Kabul - Program for Culture and Conflict Studies

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Kabul


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Kabul Province Facts - Content

Kabul Province

Governor: Hamid Akram

Population Estimate: 4,373,000

Area in Square Kilometers: 4,462

Capital: Kabul

Districts: Bagrammi, Chahar Asiab, Dih Sabz, Guldara, Istalif, Kabul, Kalakan, Khaki Jabbar, Mir Bacha Kot, Musayi, Paghman, Qaranagh, Shakar Dara, Surobi.

Ethnic Groups: Tajik, Hazara, Pashtun: Ghilzai, Kuchi, Qizilbash, Shinwari, Wardak.

Religious Groups: Primarily Sunni, some Shia.'

Total # of Mosques: 3,025

Occupation of Population: Business, Government Service, Agriculture, Skilled Professionals, Day Labor, some Animal Husbandry.

Crops/Livestock: Wheat, Potato, Vegetable, Corn, Fruit; Cow, Sheep, Goats, Donkeys, Horses, Poultry.

Literacy Rate: 47%16

Total # of Educational Institutions: 696

Colleges/Universities: 9 Universities; Bakhtar University, Kabul Education University Kabul Medical University, Kabul Polytechnic University, Kabul University, Kardan University, Kateb University, Salam University, The American University of Afghanistan 

Kabul University, Teacher Training Colleges, Polytechnic Institutes, Institute of Health Science.

Active NGOs in the Province: UNHCR, HAND, AMDA, WROR, ISRA, DACAR, NCA, SCA, UNICEF, NPO, CARE, MEDAir, INTERSOS.

Primary Roads: Three main asphalt roads/highways connect the capital with the rest of the country; the Salang Road links Kabul with the north; the Kabul-Kandahar Highway connects Kabul to the south. Many small roads in the capital are in poor condition.17

Airport: Kabul (Hamid Karzai International) Airport IATA: KBL; ICAO: OAKB) is usable but faces ongoing security concerns. The airport was modernized in 2014 and is currently served by 14 Asian, European, and Middle Eastern airlines.18

Estimated Population with Access to Electricity: 83%

Hospitals: 28

Clinics: 336

Sources/Availibility of Drinking Water: River, Canal System, Karezes, Wells; Dependent on location and quality of water.

Rivers: Kabul River

Topographical Features: Kabul city is located in a valley which dominates the province. It is surrounded by the Logar and Paghman Ranges in the south-east, the Qrough Range in the south-west, the Shirdarwaza Range in the north-east, the Charikar Range in the north, and the Tangi Gharrow Range in the west. Much of the land is very fertile rangeland and is largely rain-fed. Parts of the north-west portion of the province are used for vineyards, gardens and cultivated for crops. There are a number of reservoirs and lakes in the province; the most significant reservoirs are in Paghman and Khaki Jabbar district.19

Maps - Thumbnail
Maps Thumbnail
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Tribal Map Thumbnail
Opium in Kabul - Content
Opium in Kabul Thumbnail
Kabul Province - Data

Kabul Provincial Overview

Kabul Province borders Parwan and Kapisa in the north, Laghman and Nangarhar in the east, Logar in the south, and Mayden Wardak in the west. The topography of Kabul is a dominant valley in which Kabul city resides, surrounded by the Logar and Paghman Ranges in the south-east, the Qrough Range in the south-west, the Shirdarwaza Range in the north-east, the Charikar Range in the north, and the Tangi Gharrow Range in the west. Much of the land is very fertile rangeland and is largely rain fed. Their are a number of reservoirs and lakes in the region; the most significant are in Paghman and Khaki Jabbar districts.

The population of approximately 3.4 million are predominately based in rural habitats. Major ethnic groups are Hazara, Tajik, Pashtun, Kuchi, and Qizilbash. Primary occupations of the residents are business, agriculture, government service, skilled professional, and day labor. Their are over 1400 provincial aid projects with a planned cost of over US $61 million.

As the capital of Afghanistan, Kabul city is home to the central government and institutions of the nation. Hajji Din Mohammad, the former governor of Nangarhar, was appointed Governor of Kabul in June 2005. He is a Pashtun descendent of the Arsala Khel Family and studied at Kabul University for four years. View Hajji Din Mohammad's Full Bio Mojadidi resigned his position as provincial governor of Kabul in 2011 and has since been replaced. The current governor of the province is Hamid Akram.

