Geopolitical Resilience: A Case of Mongolia - Global ECCO
Geopolitical Resilience: A Case of Mongolia
Dr. Mendee Jargalsaikhan and Col. Altankhuu Badarch, Institute for Strategic Studies of Mongolia
1/17/25
The outbreak of war between Russia and Ukraine in February 2022 has heightened geopolitical tensions worldwide, leading to significant divisions among nations. Following a series of events, such as Western countries’ imposition of economic sanctions on Russia, pressure from major powers, energy crises, and humanitarian and military support to Ukraine, the international landscape has become complex; this has forced countries to reassess their alliances and their international position. The need for reassessment has been particularly true for Mongolia as it sits between the major powers of Russia and China, which have united their voices against the West. Mongolia is a democratic state that seeks to preserve its independent statehood, politics, economy, and society. However, it has become more challenging than usual for Mongolia to maneuver in this new landscape, given its economic dependence on its two powerful neighbors, who are its first (China) and second (Russia) largest trading partners.
The invasion of Ukraine caught Mongolians at all levels by surprise; they soon divided into pro-Russia, pro-Ukraine, or neutral positions across the country. However, Mongolia’s businesses and even multinational corporations, such as mining conglomerate Rio Tinto, have remained silent, quietly hoping Russia would continue to reliably export fuel. Almost all of Mongolia’s fuel supply comes from Russia, as does a significant portion of its electricity. Given Mongolia’s landlocked status, energy imports from Russia are essential for its economic functioning. Considering the country’s reliance on Russia, it is unsurprising that in six United Nations (UN) General Assembly votes condemning Russia’s actions in Ukraine, Mongolia’s government abstained.

Nancy Pelosi at Legislative Yuan
Tensions between the United States and Mongolia’s other neighbor, China, have increased as well, particularly after U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi visited Taipei in August of 2022.[2] China is Mongolia’s largest trading partner, accounting for over 60 percent of Mongolia’s total trade.[3] China’s demand for raw materials, such as copper and coal, is vital for Mongolia’s economy. China’s economic leverage is particularly pronounced in the minerals sector. If China were to impose trade barriers, restrict imports, or reduce demand for Mongolian exports, then it would have a devastating impact on Mongolia’s economy. Additionally, it should be noted that China often reacts to crises or registers protests by closing its borders, and such border closures dramatically affect Mongolia’s economy. Past temporary border closures following the Dalai Lama’s visit to Mongolia in 2002 led to sudden economic shocks, as did the force majeure closures of Mongolia’s Oyu Tolgoi copper mine and Tavan Tolgoi coal mine during the Chinese coal transporters’ protests in 2018.[4]
Great powers’ interests and actions shape the geopolitical environment of small states like Mongolia, leaving them vulnerable to sudden economic shocks. A country’s ability to survive these shocks depends on its resilience, or its ability to withstand disruptions caused by geopolitical upheavals. Russia’s interactions and relationships with other countries affect Mongolia significantly, as do China’s. When Mongolia’s two neighbors engage in prolonged wars or even temporary conflicts, Mongolia’s independence, economy, and society are threatened. Given the fluid and unpredictable nature of global and regional geopolitical dynamics, cultivating resilience should be a fundamental part of a small country’s security strategy; thus, the question of resilience for small states like Mongolia loom large in contemporary geopolitical and security discussions.
Given the fluid and unpredictable nature of global and regional geopolitical dynamics, cultivating resilience should be a fundamental part of a small country’s security strategy.
This article examines the concept of geopolitical resilience using Mongolia as a case study of a small, vulnerable state. The article will first explain the concept of geopolitical resilience, then it will discuss potential global and regional scenarios for Mongolia. Finally, it will emphasize the importance for Mongolia of maintaining explicit neutrality, building strong relations with “third neighbors,” and preparing its society for worst-case scenarios. By being well-prepared for any crisis or hardship, Mongolia can enhance its resilience to geopolitical shocks, thereby maintaining its independent, sovereign statehood and ensuring the well-being of its people.

