aircraft Ground Support Equipment Committee](#)
  - SAE [A-10 Aircraft Oxygen Equipment Committee](#)
  - SAE [AC-9 Aircraft Environmental Systems Committee](#)
  - SAE [AC-9C Aircraft Icing Technology Committee](#)
  - SAE [A-21 Aircraft Noise Measurement Aviation Emission Modeling](#)
  - SAE [S-9A Safety Equipment and Survival Systems Committee](#)
  - SAE [S-9B Cabin Interiors and Furnishings Committee](#)
  - SAE [G-32 Cyber Physical Systems Security Committee](#)
  - SAE [G-34 Artificial Intelligence in Aviation](#)
  - SAE [HM-1 Integrated Vehicle Health Management Committee](#)
  - SAE [S-18 Aircraft and Sys Dev and Safety Assessment Committee](#)
  - SAE [S-18UAS Autonomy Working Group](#)
  - [SAE CMH-17 Handbook](#)
- SAE ITC [AEEC \(ARINC\) Standards](#)
  - SAE-ITC ARINC IA/AEEC, Cabin Systems Subcommittee (CSS)

- SAE-ITC ARINC IA/AEEC, Galley Insert (GAIN) Subcommittee
- [EUROCAE Working Groups](#)
- ASTM [D30 Composite Materials](#)
- ISO/NP 5015-1, Unmanned aircraft systems — Part 1: Operational procedures for passenger-carrying UAS

**New Gap I18: Commercial Passenger Transport via UAS (long-haul flights carrying many passengers).**

Standards are needed to support commercial passenger transport via UAS and its operations.

**R&D Needed:** Yes

**Recommendation:** Complete work on in-development standards to support commercial passenger transport via UAS and its operations. Industry and SDOs should work together to develop standards to enable this type of operation.

**Priority:** Medium

**Organization(s):** RTCA, SAE, EUROCAE, SAE-ITC ARINC

### 8.4.5. Commercial Sensing Services

Commercial sensing services potentially could be offered by commercial UAS operators across a wide range of applications. Commercial sensing services are specialized airborne remote sensing services (e.g., video, infrared, spectral imagery, etc.) provided by outsourced service providers under a fee-for-service (FFS) contract to corporations, companies, institutions, and/or government agencies. As FFS contracts typically require a service provider to take full responsibility for the safe conduct and statutory compliance of the UAS operation, it would reasonably be expected that a degree of rigor, inspection, licensing and certification would be applicable to these services. It is likely that standards for how to employ sensors for collecting, transmitting, and storing information would be developed by the industries that make use of such services. Such industries may include, for example, real estate, film production, farming, mining, utilities, civil infrastructure, disaster/emergency management, etc.

**Published Laws, Standards, Codes, and Other Documents:**

- [FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018](#), Sec. 548. Sense of Congress on Artificial Intelligence in Aviation

No published standards have been identified for conducting commercial sensing services operations with a UAS. However, there are best practice guidelines published by various industry groups that have remote inspection components that potentially could apply including those listed below:

- ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V – Nondestructive Examination
- API 510 - Pressure Vessel Inspection Code: In-service Inspection, Rating, Repair, and Alteration

- API 570 - Piping Inspection Code: In-service Inspection, Rating, Repair, and Alteration of Piping Systems
- API 572 - Inspection Practices for Pressure Vessels

See also the list of published standards in sections 8.1, 8.2, 8.3, 8.4.6, 8.5, 9.4, 9.6.1, 9.6.2, and 9.11 of this roadmap.

**In-Development Standards and Committees:** There are several standards in development for some of the potential applications for which commercial sensor services could be provided such as those listed below. See also roadmap sections 8.1, 8.2, 8.3, 8.4.6, 8.5, 9.4, 9.6.1, 9.6.2, and 9.11.

- ASME MUS-1, Use of UAS for visual Inspection (noted in section 8.1.1)
- NACE SP21436 Large Standoff Magnetometry (LSM) Inspection of Pipelines (noted in section 8.2.4)
- ASTM E54.09 work items include (noted in section 9.6.1):
  - WK58928 Evaluating Aerial Response Robot Sensing: Thermal Image Acuity
  - WK58929 Evaluating Aerial Response Robot Sensing: Thermal Dynamic Range
  - WK58930 Evaluating Aerial Response Robot Sensing: Latency of Video, Audio, and Control

**New Gap I19: Commercial Sensing Services.** Standards are needed to enable the provision of commercial sensing services by UAS operators. Such standards should address the integrity and security of the information collected, transmitted, and stored by the service provider on behalf of the client.

**R&D Needed:** Yes

**Recommendation:** Develop standards to enable commercial sensing services. Industry groups should be consulted to determine if additional and/or higher level standards are required for UAS sensor operations conducted by outsourced service providers.

**Priority:** High (Tier 1)

**Organization(s):** ASME, NACE, ASTM

#### 8.4.6. Use of sUAS for News Gathering

News organizations may use sUAS for assisting in the gathering of video and audio of public events, crime scenes, war zone coverage, and many other newsworthy events. Newsgathering involves both VLOS and BVLOS use cases. News coverage of local events in public squares, stadiums, or at a public roadway intersection may be able to be covered with VLOS operation. However, there are certainly BVLOS use cases for newsgathering such as coverage of rush hour traffic over a city or wide-scale interstate highway backups (both of which may be covered today by the use of helicopters but tomorrow could be covered with sUAS). Other BVLOS use cases for newsgathering include coverage of



lengthy parades, marathons, bike races (e.g., the Tour de France), and ad hoc crime scenes which start in one place but may spread quickly to other areas (e.g., car-chase scenes). Some of the BVLOS use cases for long distance events may involve handover from one flight command/ground control station to another.

Coordination with local law enforcement is an important aspect of performing newsgathering with UAS, as law enforcement should be able to know who is flying in a given area. In many respects, the newsgathering use case looks very similar to many public safety use cases. Industry standards for safe operation for newsgathering can create a basis for promoting harmonization of sUAS-related rules/regs. across states/localities.

There are currently no known published standards specifically for sUAS newsgathering. Industry standards that incorporate best practices, for safety management would be useful for this use case. Currently, each news organization must work with the FAA to secure the proper authorization for flying over people and may identify themselves to local law enforcement to ease working with local authorities. The FAA UAS remote ID NPRM will assist all sUAS (including those used for newsgathering) to be able to identify themselves to local law enforcement and to others. The priority of standards in this area is high due to the public safety responsibility of news organizations to “get the message out” in coordination with law enforcement and first responders when important news events occur.

**Published Standards:** There are currently no known standards specific to sUAS newsgathering.

**In-Development Standards:** None known at this time. See section 7.4 on Operations Over People, 7.8 on Remote ID, and 7.3 on BVLOS.

**New Gap I20: Use of sUAS for Newsgathering.** Standards or best practices are needed on the use of drones by newsgathering organizations whether the drone controllers are stationary or mobile. sUAS use for newsgathering operations should also include safety and health considerations for participating crew and the public from the NIOSH and OSHA aspects.

**R&D Needed:** No

**Recommendation:** Develop operational best practices or standards on the use of UAS by newsgathering organizations

**Priority:** High (Tier 1)

**Organization(s):** companies, industry trade associations

## 8.5. Workplace Safety

UAS operated in the workplace environment have the potential to improve occupational safety. For example, UAS can be used to perform inspections and other dangerous tasks at elevation, thereby

reducing fatalities among workers from falls, a leading cause of fatal injuries in the construction industry.<sup>49</sup> Drones can also be used to monitor the workplace practices identify hazards, for example, in connection with maintenance work by tower climbers.

At the same time, the use of UAS in areas such as agriculture, oil and gas, utilities, construction, etc. has created various safety issues and potential hazards to nearby workers. Such hazards include the UA causing worker distraction, variable worksite conditions, inadequate UAS operator training or competency leading to errors, and faulty equipment. The arrival of autonomous or semi-autonomous UAS<sup>50</sup> may also present new hazards to the health and safety of workers.

**Published Regulations, Standards, and Related Materials:** While there are numerous regulations, standards, and guidelines to address occupational safety and health issues for general industry, there has been little published about the safety and health risks associated with the commercial use of UAS. Data supporting the potential hazards of UAS for workers is scarce. Safety professionals, non-participants, and construction workers need to be aware of these new hazards, assess the risks, and apply appropriate controls/mitigations to reduce those risks to an acceptable level.

Existing regulations and standards include:

- Various FAA regulations, guidance, policies from the perspectives of the safety of the National Airspace System (NAS) and aviation
- OSHA regulations, policies, guidance from the occupational safety and health perspective (does not include occupational safety implications due to UAS operations)
- The following references provide information on workplace related incidents involving UAS:
  - the FAA and [National Transportation Safety Board \(NTSB\)](#) databases
  - the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) Survey of Occupational Injuries and Illnesses (SOII) and the Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries (CFOI), and
  - accident investigations by OSHA, and Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Program (FACE) investigations by NIOSH

**In-Development Standards and Documents:** As noted in section 4.4 of this roadmap, the American Society of Safety Professionals (ASSP) A10 Committee on Construction and Demolition is developing a technical report addressing the safe use of drones for construction and demolition operations.

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<sup>49</sup> In 2015, there were 985 construction fatalities and 35.8% of them were due to falls from elevation. Source: [The Construction Chart Book](#), 6<sup>th</sup> edition, February 2018, p. 108, CPWR – The Center for Construction Research and Training, produced with support from the National Institute for Occupational safety and Health grant number OH009762, Silver Spring, MD.

<sup>50</sup> See section 6.11, Enterprise Operations: Level of Automation/Autonomy and Artificial Intelligence (AI).

**Gap I12: Occupational Safety Requirements for UAS Operated in Workplaces.** There is a need for occupational safety standards for operating UAS in workplaces. In addition to collision avoidance and awareness systems that are required to be installed on critical infrastructure, at construction sites, and on buildings, such standards should address:

- 1) Hazard identification, risk characterization, and mitigation to ensure the safe operation of UAS in workplaces. This includes incorporating hazard prevention through safety design features/concepts such as frangible UAS, lightweight manipulators, passive compliant systems, safe actuators, passive robotic systems, operating warning devices (audio/visual), two-way communications between the operator and worker supervisor(s) or workers, etc. It also includes the deployment of Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) such as helmets and other equipment and gears.
- 2) Training, especially in relation to: a) the competency, experience and qualification of UAS operators; b) operator, bystander, and worker safety; c) identification of potential hazards to equipment such as cranes, elevators, fork lifts, etc.; and, d) corrective actions, procedures, and protocols that are needed to mitigate safety hazards. (See also section 10.3 on UAS Flight Crew.)

**R&D Needed:** Yes. Collecting and analyzing objective data about negative safety outcomes is a key to identifying causes of injuries. This includes investigating:

- 1) navigation and collision avoidance systems in the design of commercial UAS so as to proactively address workplace safety.
- 2) the effects of stiffness and pliability in structural designs of UAS in relation to UAS collisions with critical infrastructure.
- 3) the severity of UAS collisions with workers wearing and not wearing helmets and other protective devices.
- 4) potential safety risks of drones in the workplace such as anti-collision lights distracting workers, increasing noise levels, psychological effects.
- 5) potential mitigation methods that follow the hierarchy of controls to reduce risks of drones to workers.

See also section 7.4 on Operations Over People and section 9.2 on HAZMAT (e.g., operations at a chemical manufacturing plant).

**Recommendation:**

- 1) Develop proactive approach-based occupational safety standards/recommended best practices for UAS operations in workplace environments. Such work should be done in collaboration and consultation with diverse groups (governmental and non-governmental), to help integrate UAS operations in construction and other industries while ensuring the safety and health of workers and others in close proximity to the UAS.
- 2) Develop educational outreach materials for non-participating people in workplaces, including construction sites where UAS operations are taking place. Occupational safety and health professional organizations should invite speakers on UAS workplace applications to further increase awareness among their members.
- 3) Encourage the voluntary reporting of events, incidents, and accidents involving UAS in workplace environments.
- 4) Encourage BLS to modify the SOII and CFOI databases to facilitate search capability that would identify injuries caused by UAS.

**Priority:** High (Tier 2)

**Organization(s):** SAE, ASTM, ASSP, BLS, OSHA, NIOSH, CPWR, ISO/TC 20/SC 16, NTSB, etc.

**Status of Progress:** Yellow

**Update:** These recommendations require community efforts. It is believed that work is underway by NIOSH in regard to recommendations 1 and 2.

## 9. Flight Operations Standards: Public Safety – WG4

### 9.1. sUAS for Public Safety Operations

Public safety officials (e.g., firefighters, police, EMS, et al.) are realizing the benefits of using drones in various operational scenarios including natural disaster response, search and rescue (SAR), structural fires, wildfires, HAZMAT release, and accident mapping/reconstruction.<sup>51</sup> A number of these use cases are explored in more detail later in this chapter.

During discussion of this topic, it was noted that standards have a role to play in helping first responders take advantage of this emerging technology and to do it safely for sUAS remote pilots, public safety officials, and the public. It was also noted that the use of sUAS for public safety operations should include safety and health considerations for participating crew and public safety officials from the NIOSH and OSHA aspects.

In April 2017, ASTM and NFPA held a meeting on the opportunities to cooperate on the topic of UxS for first responders. A year later, the two organizations signed an MOU to support the creation of AC383 - UAS Public Safety Joint Working Group (ASTM/NFPA), comprising experts in public safety and drone technology.<sup>52</sup> The group undertook to develop use cases for using drones in various public safety operations, leveraging expertise from participants in ASTM F38 on UAS, ASTM F32 on SAR, ASTM E54.09 on response robots in homeland security applications, and NFPA® 2400 on public safety. The group is currently inactive.

**Published Standards and Related Documents:** There are many existing industry standards addressing the equipment used by public safety officials, as well as operational best practices, training, and professional qualifications. These include:

- [NFPA 1500™, Standard on Fire Department Occupational Safety, Health, and Wellness Program](#), specifies the minimum requirements for an occupational safety and health program for fire departments or organizations that provide rescue, fire suppression, emergency medical services, hazardous materials mitigation, special operations, and other emergency services.

Published standards and related documents specifically related to the use of UAS by the public safety community include:

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<sup>51</sup> Werner, Charles. "[Public Safety Professionals Need Drones](#)," Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association. June 25, 2018.

<sup>52</sup> "[New Joint Effort Boosts Drone Standards for Public Safety Officials](#)," ASTM News Releases. April 16, 2018.

- [Standards for Public Safety Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems Programs](#), published by APSAC in October 2017
- [ASTM F3379-20, Standard Guide for Training for Public Safety Remote Pilot of Unmanned Aircraft Systems \(UAS\) Endorsement](#) (previously WK61764) **(New)**
- [NFPA® 2400, Standard for Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems \(sUAS\) Used for Public Safety Operations](#). This standard, begun in August 2016 and published in November 2018, covers organizational deployment, professional qualifications, and maintenance. It applies to all public safety departments with sUAS including fire service, law enforcement, and EMS. Risk assessment is mentioned in chapter 4; however, the standard does not address occupational safety. The public input period for the next iteration of NFPA® 2400 closes June 30, 2020. Additional information can be found in section 4.11 of this document.
- [Public Safety UAS Flight Training and Operations](#), DRONERESPONDERS report dated 12/4/19

**In-Development Standards:** No in-development standards have been identified.

**Gap S1: Use of sUAS for Public Safety Operations.** The roadmap version 1.0 gap stated that “Standards are needed on the use of drones by the public safety community.”

**R&D Needed:** No

**Recommendation:** The roadmap version 1.0 recommendation stated “With the publication of [NFPA® 2400, Standard for Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems \(sUAS\) Used for Public Safety Operations](#), complete work on the development of use cases by the ASTM/NFPA JWG.” As noted above, the JWG is now inactive.

