Energy: An Essential Element for Winning Future Wars — Operational Energy Part 1

By RuthAnne Darling and Paul Mason Carpenter

And it ought to be remembered that there is nothing more difficult to take in hand, more perilous to conduct, or more uncertain in its success, than to take the lead in the introduction of a new order of things, because the innovator has for enemies all those who have done well under the old conditions, and lukewarm defenders in those who may do well under the new.¹
—Niccolò Machiavelli

“He who controls oil will win the next war.”
—Winston Churchill
 

Since the beginning of the Industrial Age, operational energy (OE) has played an increasingly predominant role in warfare. Without modern OE, mankind would deploy to war on horses, sail wind powered ships, and fight with swords and arrows.² Without energy, available in forms useable by integrated circuitry and transmission systems, the cyber domain would be reduced to hand signals and colored flags. Today OE is a foundation of national defense and an indispensable attribute of military strength. Energy literally powers every action of military consequence and has been a casus belli for nearly a century. In addition to powering nearly all forms of communication and sensing; fueling all air, land, sea and space platforms; and energizing all electrical devices, OE has become a direct weapon within itself. Directed energy, railgun, laser, particle beam, and microwave arms are coming of age, and within a few years, will dominate the battlespace. Without an abundance of ready, secure, and forward-based OE, future militaries will falter and fail. Therefore, our nation must thoughtfully consider OE as a critical element of military strategy, then resource and integrate it effectively within multi-domain warfare. This will ensure that OE—like cyber—has the correct emphasis, resourcing, and support within future warfighting. The following provides an overview of OE since World War I, discusses warfighting realms, and offers how leaders might deliberate OE in the future.

Overview of OE Since World War I
In modern history, control and exploitation of energy has been a key element in multiple conflicts. OE—or the lack thereof—has either enabled or hindered the prosecution of warfare. Even in World War I, nations were reliant on OE to successfully prosecute warfare. Oil became essential for growing motorized armies and quickly expanding air forces. During the final offensive 1918, the Allies used 12,000 barrels of oil a day and during a victory dinner, British Minister of Foreign Affairs Lord George Curzon declared that, “The allied cause floated to victory upon a wave of oil.” A French senator added, “Oil had been the blood of victory.” In 1917 the United States furnished 82% of all oil imported to France; in 1918 this number grew to 89%. The Allies—"swimming in oil”—acquired multitudes of motorized and petroleum-consuming weapon systems. At the time, the Germans only had a few trucks, planes, or tanks and did not possess the required petroleum to power more.³  Reliant on a modest amount of southeast European oil, German General Erich Ludendorff admitted that Germany “should not have been able to exist, much less to carry on the war, without Romania’s corn and oil.”⁴ 

In WWII, OE powered military tanks and planes and became a focus for major military battles. During the course of the war, Germany exerted increasing control over Romanian oil fields. So these became primary targets for Allied air raids.⁵  Beginning in the Spring of 1944, the Allies conducted ‘The Oil Plan’—the systematic bombing of German oilfields, refineries and synthetic oil plants. Within 4 months, continuous attacks on the German oil industry reduced petroleum, oil, and lubricant (POL) production by more than 90%. This resulted in major shortages of fuel for the German Army and significant reductions in Luftwaffe pilot training. The German Minister for Armaments and War Production, Albert Speer, stated the methodical attacks the German oil industry were “catastrophic” to the German war effort.⁶  In addition, the US strategic bombing campaign crippled German OE/electricity supplies and military production by destroying railroad marshalling yards. These staging areas were critical in providing the coal needed for electrical production and moving POL by rail. Reducing electrical production was initially slow because of 1) the time needed to determine and strike the weak link in electrical production and 2) German industry resilience. However, in the end it was highly effective.⁷  The German offensive in the Battle of the Bulge ground to halt in a large part due to the shortage of OE. When interviewed by journalists, Field-Marshall Karl Gerd Von Rundstedt of Germany indicated how important oil was in World War II and credited Germany’s loss to three factors—Allied bombing sorties, the bombardments by Allied naval guns, and Germany's own deficiency in oil, especially in the form of gasoline.⁸ On the eastern front, the Germans failed to reach the Ukrainian oil fields before the Russians. This exacerbated German fuel problems and impacted operations. Had the Germans focused on the Caucus oil fields instead of attempting to capture Stalingrad, significant oil would have obtained, and the Germans might have been more successful on the Eastern Front.⁹ In the end, it was the deficiencies in OE that hindered German defenses and created Allied overmatch opportunities. 