Map of Mongolia
Geopolitical Resilience
Geopolitical resilience refers to a country’s capacity to withstand, adapt to, and recover from various geopolitical challenges and external shocks while maintaining its sovereignty, territorial integrity, economic stability, and national security. It involves a range of factors, including military strength, economic robustness, strategic diplomacy, domestic governance, and social cohesion, that allow a country to remain stable and pursue its interests in the face of external threats or adverse conditions. Unlike the concept of geopolitical vulnerability—which focuses on the risks and weaknesses a country faces in its geopolitical environment—geopolitical resilience emphasizes the proactive measures a country takes to ensure that it can endure and even thrive amidst global and regional uncertainties.
Small states improve their resilience by preparing to navigate shifting geopolitical landscapes to ensure their survival. Unlike large states such as Russia, China, and the United States, small states lack the resources or influence to reshape the geopolitical environment. Instead, small states often must absorb the shocks larger states cause and adjust their strategies accordingly. In today’s dynamically shifting world, cultivating resilience is crucial.
In today’s global arena, the most powerful actors remain the great powers; these nations possess the ability and resources to shape international politics and are capable of creating the greatest challenges and shocks. Mongolia considers not only China and Russia, but also the United States, as key great powers of concern. Over the past century, these nations have consistently competed for dominance and influence, both on the international and regional stages, a dynamic that continues to this day. They seek strategic advantages, including control of terrain and space, access to resources, trade routes, markets, and technology, while simultaneously seeking to keep each other’s military ambitions in check. Their behavior escalates geopolitical risks, creating stress, shocks, and significant challenges that test a small state’s resilience.
If a small state is not prepared to handle such geopolitical disruptions and shocks, then it risks facing dire outcomes. These dire outcomes may include becoming a failed state, such as Afghanistan or Somalia; a contested or divided state driven by proxy wars, like the two Koreas during the 1950s; a controlled or satellite state compelled to seek out membership in a mutual defense alliance, such as small states caught up in the Cold War rivalry; or, in the worst case, a state that loses its independence and sovereignty altogether, such as small states during the world wars. [5] Mongolia’s history has provided harsh lessons. In the 1930s and 1960s, during periods of hostility between its two neighbors, Mongolia was compelled to align with the Soviet Union. Following the end of the Cold War in the 1990s, Mongolia’s status as a satellite state finally came to an end, allowing the country to enjoy newfound freedom. However, maintaining a delicate balance between these two giants remains challenging, as Mongolia continues to be vulnerable to their influence and pressure as they compete on the world stage.
Maintaining a delicate balance between these two giants remains challenging, as Mongolia continues to be vulnerable to their influence and pressure as they compete on the world stage.
Global and Regional Scenarios
Geopolitical risks confront small states on both the global and regional levels. For Mongolia, at the global level, the strategic interactions among China, Russia, and the United States are critical factors, [6] while at the regional level, the interests and actions of China and Russia primarily shape Mongolia’s risks. The following two sections review the favorable and unfavorable scenarios for Mongolia on the global and regional levels.
Global Scenarios
Geopolitically, the most favorable scenario for small states like Mongolia occurs when the great powers maintain friendly relations. In this scenario, the great powers strengthen international institutions such as the UN and other key organizations, reduce defense spending, engage in confidence-building measures, and promote international trade and economic cooperation. Small states that do not provoke tensions can benefit from the “peace dividend” while adhering to international norms and standards. Additionally, the great powers could collaborate to address the issues of small states that pose global security and economic concerns. For Mongolia, this scenario is ideal as it allows the country to develop ties with all major powers while simultaneously providing the time and space to work on building its resilience in preparation for any sudden shocks that might occur.
According to Matthias Maass, the classical balance of power system unexpectedly benefits small states, as great powers are preoccupied with counterbalancing one another, leaving small states with more room to maneuver. [7] However, overly close ties between Mongolia’s two neighbors often enable them to make decisions about critical issues related to Mongolia’s security and interests without Mongolia’s involvement. For example, during the Kyakhta negotiations of 1915, which resulted in the Treaty of Kyakhta, Russia and China significantly undermined Mongolia’s independent status, declared just four years earlier in 1911; the treaty granted Mongolia’s two neighbors certain powers over Mongolia and failed to recognize Mongolia as a fully independent state.[8] While the classical balance of power system can create opportunities for small states, Mongolia’s historical experience demonstrates their persistent vulnerability to the strategic calculations of larger powers, as seen in its struggle for autonomy during the Kyakhta negotiations.