**Priority:** High (Tier 2)

**Organization(s):** NFPA, ASTM

**Status of Progress:** Closed

**Update:** APSAC standards, ASTM F3379, NFPA® 2400, NFPA 1500™

## 9.2. Hazardous Materials Incident Response

A dangerous good or hazardous material (HAZMAT)<sup>53</sup> is any solid, liquid, or gas that can harm people, other living organisms, property, or the environment. A HAZMAT may be radioactive, flammable,

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<sup>53</sup> As defined in 49 CFR Part 171.8, a hazardous material means a substance or material that the Secretary of Transportation has determined is capable of posing an unreasonable risk to health, safety, and property when

explosive, toxic, corrosive, biohazardous, an oxidizer, an asphyxiant, a pathogen, an allergen, or may have other characteristics that render it hazardous in specific circumstances.

UAS are becoming a useful tool for responding to HAZMAT incidents. Pilots may be called to respond to large scale HAZMAT incidents (e.g., chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or explosive) and not understand the risks associated with HAZMAT responses, including in both emergency and post-emergency operations.

#### **Published Regulations, Standards, and Related Materials:**

- [ICAO Unmanned Aircraft Systems \(UAS\) for Humanitarian Aid and Emergency Response Guidance U-AID](#)
- FAA regulations on use of UAS to transport HAZMAT are covered under 14 CFR parts 107 and 135
- OSHA has a set of standards and procedures for emergency first responders (Standards - 29 [CFR Part 1910.120](#))
- DOT's Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) has published the [Emergency Response Guidebook \(2016\)](#) for first responders during the initial phase of a transportation incident involving dangerous goods/HAZMAT
- [U.S. Army, Field Manual 3-11.5, Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Decontamination](#) (2006)
- [ASTM F3379-20, Standard Guide for Training for Public Safety Remote Pilot of Unmanned Aircraft Systems \(UAS\) Endorsement](#). The standard (previously WK61764) addresses hazardous materials but not transport, decontamination, or requirements for sensors in terms of sourcing and selecting them.
- [NFPA® 2400, Standard for Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems \(sUAS\) Used for Public Safety Operations](#) – however, this does not cover transportation or decontamination in any detail
- [NFPA 470, Hazardous Materials Standards for Responders](#)
- [NFPA 471, Recommended Practice for Responding to Hazardous Materials Incidents](#)
- [NFPA 472, Standard for Competence of Responders to Hazardous Materials/Weapons of Mass Destruction Incidents](#)
- [NFPA 473, Standard for Competencies for EMS Personnel Responding to Hazardous Materials/Weapons of Mass Destruction Incidents](#)

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transported in commerce, and has designated as hazardous under section 5103 of Federal hazardous materials transportation law (49 U.S.C. 5103). The term includes hazardous substances, hazardous wastes, marine pollutants, elevated temperature materials, materials designated as hazardous in the Hazardous Materials Table (see 49 CFR 172.101), and materials that meet the defining criteria for hazard classes and divisions in 49 CFR Part 173.

- [NFPA 475, Recommended Practice for Organizing, Managing, and Sustaining a Hazardous Materials/Weapons of Mass Destruction Response Program](#)
- [NFPA 1072, Standard for Hazardous Materials/Weapons of Mass Destruction Emergency Response Personnel Professional Qualifications](#)

**In-Development Standards:** None identified.

**Gap S2: Hazardous Materials Response and Transport Using a UAS.** Standards are needed to address the transportation of known or suspected HAZMAT by UAS and UAS being exposed to HAZMAT in a response environment.

**R&D Needed:** Yes. Research to assist policy makers and practitioners in determining the feasibility of using UAS in emergency response situations.

**Recommendation:** Create a standard(s) for UAS HAZMAT emergency response use, addressing the following issues:

- The transport of HAZMAT when using UAS for detection and sample analysis
- The design and manufacturing of ingress protection (IP) ratings when dealing with HAZMAT
- The method of decontamination of a UAS that has been exposed to HAZMAT

**Priority:** Medium

**Organization(s):** ASTM, NFPA, OSHA, U.S. Army

**Status of Progress:** Not Started

**Update:** Numerous standards have been published.

### 9.3. Transport and Post-Crash Procedures Involving Biohazards

A biological hazard, also known as a biohazard, is any infectious substance (Category A - 49 CFR 173.134/173.196) capable of causing permanent disability, life-threatening, or fatal disease in otherwise healthy humans or animals when exposure to them occurs. This can include samples of a microorganism, virus or toxin (from a biological source) that can affect human health. It can also include substances harmful to other animals. Biohazards are a subset of HAZMAT (see section 9.2) but the safety/threat impacts of biohazards are different from HAZMAT, and they are considered a national security issue.

The U.S. regulatory framework pertaining to biohazards transportation such as air transportation requires protection against the risks to life, property, and the environment that are inherent in the transportation of hazardous materials in intrastate, interstate, and foreign commerce.

Biohazards agents are classified for international transportation by UN number (a four digit number) by the United Nations. The U.S. government has adopted a similar nomenclature system, i.e., NA numbers



(NA = North America). The U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) categorizes various diseases in levels of biohazards, with Level 1 being minimum risk and Level 4 the extreme risk. CDC issues procedures, containments, and mitigations needed to handle biohazards. While the CDC is not an aviation entity, its procedures, regulations, and mandates along with other government entities' requirements are still applicable to aviation, if the biohazards are transported through air transportation.

There is a lack of knowledge in compliance and enforcement relating to the transport of biohazards and applicable procedures and measures required to contain the biohazards during transport and after the crash of an unmanned aircraft (UA). This has implications in terms of both safety and national security aspects. For example, the transportation of biohazards requires special considerations and approvals of an aircraft and UA at the design and construction phase and, during operations, in terms of communicating the presence of hazardous materials, handling, packaging, and storing the hazardous materials, maintenance of the UAS, etc.

When biohazards are transported using an aircraft in the United States, the operator of that aircraft is required to meet all the applicable transportation regulations, mandates, policies, guidance, standards, etc., of the United Nations World Health Organization, PHMSA which is part of DOT, FAA, DOD, CDC, USDA, DHS, U.S. Postal Service (USPS), ICAO and other agencies/entities. ICAO has developed guidance material applying in circumstances when a State has determined that the use of UA to transport dangerous goods for humanitarian aid and emergency response is appropriate(see ICAO U-AID guidance material.<sup>54</sup>

Today, UAS are used to support emergency response and to transport medical supplies and biohazards such as blood, human organs, etc. While the rapidly growing deployment of UAS technology has tremendous benefits to society, the potential for negligence, non-compliance and misuse of this technology related to transportation of biohazards poses significant safety and national security challenges. Some of the challenges are biohazards identification and threat discrimination, such as knowing who is flying a UAS, and what they are transporting. Information about onboard biohazards and the UAS flight path and destination will assist regulators and enforcement agencies (PHMSA, FAA, CDC, USDA, DHS, DOJ, DOD, ICAO, etc.) in understanding a UAS pilot's intent, and are critical to safety and threat assessment and appropriate mitigations/responses. See also section 9.9 of this roadmap.

Collaboration between regulators, enforcement agencies, and departments both domestic and international regarding transportation of biohazards and potential issues that may arise during flight and in post-crash events will lead to the safest and most efficient aviation system in the world.

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<sup>54</sup> ICAO Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) for Humanitarian Aid and Emergency Response Guidance U-AID <https://www.icao.int/safety/UA/UAID/Documents/ICAO%20U-AID%20Guidance%20Material.pdf>

State, city, local, and tribal governments may have additional requirements related to air transportation of biohazards using UAS, and the operators and pilots responsible to meet those requirements, in addition to the U.S. government regulations and mandates.

**Published Standards and Related Materials:** While not UAS-specific, a comprehensive list of published biohazards standards can be found in the [UASSC Reference Document](#).

**In-Development Standards:** While not specific to UAS transport or post-crash events involving biohazards, the following general aviation standards may be relevant:

SAE International:

- [AC-9M Cabin Air Measurement Committee](#)
  - [AS6923, Portable devices for measuring air contamination on aircraft](#)
- [AC-9 Aircraft Environmental Systems Committee](#)
- AIR1266B, Fault Isolation in Environmental Controls Systems of Commercial Transports
- AIR1539C, Environmental Control System Contamination
- AIR1609B, Aircraft Humidification
- AIR1811B, Liquid Cooling Systems
- AIR4766/2A, Airborne Chemicals in Aircraft Cabins
- AIR5744, Aircraft Thermal Management System Engineering
- AIR64C, Electrical and Electronic Equipment Cooling in Commercial Transports
- ARP1270C, Aircraft Cabin Pressurization Criteria
- ARP292D, Environmental Control Systems for Helicopters
- ARP5743, Aircraft Galley Refrigeration Equipment Installation And Integration Recommendations
- ARP89E, Aircraft Compartment Automatic Temperature Control Systems

**Gap S3: Transport and Post-Crash Procedures Involving Biohazards.** No published or in-development standards have been identified that address UAS transport of biohazards and associated post-crash procedures and precautions.

**R&D Needed:** Yes

**Recommendation:**

- 1) Write standards to address UAS transportation of biohazards and post-crash procedures and containments
- 2) Encourage the development of standards to address and accommodate transport of biohazards and post-crash procedures and containments that cannot meet the current regulatory requirements and standards of manned aviation

**Priority:** High (Tier 3)

**Organization(s):** UN, WHO, ICAO, DOD, DHS, CDC, USDA, NIH, NFPA, SAE

**Status of Progress:** Unknown

**Update:** None provided at this time.

## 9.4. Forensic Investigations Photogrammetry

The use of sUAS by public safety agencies to photograph/document incident scenes has become one of the most popular uses for this technology. In some cases, such as natural disasters, the video/ photographs alone may provide sufficient documentation of the scene. In other cases, the imagery is used for “photogrammetry,” which is defined as the “science of gathering dimensions from photographs.”<sup>55</sup> The input to photogrammetry is the aerial photographs, and the output is typically a map, a drawing, a measurement, or a 3D model of some real-world object or scene. To do this, multiple overlapping photos of the ground are taken as the aircraft flies along a flight path. These are then processed by a computer to map the scene, provide measurements, or generate the 3D model.

Forensic investigations may include transportation accident reconstruction (motor vehicle/aircraft/rail) or crime scenes. In forensic investigations, the location of key pieces of evidence are located and measured as part of incident scene documentation. This is referred to as “mapping” the scene.

As an example, in traditional vehicular crash scene reconstruction, mapping involves using a surveyor’s instrument (total station) to physically measure key elements of the crash scene to determine the mechanics and, ultimately, the cause of the crash. This is a laborious, time-consuming process. In most cases, for crashes involving death or serious injury, the roadway remains closed for hours while specially trained and equipped officers take the required measurements and photographs. Many studies have been conducted that show the economic costs of shutting down roadways, in particular interstate highways, not to mention the issue of inconveniencing the motorists. In this application, sUAS are used to photograph the crash scene. The photographs are then processed by a computer program that generates a geo-referenced 3D model and diagram that assures both relative and absolute positional accuracy.<sup>56</sup>

The accuracy of evidence produced through this method of investigation is critical because of the potential for criminal prosecution or other enforcement action against the at-fault driver, or for

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<sup>55</sup> Oklahoma v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112073 (N.D. Okla. Aug. 12, 2009)

<sup>56</sup> The [Geographic Information Technology Training Alliance](#) defines these terms as follows: “Positional Relative Accuracy as the measure of how objects are positioned relative to each other. It is always illustrated as (+ or -) meter or feet or inch. ... Positional Absolute Accuracy as the indicator or measure of how a spatial objects is accurately positioned on the map with respect to its true position on the ground, within an absolute reference frame such as UTM coordinate system.”

evidence in a civil action. In both cases, the measurements and photographs taken at the scene must be accurate to withstand the scrutiny of the court.

There are several tests for the admissibility of scientific evidence at trial, including the Frye Standard and the Daubert Standard. Factors that may be considered in determining the validity of the scientific evidence include the existence and maintenance of standards controlling the drone's operation. The use of UAS are the "least mature and thus least established among the considered measurement techniques, regarding court acceptance." (Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Lab, 2017)

Thus, the issue here is the lack of existing standards that outline the accuracy required of the payloads/sensors used to capture the data and the programs used for post-processing to assure admissibility in court.

#### **Published Standards and Related Materials:**

- [Standards for Public Safety Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems Programs](#), published by APSAC in October 2017. These are operational standards for the use of sUAS, but they do not address technical standards for sensors or post-processing computer programs.
- Positional Accuracy Standards, published by the American Society for Photogrammetry and Remote Sensing (ASPRS) in November, 2014.
- Sensor Web Enablement (SWE) Standards (summary descriptions of the following SWE standards are found [here](#)):
  - [OGC Sensor Model Language \(SensorML\)](#)
  - [OGC Sensor Observation Service \(SOS\)](#)
  - [OGC Sensor Planning Service \(SPS\)](#)
  - [OGC Observations & Measurements \(O&M\)](#)
- [OGC SensorThings API Part 1: Sensing \(v1\)](#)
- [OGC Web Processing Service](#) – allows the insertion of processing algorithms on board the UAV or anywhere in a workflow to support the processing of sensor observations to support the end user, or the next application in a workflow
- [OGC Wide Area Motion Imagery \(WAMI\) Best Practice](#) – this OGC Best Practice recommends a set of Web service interfaces for the dissemination of Wide Area Motion Imagery (WAMI) products
- [OGC Geography Markup Language \(GML\) — Extended schemas and encoding rules \(v3.3\)](#)
- [OGC KML 2.3 \(v1\)](#)
- [OGC OpenGIS Web Map Server Implementation Specification \(v1.3\)](#)
- [OGC OpenGIS Web Map Tile Service Implementation Standard \(v1\)](#)
- [OGC Web Coverage Service \(WCS\) 2.0 Interface Standard \(v2\)](#)
- [OGC LAS](#) – is an OGC Community Standard representing a standardized file format for the interchange of 3D point cloud data between data users

- [OGC GeoTIFF \(v1.1\)](#). Geostationary Earth Orbit Tagged Image File Format (GeoTIFF) is used throughout the geospatial and earth science communities to share geographic image data. GeoTIFF was adopted as an OGC standard in 2019.
- US DOJ Community Policing & Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Guidelines to Enhance Community Trust
- [National Institute of Justice \(NIJ\) Considerations and Recommendations for Implementing an Unmanned Aircraft Systems \(UAS\) Program, NCJ 250283](#)
- [ASTM Committee E30 on Forensic Sciences](#) has a portfolio of some 62 published standards maintained by 3 technical subcommittees. These standards relate to all aspects of forensic sciences, including criminalistics, questioned documents, forensic engineering, fire debris analysis, drug testing analysis, and collection and preservation of physical evidence. The most relevant work related to this roadmap issue is within [E30.12 Digital and Multimedia Evidence](#).
- [NFPA® 2400, Standard for Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems \(sUAS\) Used for Public Safety Operations](#). The NFPA has developed operational standards similar to APSAC, but they are not designed to address the required technical standards.

#### In-Development Standards:

- OGC is advancing best practices through its [UxS DWG](#) and through a series of ongoing interoperability pilot activities.
- OGC is also developing standard quality measures to describe the accuracy of the location of images collected from overhead as well as a means to describe the color of the pixels in the images in a consistent way.

**Gap S4: Forensic Investigations Photogrammetry.** Standards are needed for UAS sensors used to collect digital media evidence. The equipment used to capture data needs to be able to survive legal scrutiny. Standards are also needed for computer programs performing post-processing of digital media evidence. Processing of the data is also crucial to introducing evidence into trial.