 

Map of Kabul

 

Human Terrain

Pashtun

Pashtuns are located throughout the districts of Kabul province.  They are the largest single ethnicity of Afghanistan, and in particular the largest tribe of Pashtuns, the Ghilzai, formed the backbone of the Taliban movement. Traditionally beholden to the moral code of Pashtunwali (“the way of the Pashtun”), they can easily be deeply offended by breaches of their code and carry the grudge for generations. The Pashtuns are fiercely independent and often view themselves, as the largest ethnicity in the country, as the rightful leaders of Afghanistan. That being said, they suffered much during the Soviet invasion, and must be included in any effort to secure and develop the country.

Wardak Pashtun

Some leaders of the Wardak Pashtun were notorious for their opposition to the British in 1879-1880.  The Wardak tribe is subdivided in the Mayar, Mirkehl (which may be the same as the Amir Khel), and the Nuri.1 There is some disagreement whether the Wardaks are Karlanri or Ghilzai Pashtun.  Most evidence suggests they are Karlanri.  Currently several Wardak Pashtuns hold important posts in the central government, including the Ministry of Defense (General Abdur Rahim Wardak), the Ministry of Information, Culture and Youth (Abdul Karim Khoram), and the Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs.  It is also important to note that “several Islamic radicals emerged from Wardak who helped to promote and implement Taliban’s conservative interpretation of Islam.”2

Khogiani

Feud with Shinwari and Ghilzai.  History of opposing the British.  They are classified as Karlanri and Hill Tribe Pashtuns. View the Khogiani Tree

Shinwari

Feud with Khogiani.  History of opposing the British and the central government in Kabul.  A major thorn in the side of Amir Abdur Rahman Khan during the 1880s.  They are classified as Eastern, Sarbani Pashtuns. View the Shinwari Tree

Kafi (Safi)

Kunar Safis are the largest and most powerful of the province’s Pashtun tribes and live primarily in the Pech Valley region.  The Safis historically have been one of the most dissident tribes in Afghanistan, with a major uprising against the central government in 1945-1946.  The tribe is divided into three clans, the Gorbuz, the Massoud and the Wadir.  The three clans were divided politically during the communist era.  In large part the Wadir Safis were aligned with the communists and served in the government.  Many Safis mujahedin leaders came from the Gorbuz clan.  The Massoud clan, however, was split between both sides.3

Tajik

Tajiks are located throughout most of the Kabul province.  Tajiks are the second largest ethnic group in Afghanistan, after the Pashtuns and comprise between 25-30% of the population.  The Tajiks in Afghanistan tend to live in settled communities as opposed to a nomadic lifestyle.  They are of Iranian descent and primarily speak Dari.  The majority of Tajiks are Sunni Muslims.  Tajiks made up the majority of the Northern Alliance, both in terms of membership and leadership.  Tribal ties have largely broken down among the Tajiks; therefore, social organization is defined primarily by geography. Despite their lack of cohesiveness the Tajiks are often brought together due to the perceived common threat posed by the Pashtuns.4 View the Tajik Tree

Hazara

Hazara are located in pockets throughout Kabul province.5 The Hazara, a distinct ethnic and religious group within the population of Afghanistan, have often been the target of discriminatory and violent repression.  Most likely descended from the Mongols of Genghis Khan, (there is also a strong argument that they are of Eastern Turkic origin), the Hazara are noticeably different in physical appearance when compared to the Pashtun majority.  In terms of religion, the vast majority of the Hazara are of the Shia Muslim faith, again in contrast to the Pashtuns who are Sunni Muslim.  Due to these differences, “the Hazara have experienced discrimination at the hands of the Pashtun-dominated government throughout the history of modern Afghanistan."6 As the traditional underclass of Afghan society, Hazara were exploited and made to work as servants and laborers.  As a result there tends to be an anti-government and anti-Pashtun bias among the Hazara.  In present day Afghanistan, the Hazara are divided geographically into two main groups: the Hazarajat Hazara and those who live outside the Hazarajat.  The Hazarajat is located in the Hindu Kush Mountains in central Afghanistan and is “centered around Bamiyan province and include[s] areas of Ghowr, Uruzgan, Wardak, and Ghazni province."7 The Hazara living outside of the Hazarajat live in and around Kabul, Herat, Mazar-e-Sharif and Samangan province.  Due to atrocities committed against them by the Taliban, the Hazara by and large are opposed to the Taliban.  In August 1998, the Taliban massacred approximately 4,000 Hazara in Mazara-e-Sharif; this massacre was followed by another the next month when the Taliban killed another 500 Hazara in Bamiyan.  The Hezb-e Wahdat (Islamic Unity Party of Afghanistan) is an umbrella political organization which commands the support of large numbers of Hazara.  The Hazara are also often at odds with the Kuchi population within the Hazarajat. View the Hazara Tree