Deputies from China, Russia and Outer Mongolia signing Kyakhta Treaty
Conversely, the worst-case scenario arises when all great powers engage in antagonistic relationships with one another. Competitive actions among these powers weaken international organizations, erode trust, and create challenges for multilateral cooperation. In such an environment, small states like Mongolia become pressured to take sides, increasing their incentive to play great powers against each other for various benefits. This scenario is particularly perilous for Mongolia due to its geostrategic location. An alignment with either China or Russia could be perceived as an attempt to shift the regional balance of power. Therefore, Mongolia must maintain explicit neutrality and continue to enhance its resilience while navigating these pressures.
An alignment with either China or Russia could be perceived as an attempt to shift the regional balance of power.
Currently, antagonistic relationships among the great powers are complicating the global landscape, presenting two scenarios involving Mongolia’s neighbors and the United States. In the first scenario, antagonism between the United States and Russia leads to three options for Mongolia, depending on China’s stance toward Russia and the United States. In the second scenario, antagonism between China and the United States leads to three options for Mongolia, depending on Russia’s stance toward China and the United States. In both cases, Mongolia must carefully navigate the competing interests of these major powers to safeguard its national interests.
First Scenario
Option A involves China maintaining friendly relations with both Russia and the United States, which is favorable for Mongolia as it reduces pressure from these three major powers on the small country.
Option B sees China friendly with the United States but hostile toward Russia, placing Mongolia in a difficult position in which it might have to choose sides between China or Russia or become a geopolitical battleground. In this scenario, Russia may attempt to subsidize Mongolia’s economy in key areas such as energy, transportation, and mining to secure its loyalty. Russia’s intent in this case is to limit China’s influence over Mongolia by keeping Mongolia within its sphere of influence. This approach reflects Russia’s longstanding strategy of ensuring its own security by establishing buffer states along its borders.
Option C involves China being friendly with Russia but hostile toward the United States, making Mongolia’s ties with the United States challenging, as both of its neighbors would be antagonistic toward the United States. This scenario could significantly hinder Mongolia’s efforts to deepen its ties with the United States due to increased geopolitical pressures and perceptions of alignment. If China is hostile toward the United States but friendly with Russia, both neighbors may view Mongolia’s cooperation with the United States as an indirect threat to their interests. For instance, if Mongolia were to participate in a regional military exercise with the United States and other Western allies, China and Russia could respond by jointly issuing statements condemning Mongolia’s actions as destabilizing, followed by a military drill near Mongolia’s borders to signal discontent. Joint pressures from Beijing and Moscow could force Mongolia to limit or sever its relations with Washington, while also increasing the potential for trilateral economic cooperation, thereby testing Mongolia’s resilience through various political and diplomatic pressures. For instance, China and Russia could escalate tensions by closing borders, imposing trade barriers, or restricting Mongolia’s export and import activities. Such actions could severely disrupt Mongolia’s economy, given its reliance on trade with these neighbors, and create diplomatic challenges by isolating Mongolia on the international stage. These pressures would test Mongolia’s capacity to maintain its sovereignty, adapt to economic disruptions, and pursue an independent foreign policy. Under China’s “Belt and Road Initiative,” one of the six sub-land corridors, called the China-Mongolia-Russia Economic Corridor, is under implementation, though it has not progressed much recently. Since 2016, China, Mongolia and Russia have signed a number of tripartite agreements to streamline border clearance procedures and facilitate seamless road and railway transport along the corridor.[9] Moreover, negotiations between the three parties on the development of a gas pipeline from Russia to China via Mongolia are still ongoing but have significantly slowed due to China’s cautious and hesitant approach, illustrative of the delicate tensions at play in the region.
Second Scenario
Whereas the first scenario, antagonism between Russia and the United States, involves Mongolia’s relationship with China, the second scenario, antagonism between China and the United States, involves Mongolia’s relationship with Russia. Three options for Mongolia emerge based on Russia’s stance toward China and the United States.