**R&D Needed:** Yes. R&D will be needed to develop the technical standards to meet legal requirements for the admissibility of digital media evidence into court proceedings.

**Recommendation:** Develop standards for UAS sensors used to collect digital media evidence and for computer programs performing post-processing of digital media evidence. These standards should take into account data, security, and accountability.

**Priority:** Medium

**Organization(s):** OGC

**Status of Progress:** Green

**Update:** The OGC GeoTIFF standard was adopted as an OGC standard in 2019, and best practices are in development in OGC UxS DWG.

## 9.5. Payload Interface and Control for Public Safety Operations

In an examination of UAS utilization among public safety / law enforcement users, a common concern that emerges is how to find appropriate aircraft and payloads for a particular mission. Currently, most public safety drone operators rely on consumer-grade equipment since the capability and price is more affordable. However, the market for these aircraft is very different than the public safety market, and performance/mission ops compromises are typical. Consumer-grade drones are sold with a limited selection of payload options – usually Electro-Optical/Infra-red (EO/IR) cameras – that typically cannot be interchanged or upgraded, meaning that the failure of a payload may take the drone system out of service. EO/IR payloads have obvious uses for government operators, but there are many more mission scenarios that cannot be fulfilled with only a camera. Audio systems, grappling payloads, CBRNE detection, and multispectral imaging are some examples of payloads that have utility within the public safety community. Additionally, data processing support for object detection and tracking as well as communications needs can be handled using interchangeable payloads.

The public safety community is in need of more rigid design requirements to foster cross-agency use and collaboration, as well as generating an interest among the UAS development community to provide mission-specific solutions for public safety. The specialized payloads needed by public safety UAS operators are unique to the community and do not appear in other operational sectors, and the utilization of the aircraft cross-agency with a selection of payloads is also unique. Additionally, communications requirements for fire, public safety, and law enforcement are specific to the users and mission, and are generally not available to the public.

Payloads that are dropped during flight also represent a design consideration for mounting that should be defined for interchangeability. With a strong interest in droppable payloads from the commercial sector, these standards may also apply to delivery drones. Public safety payloads would include items such as medical supplies, sustenance, and equipment. Operators that are not concerned about the aircraft, considering it only serves as a means of delivering a product, may utilize user designed/installed payload drop mechanisms or third-party mechanisms designed for the purpose of dropping a payload.

Current public safety users may have operational needs for payload control, thereby using a UAS platform outside of the manufacturer's design specifications in order to accomplish payload attachment with limited control of the payload. There are minimal third-party payload control options on the market designed for specific UAS platforms. These third-party options may not have been designed in partnership with the UAS platform manufacturer, thereby limiting full integration with the UAS and resulting in the absence of safety features. It is imperative that payload control mechanisms contain safety features that would prevent accidental payload release, etc. Additionally, payload control mechanisms designed without full integration with the UAS manufacturer may lead to aircraft weight and balance (W&B) and UAS performance issues, unknown to the end user.

To facilitate platform agnostic payloads, mechanical and electrical interface standards should be developed for all payloads, including those that are dropped. These standards will, for the first time, create a market for payloads without reference to a particular aircraft design. Operators will then be able to use any aircraft available for any payload, provided both conform to the mechanical, electrical, and software standards for communications. As payloads evolve, aircraft usage will be extended because of the platform agnostic design of the system. Figure 5 shows a diagram of the proposed architecture.




Figure 5: Public Safety UAS Architecture. Used with the permission of Kevin Kochersberger

**Published Standards:** There are currently no published standards for UAS payloads in public safety operations. The FAA has used various mechanisms to encourage standards development, such as the designation of test sites across the country, pathfinder projects, and integration pilot programs (IPP) that examine future use cases under controlled conditions. Many of these programs could benefit from the integration of public safety drone use cases into the studies. This work will provide guidance to the FAA to help with final rulemaking.

**In-Development Standards:** ASTM E54.09 has several proposed new standards pertaining to the system-level performance of drones in public safety applications. However, these standards will not address aircraft/payload compatibility or manufacturing standards that are needed to support the public safety drone community. A related work item concerning package delivery in development in ASTM F38.02 is [ASTM WK62344, Revision of F3196 - 17 Standard Practice for Seeking Approval for Extended Visual Line of Sight \(EVLLOS\) or Beyond Visual Line of Sight \(BVLOS\) Small Unmanned Aircraft System \(sUAS\) Operations](#).

Also in development are:

- [IEEE P1937.1, Standard Interface Requirements and Performance Characteristics for Payload Devices in Drones](#)

- ISO/WD 24354, General requirements for civil small and light UAS payload interface

**Gap S5: Payload Interface and Control for Public Safety Operations.** Standards are needed for public safety UAS payload interfaces including:

- Hardware
- Electrical connections (power and communications)
- Software communications protocols

Additional standards development may be required to define location, archiving, and broadcast of information which will grow in need as data analytics plays a larger role in public safety missions.

There currently are no published standards that define the expected capabilities, performance, or control of sUAS payload drop mechanisms.

**R&D Needed:** Yes. Need to examine available options in universal payload mounting as well as electrical connections and communications. Stakeholders including end users and manufacturers of drones should be engaged to contribute to the process of defining acceptable standards. Existing payload drop and control systems should be researched with attention to weight, degree of operator control, and interoperability considered in defining standards that are useful for both public safety and commercial operators.

**Recommendation:** Develop standards for the UAS-to-payload interface, which includes hardware mounting, electrical connections, and software message sets. Develop a standard for a UAS payload drop control mechanism that includes weight, control, safety and risk metrics, and remote status reporting.

**Priority:** High (Tier 3)

**Organization(s):** ASTM, DOJ, NFPA, DHS, NIST, IEEE, ISO

**Status of Progress:** Green

**Update:** IEEE P1937.1, ISO/WD 24354

## 9.6. Search and Rescue (SAR)

### 9.6.1. sUAS Infrared (IR) Camera Sensor Capabilities

sUAS are becoming a primary tool for Search And Rescue (SAR) missions. Specific sensor packages are required to ensure sUAS are properly equipped to fulfill the mission objectives. Although sUAS may be flown up to an altitude of 400' AGL without additional waivers from the FAA, the camera sensors must be capable of providing needed imagery definition [imagery definition here means whether it is HD or



Ultra HD (UHD) or Super Ultra HD (SUHD)] that would allow a person to accurately identify an individual in the frame.

There are several forward-looking infrared (IR) cameras that are being fitted to UAS platforms by third parties. These cameras may not have the ability to be fully controlled by the remote pilot in command (RPIC) or sensor or payload operator. Additionally, these IR cameras may not have the necessary screen resolution and/or thermal resolution to accurately identify the missing person(s). Public safety entities have purchased IR cameras only to determine that the IR capabilities will not allow them to fulfill the operational objectives due to the camera's limited performance capabilities. Public safety IR cameras should include user controls for thermal resolution, radiometric measurement, temperature measurement, etc.

Infrared imagery requirements for the SAR missions differ from IR requirements for structural fires. Structural fires may simply require identification of thermal differences to identify lateral and/or vertical fire spread. Public safety organizations may or may not desire radiometric capabilities, etc. The screen and thermal resolution requirement to identify fire spread is lower than what would be needed to identify a person in a SAR mission.

**Published Standards:** No UAS standards in development specific to this topic have been identified. With respect to SAR standardization generally, ASTM F32 and its subcommittees cover equipment, testing, and maintenance (F32.01); management and operations (F32.02); and personnel, training, and education (F32.03).

**In-Development Standards:** ASTM E54.09 work items include:

- WK58928 Evaluating Aerial Response Robot Sensing: Thermal Image Acuity
- WK58929 Evaluating Aerial Response Robot Sensing: Thermal Dynamic Range
- WK58930 Evaluating Aerial Response Robot Sensing: Latency of Video, Audio, and Control

**Gap S6: sUAS Forward-Looking Infrared (IR) Camera Sensor Capabilities.** UAS standards are needed for IR camera sensor capabilities. A single standard could be developed to ensure IR technology meets the needs of public safety missions, which would be efficient and would ensure an organization purchases a single camera to meet operational objectives.

**R&D Needed:** Yes. R&D (validation/testing) is needed to identify IR camera sensor sensitivity, radiometric capabilities, zoom, and clarity of imagery for identification of a person/object for use in public safety/SAR missions.

**Recommendation:** Complete work on standards in development related to IR camera sensor specifications for use in public safety and SAR missions.

**Priority:** Medium

**Organization(s):** NIST, NFPA, ASTM

**Status of Progress:** Green

**Update:** ASTM E54.09

## 9.6.2. sUAS Automated Missions during Emergency Response

UAS that allow the public safety RPIC and/or sensor operator to pre-program waypoints, sensor orientation, sensor trigger points, altitudes, etc., ensure that public safety/emergency response missions are completed in the most timely and efficient manner, directly improving outcomes.

For example, wide area search and rescue (SAR) missions, in wilderness and urban environments, are normally conducted via a grid pattern by air or ground assets. Although a RPIC can manually control a UAS for wide area SAR missions, there may well be a loss of efficiency and incident mitigation due to missed search areas or redundancy in areas covered. Small area searches may provide adequate landmarks which may be used as reference points for manually flown SAR missions. The presence and use of adequate landmarks throughout the operational area could mitigate redundancy of flight paths. Manually flown SAR missions would be most applicable when the victim's general location is known.

While professional- or survey-grade UAS exist that have these capabilities, many public safety agencies use consumer-grade UAS as a low-cost alternative to more expensive systems. Many consumer-grade systems are manufactured to evade restrictions under the ITAR, EAR and the U.S. Import Munitions List while having maximum market coverage. The FAA reports that 93% of all sUAS are imported consumer-grade systems (see NPRM for RID).

**Published Standards:** With respect to SAR standardization generally, ASTM F32 and its subcommittees cover equipment, testing, and maintenance (F32.01); management and operations (F32.02); and personnel, training, and education (F32.03). ASTM F38.01 has published [F3201-16, Standard Practice for Ensuring Dependability of Software Used in Unmanned Aircraft Systems \(UAS\)](#). RTCA has published DO-178 and DO-278. NIST has published several prototype standards for evaluating aerial response robots (aka UAS). OGC has published a Wide Area Motion Imagery (WAMI) Best Practice that will likely mature into a full standard. It includes defined coverage area, automated optical inspection (AOI) selection, where each image in video is spatially / temporally related to the next -- for surveillance and wide area incident ops.

### **In-Development Standards:**

- ASTM F32
- ASTM F38.01: [WK68098, Standard Practice for Ensuring Dependability of Software Used in Unmanned Aircraft Systems \(UAS\)](#), is a work item revision to existing standard F3201-16.
- ASTM E54.09 covers response robots, including UAS, and has several standards in development, including [WK58938, Evaluating Aerial Response Robot Situational Awareness: Map Wide Areas \(Stitched Images\)](#)
- RTCA SC-240/EUROCAE WG-117

**Gap S7: Need for Command and Control Software Specifications for Automated Missions during Emergency Response.** While standards exist for software specifications to complete automated missions, there remains a need to encourage the user community to purchase professional grade equipment that is compliant with these standards, rather than using low-cost, consumer grade equipment.

**R&D Needed:** No.

**Recommendation:** Encourage UAS OEMs to adopt existing standards. Encourage public safety agencies to consider equipment that is compliant with industry standards, and NIST/FEMA guidelines, prior to acquiring UAS. See section 7.6 on data handling and processing and 6.4.4 on software considerations and approval.

**Priority:** Low

**Organization(s):** NIST, NFPA, ASTM, RTCA, EUROCAE, OGC, UAS OEMs, public safety agencies/organizations

**Status of Progress:** Green

**Update:**

- RTCA DO-178, DO-278; RTCA SC-240/EUROCAE WG-117
- ASTM F32; ASTM F38: F3201, WK68098; ASTM E54: WK58938
- Standards exist for software specifications to complete automated missions. Other standards are under development.

## 9.7. Response Robots

In response to various presidential policy directives on national preparedness, NIST, with support from the DHS and others, has been working to develop a [comprehensive suite of standard test methods](#) and performance metrics to quantify key capabilities for robots used in emergency response operations. While the project applies to remotely operated ground, aquatic, and aerial systems, the most recent U.S. presidential directive in 2017 highlighted the urgency of standards development for sUAS. Accordingly, the NIST project addresses how to measure and compare sUAS capabilities and remote pilot proficiencies. The standardized test methods resulting from these efforts will enable users to generate performance data to evaluate airworthiness, maneuvering, sensing, payload functionality, etc. This data can be used to inform user community purchasing decisions, develop training programs, and set thresholds for remote pilot proficiency. NIST and its associates in the project are developing a usage guide.

**Published Standards:** The test methods resulting from the NIST R&D are being standardized through ASTM Committee E54 on Homeland Security Applications, Subcommittee E54.09 Response Robots. UAS-specific published standards include:

- [ASTM E2521-16, Standard Terminology for Evaluating Response Robot Capabilities](#)
- ASTM E2854 – 12, Standard Test Method for Evaluating Emergency Response Robot Capabilities: Radio Communication: Line-of-Sight Range
- ASTM E2855 – 12, Standard Test Method for Evaluating Emergency Response Robot Capabilities: Radio Communication: Non-Line-of-Sight Range

In addition, the following ASTM F38 standard references the E54.09 test methods:

- [ASTM F3379-20, Standard Guide for Training for Public Safety Remote Pilot of Unmanned Aircraft Systems \(UAS\) Endorsement](#)

**In-Development Standards:** UAS-specific in-development standards in [ASTM E54.09](#) include:

- [ASTM WK58677, Evaluating Aerial Response Robot Sensing: Visual Image Acuity](#)
- [ASTM WK58925, Evaluating Aerial Response Robot Sensing: Visual Color Acuity](#)
- [ASTM WK58926, Evaluating Aerial Response Robot Sensing: Visual Dynamic Range](#)
- [ASTM WK58927, Evaluating Aerial Response Robot Sensing: Audio Speech Acuity](#)
- [ASTM WK58928, Evaluating Aerial Response Robot Sensing: Thermal Image Acuity](#)
- [ASTM WK58929, Evaluating Aerial Response Robot Sensing: Thermal Dynamic Range](#)
- [ASTM WK58930, Evaluating Aerial Response Robot Sensing: Latency of Video, Audio, and Control](#)
- [ASTM WK58931, Evaluating Aerial Response Robot Maneuvering: Maintain Position and Orientation](#)
- [ASTM WK58932, Evaluating Aerial Response Robot Maneuvering: Orbit a Point](#)
- [ASTM WK58933, Evaluating Aerial Response Robot Maneuvering: Avoid Static Obstacles](#)
- [ASTM WK58934, Evaluating Aerial Response Robot Maneuvering: Pass Through Openings](#)
- [ASTM WK58935, Evaluating Aerial Response Robot Maneuvering: Land Accurately \(Vertical\)](#)
- [ASTM WK58936, Evaluating Aerial Response Robot Situational Awareness: Identify Objects \(Point and Zoom Cameras\)](#)
- [ASTM WK58937, Evaluating Aerial Response Robot Situational Awareness: Inspect Static Objects](#)
- [ASTM WK58938, Evaluating Aerial Response Robot Situational Awareness: Map Wide Areas \(Stitched Images\)](#)
- [ASTM WK58939, Evaluating Aerial Response Robot Energy/Power: Endurance Range and Duration](#)
- [ASTM WK58940, Evaluating Aerial Response Robot Energy/Power: Endurance Dwell Time](#)
- [ASTM WK58941, Evaluating Aerial Response Robot Radio Communications Range: Non Line of Sight](#)
- [ASTM WK58942, Evaluating Aerial Response Robot Radio Communication Range : Line of Sight](#)
- [ASTM WK58943, Evaluating Aerial Response Robot Safety: Lights and Sounds](#)

NFPA is adopting the NIST and ASTM E54.09 draft standard test methods as measures of operator proficiency for the JPRs spelled out in [NFPA® 2400, Standard for Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems \(sUAS\) Used for Public Safety Operations](#).