In the Pacific, critical US and Japanese major weapon systems—ships and aircraft—were highly dependent on oil for OE. Before the war, Japan sourced the US for 90% of its petroleum. But because of aggressive Japanese expansion and related atrocities (e.g. Nanjing Massacre in China), the US placed an embargo on Japan that included oil and other key materials. The US hoped that the embargo would dissuade Japan from further aggression, but it had the opposite effect. Japan saw the US as meddling in Asian affairs and as an inevitable enemy, so they struck. Although their attack on Pearl Harbor was successful, the Japanese neglected to damage the oil storage facilities that soon powered US combat operations.¹⁰ The fuel supplies at Pearl Harbor were crucial for the US to bring the war to the Japanese. Admiral Chester W. Nimitz summed it up best, “Had the Japanese destroyed POL stores and transport, it would have prolonged the war another two years.”¹¹ And as noted by retired Navy officer Al Miller (Advisor to Defense Operational Energy Innovation), “If the two year delay occurred, there would not have been a Battle of the Coral Sea or a Battle of Midway until much later in the war.” And with full control of the Midway Atoll, the Japanese might have had the ability to conduct land-based air attacks on Hawaii.¹²  

Japan never found an adequate fuel supply and their military operations were hamstrung throughout the war. A very high-quality Japanese military at the beginning of the war withered and lost a much of its effectiveness. Increasingly short of oil, the larger Japanese naval platforms were more frequently confined to their home ports with their aircraft grounded. 

Since WWII, OE has remained an essential foundation for military operations. OE dominance as a strategy is evident during the Korean War, Vietnam War, Iran-Iraq War, 1st Gulf War, Kosovo Conflict, Afghanistan, and the 2nd Gulf War with fuel and the associated convoys primary, high-value targets. On 24 May 1999, Lt. Gen Mike Short—Operation ALLIED FORCE Combined Air Component Commander—directed F-117 aircraft to attack electrical power in Serbia. The F-117s successfully struck the transformer yards, halted electrical power to 80 percent of Serbia, and this was the most influential attack in Operation ALLIED FORCE to that date.¹³  

Electrical grid vulnerability and dependence on oil/gas imports were major challenges for the Ukrainians during their 2018 civil conflict that involved the Russians. The Ukrainians, dependent on Russian energy, experienced energy blackouts for extended periods of time. Now, as the US enters a period of military peer competition—the first since the Cold War—US success is more dependent than ever in its ability to exploit OE.  

Warfighting Realms
Recognizing the critical importance of energy in warfighting, a discussion of how OE might be best approached in the future is warranted. One consideration is that energy be managed like a warfighting realm. OE is a physical element, but it is also both a physical and virtual force. Operators may employ OE to attack directly and OE enables almost all other warfare. A definition for a realm or domain is a specified sphere of activity and/or knowledge. As described by Frank Hoffman and Michael Davies, domains “create a frame of reference that defines the preparation and conduct of war.” Each of the military departments and military services build doctrine and platforms that best operate or maneuver in selected domains. The bulk of warfare planning, training, and budgeting is accomplished in preparation to use these platforms and weapon systems technology to execute war operations within and across these domains.¹⁴  

Arguably the most comprehensive model for identifying warfighting realms is captured in the “Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, Version 2.0.” Ahead of its time, this document was published in August 2005. It highlights that multiple domains function across many potential operating “spaces,” to effect adversary targets and target systems. The conceptional framework identifies 1) the physical domains of land, sea, air, and space; 2) the virtual realms of information and cyber; and 3) the human domains of the cognitive, moral, and social aspects.”¹⁵ This organizational construct has significant potential for best organizing, training, and equipping multi-domain forces. And given the importance of OE to warfare today, OE itself might also be recognized as a warfighting realm.