Option A entails Russia maintaining friendly relations with both the United States and China, which complicates Mongolia’s position due to China’s significant economic leverage over Mongolia. Despite pressures from both Washington and Moscow, China’s economic influence remains a dominant factor in Mongolia’s economy. China is not only Mongolia’s largest trade partner but it also accounts for over 80 percent of its exports. [10]
Option B involves Russia being friendly with the United States but hostile toward China, creating a highly complex situation for Mongolia as it faces joint pressure from both Russia and the United States.
Option C sees Russia friendly with China but hostile toward the United States, resulting in Mongolia facing the likelihood of coordinated pressure from both neighbors if it attempts to deepen ties with the United States. In this case, Mongolia may be forced to align more closely with its powerful neighbors, which would compromise its independence and test its resilience.
In the second scenario of antagonism between China and the United States, Mongolia’s relationship with Russia and regional dynamics heavily influences its strategic positioning. Regardless of whether Russia adopts a neutral, pro-China, or pro-U.S. stance, Mongolia faces significant challenges in balancing external pressures. The dominance of China’s economic leverage, Russia’s potential alignment with either rival power, and the overarching geopolitical rivalry underscore Mongolia’s precarious position. To navigate this complex environment, Mongolia must prioritize safeguarding its sovereignty and resilience by pursuing a pragmatic and nuanced foreign policy that mitigates risks from external pressures while seeking opportunities to strengthen its autonomy and diversify its strategic partnerships.
Regional Scenarios
Unlike other Asian states, Mongolia is geographically isolated, bordered by only two countries. Therefore, in terms of regional scenarios, the dynamics between China and Russia shape Mongolia’s geopolitical risks. The following four key regional scenarios emerge: (1) friendly relations between China and Russia, (2) conflictual relations between China and Russia, (3) distracted China and/or distracted Russia, and (4) instability in China and/or Russia.[11]
In scenario 1, the most favorable regional scenario for Mongolia, China and Russia maintain peaceful and amicable relations without conflicts or tensions involving other major powers. In this situation, trilateral cooperation in political, economic, and social spheres can thrive, fostering a stable neighborhood. However, given their longstanding competition for influence and the inherently competitive nature of China and Russia, this scenario is challenging to sustain. Nonetheless, this favorable setting provides a less strenuous test of Mongolia’s resilience.
In scenario 2, China and Russia have hostile and conflictual relations with each other. This is the most dangerous regional scenario for Mongolia. Mongolia’s geographical location makes it a focal point for both neighbors, who are seeking to increase their presence and influence, and therefore this location is of vital strategic importance. In such a scenario, maintaining absolute neutrality becomes extremely difficult as Mongolia could become a proxy zone for the geopolitical contest that erupts between the two powers. Both powers might attempt to manipulate Mongolia’s domestic politics to serve their own interests, severely testing Mongolia’s resilience to withstand competing pressures from its powerful neighbors.
The remaining two regional scenarios involve external and domestic challenges faced by Mongolia’s neighbors. Scenario 3, distracted China and/or distracted Russia, is a favorable scenario for Mongolia, arising when one or both neighbors are distracted by external events, which reduces direct pressure on Mongolia. However, this scenario also creates challenges due to Mongolia’s dependence on its neighbors for trade and security, as seen in the 1990s when both China and Russia were preoccupied with their own issues. Russia struggled in the aftermath of the Soviet Union’s breakup, with internal conflicts (for example, breakaway regions such as Chechnya) and political and socioeconomic transformations occurring in the former Soviet republics as well as in Central and Eastern Europe. Similarly, China was preoccupied with domestic political turmoil following the Tiananmen Square Incident (1989) and socioeconomic hardships. Currently, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine distracts it from concerns with Mongolia. In this context, as long as Mongolia maintains neutrality and avoids triggering security concerns, both neighbors may remain satisfied with Mongolia’s peaceful stance in the region.