In addition, ASTM F38 has an accelerated work item which will specify performance-based test methods for UAS: [ASTM WK70877, New Practice for Showing Durability and Reliability Means of Compliance for Unmanned Aircraft Systems](#).

**Gap S8: UAS Response Robots.** There is a need for standardized test methods and performance metrics to quantify key capabilities of sUAS robots used in emergency response operations and remote pilot proficiencies.

**R&D Needed:** Yes

**Recommendation:** Complete work on UAS response robot standards in development in [ASTM E54.09](#) and reference them in [NFPA® 2400, Standard for Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems \(sUAS\) Used for Public Safety Operations](#)

**Priority:** Medium

**Organization(s):** NIST, ASTM E54.09, NFPA, DHS

**Status of Progress:** Green

**Update:** ASTM E54.09, ASTM F38: ASTM WK70877, NFPA® 2400

## 9.8. Public Safety Tactical Operations

### Law Enforcement Tactical Operations

Like most law enforcement operations, tactical situations can involve an endless number of scenarios and variables. However, two of the most common, and similar in many respects, involve the service of high-risk arrest and search warrants and barricaded subjects. One key difference is that there usually is time to plan for service of a warrant, while barricaded subjects evolve from some type of event that leads to a subject(s) refusing to surrender and in some cases holding hostages. These exigent types of events where time for planning is not available can result from such things as domestic disputes, a mental health crisis, or the escape from a crime scene that is stopped by arriving officers. In some cases, an attempted warrant service may result in a barricaded suspect.

In both cases, warrant service and barricade, there are common factors. First, the location of the event is most likely fixed; it is not a mobile situation. Second, such incidents many occur during hours of darkness. Third, access to the location of the event is controlled by police with an inner perimeter where only police, usually tactical officers, are permitted and an outer perimeter within which non-involved

people are evacuated, or told to shelter in place. No one, except authorized personnel, is allowed to enter the perimeter until the incident is resolved.

High-risk warrant service includes those incidents where there are multiple suspects, they are known to be armed, they have used or threatened violence in the past, and/or there is the possibility of the destruction of evidence. Absent exigent circumstances, these operations may be conducted in the early morning hours when people, including suspects, are asleep, giving officers the benefit of surprise. A sUAS can be used to obtain situational awareness of the location prior to entry, including access and escape points (doors and windows), animals that could alert the suspect of approaching officers, trip hazards, stairs, suspect(s)/others moving about inside the building, lighting (interior and exterior), etc. With this intelligence, officers can make an approach and entry in a much more efficient and safe manner. During the entry phase, the sUAS can be put into a position above the location to enable the incident commander (IC) to monitor the entire situation from an aerial vantage point. Should the suspect(s) escape, the sUAS can be used to track and apprehend them.

For a barricaded suspect, the intelligence gathering is the same, in particular the location of the suspect(s) inside the building, location of hostages, weapons, etc. These can be extended operations as negotiators attempt to resolve the situation by talking to the suspect. During negotiations, the sUAS can remain overhead giving the IC constant situational awareness.

### **Fire/Rescue Special Operations**

Specialized rescue operations in the fire/rescue service are commonly referred to as “very high risk - low frequency” incidents. Such incidents may include HAZMAT, bombs/suspicious packages, high-angle rescue, structural collapse, etc. Technical rescue incidents can occur in any environment, any location, and during any time of day or night. These incidents typically involve lots of rescue personnel and many specialized apparatus and equipment. The use of UAS to gain a “bird’s eye view” of an incident can provide responders with critical information for determining the strategies, tactics, and resources needed to mitigate an incident.

In most of these situations, the area surrounding the incident is secured by emergency responders (fire/rescue and/or law enforcement). Personnel entering or exiting the operational area are controlled and monitored. Areas surrounding an incident involving HAZMAT, bombs/suspicious packages, or other dangerous situations are usually evacuated and/or persons are protected in place. Only authorized persons involved in the incident are allowed in the operational area until the operation has concluded.

HAZMAT incidents are arguably one of the most challenging uses of UAS in the public safety arena. There is potential for unknowingly flying into a combustible, flammable, corrosive, or other austere environment. There is also potential for aerosolizing or other spreading of a product with the UAS rotor wash. In many cases, however, the use of UAS during the early stages of a HAZMAT incident could provide valuable information to the IC and the HAZMAT team.

It is important that policies, standards, rules, etc., have provisions in place to allow emergency response personnel with the ability to transport HAZMAT during these incidents. At times there may be a need to

package and transport a sample of the suspected HAZMAT to another controlled location within the operational area via UAS so it can be tested or further packaged for transportation to a lab, etc. This ability is currently not allowed by FAA regulations. See also section 9.2 on Hazardous Materials Incident Response and Transport.

Bomb/suspicious package incidents create their own issues regarding UAS use. However, they are similar in nature to a HAZMAT incident. The operational area is typically secured in the same manner and persons are either evacuated or protected in place, thus creating a safe area for UAS operations.

Both HAZMAT and bomb/suspicious package incidents require lengthy processes and preparations prior to sending personnel into the immediate area to begin reconnaissance or actual situation mitigation tasks. The use of UAS to provide critical information to the IC and special ops teams during this time is paramount.

HAZMAT, bomb/suspicious package incidents, certain law enforcement incidents (active shooter, barricaded subject, etc.), and various other emergency situations, create the need for flying the UAS in an area where it is dangerous to have the RPIC or visual observer (VO) within eyesight of the aircraft. The RPIC or VO cannot be placed into a position to see the UAS because of the potential to be in close proximity to the bomb/IED, HAZMAT, or nefarious actors, any of which could be a deadly location for these persons to be in. The ability of low altitude/close proximity BVLOS operations (i.e., operations at roof/tree top level, behind a building or wood line, etc.) would allow emergency services UAS to provide critical information to the IC or other critical decision makers in their efforts to mitigate a favorable of a given incident.

#### **Published Standards and Other Documents:**

- [Standards for Public Safety Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems Programs](#), published by APSAC in October 2017. These are operational standards for the use of sUAS and provide adequate guidance for tactical operations.
- [ASTM F3379-20, Standard Guide for Training for Public Safety Remote Pilot of Unmanned Aircraft Systems \(UAS\) Endorsement](#)
- [NFPA® 2400, Standard for Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems \(sUAS\) Used for Public Safety Operations](#). The NFPA has developed operational standards similar to APSAC, that are designed to address tactical operations.
- *Standard Test Methods for Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems and Standard Test Methods for Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, Public Safety Maneuvering with Payloads*, published by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), 2019. NIST developed these test methods standards to fill the gap left by Part 107, pilot certification, that has no practical skills assessment and to assist public safety agencies in evaluating UAS suitability to perform identified missions.

**In-Development Standards:** None identified.

No general standards gap on tactical operations has been identified.

### **Actively Tethered UAS**

To support public safety tactical operations, Congress, in the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018, established a separate class of small UAS and mandated specific operating rules for use by public (government) agencies. The newly defined systems are called “*Actively Tethered Unmanned Aircraft Systems*.” As defined in the Act, the term “actively tethered unmanned aircraft system” means an unmanned aircraft system in which the unmanned aircraft component weighs 4.4 pounds or less, including payload, but not including the tether. The aircraft is physically attached to a ground station with a taut, appropriately load-rated tether that provides continuous power to the unmanned aircraft and is unlikely to be separated from the unmanned aircraft; and is controlled and retrieved by such ground station through physical manipulation of the tether.

Public actively tethered unmanned aircraft systems may be operated:

- Without any requirement to obtain a certificate of authorization, certificate of waiver, or other approval by the FAA.
- Without requiring airman certification.
- Operated at an altitude of less than 150 feet above ground level.
- Within class G airspace; or at or below the ceiling depicted on the FAA’s published UAS facility maps for class B, C, D, or E surface area airspace.
- Not flown directly over non-participating persons.
- Operated within visual line of sight of the operator.
- Operated in a manner that does not interfere with and gives way to any other aircraft.

**Published Standards:** No published standards have been identified specifically related to tethered UAS operation in the public safety community.

### **In-Development Standards:**

- ISO/WD 24356, *General requirements for tethered unmanned aircraft system*
- ISO/DIS 21384-3, *Unmanned aircraft systems -- Part 3: Operational procedures*

**New Gap S10: Use of Tethered UAS for Public Safety Operations.** Training and operational standards are needed on the use of Actively Tethered sUAS by public safety agencies.

**R&D Needed:** Yes

**Recommendation:** Develop standards for Actively Tethered Public Safety sUAS operations

**Priority:** Medium

**Organization(s):** ISO, NFPA, APSAC, ASTM



## 9.9. UAS Detection and Mitigation

### 9.9.1. UAS Detection

The most common drone detection tools include ground-based radio-frequency detection, acoustic detection, radar, electro-optical, and infra-red technology. In the absence of performance standards for UAS detection, agencies that need situational awareness of intruders within their operational airspace cannot judge which systems are effective. This risks not only wasting money, but providing an inaccurate picture of risk exposure.

Counter-UAS (C-UAS) activities, as defined by the 2018 Preventing Emerging Threats Act established in Division H, § 1601 of the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018, that would otherwise violate certain federal criminal laws are expressly authorized only for a few specific agencies within the federal government, as noted in section 9.9.2. However, many other entities are interested in being aware of drone operations within their operational airspace, even if mitigation is not possible. Examples include airports and other critical infrastructure, as well as public safety agencies involved in search, recovery, disaster response, or law enforcement missions.

It is recommended that, prior to the testing, acquisition, installation, or use of UAS detection and/or mitigation systems, entities seek the advice of counsel experienced with both federal and state criminal, surveillance, and communications laws.

**Published Standards:** No published standards have been identified.

**In-Development Standards:** RTCA SC-238, Counter UAS special committee, is developing a consensus standard that details detection and mitigation standards. This committee will operate as a joint committee with EUROCAE Working Group (WG) 115, Counter UAS (C-UAS). RTCA SC-238 and EUROCAE WG 115 are developing consensus documents that detail detection and mitigation performance standards for non-cooperative targets, their interoperability, and interfaces with stakeholders in the C-UAS domain, such as airports, air navigation service providers, surveillance systems manufacturers, law enforcement, pilots, etc.

**New Gap S11: UAS Detection.** Standards are needed for the performance of UAS detection systems that might be used by operators of critical infrastructure or public safety agencies.

Given the importance of drone detection capabilities, standards must be developed for user identification, design, performance, safety, and operations. User identification ensures accountability and provides a necessary tool to public safety officials and operators of critical infrastructure. Design, performance, and safety standards can ensure that risk management decisions are based on reliable and valid data.

A comprehensive evaluation template for testing UAS detection systems is needed to: (1) identify current capabilities and anticipated advancement for UAS technologies and (2) forecast trends in the

UAS burgeoning market. The test and evaluation (T&E) community must have clear guidance and a framework to test and evaluate the needs of the end user.

**R&D Needed:** Yes

**Recommendation:** Encourage the development of detection standards addressing user identification, design, performance, safety, operational aspects, and various available technological methods for detecting UAS. For example, RF detection based systems will follow a different standards protocol than electro-optical or infra-red based systems.

**Priority:** High (Tier 1)

**Organization(s):** DOD, DHS, DOJ, DOE, FCC, NTIA, EUROCAE, RTCA

## 9.9.2. UAS Mitigation

Per the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018, the term counter-UAS (C-UAS) system means a system or device capable of lawfully and safely disabling, disrupting, or seizing control of an unmanned aircraft or unmanned aircraft system. Only specific U.S. governmental agencies and departments have been expressly authorized to use counter-UAS systems.

With the widespread use of UAS operations comes negligent, inappropriate, and illegal use by those who either disregard applicable aviation regulations or remain unaware of them, potentially compromising national security, the safety of the national airspace system (NAS) and critical infrastructure, and causing other security vulnerabilities.

C-UAS systems are new, complex, and continue to evolve. The most popular drone detection techniques are radar, RF detection, electro-optical (EO), and infra-red (IR). Standards gaps for detection of UAS are discussed in the prior section. Mitigation techniques, distinct from detection capabilities, include kinetic methods such as nets, projectiles, and trained animals, or non-kinetic, such as RF jamming, GNSS jamming, or signal substitution. Other techniques are considered to be non-kinetic with kinetic effect, such as lasers and high-powered microwave. A lack of common standards in the C-UAS industry establishes a wide variance in C-UAS systems design impacting the effectiveness and reliability of systems.

**Published Standards:** No published standards have been identified.

**In-Development Standards and Related Activity:** RTCA SC-238, Counter UAS special committee, is developing a consensus standard that details detection and mitigation standards. This committee will operate as a joint committee with EUROCAE WG 115, Counter UAS (C-UAS). RTCA SC-238 and EUROCAE WG 115 are developing consensus documents that detail detection and mitigation performance standards for non-cooperative targets, their interoperability, and interfaces with stakeholders in the C-

UAS domain such as airports, air navigation service providers, surveillance systems manufacturers, law enforcement, pilots, etc.

In-development standards and policy activities of U.S. government entities are not known to the public. This is due to the nature and mission of the military, national security, law enforcement, and for the security and protection of the NAS, as it relates to the implementation and use of the counter-UAS system by agencies and departments of the U.S. government in coordination with the FAA.

Currently, only the federal government has legislative authority to engage in C-UAS interdiction activities, specifically the following (4) agencies: Department of Defense (DOD), Department of Energy (DOE), Department of Justice (DOJ), and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).

- In 2016, Congress authorized DOD and DOE to conduct C-UAS activities to protect covered facilities or assets.
- In 2018, through the FAA Reauthorization Act, Congress granted both DOJ and DHS authority to operate C-UAS systems to protect covered facilities or assets under specific circumstances.
- On April 13, 2020, the United States Attorney General issued [guidance](#) to Department of Justice components authorized under the Preventing Emerging Threats Act of 2018 (“the Act”) to take actions necessary to mitigate a credible threat posed by an unmanned aircraft or unmanned aircraft system. The Guidance outlines the process by which authorized components can request designation of facilities or assets for protection under the Act, and ensures proper coordination with the FAA.

State, local, and private entities currently do not have authority to operate C-UAS detection or mitigation systems that might otherwise violate certain federal criminal laws.

**Gap S9: UAS Mitigation.** Given the imperative that C-UAS technologies be available for use by the proper authorities, user identification, design, performance, safety, and operational standards are needed. User identification ensures accountability and provides a necessary tool to public safety officials. Design, performance, and safety standards can reduce the likelihood of harming or disrupting innocent or lawful communications and operations.

Today’s C-UAS technologies are often the result of an immediate need for a life-saving measure that was neither originally anticipated, nor given time to mature. Regarding test and evaluation (T&E) of C-UAS technologies, the goals, methods, data collected, and results output are generally not uniform. A comprehensive evaluation approach and template for testing C-UAS systems is needed. The test and evaluation (T&E) community must have clear guidance on what to look for in order to test and evaluate to the needs of the acquisition community; the model, simulation, and analysis (MS&A) community; the systems engineering community; and the end user. Model Based Systems Engineering (MBSE) and Interchange of data and results will benefit from standardizing the data formats for: the data collected, the aggregated performance, and the metrics. Clearly defined metrics and standards require foundational criteria upon which to build.

**R&D Needed:** Yes

**Recommendation:** Encourage the development of Counter-UAS standards addressing user identification, design, performance, safety, operational aspects, and various available technological methods for C-UAS. For example, laser-based systems will follow a different standards protocol than a kinetic, acoustic, or RF-based solution. Encourage the T&E community to collaborate.