While the basic principles of military doctrine remain relevant over time, the details evolve. Those nations who successfully employed one doctrine in a previous war may be at risk using that same doctrine in the next. In regard to OE, newer doctrine might consider it in a radically new way. OE is more than an enabler—it is a force that permeates all the other realms of warfighting and will be the most advanced weapon of the future. Doctrine must explicitly integrate OE to optimize successful combat outcomes. And as with other warfighting domains, OE requires full domain integration with a goal of attaining energy superiority over any adversary. 

Deliberating OE 
Based on the growing predominance of OE and its crucial roles to power and attack directly, it is reasonable to consider identifying OE as a warfighting domain. Inculcating OE as part and parcel with the other domains would improve military and industrial capability by better defining OE, establishing requirements, improving resourcing, and integrating it with other realms. 

OE is not a managed commodity, but in the strategic sense, is a multi-faceted realm where almost all operations transpire. The cyber domain is not considered in terms of computers and servers, but as complex system in which information operates. In this regard, the OE domain is similar to the cyber domain, but even more universal. Liquid and solid fuel, electricity, and battery storage power are commodities that are managed; OE is the system or domain that they fall within. Arguably, without energy, cyber would not even exist. 

Today, there are five generally recognized warfighting domains—air, cyber, land, sea, and space. These realms transcend the military services, assist force integration, and focus development. Multi-Domain Battle (MDB) is a major focus for US and allied forces. Dr. Albert Palazzo (Director Australian Army Research Center) and Lt. Col. David P. McClain (Australian Chief, Integration and Operations Branch in the Joint and Army Concepts Division) stated that MDB enables the joint force commander to dominate other adversary domains; it eliminates traditional barriers between and improves capability by better exploiting the capabilities of the whole force.¹⁶ However, this integration is less likely to occur if all warfighting domains are not first recognized as such. 

As MDB continues to evolve, it is important we clearly determine all critical military realms as we integrate them. While the integration is paramount, development within the individual domains is equally important. OE is the most proliferated component of all the aspects of battle. It must be understood and logically promoted as fully integrated within multi-domain warfare.  By viewing OE as a domain, itself, the requisite focus and support in regard to OE will best occur.

Today, OE is a physical force, powering platforms and operating as a weapon itself. Almost every component in modern combat requires OE. OE powers both physical and virtual realms. Future warfare necessitates that energy be operationalized and its full capabilities employed and deployed from platforms and weapon systems that are dispersed at home and to forward operating locations. Most of these future weapon systems will likely evolve from petroleum motors to hybrids, and then to fully electrical engines that are charged from wireless support systems. However, some of these emerging technologies, including energy “reading” for preventive maintenance and wireless charging systems may partner with both the cyber and space domains. 

In The Art of War, Sun Tzu stated, “In all fighting, the direct method may be used for joining battle, but indirect methods will be needed in order to secure victory.¹⁸ These two in combination give rise to “an endless series of maneuvers.”¹⁹ Today, OE is an integral aspect of both the direct and indirect methods, and is laced throughout all spectrums of conflict. Since World War I the US has enjoyed energy superiority, but the world is evolving, and US OE predominance is being challenged. While the US may not lead in every area of military capability, it must be first to lead in the OE domain. Victory in the OE domain occurs when 1) there is efficient, effective, and sustained production of combat power when and where it is required by friendly forces, while 2) the enemy combat power production is disrupted, degraded or destroyed.  OE superiority is the ability to fully exploit one’s own energy capabilities while preventing the adversary from doing the same. These should be the primary US goals and ones America must attain.

US has enjoyed energy superiority, but the world is evolving, and US OE predominance is being challenged. While the US may not lead in every area of military capability, it must be first to lead in the OE domain. Victory in the OE domain occurs when 1) there is efficient, effective, and sustained production of combat power when and where it is required by friendly forces, while 2) the enemy combat power production is disrupted, degraded or destroyed.²⁰ OE superiority is the ability to fully exploit one’s own energy capabilities while preventing the adversary from doing the same. These should be the primary US goals and ones America must attain.
 