Scenario 4, instability in China and/or Russia, is unfavorable and involves domestic instability or implosion in either or both neighbors. Such instability would overwhelm Mongolia’s border security and disrupt trade with other countries. If instability arises in one neighbor, Mongolia would need to collaborate with the other to prevent humanitarian disasters, protect its borders, and maintain law and order. Mongolia’s landlocked status exacerbates this increased dependency on the remaining stable neighbor. Historical precedents, such as the instability in China and Russia from 1900 to 1921, and the civil war in China until 1949, illustrate the potentially devastating impact of such scenarios. Scenario 4 demands a high degree of resilience and resistance from Mongolia’s state and people.
Nexus of Global and Regional Scenarios
When considering both global and regional scenarios together, the most favorable conditions for Mongolia occur when Russia, China, and the United States engage in friendly interactions and collaborate on common security and economic challenges. Conditions are also favorable for Mongolia if China and Russia are distracted by foreign policy issues elsewhere, because the country can focus on building its resilience to prepare for worst-case scenarios, ensuring that the state and its people can withstand future difficult times.
Conversely, the worst-case scenarios for Mongolia include direct conflict between its two neighbors, joint conflict or joint competition between its neighbors and the United States, or conflict between one neighbor and the United States. These scenarios would rigorously test Mongolia’s resilience as it would need to navigate the uncertainties of geopolitical competition without knowing the scope, duration, or impact of these tensions.
Viable Strategies for Strengthening Mongolia’s Geopolitical Resilience
While many strategies and tactics are available for a state to navigate various geopolitical conditions, three strategies appear to be the most viable for Mongolia at the present time.
The foremost strategy is maintaining a consistent, well-communicated, and apolitical commitment to neutrality toward the great powers—China, Russia, and the United States—and institutionalizing itself as a zone of peace. Mongolia’s neutrality is essential for Sino-Russian security. Historically, one of the primary conditions for the normalization of Sino-Soviet and Sino-Russian relations was the complete withdrawal of Soviet military forces from Mongolia in the 1920s and 1980s.[12] To maintain this neutrality, Mongolia cannot openly align with the geopolitical or security interests of the United States, which is a key strategic competitor to its two powerful neighbors. Neutrality is deeply enshrined in Mongolia’s constitution, as well as its national security and foreign policy frameworks, and is reflected in its treaties with these great powers. Therefore, Mongolia should ensure clear channels of communication with all three powers to avoid misperceptions or miscommunications.
The foremost strategy for Mongolia is maintaining a consistent, well-communicated, and apolitical commitment to neutrality toward the great powers and institutionalizing itself as a zone of peace.

Equestrian statue of Damdin Sukhbaatar, Mongolia’s revolutionary hero, Sukhbaatar Square, Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia
As part of this primary strategy, Mongolia could position itself as a neutral platform—a kind of “Asian Switzerland”—where these powers can engage in dialogue and cooperation. To make its neutrality more credible, Mongolia’s political leaders and the public must agree to not politicize foreign policy, not allow populist rhetoric to manipulate the situation, and not permit domestic political or business groups to pursue narrow interests, particularly in major economic projects. There have been numerous cases in Mongolia’s history when some members of Parliament, groups of wealthy businessmen, political parties, or even local officials with personal interests in large mining projects planned and operated by the government, have lobbied to exploit these projects for short-term or localized gains, or politicized them in favor of or against major investing countries at the expense of broader national interests. Prohibiting such behavior would be a key part of this strategy. The success of this neutrality strategy largely depends on how effectively Mongolia communicates with and navigates its relationships with these great powers.
The second strategy is to strengthen relationships with third neighbors and other states facing similar geopolitical challenges, as difficult times require strong friendships. Thanks to its persistent efforts toward gaining international recognition since 1911, Mongolia has attracted the political support of some of its third neighbors and many former socialist states, even during the Cold War. In the favorable geopolitical conditions of the 1990s, Mongolia deepened ties with third neighbors that included Japan, India, Turkey, Germany, South Korea, Canada, and Australia.[13] Mongolia should continue to develop strong, close cooperation with these and other third neighbors both bilaterally and multilaterally. In the 1990s, Japan, Germany, Australia, and South Korea were crucial partners in helping Mongolia overcome the economic challenges of its transition. More recently, during the COVID-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine, Japan, Germany, South Korea, and Turkey provided Mongolia with crucial international flight connections when its two neighbors closed their airports. Moreover, Mongolia should build alliances with countries that are also pursuing a neutral stance in the geopolitical rivalries of the great powers. In this regard, Mongolia could engage in multilateral initiatives, such as nuclear nonproliferation, and women, peace, and security, while cooperating with international organizations such as the European Union (EU), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA).