**Priority:** High (Tier 1)

**Organization(s):** DOD, DHS, DOJ, DOE, FCC, NTIA, EUROCAE, RTCA

**Status of Progress:** Green

**Update:** RTCA SC-238/EUROCAE WG-115

## 9.10. UAS for Emergency Management and Disasters

It is important to ensure the safe and effective utilization of UAS for rapidly expanding incidents, complex emergencies, and the management of significant disasters.

UAS technology assists first responders, emergency management professionals, and other key stakeholders in executing emergency and disaster management operations in accordance with FEMA's National Incident Management System (NIMS) and the Incident Command System (ICS). UAS can also be effectively deployed in support of FEMA's National Response Framework (NRF) core capabilities to include prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery missions surrounding common threats and hazards.

The nature of UAS make for ideal deployable aviation assets in support of both planned incidents (such as sporting events, political rallies, music concerts) and unplanned incidents (such as tornados, earthquakes, major transportation accidents, wildfires).

During the 2017 hurricane season, UAS showed exceptional potential in helping a wide range of organizations respond and recover from major hurricane landfalls – a trend which continues through today. States and local jurisdictions are now integrating UAS into their emergency management operations to allow rapid deployment to a wide range of incident scenes including inaccessible areas suffering catastrophic damage.

### **Examples of UAS Missions for Major Incidents, Complex Emergencies, and Disaster Management**

- **Prevention**
  - Security surveillance at a large protest or march
  - Crowd and traffic monitoring at a major sporting event
  - Fire break inspections in forests and parks during dry season
- **Protection**

- Nuclear power plant perimeter security
- Crowd overwatch at a large outdoor music festival
- Suspicious vehicle interdiction at a major political rally
- **Mitigation**
  - Aerial flood plain mapping for rural communities
  - Environmental/conditions assessment, including weather, infrastructure condition, and documentation of vital community assets
  - Assessing foliage overgrowth along power distribution circuits prior to hurricane season
- **Response**
  - Searching for, and marking the position of, survivors and victims of disasters
  - Conducting rapid aerial damage assessment of neighborhoods
  - Transporting urgent supplies to victims and responders in remote locations under austere conditions
  - Resource tracking and initial response situational awareness/command and control
- **Recovery**
  - Power and asset inspection and restoration
  - Debris management
  - Insurance inspections

#### **Published Regulations, Standards, and Guidance Material:**

- [ICAO Unmanned Aircraft Systems \(UAS\) for Humanitarian Aid and Emergency Response Guidance U-AID](#)
- [ASTM F3379-20, Standard Guide for Training for Public Safety Remote Pilot of Unmanned Aircraft Systems \(UAS\) Endorsement](#)
- [ATIS-1-000071 Use of UAVs for Restoring Communications in Emergency Situations](#), December 2018
- [Center for Disaster Risk Policy \(CDRP\), Florida State University \(FSU\), All Hazards UAS Team - Resource Definition](#), Draft October 4, 2019
- [CDRP FSU, Small UAS Data Technician \[SUASDT\]- Resource Definition](#), Draft October 4, 2019
- [CDRP FSU, Small UAS Pilot \[SUASP\]- Resource Definition](#), Draft October 4, 2019
- [CDRP FSU, Small UAS Team Leader \[SUASTL\]- Resource Definition](#) Draft October 4, 2019
- [CDRP FSU, UAS Position Descriptions](#), Draft October 4, 2019
- [CDRP FSU, UAS Position Task Book \(PTB\)](#), Draft October 4, 2019
- [Esri, Integrating UAS and GIS Improves Search-and-Rescue Effort](#), Spring 2016
- [FEMA, Resource Typing Definition for Response, NIMS 509, Remote Pilot in Command, Technical Specialist – Unmanned Aircraft System, Unmanned Aircraft System Team](#)
- [FEMA, Unmanned Aircraft System Team Resource Typing Definition for Response Situational Assessment](#), September 2017
- [Federal Highway Administration \(FHWA\), Tech Brief Use of Small Unmanned Aerial Systems for Emergency Management of Flooding](#), May 2019

- [IBM Center for The Business of Government, Drones Shine in Emergency Management](#), February 11, 2019
- [IssueLab by Candid, Drones for Disaster Response and Relief Operations](#), April 2015
- [National Disaster Preparedness Training Center at the University of Hawai'i, Unmanned Aircraft Systems in Disaster Management \(AWR-345\)](#)
- [NFPA 2400 Standard for Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems \(sUAS\) Used for Public Safety Operations](#), 2019
- [National Wildfire Coordinating Group \(NWCG\), PMS 520: NWCG Standards for Airspace Coordination](#), May 2018
- NIST. *Standard Test Methods for Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems and Standard Test Methods for Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, Public Safety Maneuvering with Payloads*, 2019. NIST developed these test methods standards to fill the gap left by Part 107, pilot certification, that has no practical skills assessment and to assist public safety agencies in evaluating UAS suitability to perform identified missions.
- [NWCG, Standards for Fire Unmanned Aircraft Systems Operations](#), Feb 2019
- Airborne Public Safety Accreditation Commission, [Standards for Small Unmanned Aircraft System \(sUAS\) Programs](#), released October, 2017
- [U.S. Department of Homeland Security \(DHS\), National Response Framework](#), Fourth Edition October 28, 2019
- [U.S. Department of Justice \(DOJ\), 9-95.000 – Unmanned Aircraft Systems \(UAS\)](#), November 2019
- [U.S. Geological Survey \(USGS\), The National Map](#)

**In-Development Regulations, Standards, and Guidance Material:** There is a FEMA “Imagery with Context” project underway.

**New Gap S12: Integration of UAS into FEMA ICS Operations Section, Air Operations Branch.** The FEMA NIMS does not fully address UAS operations. FEMA’s ICS does not presently contain official guidance surrounding the use of UAS within the Operation Section, Air Operations Branch.

**R&D Needed:** Yes, limited

**Recommendation:** The NIMS should be revised to integrate the use of UA of all types as part of the ICS. Specific recommendations include:

- 1) Air Operations Summary (ICS 220) should be updated to incorporate UAS as an aviation resource.
- 2) FEMA, Resource Typing Definition for Response, should be expanded to include such positions as UAS Coordinator and UAS Base Manager, or similar positions necessary to manage UAS operations under the Air Operations Branch (e.g., sUAS airbase manager, sUAS air operations supervisor, etc.) including taskbooks and training.
- 3) Update FEMA, National Training and Education Division, Course Number AWR-345, “Unmanned Aircraft Systems in Disaster Management.”

**Priority:** Medium

**Organization(s):** FEMA NIMS, National Wildfire Coordinating Group (NWCG)

## 9.11. Standardization of Data Formatting for sUAS Public Safety Operations

Standards can enable inter-agency cooperation at the government (federal, state, local, and tribal) levels and between government agencies and public safety officials. Public safety agencies often need to exchange data having never worked together and this often needs to be done expediently in the field and sometimes with little or no connectivity and often to remote locations. Standards can also help to guide industry in the development of products specifically used by public safety.

Typical use cases:

- a. Using a UAS to map a large crime scene or large damaged area for evidence, documentation, or to coordinate the local response. This can be reviewed on location, but often needs to be processed and/or shared with multiple users off site. Many of the off site users will not have access to bespoke image review tools.
- b. Live video dissemination is a powerful tool both on site and for off site review. The video needs to be distributed and format so that off site parties can see it live without the requirement for bespoke installed software packages.
- c. UAS recorded GIS data and associated map marking is often recorded on scene where local referencing is available. Off site reviewing and sharing this data across multiple agencies is often hindered by differing recorded formats and mapping/display platforms.

Standardized formats for various types of data include:

- a. Live Video
- b. KLV Meta Data
- c. Recorded Video
- d. Still Imagery
- e. Aerial Mapping
- f. Digital Map Marking
- g. GIS data

**Published Standards and Related Documents:** Existing formats for Live Video & KLV Meta Data that are applicable to UAS operations include those promulgated by the Motion Imagery Standards Board ([MISB](#)) and NATO (STANAG 4609) which refers to MISB.

MISB published UAS specific standard(s) include:

- ST 0601.8 through ST 0601.15, UAS Datalink Local Set
- ST 0601.2 through ST 0601.7, UAS Datalink Local Metadata Set
- EG 0601, EG 0601.1, UAS Datalink Local Metadata Set

Published general industry standard formats include:

- Recorded Video - Motion Picture Experts Board ([MPEG](#))
- Still Imagery - Joint Photographic Experts Group ([JPEG](#))
- Aerial Mapping - American Society for Photogrammetry and Remote Sensing ([ASPRS](#))
- Digital Map Marking - [GeoTiff](#), [GeoJSON](#)
- GIS data - KMZ, [KML](#), Shape
- [OGC Wide Area Motion Imagery \(WAMI\) Best Practice](#)

No standards have been identified for UAS public safety applications associated with the following formats: Recorded Video; Still Imagery; Aerial Mapping.

**In-Development Standards:** No in-development standards have been identified

**New Gap S13: Data Format for Public Safety sUAS Operations.** Standards are needed for the formatting and storage of UAS data for the public safety community, especially to foster inter-agency cooperation and interoperability, and to help guide industry product development.

**R&D Needed:** No

**Recommendation:** Develop standards for accepted format of live video and still imagery and associated GIS data for use in sUAS public safety operations.

**Priority:** High (Tier 2)

**Organization(s):** NFPA, ASTM, Airborne Public Safety Association (APSA), DRONERESPONDERS, AIRT, OGC



## 10. Personnel Training, Qualifications, and Certification Standards: General – WG2

### 10.1. Terminology

The UAS industry is formed from a community that includes both traditional manned aviators and new UAS aviators who are unfamiliar with aviation safety culture, practices, and regulations. This has led to some confusion within the stakeholder community as to the application or misuse of unfamiliar and highly technical jargon.

**Published Standards and Guidance:** There are a number of standards that include terminology sections in them including, for example, standards DO-362 and DO-365A from RTCA SC-228. The list of standards and other documents below are those that are devoted specifically to terminology.

Committee	Document
ASTM F38.03, UAS - Personnel Training, Qualification & Certification	<a href="#">ASTM F3341/F3341M-20, Standard Terminology for Unmanned Aircraft Systems (New)</a> (previously WK62416)
ASTM F44.91, General Aviation – Terminology	<a href="#">ASTM F3060-20, Standard Terminology for Aircraft</a> . It includes a section on autonomous aircraft that is applicable to the UAS ecosystem <b>(New)</b>
ISO/TC 20/SC 16	<a href="#">ISO 21895:2020, Categorization and classification of civil unmanned aircraft systems (New)</a>
JARUS WG6	<a href="#">JARUS guidelines on SORA, Annex I, Glossary of Terms</a>
SAE AS-4UCS	<a href="#">AS6969 Data Dictionary for Quantities Used in Cyber Physical Systems</a>
SAE ITC	SAE-ITC ARINC IA 645, Common Terminology and Functions for Software Distribution and Loading

**In-Development Standards and Related Materials:** It is the practice of ASTM F38.03 that whenever a new term is added to the F3341/F3341M-20 terminology standard, it counts as a revision. At present there are some 27 active work items that represent new terms to be added to that standard.

Other documents in development:

- ISO/FDIS 21384-4, *Terms and Definitions*
- [IEEE P1936.1, Standard for Drone Applications Framework](#)
- The Unmanned Aircraft Safety Team (UAST) Safety Performance Indicator Team is working to establish or adopt a common UAS safety taxonomy

**Gap P1: Terminology.** Standards for UAS terminology are needed. Several are in development and will satisfy the market need for consumer and commercial UAS terminology.

**R&D Needed:** No

**Recommendation:** Complete work on terminology standards in development.

**Priority:** High (Tier 3)

**Organization(s):** ASTM, IEEE, ISO, RTCA

**Status of Progress:** Green

**Update:** Numerous standards have been published and are in-development.

## 10.2. Manuals

A UAS operator should be able to demonstrate an adequate organization, method of control and supervision of flight operations, and training program as well as ground handling and maintenance arrangements consistent with the nature and extent of the specified operations. Currently, the methods for guiding such a demonstration are found in manual specifications.

The operator should be able to demonstrate arrangements for use of approved remote pilot station (RPS) and voice and data links that will meet the quality of service (QoS) appropriate for the airspace and the operation to be conducted.

### Published Regulations, Standards, and Other Guidance Documents Include:

Organization/Committee	Document	Date
FAA	<a href="#"><i>Order 8040.6, Unmanned Aircraft Systems Safety Risk Management Policy</i></a>	Oct 2019
ASD, AIA, and ATA <sup>57</sup>	<a href="#"><i>S1000D: International Specification for Technical Publications (New)</i></a>	2019
ASTM F38.02, UAS – Operations	<a href="#"><i>ASTM F2909-19, Standard Specification for Continued Airworthiness of Lightweight Unmanned Aircraft Systems (New)</i></a> (previously WK63991)	2019

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<sup>57</sup> Aerospace and Defense Industries Association of Europe (ASD), Aerospace Industries Association (AIA), Air Transport Association (ATA) e-Business Program

ASTM F38.03, UAS - Personnel Training, Qualification & Certification	<a href="#">ASTM F2908-18, Standard Specification for Unmanned Aircraft Flight Manual (UFM) for an Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS)</a>	2018
ASTM F38.03, UAS - Personnel Training, Qualification & Certification	<a href="#">ASTM F3330-18, Standard Specification for Training and the Development of Training Manuals for the UAS Operator</a>	2018
ASTM F38.03, UAS – Personnel Training, Qualification & Certification	<a href="#">ASTM F3366-19, Standard Specification for General Maintenance Manual (GMM) for a small Unmanned Aircraft System (sUAS) (New)</a> (previously WK62743)	2019
ASTM F37.20, LSA – Airplane	<a href="#">ASTM F2745-15, Standard Specification for Required Product Information to be Provided with an Airplane</a>	2015
ASTM F37.70, LSA - Cross Cutting	<a href="#">ASTM F2483-18e1, Standard Practice for Maintenance and the Development of Maintenance Manuals for Light Sport Aircraft</a>	2018
JARUS WG1 - Flight Crew Licensing	<a href="#">JARUS FCL Recommendation. The document aims at providing recommendations concerning uniform personnel licensing and competencies in the operation of RPAS</a>	Sep 2015
JARUS WG1 - Flight Crew Licensing	<a href="#">JARUS FCL GM, Guidance Material to JARUS-FCL Recommendation</a>	Apr 2017
JARUS WG 6	<a href="#">JARUS Guidelines on SORA, ANNEX A – Guidelines on collecting and presenting system and operation information for a specific UAS operation</a>	Jun 2017
NFPA	<a href="#">NFPA® 2400, Standard for Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems (sUAS) Used for Public Safety Operations</a>	Nov 2018
NPSTC	<a href="#">Guidelines for Creating an Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) Program (v2)</a>	2017
SAE ITC	SAE-ITC ARINC IA 446, Guidance for Flight Training Device Documentation Structure, Content, and Maintenance	

#### In-Development Standards:

Committee	Document
ASTM F38.03, UAS - Personnel Training, Qualification & Certification	<a href="#">ASTM WK62734, New Specification for Specification for the Development of Maintenance Manual for Lightweight UAS</a>
ASTM F38.03, UAS - Personnel Training, Qualification & Certification	<a href="#">ASTM WK62744, New Practice for General Operations Manual for Professional Operator of Light Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS)</a>

ASTM F38.03, UAS - Personnel Training, Qualification & Certification	<a href="#">ASTM WK63407, New Specification for Required Product Information to be Provided with a Small Unmanned Aircraft System</a>
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**Gap P2: Manuals.** Several published UAS standards have been identified for various manuals. Several more are in development and will satisfy the market need for civil and public operators.