Kabuli

A term which refers to the heterogeneous urban population of the city of Kabul.  In general the term is ethnic-neutral, due the multi-ethnic nature of the capital and the result of generations of intermarriages.  According to Peter R. Blood, “A typical Kabuli speaks Dari in addition to his mother tongue and, whether male or female, is urbane, favors European fashions, is secularly educated, and most probably works as a bureaucrat, shopkeep/owner or in the service sector.  Many have had professional education or experience abroad…are Western-oriented in outlook and enjoy cosmopolitan lifestyles.”  Many Kabulis left the capital during the past three decades of war.8

Kuchi

In Kabul province, the Kuchi are located primarily in the north-west.  Involved in a constant and centuries old range war with the Hazara, the Kuchi are Pashtun nomads. Drawn primarily from the Ghilzai tribe, the Kuchis have moved across Afghanistan and Pakistan for generations, and only since Pakistani independence were banned from Pakistani territory. Dispersed and well-traveled, they often receive news from distant relations in far-away provinces relatively quickly. The self-declared “leader” of the Kuchis is one Hashmat Ghani Ahmadzai. Partially settled by the king and the following socialist governments, they were strong supporters of the Taliban, both ideologically and pragmatically, as they came into possession of many Hazara lands thanks to the repression of the Shi’ite Hazara by the Taliban. There are estimated to be around three million Kuchi in Afghanistan, with at least 60% remaining fully nomadic.9

Qizilbash

The Qizilbash in Kabul province are located in the capital and the surrounding districts.  The Qizilbash are an Imami Shia group thought to be descended from Persian “mercenaries and administrators left behind by the Safavid Emperor Nadir Shah Afshar to govern the Afghan provinces."10 After the demise of the Safavid Empire in Afghanistan, the Qizilbash, due to their higher levels of education and experience as administrators, remained influential in the Afghan court and government bureaucracies.  Their Shia faith combined with their disproportionate political influence often resulted in resentment by large portions of the Sunni majority within Afghanistan.11 Also, they were used by the shahs as personal bodyguards and assigned to put down uprisings among the populace, which further alienated them from the Pashtun majority.  Due to the persecution, religious and political, the Qizilbash frequently resorted to the use of taqiyya, the practice of precautionary dissimulation or the adoption of a dual religious identity.  In order to play a role in government and society, the Qizilbash, like other Imami Shia, publicly portrayed themselves as Sunnis or Pashtuns while they privately maintained their Shia faith.12 In present day Afghanistan, the Qizilbash continue to practice taqiyya making it difficult to gain accurate census data.  It appears that they largely reside in urban centers and “tend to be predominantly urban professionals—doctors, teachers, engineers, and lawyers.”13

Tatar

Located in the north-west portion of Kabul province.  The first Central Asian Muslims to come under the Russian yoke, Tatars still retain their own republic within the Russian Federation. During the colonial era they were often used as spies and guides for Russian and later Soviet efforts, and heavily involved in commercial trading. In Afghanistan, many of the Tatars settled after either trying to escape the Russians, or as traders. View the Tatar Tree

Hindus and Sikhs

A small number of Hindus are located in the districts surrounding the capital.  Long a part of the commercial life of Afghanistan, Hindus and Sikhs have lived in the country for centuries as traders and money-lenders. During the time of the Taliban they were harassed and forced to wear identifying badges, and as a result many left the country. Since the beginning of OEF, however, many have returned to Afghanistan and their previous vocations.

 

Political Parties

Hezb-e Islami Khalis (HiK)

Originally a mujahideen group which split with Hekmatyar’s Hezb-e Islami under the leadership of Yunus Khalis.  HiK was dominant in Nangarhar. Khalis died in 2005 or 2006, resulting in an internal power struggle for control of the party between Khalis’ son Anwarul Haq Mujahid and Hajji Din Mohammad.  It appears that Mohammad was successful in consolidating his control over much of the party.  Recent and active political players in Nangarhar have connections to HiK.  Led by Hajji Din Mohammad, former governor of Kabul (2005-2009) and current member of the Afghanistan High Peace Council.