The third strategy is strengthening Mongolia’s resilience as a society in preparation for the worst geopolitical scenarios. Resilience is deeply rooted in Mongolia’s nomadic culture and traditions. Survival and perseverance in a harsh continental climate have shaped the societal mindset over centuries. Historically, severe winter conditions unique to Mongolia tested the resilience of nomadic herders, and the traditional knowledge and spirit of adaptability have been passed down for generations. Nomadic families traditionally formed small groups to cooperate during harsh times, sharing resources and labor, and community cooperation remains a time-honored value. Mongolians have practiced rotational grazing to prevent overgrazing and maintain pasture health, making sustainable resource management a common occurrence. The traditional ger dwelling embodies minimalism and efficiency, with each item serving multiple purposes; thus, Mongolians are the embodiment of minimalism and resourcefulness. Mongolian folklore and epics often celebrate heroes who overcome great adversities, embodying mental toughness and emotional resilience. In nomadic communities, elders traditionally pass down skills and knowledge to younger generations; thus, intergenerational knowledge transfer is another element of resilience that Mongolian people are well acquainted with. Mongolia should further cultivate and adapt this traditional and cultural resilience to meet contemporary challenges.

Mongolian eagle hunters wearing traditional Mongolian dress, Altai Mountain Range, Bayan-Ulgii Province, Mongolia
Intergenerational knowledge transfer is another element of resilience that Mongolian people are well acquainted with.
To further cultivate this traditional and cultural resilience, Mongolia should introduce practical measures. For instance, Mongolia could incorporate resilience-focused programs into its educational system at various levels. School curricula could include lessons on nomadic survival skills, sustainable resource management, and the importance of community cooperation, drawing inspiration from traditional practices. Additionally, initiatives to promote intergenerational knowledge transfer, such as mentorship programs connecting elders with youth, could ensure that Mongolians preserve their cultural wisdom while adapting it to modern challenges. Resilience-themed community activities, including folklore storytelling, skill-building workshops, and collaborative projects, could also help foster a stronger societal mindset capable of withstanding contemporary and future adversities.
Moreover, as part of this third strategy, Mongolia must safeguard its open, pluralistic, and inclusive society by upholding the rule of law. Over the past three decades, the country has made significant progress in democratic governance and maintaining a free society. Educated citizens and strong legal frameworks are critical to protecting this democracy.
Finally, as part of this third strategy, Mongolia as a society should develop short-, mid-, and long-term strategic plans to address potential geopolitical risks and shocks. For instance, Mongolia could develop short-term plans (1-2 years) focused on establishing a crisis response framework, launching public awareness campaigns, and building a stockpile of essential materials. Mid-term plans (3-5 years) could prioritize diversifying trade partners, enhancing infrastructure resilience, and introducing educational initiatives. Long-term plans (5-10 plus years) might include advancing energy independence, strengthening national security and policy coordination, and promoting cultural preservation and modernization. These plans would integrate the idea of resilience into Mongolia’s national framework, aligning with the goal of embedding it as a core societal value. This approach would help resilience become a core part of the thinking and actions of Mongolia’s citizens, communities, and society.
Conclusion
Geopolitical rivalry among great powers is nothing new, and small states have always had to navigate complex terrains shaped by the competing interests and interactions of larger nations. Mongolia operates within two distinct geopolitical frameworks: the global level, defined by strategic interactions among China, Russia, and the United States, and the regional level, where the balance of power between China and Russia is the critical focus. Despite its vulnerability, Mongolia has demonstrated resilience in maintaining its independence and sovereignty. However, the current geopolitical landscape presents even greater uncertainty, where China’s relations with both the United States and Russia are emerging as key factors in testing Mongolia’s resilience.