**R&D Needed:** No

**Recommendation:** Complete existing work on manual standards in development

**Priority:** High (Tier 2)

**Organization(s):** ASTM, JARUS, NPTSC, NFPA

**Status of Progress:** Green

**Update:** ASTM F2908-18, F3330-18, F3366-19; ASTM WK62734, WK62744, WK63407

### 10.3. UAS Flight Crew

The regulatory focus for UAS flight crew has rightfully remained on the individuals necessary for entry and operations within the NAS (i.e., the remote pilots). While commercial aviation has evolved to rely on multiple pilots (i.e., a captain and a first officer who are either commercial or airline transport pilots), the military and law enforcement have long used a structure of pilots and non-rated crewmembers (i.e., sensor operators/tactical flight officers) based on rank structure and the cost/length of training of new pilots. With the low barrier to entry of Part 107, anyone acting as UAS flight crew should be a certified remote pilot, with additional skills and training as applicable to the operation.

See also section 7.5 of this roadmap on weather, section 10.4 on additional crew members, and 10.7 on human factors in UAS operations.

**Published Standards and Related Activity:** The AU VSI Trusted Operator Program™ (TOP) is a graduated series of protocols that leverage existing standards to meet the market need for flight crewmembers and functional area qualification. Others:

Organization/Committee	Document/Program	Date
ACI	<a href="#">ACI UAS Pilots Code</a> (Annotated Version 1.0)	27 Jan 18
ACI	<a href="#">ACI Flight Safety in the Drone Age</a> (Version 1.0)	

ASTM F38.03, UAS - Personnel Training, Qualification & Certification	<a href="#">ASTM F3266, Standard Guide for Training for Remote Pilot in Command of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Endorsement</a>	1-May-18
ASTM F38.03, UAS - Personnel Training, Qualification & Certification	<a href="#">ASTM F3330-18, Standard Specification for Training and the Development of Training Manuals for the UAS Operator (New)</a>	2019
ASTM F38.03, UAS - Personnel Training, Qualification & Certification	<a href="#">ASTM F3379-20, Standard Guide for Training for Public Safety Remote Pilot of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Endorsement (New)</a> (previously WK61764)	2020
AUVSI Remote Pilots Council	<a href="#">Trusted Operator Program™ (TOP) training protocols for remote pilots and training organizations</a>	1-Nov-18
Professional Photographers of America (PPA)	<a href="#">PPA Certified Drone Photographer</a>	2017
SAE G-10G Realistic Training Committee	<a href="#">AIR6155, Multi-Crew Pilot License (MPL) Training: Definitions and References</a>	
SAE G-10G Realistic Training Committee	<a href="#">AIR6319, ATP360 An Air Carrier First Officer Training Program</a>	
SAE G-10G Realistic Training Committee	<a href="#">ARP5453, Training Pilots Prior to Simultaneous Instrument Landing System (ILS) Precision Runway Monitor (PRM) Approaches to Closely-Spaced Parallel Runways</a>	
SAE G-30 UAS Operator Qualifications & G-10U Unmanned Aerospace Vehicle	<a href="#">SAE ARP5707, Pilot Training Recommendations for Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Civil Operations</a>	3-Apr-16
SAE ITC	SAE-ITC ARINC IA 438, Guidance For Acceptance of Flight Simulation Training Devices	
SAE ITC	SAE-ITC ARINC IA 601, Control/Display Interfaces	

Other SAE-ITC Committees:

- SAE-ITC ARINC IA/FSEMC, Future Concepts for Simulators (FCS) Subcommittee
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA/FSEMC, Simulated Air Traffic Control Environment (SATCE) Working Group
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA/FSEMC, Simulator Continuing Qualification (SCQ) Working Group

**In-Development Standards and Related Activity:**

Committee	Document
ASTM F38.03, UAS - Personnel Training, Qualification & Certification	<a href="#">ASTM WK61763, New Guide for Training for Remote Pilot Instructor (RPI) of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Endorsement</a> is expected to be balloted and published in the Fall of 2020

ASTM F38.03, UAS - Personnel Training, Qualification & Certification	<a href="#">ASTM WK62741, New Guide for Training UAS Visual Observers</a> is expected to be balloted and published in the Fall of 2020
ISO/TC 20/SC 16	<a href="#">ISO/DIS 23665, Unmanned Aircraft Systems -- Training of Operators</a>
SAE G-10G Realistic Training Committee	<a href="#">AIR6242, Description of Multi-Crew Pilot License (MPL) Training</a>
SAE G-10G Realistic Training Committee	<a href="#">ARP6321, RECOMMENDED PRACTICES FOR AIR CARRIER FIRST OFFICER INITIAL TRAINING PROGRAMS</a>
SAE G-10G Realistic Training Committee	<a href="#">ARP7218, "Startle Effect" and Crew Performance</a>
SAE G-10HWD Head Worn Display Committee	<a href="#">ARP6377, Behavioral Engineering Technology Recommended Practices for Implementation of Head Worn Displays</a>
SAE G-30 UAS Operator Qualifications & G-10U Unmanned Aerospace Vehicle	Aerial photography

**Gap P3: Instructors and Functional Area Qualification.** Several published UAS standards have been identified for various crewmember roles. Several are in development and will satisfy the market need for remote pilot instructors and functional area qualification.

**R&D Needed:** No

**Recommendation:** Complete work on UAS standards currently in development.

**Priority:** High (Tier 2)

**Organization(s):** SAE, ASTM, AUVSI, PPA, ISO

**Status of Progress:** Green

**Update:** ASTM F3330-18, ASTM F3379-20, ASTM WK61763, WK62741; ISO/DIS 23665

## 10.4. Additional Crew Members

As the size and complexity of commercial UAS technology expands, so too grows the number of UAS applications. These include surveying and mapping, surveillance, SAR, law enforcement, aerial photography and cinematography, aerial news reporting, disaster response, utility inspection, and traffic monitoring applications.

Some of these applications will often require an additional crew member other than the RPIC to safely and effectively operate the UA. The scope of these multi-crew UAS operations will likely increase with

the advancement of commercial UAS greater than 55 pounds operating beyond the small UAS rule in 14 CFR Part 107. This exposes safety-of-flight risks and potential gaps in existing standards.<sup>58</sup>

Various names for these additional UAS crew members include: sensor operator, remote sensing specialist, aerial cinematographer/camera operator, payload operator, tactical flight officer, and navigator.

Depending on the aircraft and/or CONOPs, multi-crew operations will likely define a set of responsibilities for each crew member, but some responsibilities will also be shared. For example, the large military MQ-1/9 series RPA requires a crew of two: the pilot-in-command responsible for flying the UA (the final authority for the safe operation of the aircraft), and the sensor operator (SO) responsible for operating the sensor(s) to track points of interest. In the United States Air Force (USAF), the crew members have different titles and qualification criteria, but in the Army both are qualified as pilots. In each case, the crew member operating the sensor is considered a primary flight crew member who contributes to the safe operation of the UA in areas such as: checklist procedures, aircraft system monitoring, general airmanship and situational awareness, and participating during critical phases of flight including emergency procedures.

A primary concern is the introduction of undesired risks in civil, multi-crew UAS operations, resulting from untrained flight crew members participating in flight activities, particularly on large UAS. For example, in the case of sUAS, a flight crew member is not currently required to be trained or certified as a remote pilot to participate in commercial UAS operations as long as there is a certified RPIC. Should the Part 107 framework be expanded to other classes of UAS, then undesired risks – mainly around crew resource management concerns – are likely. These risks can be mitigated with proper training. If adequately trained, additional aircrew can increase the overall safety of the UA operation when compared to a single-crew operation. This training should *only* be necessary for flight crew members actively participating in flight duties that contribute to safety-of-flight.

See also section 10.7 on human factors in UAS operations.

#### **Published Standards and Related Activity:**

The USAF military training, evaluation, and operational duties of SOs are well understood and documented in *AFI 11-2MQ-1&9 Volume 1 – Aircrew Training*, *AFI 11-2MQ-1 Volume 2 – Evaluation Criteria*, *AFI 11-2MQ-9 Volume 2 – Evaluation Criteria*, and *AFI 11-2MQ-1&9 Volume 3 – Operations Procedures*. The Army framework for the same aircraft (MQ-1) uses two similarly trained remote pilots, with one designated as a pilot-in-command equivalent.

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<sup>58</sup> It should be noted that FAA is looking at mission specific competency, not weight.

An overarching standard is CJCSI 3255.01, *Joint Unmanned Aircraft Systems Minimum Training Standards*. CJCSI 3255 implements NATO STANAG 4670, *STANAG on Recommended Guidance for the Training of Designated Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Operator (DUO) Training*, and applies to all of the U.S. military. CJCSI 3255 establishes the minimum recommended training level for UAS crew who perform duties other than the pilot (e.g., aircraft operator/sensor operator). Such individuals must possess required aviation knowledge and UAS knowledge-based skills to fly under visual flight rules (VFR) in Class E, G, and restricted/combat airspace.

When CJCSI 3255 was published in 2009, 14 CFR Part 107 was not yet written. However, CJCSI 3255 clearly establishes a minimum level of training that meets or exceeds the contemporary Part 107 requirements for a remote pilot. A similar standard ensuring a minimum training for all flight crew members for the wide range of potential civil applications has yet to be developed, although ICAO Document 10019, *Manual on Remote Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS)*, addresses remote pilots, remote pilot instructors, and observers.

SAE ARP5707 covers pilot training recommendations across the UAS spectrum and mentions additional crew members (section 4) but does not detail any training standards for such crew members. ASTM F3266 mentions additional required crew members and acknowledges that flight operations outside the scope of “lightweight UAS” may require additional training.

<b>Organization/Committee</b>	<b>Document/Program</b>	<b>Date</b>
Airborne Sensor Operators (ASO) Group	<a href="#">ASO Guide, Professional Standards, 1<sup>st</sup> edition</a>	2018
ASTM F38.03, UAS - Personnel Training, Qualification & Certification	<a href="#">ASTM F3266, Standard Guide for Training for Remote Pilot in Command of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Endorsement</a>	1-May-18
ASTM F38.03, UAS - Personnel Training, Qualification & Certification	<a href="#">ASTM F3330-18, Standard Specification for Training and the Development of Training Manuals for the UAS Operator (New)</a>	2018
ASTM F38.03, UAS - Personnel Training, Qualification & Certification	<a href="#">ASTM F3379-20, Standard Guide for Training for Public Safety Remote Pilot of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Endorsement (New)</a> (previously WK61764). The standard describes flight crew beyond the RPIC. This includes describing a Tactical Flight Officer as a trained remote pilot who assists the RPIC during public safety operations.	
AUVSI Remote Pilots Council	<a href="#">Trusted Operator Program™ (TOP) training protocols for remote pilots and training organizations</a>	1-Nov-18
NFPA	<a href="#">NFPA® 2400, Standard for Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems (sUAS) Used for Public Safety Operations</a>	25-Nov-18



Professional Photographers of America (PPA)	<a href="#">PPA Certified Drone Photographer</a>	2017
SAE G-30 UAS Operator Qualifications & G-10U Unmanned Aerospace Vehicle	<a href="#">SAE ARP5707, Pilot Training Recommendations for Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Civil Operations</a>	3-Apr-16
SAE ITC	SAE-ITC ARINC IA 601, Control/Display Interfaces	

**In-Development Standards and Related Activity:**

Organization/Committee	Document
ASTM F38.03, UAS - Personnel Training, Qualification & Certification	<a href="#">ASTM WK61763, New Guide for Training for Remote Pilot Instructor (RPI) of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Endorsement.</a> The Remote Pilot Instructor is responsible for training flight crew.
ASTM F38.03, UAS - Personnel Training, Qualification & Certification	<a href="#">ASTM WK62741, New Guide for Training UAS Visual Observers</a>
ISO/TC 20/SC 16	<a href="#">ISO/DIS 23665, Unmanned Aircraft Systems -- Training of Operators</a>

**Gap P4: Training and Certification of UAS Flight Crew Members Other Than the Remote Pilot.** There is a standards gap with respect to the training and/or certification of aircrew other than the RPIC specifically around the following:

- Functional duties of the crew member
- Crew resource management principles
- Human factors
- General airmanship and situational awareness, and
- Emergency procedures

**R&D Needed:** No

**Recommendation:**

- 1) Develop a framework to classify additional UAS crew members around common flight activities identifying in particular those who directly or indirectly influence safety-of-flight.
- 2) Develop a standard(s) around training, evaluation, and best practices for the relevant UAS crew members other than the RPIC for UAS >55Lbs for activities affecting safety-of-flight.
- 3) Consider the possibility of recommending – through best practices or a standard – that *all* flight crew members actively participating in flight activities on UAS > 55Lbs meet the minimum training of a remote pilot for the applicable UA.

**Priority:** Medium

**Organization(s):** SAE, ASTM, AUVSI, JARUS, ISO

**Status of Progress:** Green

**Update:** ASTM F3330-18, ASTM F3379-20, ASTM WK61763, WK62741; ISO/DIS 23665

## 10.5. Maintenance Technicians

The largest gap in the personnel, training, and certification block appears to be related to the lack of qualification for persons involved in UAS repair. While the current regulations for civil operation (14 CFR Part 107) do not mandate any specific qualification, *Flight Standards Information Management Systems (FSIMS) Volume 16 Unmanned Aircraft Systems, Chapter 5 Surveillance, Section 2, Site Visits of UAS Operations*, describes maintenance as an area of inspection. Recent Part 107 waivers approved by the FAA also place a growing emphasis on maintenance practices.

### Published Standards and Other Documents:

- [ASTM National Center for Aerospace & Transportation Technologies \(NCATT\), Unmanned Aircraft System \(UAS\) Maintenance Standard \(2012\)](#)
- [ASSURE, A.5 UAS Maintenance, Modification, Repair, Inspection, Training, and Certification Considerations Task 4: Draft Technical Report of UAS Maintenance Technician Training Criteria and Draft Certification Requirements, 6 Nov 2017, Final Report](#)
- [Aviators Code Initiative \(ACI\), Aviation Maintenance Technicians Model Code of Conduct \(AMTMCC\) \(2009\)](#)
- SAE AS-3 [ARP5602](#), *A Guideline for Aerospace Platform Fiber Optic Training and Awareness Education*
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 440, Guidelines for the Provisioning and Support of Training Equipment Data
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 441, Guidelines for the Supply of Binary Format Software for Training Purposes
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 444, Overview of Export Control Issues for Flight Training Devices
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 445, Guidance for Configuration and Control of Loadable Software Parts in Flight Simulation Training Devices
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 644, Portable Maintenance Access Terminal (PMAT)
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 422-1, Guidance for Modification Status Indicators and Avionics Service Bulletins
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 429P1-19, Data Labels
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 432-2, Training Requirements for Flight Training Equipment Support Personnel
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 602A-2, Test Equipment Guidance
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 602B, Test Equipment Guidance
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 604-1, Guidance for Design and Use of Built-In Test Equipment (BITE)
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 606-1, Guidance for Electrostatic Sensitive Device Utilization and Protection
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 606A, Guidance for Electrostatic Sensitive Utilization and Protection

- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 608A, Design Guidance for Avionics Test Equipment, Part 1 - System Definition
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA 668-1, Guidance For Tool and Test Equipment (TTE) Equivalency
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA/AMC, Air Transport - Avionics Service Bulletin (AT-ASB) Harmonization Working Group
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA/AMC, Test Program Set (TPS) Quality Working Group

**In-Development Standards:**

- [ASTM WK60659, New Guide for Lightweight UAS Maintenance Technician Qualification. This work item](#) will be part of a standard in ASTM F46 and is likely to be published before the roadmap is finalized at which time the gap will be closed.