Hezb-e Afghanistan Naween (New Aghanistan Party/Qanuni)

Led by Mohammad Yunus Qanuni.  Part of a political alliance called Jabahai Tafahim Millie or National Understanding Front.  Qanuni was the primary contender against Karzai for the presidency.  He is a Tajik who has been a mujahideen, spokesman for Ahmed Shah Masoud, and Minister of Interior and Education.  He was elected to parliament in 2005 and was chosen to lead the Wolesi Jirga.  Support for him and his party may be a political counter-weight to Karzai.

Hamnazar

One of the most important parties of the Meshrano Jirga, Hamnazar (Alliance), It mainly consists of pro-Karzai MPs, who are Western sympathizers. The group numbers some thirty parliamentarians and is led by Amin Zai. A doctor by profession, he is closely allied with Karzai who strongly supported him for this position.14

Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin (HiG)

Mujahideen party active since the Soviet invasion; led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.  Actively opposed to US-led and Afghan national forces.  Politically active in Sherzad, Surk Rod and Pachir Wa districts.  Hekmatyar is a Kharoti Ghilzai and, therefore, less influential than the much more respected and powerful Khugianis, such as Hajji Din Mohammad and Anwarul Haq Mohammad.15

Ittihad-e Islami (Sayyaf)

This party is under the guidance of one Abdul Rasool Sayyaf, and has been since the anti-Soviet campaign. Despite ideological and cultural similarities with the Taliban, Sayyaf did not join them (for personal reasons) and went with the Northern Alliance. He follows strict Wahhabi interpretations of Islam, and is not known for tolerance. In the past this party has been known for its foreign supporters and followers; the former often Arab, the latter from places as diverse as the Southern Philippines, Chechnya, and Bosnia.  In February 1993 government forces and members of the Ittihad-e Islami massacred over 700 Hazara in the Afshar district of West Kabul.

In 2005, Ittihad-e Islami registered as a political party under the name "Islamic Dawah Organisation of Afghanistan".20

 

Resources - Menu

1 Adamec, Vol. 6, 802-803.

2 Mirwais Wardak, Idrees Zaman, and Kanishka Nawabi, “The Role and Functions of Religious Civil Society in Afghanistan: Case Studies From Sayedabad & Kunduz,” Cooperation for Peace and Unity, (July 2007): 9, at Link.

3 US Department of State Asadabad Provincial Reconstruction Team Political Officer Reporting, 2005.

4 US State Department Afghanistan Culture and Ethnic Studies, 2004.

5 UNHCR District Profiles, Link; Link.

6 US State Department Afghanistan Culture and Ethnic Studies, 2004.

7 Ibid.

8 Peter R. Blood, ed., Afghanistan: A Country Study, (Washinton D.C.: GPO for the Library of Congress, 2001), at Link.

9 Afghan Nomads Say U.S. Bombing Killed Nine,” Associated Press, September 25, 2003, at Link; Paul Garwood, “Poverty, violence put Afghanistan's fabled Kuchi nomads on a road to nowhere,” Associated Press, May 14, 2006, Link.

10 U.S. Library of Congress, Country Studies: Afghanistan, at Link; Louis Dupree, Afghanistan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980).

11 World Culture Encyclopedia, Qizilbash, at Link.

12 Etan Kohlberg, “Some Imami-Shi’i Views on Taqiyya,” Journal of the American Oriental Society, Vol. 95, No. 3 (July-September 1975: 395-402 and Louis Dupree, “Further Notes on Taqiyya: Afghanistan,” Journal of the American Oriental Society, Vol. 99, No. 4 (October-December 1979): 680-682.

13 World Culture Encyclopedia.

14 “The New Parliament: an Afghan Way to Democracy,” CeMiSS Quarterly, Centro Militare di Studi Strategici, April 2006, at Link.

15 Chris Mason, Tora Bora Nizami Mahaz.

16 Civil Military Fusion Center.

17 Nelles Verlag, Afghanistan, 2006; Regional Rural Economic Regeneration Strategies (RRERS), Provincial Profile for Kabul, 2006.

18 RRERS; Flightstats.com.

19 AIMS, Afghanistan Paktika Province Land Cover Map, April 2002; Nelles Verlag, Afghanistan

20 Afghanistan Online, at Link 2006Af; RRERS.

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Material contained herein is made available for the purpose of peer review and discussion and does not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of the Navy or the Department of Defense.