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

RuthAnne Darling, Director, Operational Energy - Innovation, OUSD R&E
Contact RuthAnne Darling at ruthanne.s.darling.civ@mail.mil

Paul Mason Carpenter, Transition Engineer, Operational Energy - Innovation, OUSD R&E
Contact Paul Carpenter at p.m.carpenter.ctr@mail.mil

Notes

1. Machiavelli, Niccolò, The Prince (Unabridged and Illustrated), Kindle Edition, location 556.
2. Wikipedia, AN/SEQ-3 Laser Weapon System, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AN/SEQ-3_Laser_Weapon_System#/media/File:Laser_Weapon_System_aboard_USS_Ponce_(AFSB(I)-15)_in_November_2014_(05).JPG, photo. 
3. William F Engdahl, A Century of War: Anglo-American Oil Politics and the New World Order, (London: Pluto Press, revised 2004 (original 1992), pages 46-48. 
4. George Sweet Gibb, and Evelyn H. Knowlton, The Resurgent Years, 1911-1927 (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1956), pages 179-180.
5. ““Ulei Română” During World War II and Beyond: Development of the Romanian Oil Industry,” The Yale Review of International Studies, October 2014, http://yris.yira.org/essays/1474, accessed 24 May 2020.
6.  Air university History Office, “WWII Allied ‘Oil Plan’ Devastates German POL Production,” 26 June 2019, https://www.maxwell.af.mil/News/Display/Article/1887774/wwii-allied-oil-plan-devastates-german-pol-production/, accessed 24 April 2020. 
7. Alfred Mierzejewski, The Collapse of the German War Economy, 1944-1945, (Chapel Hill: The University of North Caroline Press, 1988), locations 3591-3658.
8. Keith Miller, “How Important Was Oil in World War II?,” History News Network, Columbian College of Arts & Sciences, The George Washington University, https://historynewsnetwork.org/article/339, accessed 24 April 2020.
9. Robert Citino, “Oil War 1942,” History Net, https://www.historynet.com/oil-war-1942.htm. Accessed 27 April 2020.
10. Sarah Pruitt, “Why Did Japan Attack Pearl Harbor?,” History.com, https://www.history.com/news/why-did-japan-attack-pearl-harbor, accessed 24 April 2020.
11. Gordon W. Prange, At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1986) page 510.
12. Al Miller, phone conversation with Mace Carpenter, 15 May 2020.
13. RAND Report, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1365/MR1365.insert.pdf, accessed 24 April 2020.
14. Hoffman, FG & Davies, MC (10 June 2013). “Joint Force 2020 and the Human Domain: Time for a New Conceptual Framework?” Small Wars Journal. http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/joint-force-2020-and-the-human-domain-time-for-a-new-conceptual-framework, accessed 17 January 2020.
15. Joint Chiefs of Staff Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, (August 2005), Version 2.0. (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 2005), page 16. http://www.dtic.mil/futurejointwarfare/concepts/approved_ccjov2.pdf, accessed 17 January 2020 through “Multi-Domain Confusion: All Domains Are Not Created Equal” by Erik Heftye.
16. A. Palazzo & D.P. McLain III. “Multi-Domain Battle: A New Concept for Land Forces.” War on the Rocks. Retrieved from http://warontherocks.com/2016/09/multi-domain-battle-a-new-concept-for-land-forces/, accessed through War on the Rocks, 20 April 2020.
17. Tom Shearer, School of Advanced Air and Space Studies graduate, phone conversation with Mace Carpenter, 20 May 2020.
18. Sun Tzu. The Art of War. (Leicester, UK: Allandale Online Publishing, 2000). Translated by Lionel Giles. https://sites.ualberta.ca/~enoch/Readings/The_Art_Of_War.pdf, accessed 27 May 2020, page 15.
19. Ibid, page 16.
20. Dr. Dan Nussbaum, PhD. Energy Academic Group Chair, Naval Post Graduate School. Conversation with Mace Carpenter, 18 June 2020.