**Gap P5: UAS Maintenance Technicians.** Standards are needed for UAS maintenance technicians. Ensure that maintenance requirements are appropriate for the scale and risk of the UAS.

**R&D Needed:** No

**Recommendation:** Complete work on UAS maintenance technician standards currently in development

**Priority:** High (Tier 2)

**Organization(s):** ASTM, SAE

**Status of Progress:** Green

**Update:** ASTM WK60659

## 10.6. Compliance/Audit Programs

In the interests of aviation safety, minimum requirements for compliance/audit programs for UAS operators are desirable. This would cover initial assessments of operators bringing new aircraft to market and periodic review of existing operators. It would also include auditor qualifications.

**Published Standards:**

Organization/Committee	Document/Program	Date
ASTM F37.70, LSA - Cross Cutting	<a href="#">ASTM F2839-11(2016), Standard Practice for Compliance Audits to ASTM Standards on Light Sport Aircraft</a>	2016
ASTM F37.70, LSA - Cross Cutting	<a href="#">ASTM F3205-17, Standard Practice for Independent Audit Program for Light Aircraft Manufacturers</a>	2017

ASTM F38.03, UAS - Personnel Training, Qualification & Certification	<a href="#">ASTM F3266, Standard Guide for Training for Remote Pilot in Command of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Endorsement</a>	1-May-18
ASTM F38.03, UAS - Personnel Training, Qualification & Certification	<a href="#">ASTM F3364-19, Standard Practice for Independent Audit Program for Unmanned Aircraft Operators (New)</a> (previously WK62730)	2019
ASTM F38.03, UAS - Personnel Training, Qualification & Certification	<a href="#">ASTM F3365-19, Standard Practice for Compliance Audits to ASTM Standards on Unmanned Aircraft Systems (New)</a> (previously WK62731)	2019
AUVSI Remote Pilots Council	<a href="#">Trusted Operator Program™ (TOP) Protocol Certification Manual</a>	1-Nov-18
NFPA	<a href="#">NFPA® 2400, Standard for Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems (sUAS) Used for Public Safety Operations</a>	25-Nov-18
SAE ITC	SAE-ITC ARINC IA 438, Guidance For Acceptance of Flight Simulation Training Devices	
SAE ITC	SAE-ITC ARINC IA 440, Guidelines for the Provisioning and Support of Training Equipment Data	
SAE ITC	SAE-ITC ARINC IA 444, Overview of Export Control Issues for Flight Training Devices	
SAE ITC	SAE-ITC ARINC IA 662-1, Obsolescence Management Strategies for Commercial Aircraft	
SAE ITC	SAE-ITC ARINC IA 668-1, Guidance For Tool and Test Equipment (TTE) Equivalency	

Other SAE-ITC Committees:

- SAE-ITC ARINC IA/AMC, Air Transport - Avionics Service Bulletin (AT-ASB) Harmonization Working Group
- SAE-ITC ARINC IA/AMC, Test Program Set (TPS) Quality Working Group

**In-Development Standards:** None.

**Gap P6: Compliance and Audit Programs.** The version 1.0 gap stated “No published UAS standards have been identified for UAS-specific compliance/audit programs. However, several are in development and will satisfy the market need.”

**R&D Needed:** No

**Recommendation:** The version 1.0 recommendation stated “Complete work on compliance and audit program standards currently in development.”

**Priority:** High (Tier 3)

**Organization(s):** ASTM, AUVSI

**Status of Progress:** Closed

**Update:** ASTM F3364-19, ASTM F3365-19

## 10.7. Human Factors in UAS Operations

The term human factors has grown increasingly popular as the commercial aviation industry realizes that human error, rather than mechanical failure, underlies most aviation accidents and incidents.<sup>59</sup> Human factors science or technologies are multidisciplinary fields incorporating contributions from psychology, engineering, industrial design, statistics, operations research, and anthropometry. It is a term that covers the science of understanding the properties of human capability, the application of this understanding to the design, development, and deployment of systems and services, and the art of ensuring successful application of human factors principles into aviation and its support activities such as sustainment of aircraft/UAS.

To ensure the seamless integration of UAS operations into the NAS, human factors must be incorporated into the design of all of the system components. This includes more than the equipment used by the UAS operators (e.g., control stations). It also includes: the equipment and procedures used by air traffic control to accommodate UAS operations; examination of the effects of UAS operations on the tasks of air traffic controllers and pilots of manned aircraft; and continuous monitoring of the effects of UAS operations on the safety and efficiency of the NAS.

While unmanned aviation has many of the same human factors challenges as manned aviation, in unmanned operations – particularly those involving UAS that are capable of operating BVLOS and at higher altitudes – the remote pilot’s task is different and in many ways more challenging.

Human factors related challenges that must be addressed for UAS operations include:

- Timeliness and quality of interactions between remote pilots, air traffic control, and pilots of manned aircraft.
- Lack of “shared fate.”<sup>60</sup>
- Reduced sensory cues.
- Timely response to Detect and Avoid activity.<sup>61</sup>
- Reliance on quality of Control and Communication radio link.

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<sup>59</sup> [AMT Handbook Chapter 14, Human Factors](#)

<sup>60</sup> Hobbs, A. (2010). Unmanned aircraft systems. In Human factors in aviation (pp. 505-531). Academic Press.

<sup>61</sup> FAR Sec. 91.113

- UAS control station characteristics, design and evaluation.<sup>62</sup>
- Transfer of control during ongoing operations.
- Flight termination (assuming the UAS is not being used to carry passengers).
- Reliance on automation.
- Widespread use of interfaces based on consumer products.
- Incident/accident investigations.

**Published Standards, Regulations, and Related Materials:** There are no published comprehensive standards specific to human factors for civilian UAS operations. However, existing regulatory frameworks and associated industry standards for manned aviation include human factors embedded into certification (design, production, and airworthiness), approval, and authorization. In addition, there are several related standards and a wealth of published material on the subject of human factors in aviation (with many references therein). These include, for example:

ICAO:

- ICAO Human Performance (HP) Training Manual (Doc 9863-AN/950). A revised document is due to be released in 2020 with UAS HP standards.
- ICAO RPAS Manual Doc 10019. HP Chapter is due for release in 2020.

EUROCAE:

- ED-251 Operational Services and Environment Definition for RPAS Automatic Taxiing
- ED-252 Operational Services and Environment Definition for RPAS Automatic Take-off and Landing

FAA:

- 14 CFR part 5 Safety Management Systems
- 14 CFR Subchapter C—Aircraft (Parts 21, 23, 25, 26, 27, 29, 31, 33, 34, 35, 36, 39, 43)
- 14 CFR Subchapter F - Air Traffic and General Operating Rules (Parts 91 - 107)
- Part 183 - Representatives of the Administrator
- 14 CFR Subchapter G - Air Carriers and Operators for Compensation or Hire: Certification and Operations (Parts 110 - 139)
- [AMT Handbook Chapter 14, Human Factors](#)
- Human Factors - Aircraft Certification Service (AIR) [Policies and Guidance](#)
- Human Factors - Aircraft Certification Service (AIR) [Regulations](#) (For new Part 23 (Amendment no 23-64, August 30, 2017) regulations see <https://rgl.faa.gov/>.)

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<sup>62</sup> FAA Advisory Circular (AC) 00-74, Avionics Human Factors Considerations for Design and Evaluation

SAE:

- [HEB1B](#), *Human Engineering - Principles and Practices*
- [SAE6906](#), *Standard Practice for Human Systems Integration*
- [ARP94910](#), *Aerospace - Vehicle Management Systems - Flight Control Design, Installation and Test of, Military Unmanned Aircraft, Specification Guide For*
- [ARP4033](#), *Pilot-System Integration*
- [ARP4107](#), *Aerospace Glossary for Human Factors Engineers*
- [ARP4153](#), *Human Interface Criteria for Collision Avoidance Systems in Transport Aircraft*
- [ARP4155A](#), *Human Interface Design Methodology for Integrated Display Symbology*
- [ARP4791A](#), *Human Engineering Recommendations for Data Link Systems*
- [ARP5056](#), *Flight Crew Interface Considerations in the Flight Deck Design Process for Part 25 Aircraft*
- [ARP5108A](#), *Human Interface Criteria for Terrain Separation Assurance Display Technology*
- [ARP5119](#), *Location of and Display Symbology Requirements for Head-Down Electronic Flight Displays for Steep IMC Approaches*
- [ARP5365](#), *Human Interface Criteria for Cockpit Display of Traffic Information*
- [ARP5430](#), *Human Interface Criteria for Vertical Situation Awareness Displays*
- [ARP5898](#), *Human Interface Criteria for Flight Deck Surface Operations Displays*
- [AS8568A](#), *Binoculars, Prismatic, Hand-Held (for Aeronautical Use) (7 x 50 and 6 x 42 (Wide Field))*
- [ARP6467](#), *Human Factors Minimum Requirements and Recommendations for the Flight Deck Display of Data Linked Notices to Airmen (NOTAMs)*
- [ARP4032B](#), *Human Engineering Considerations in the Application of Color to Electronic Aircraft Displays*
- [ARP5677](#), *Human Engineering Considerations for Airborne Implementation of Enhanced Synthetic Vision Systems*
- [ARP5289A](#), *Electronic Aeronautical Symbols*
- [ARP5621](#), *Electronic Display of Aeronautical Information (Charts)*
- [ARP5364](#), *Human Factor Considerations in the Design of Multifunction Display Systems for Civil Aircraft*
- [ARP60494](#), *Touch Interactive Display Systems: Human Factors Considerations, System Design and Performance Guidelines*
- [ARP5707](#), *Pilot Training Recommendations for Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Civil Operations*
- [ARP6023](#), *Human Engineering Considerations for Implementing Enhanced Synthetic Vision Systems in Vertical Flight Capable Platforms*
- [ARP5740](#), *Cockpit Display of Data Linked Weather Information*

If a remote pilot control station mimics an airborne flight deck or if the aircraft is optionally piloted, then the following standards may apply:

- [AIR4653](#), *Flight Management Systems Review*
- [AIR6237](#), *Loss-of-Control Mishaps in Revenue Airline Service*

- [ARP4101](#), *Flight Deck Layout and Facilities*
- [ARP4101/1](#), *Seats and Restraint Systems for the Flight Deck*
- [ARP4101/2](#), *Pilot Visibility From the Flight Deck*
- [ARP4101/3A](#), *Crew Rest Facilities*
- [ARP4101/4A](#), *Flight Deck Environment*
- [ARP4101/5A](#), *Aircraft Circuit Breaker and Fuse Arrangement*
- [ARP4101/6A](#), *Stowage of Flight Crew's Survival Emergency and Miscellaneous Equipment*
- [ARP4101/7A](#), *Flight Deck Escape Provisions for Transport Aircraft*
- [ARP4101/8A](#), *Flight Deck Interior Doors for Transport Aircraft*
- [ARP4101/9A](#), *Crew Safety Provisions for Cargo Aircraft*
- [ARP4102](#), *Flight Deck Panels, Controls, and Displays*
- [ARP4102/1](#), *On Board Weight and Balance System*
- [ARP4102/2A](#), *Automatic Braking System (ABS)*
- [ARP4102/3](#), *Flight Deck Tire Pressure Monitoring System (TPMS)*
- [ARP4102/4](#), *Flight Deck Alerting System (FAS)*
- [ARP4102/5SECT1](#), *Primary Flight Controls by Electrical Signaling*
- [ARP4102/5SECT3](#), *Engine Controls by Electrical or Fiber Optic Signaling*
- [ARP4102/6](#), *Communications and Navigation Equipment*
- [ARP4102/7](#), *Electronic Displays*
- [ARP4102/7 APXC](#), *Appendix C Electronic Display Symbology for Engine Displays*
- [ARP4102/8A](#), *Flight Deck Head-Up Displays*
- [ARP4102/9A](#), *Flight Management System (FMS)*
- [ARP4102/10B](#), *Traffic Display and Collision Avoidance Systems*
- [ARP4102/11C](#), *Airborne Windshear Systems*
- [ARP4102/12B](#), *Approach to Landing Guidance System for Transport Aircraft*
- [ARP4102/13A](#), *Data Link*
- [ARP4102/14C](#), *Full-Format Printer*
- [ARP4102/15A](#), *Electronic Data Management System (EDMS)*
- [ARP4104](#), *Design Objectives for Handling Qualities of Transport Aircraft*
- [ARP4104/1](#), *Flight Envelope Awareness/Protection*
- [ARP4105C](#), *Abbreviations, Acronyms, and Terms for Use on the Flight Deck*
- [ARP4927](#), *Integration Procedures for the Introduction of New Systems to the Cockpit*
- [ARP5366](#), *Autopilot, Flight Director, and Autothrust Systems*
- [ARP5628](#), *Final Approach Spacing System (Fass)*
- [AS425C](#), *Nomenclature and Abbreviations for Use on the Flight Deck*
- [AS8044A](#), *Takeoff Performance Monitor (TOPM) System, Airplane, Minimum Performance Standard for*
- [AIR5995](#), *Evaluation of Human Factor Considerations for Outdoor Laser Operations in the Navigable Airspace*
- [ARP5598](#), *Unauthorized Laser Illuminations: Pilot Operational Procedures*
- [ARP6378](#), *Guidance on Mitigation Strategies Against Laser Illumination Effects*
- [AS4970](#), *Human Factors Considerations for Outdoor Laser Operations in the Navigable Airspace*



- [ARP5589](#), *Human Engineering Considerations for Design and Implementation of Perspective Flight Guidance Displays*
- [ARP5290A](#), *Laser Beam Divergence Measurements Techniques Comparison*
- [ARP5293A](#), *Safety Considerations for Lasers Projected in the Navigable Airspace*
- [ARP5535A](#), *Observers for Laser Safety in the Navigable Airspace*
- [ARP5560](#), *Safety Considerations for High-Intensity Lights (HIL) Directed into the Navigable Airspace*
- [ARP5572A](#), *Control Measures for Laser Safety in the Navigable Airspace*
- [ARP5674](#), *Safety Considerations for Aircraft-Mounted Lasers Projected into the Navigable Airspace*
- [AS6029A](#), *Performance Criteria for Laser Control Measures Used for Aviation Safety*

SAE-ITC:

- SAE-ITC ARINC [IA 837](#), *Design Guidelines for Aircraft Cabin Human Machine Interfaces*

ASTM:

- [ASTM F3002-14a](#), *Standard Specification for Design of the Command and Control System for Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems (sUAS)*

Related Reference Materials:

- Abrahamsen, T. & Fulmer, D. (2013). *Unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) operational issues identification and mitigation*. MP130512, MITRE.
- Cardosi, K., Lu, J., France, M., Lennertz, T., Hoffman, A., & Sheridan T. (2018). *Monitoring Risk Associated with Operations of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) in the National Airspace System: Models for Analysis of Mandatory Occurrence Reports involving UAS-Manned Aircraft Encounters*. DOT-VNTSC-FAA-18-08.
- Cardosi, K. & Lennertz, T. (2017). *Human Factors Considerations for the Integration of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in the National Airspace System: An Analysis of Reports Submitted to the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS)*. DOT-VNTSC-FAA-17-11.
- Federal Aviation Administration. (September 2012). *Integration of Unmanned Aircraft Systems into the National Airspace System, Concept of Operations (v2.0)*.
- Hobbs, A., & Lyall, B. (2016). Human Factors Guidelines for Unmanned Aircraft Systems. In Sage Journal [Ergonomics in Design](#) (Volume: 24 issue: 3, pp: 23-28)
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- Hobbs, A. (2017). Remotely Piloted Aircraft. In S.J. Landry (Ed.) [Handbook of Human Factors in Air Transportation Systems](#) (1st ed., Ch17, pp379-395). CRC Press.
- Hobbs, A. (2010). Unmanned aircraft systems. In E. Salas & D. Maurino (Eds.), [Human factors in aviation](#) (2nd ed., pp. 505–531). San Diego, CA: Elsevier.

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- McCarley, J. & Wickens, C. (2005). [Human factors concerns in UAV flight](#). Institute of Aviation, Aviation Human Factors Division, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. Also available on the [FAA website](#).
- Thompson, L., Sollenberger, R., & Pastakia, B. (2016). *UAS operational assessment: En route contingency operations user needs analysis results*. FAA.

### **In-Development Standards and Related Materials:**

#### ICAO:

- ICAO is modifying the Standards and Recommended Practices contained in Annexes to the Chicago Convention to enable international operations of RPAS under IFR.
  - ICAO is adding RPAS human factors guidance to a new ICAO Human Performance Manual and to the next edition of the ICAO RPAS Manual. The new Human Performance Manual will replace the existing ICAO Human Factors Training Manual, and will include human factors guidance material for all sectors of civil aviation, including (for the first time) remotely piloted operations. The current ICAO RPAS Manual contains limited information on human factors. The new edition will contain a chapter dedicated to RPAS human factors.

#### SAE:

- [HEB1C](#), *Human Engineering - Principles and Practices*
- [SAE1006](#), *Standard Practice for Personnel*
- [SAE1007](#), *Standard Practice for Habitability*
- [SAE1008](#), *Standard Practice for Force Protection and Survivability (FP&S)*
- [SAE1009](#), *Design For Maintainer (DFM) Process Standard*
- [SAE1010](#), *Standard Practice for Manpower and Personnel*
- [SAE6906A](#), *Standard Practice for Human Systems Integration*
- [ARP8459](#), *Human Engineering Considerations with Implementation of Aided Flight Vision for Vertical Flight Platforms All Weather Operations*

If a remote pilot control station mimics an airborne flight deck or if the aircraft is optionally piloted, the following standards may apply:

- [AIR6373](#), *Harmonizing weather information sharing for air transport*
- [ARP4101A](#), *Flight Deck Layout and Facilities*
- [ARP4101/1A](#), *Seats and Restraint Systems for the Flight Deck*
- [ARP4101/2A](#), *Pilot Visibility From the Flight Deck*
- [ARP4102A](#), *Flight Deck Panels, Controls, and Displays*
- [ARP4102/4A](#), *Flight Deck Alerting System (FAS)*
- [ARP4102/5SECT1A](#), *Primary Flight Controls by Electrical Signaling*

- [ARP4102/5SECT3A](#), Engine Controls by Electrical or Fiber Optic Signaling
- [ARP4102/6A](#), Communications and Navigation Equipment
- [ARP4102/7A](#), Electronic Displays
- [ARP4102/7 APXD](#), Appendix C Electronic Display Symbology for Engine Displays
- [ARP4102/8B](#), Flight Deck Head-Up Displays
- [ARP4102/9B](#), Flight Management System (FMS)
- [ARP4102/11D](#), Airborne Windshear Systems
- [ARP4102/13B](#), Data Link
- [ARP4104/1A](#), Flight Envelope Awareness/Protection
- [ARP4104A](#), Design Objectives for Handling Qualities of Transport Aircraft
- [ARP4105D](#), Abbreviations, Acronyms, and Terms for Use on the Flight Deck
- [ARP4927A](#), Integration Procedures for the Introduction of New Systems to the Cockpit
- [ARP5628A](#), Final Approach Spacing System (Fass)
- [ARP6149](#), Mitigation for Loss-of-Control Accidents in Transport Airplanes
- [ARP6238](#), Display Latency Evaluation Procedures
- [AIR6266](#), *Application of Lasers in the Aviation Environment*
- [ARP5560A](#), *Safety Considerations for High-Intensity Lights (HIL) Directed into the Navigable Airspace*
- [ARP5674A](#), *Safety Considerations for Aircraft-Mounted Lasers Projected into the Navigable Airspace*
- [AS6029B](#), *Performance Criteria for Laser Control Measures Used for Aviation Safety*

EUROCAE:

- MASPS for RPAS Automatic Take-off and Landing
- MASPS for RPAS Automatic Taxiing
- MASPS for RPAS Automation & Emergency Recovery functions
- MASPS for RPAS Automation & Emergency Recovery functions

ASTM:

- [WK62670, New Specification for Large UAS Design and Construction](#)

**Gap P7: Displays and Controls.**<sup>63</sup> Standards are needed for the suite of displays, controls, and onboard sensors that provide the UAS pilot with the range of sensory cues considered necessary for safe unmanned flight in the NAS.

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<sup>63</sup> Adapted from McCarley, J. & Wickens, C. (2005): pp1-3

The UAS pilot is deprived of a range of sensory cues that are available to the pilot of a manned aircraft. Hence, compared to the pilot of a manned aircraft, a UAS pilot must perform in relative “sensory isolation” from the aircraft under his/her control.

Of particular interest are recent developments in the use of augmented reality and/or synthetic vision systems (SVS) to supplement sensor input. Such augmented reality displays can improve UAS flight control by reducing the cognitive demands on the UAS pilot.

The quality of visual sensor information presented to the UAS pilot will also be constrained by the bandwidth of the communications link between the aircraft and its CS. Data link bandwidth limits, for example, will limit the temporal resolution, spatial resolution, color capabilities and field of view of visual displays, and data transmission delays will delay feedback in response to operator control inputs.

**R&D Needed:** Yes

**Recommendation:**

- 1) Develop Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS) for the suite of displays, controls, and onboard sensors that provide the UAS pilot with the range of sensory cues considered necessary for safe operation in the NAS.
- 2) Conduct further research and development in several areas, specifically, to:<sup>64</sup>
  - a. Explore advanced display designs which might compensate for the lack of direct sensory input from the environment.
  - b. Examine the potential use of multimodal displays in countering UAS pilot sensory isolation, and to determine the optimal design of such displays for offloading visual information processing demands. A related point is that multimodal operator controls (e.g., speech commands) may also help to distribute workload across sensory and response channels, and should also be explored.
  - c. Determine the effects of lowered spatial and/or temporal resolution and of restricted field of view on other aspects of UAS and payload sensor control (e.g., flight control during takeoff and landing, traffic detection).
- 3) Examine the design of displays to circumvent such difficulties, and the circumstances that may dictate levels of tradeoffs between the different display aspects (e.g., when can a longer time delay be accepted if it provides higher image resolution). For example, research indicates that a UAS pilot’s ability to track a target with a payload camera is impaired by low temporal update rates and long transmission delays.

**Priority:** High (Tier 3)

**Organization(s):** RTCA, NASA, SAE, INCOSE, ASTM, EUROCAE, ICAO

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<sup>64</sup> Ibid

**Status of Progress:** Unknown

**Update:** ICAO, EUROCAE

**Gap P9: Human Factors in UAS Operations.**<sup>65</sup> Standards are needed to address human factors-related issues in UAS operations.

**R&D Needed:** Yes

**Recommendation:**

- 1) Complete in-development standards, and develop new standards for UAS human factors-related issues, including those relevant to the composition, selection, and training of UAS flight crews.
- 2) Conduct further research to:<sup>66</sup>
  - a. Determine the crew size and structure necessary for various categories of UAS missions in the NAS, and to explore display designs and automated aids that might reduce crew demands and potentially allow a single pilot to operate multiple UASs simultaneously.
  - b. Develop techniques to better understand and facilitate crew communications, with particular focus on inter-crew coordination during the hand off of UAS control from one team of operators to another.
  - c. Identify specific ways in which sensory isolation affects UAS pilot performance in various tasks and stages of flight.
  - d. Examine the concept of “shared fate,” as related to UAS operations. There might be negative consequences from the pilot not having a shared fate with the aircraft, but whether an exocentric viewpoint diminishes the feeling of shared fate or not is unknown.
  - e. Determine the circumstances (e.g., low time delay vs. high time delay, normal operations vs. conflict avoidance and/or system failure modes) under which each form of UAS control is optimal. Of particular importance will be research to determine the optimal method of UAS control during takeoff and landing, as military data indicate that a disproportionate number of the accidents for which human error is a contributing factor occur during these phases of flight.
  - f. Examine the interaction of human operators and automated systems in UAS flight. For example, allocation of flight control to an autopilot may improve the UAS pilot’s performance on concurrent visual mission and system fault detection tasks.

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<sup>65</sup> Adapted from McCarley, J. & Wickens, C. (2005): pp3-4

<sup>66</sup> Ibid

g. Determine which of the UAS pilot's tasks (e.g., flight control, traffic detection, system failure detection, etc.) should be automated and what levels of automation are optimal.

**Priority:** High (Tier 2)

**Organization(s):** RTCA, NFPA, MITRE, NASA, ICAO

**Status of Progress:** Unknown

**Update:** None provided at this time.

## **11. Next Steps**

It is essential that this roadmap continue to be widely promoted among interested stakeholders so that its recommendations see broad adoption.

To the extent R&D needs have been identified, the roadmap can be used as a tool to help direct funding to the areas of research needed for UAS.

In terms of standards activities, an ongoing dialogue between industry, FAA, and the SDOs would be beneficial to continue discussions around coordination, forward planning, and implementation of the roadmap's recommendations. Such a dialogue can also identify emerging issues that require further elaboration.

It is recognized that standardization activity will need to adapt as the ecosystem for UAS evolves due to technological innovations and regulatory developments, and as additional industry sectors enter the UAS market.

Depending upon the realities of the standards environment, the needs of stakeholders, and available resources, it is envisioned that a mechanism may be established to monitor progress to implement the roadmap's recommendations.

Ultimately, the aim of such an effort would be to continue to guide, coordinate, and enhance standardization activity for UAS and to enable the market for UAS to thrive.

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## Appendix A. Glossary of Acronyms and Abbreviations

AAM – advanced air mobility	CPDLC – Controller Pilot Data Link Communications
AASHTO – American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials	CS – control station
AC – advisory circular	CTA – Consumer Technology Association
ACAS – Airborne Collision Avoidance System	C-UAS – counter-UAS
ADI – Alliance for Drone Innovation	DAA – detect and avoid
ADS-B – automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast	DHS – U.S. Department of Homeland Security
AGL – above ground level	DOD – U.S. Department of Defense
AIAA – American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics	DOE – U.S. Department of Energy
ANSI – American National Standards Institute	DOI – U.S. Department of the Interior
ANSP – air navigation service provider	DOJ – U.S. Department of Justice
APSA – Airborne Public Safety Association	DOT – U.S. Department of Transportation
APSAC – Airborne Public Safety Accreditation Commission	DWG – Domain Working Group
ARC – Aviation Rulemaking Committee	EASA – European Aviation Safety Agency
ASME – American Society of Mechanical Engineers	EMS – emergency medical services
ASSP – American Society of Safety Professionals	EUROCAE – European Organisation for Civil Aviation Equipment
ASSURE - FAA UAS Center of Excellence – the Alliance for System Safety of UAS through Research Excellence (ASSURE)	EUSCG – European UAS Standards Coordination Group
ASTM – ASTM International	EWIS – electrical wiring interconnect system
ATC – air traffic control	FAA – Federal Aviation Administration
ATIS – Alliance for Telecommunications Industry Solutions	FCC – Federal Communications Commission
ATM – air traffic management	FEMA - Federal Emergency Management Agency
AUVSI – Association for Unmanned Vehicle Systems International	FERC – Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
BPV – boiler and pressure vessel	GML – Geography Markup Language
BVLOS – beyond visual line of sight	GNSS – Global Navigation Satellite System
C2 – command and control	GUTMA – Global UTM Association
C3 – command, control, and communications	HAZMAT – hazardous materials
CAA – civil aviation authority	ICAO – International Civil Aviation Organization
CFR – Code of Federal Regulations	IEC – International Electrotechnical Commission
COA – certificate of authorization	IEEE – Institute for Electrical and Electronics Engineers
CONOPS – concept of operations	IFR – instrument flight rules
COTS – commercial off-the-shelf	IoT – internet of things
	ISO – International Organization for Standardization
	ITA – International Trade Administration
	JARUS – Joint Authorities for Rulemaking on Unmanned Systems
	JPR – Job Performance Requirement

JWG – joint working group  
LSA – light sport aircraft  
MASPS – Minimum Aviation System Performance Standards  
MOPS – Minimum Operational Performance Standards  
NAS – national airspace system  
NASA – National Aeronautics and Space Administration  
NCPUSU – National Council on Public Safety UAS  
NERC – North American Electric Reliability Corporation  
NFPA – National Fire Protection Association  
NIOSH National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health  
NIST – National Institute of Standards and Technology  
NPSTC – National Public Safety Telecommunications Council  
NTIA – National Telecommunications and Information Administration  
OGC – Open Geospatial Consortium  
OMB – White House Office of Management and Budget  
OOP – operations over people  
ORA – operational risk assessment  
OSHA – Occupational Health and Safety Administration  
PIA – Parachute Industry Association  
PII – personally identifiable information  
PPE – personal protective equipment  
QA – quality assurance  
QC – quality control  
QoS – quality of service  
R&D – research and development

RF – radio frequency  
RPAS – remotely piloted aircraft systems  
RPIC – remote pilot in command  
RPS – remote pilot station  
RTCA – RTCA, Inc.  
SAE – SAE International  
SAR – search and rescue  
SC – subcommittee  
SDO – standards developing organization  
SIA – Security Industry Association  
SORA – Specific Operations Risk Assessment  
sUAS – small unmanned aircraft system  
SWG – special working group  
TC – technical committee  
TCAS – Traffic Alert & Collision Avoidance System  
TF – Task Force  
TIA – Telecommunications Industry Association  
TSO – Technical Standard Order  
UA – unmanned aircraft  
UAM – urban air mobility  
UAS – unmanned aircraft system  
UAST – Unmanned Aircraft Safety Team  
UAV – unmanned aerial vehicle  
UCS – UxS control segment  
UL – Underwriters Laboratories, Inc.  
USDA – U.S. Department of Agriculture  
USS – UAS service supplier  
UTM – UAS traffic management  
UxS – unmanned systems  
VFR – visual flight rules  
VLL – very low-level  
VLOS – visual line of sight  
VO – visual observer  
VTOL – vertical take-off and landing  
WG – working group

## PROJECT LEADERSHIP

The **American National Standards Institute** (ANSI) is a private non-profit organization whose mission is to enhance U.S. global competitiveness and the American quality of life by promoting, facilitating, and safeguarding the integrity of the voluntary standardization and conformity assessment system. Its membership is comprised of businesses, professional societies and trade associations, standards developers, government agencies, and consumer and labor organizations. The Institute represents and serves the diverse interests of more than 270,000 companies and organizations and 30 million professionals worldwide. ANSI is the official U.S. representative to the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and, via the U.S. National Committee, the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC).

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“This updated version of the UASSC Roadmap is of great importance to the greater standards community. This updated framework will be used to guide and facilitate the coordinated development of critical UAS standards. The development and implementation of integrated standards is critical for this rapidly evolving capability. This coordinated approach addressing performance, safety, testing, and training for UAS systems and operators is of vital importance to the Department of Homeland Security and Homeland Security Enterprise operations, and for numerous other use cases. Standards and the related policy and guidance will enhance the safe and effective integration of UAS. We look forward to continued collaboration with ANSI and other standards organizations supporting the coordinated development and use of UAS standards in support of the homeland security mission.”

**Philip Mattson, Standards Executive, Department of Homeland Security**



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