To withstand these challenges, Mongolia must remain steadfast in its neutrality, strengthen its ties with third neighbors, and cultivate resilience in its society to include reinforcing the rule of law to protect its democratic institutions. Ultimately, the key to Mongolia’s geopolitical resilience lies in being fully prepared for worst-case scenarios. These strategies are not unique to Mongolia but can serve as a blueprint for other small states navigating similar geopolitical pressures such as Bhutan, Nepal, and others. By adapting such approaches to their specific contexts, small states can enhance their resilience and safeguard their sovereignty to better withstand the shifting dynamics of global and regional power rivalries.
About the Authors
Dr. Mendee Jargalsaikhan is Director of the Institute for Strategic Studies of Mongolia. He received an MA from the Mongolian National University, an MA from the US Naval Postgraduate School, and an MA from the University of British Columbia. He obtained his Ph.D. in political science from the University of British Columbia.
Col. Altankhuu Badarch is a Senior Research Fellow at the Center for International Security, Institute for Strategic Studies of Mongolia, and a Ph.D. Candidate at the National Defense University of Mongolia. He holds an MA from the National Defense University in the People’s Republic of China and an LLM from the University of Glasgow in the United Kingdom. Additionally, he is a graduate of the U.S. Army War College.
This is a work of the US federal government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. Foreign copyrights may apply.
Image Credits
- Photo by: Shutterstock
- Photo by: Wikimedia Commons
- Photo by: Wikimedia Commons
- Photo by: Wikimedia Commons
- Photo by: Shutterstock
- Photo by: Shutterstock
Endnotes
[1] The views expressed in this article are those of the authors. They do not purport to reflect the opinions or views of the Institute for Strategic Studies of Mongolia.
[2] Yimou Lee and Sarah Wu, “Pelosi arrives in Taiwan vowing U.S. commitment; China enraged,” Reuters, 2 August 2022: https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/pelosi-expected-arrive-taiwan-tuesday-sources-say-2022-08-02/
[3] “Mongolia’s Top Trade Partners,” European Parliamentary Research Service, accessed 12 December 2024: https://epthinktank.eu/2024/09/02/eu-mongolia-relations-possible-critical-raw-materials-partnership/mongolia-s-top-trade-partners/#:~:text=According%20to%20IMF%20data%2C%20in,the%20EU%20(Figure%201)
[4] Cecilia Jasasmie, “Force Majeure at Oyu Tolgoi mine due to border protests,” Mining.com, 18 January 2018: https://www.mining.com/force-majeure-oyu-tolgoi-mine-due-border-protests/
[5] Robert I. Rotberg, “Failed States, Collapsed States, Weak States: Causes and Indicators,” in State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror, World Peace Foundation, 2003: https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/statefailureandstateweaknessinatimeofterror_chapter.pdf
[6] Lowell Dittmer, “The Strategic Triangle: An Elementary Game-Theoretical Analysis,” World Politics vol. 33, no. 4, Jul. 1981, pp. 485-515.
[7] Matthias Maass, Small States in World Politics: The Story of Small State Survival, 1648-2016, Manchester University Press, 2017.
[8] Sureyya Yigit, “Mongolia’s Historic Relations with Its Largest Neighbor: Russia,” Electronic Journal of Social and Strategic Studies, vol. 2, no. 4, 30 August 2021: https://www.ejsss.net.in/uploads/172/13219_pdf.pdf
[9] United Nations, “Greening the China-Mongolia-Russia economic corridor”: https://www.un.org/ohrlls/sites/www.un.org.ohrlls/files/mr._shigang_zhang_senior_prog_managt_officer_unep_greening_the_chinamongoliarussia_economic_corridor.pdf
[10] “Mongolia Top 5 Export and Import Partners 2022,” World Integrated Trade Solution, accessed 20 December 2024: https://wits.worldbank.org/CountrySnapshot/en/MNG/textview#:~:text=Mongolia%20top%205%20Export%20and,partner%20share%20of%2084.30%20percent
[11] J. Mendee and N. Soyolgerel, “Mongolia’s new foreign policy strategy: A balancing act with Central and Northeast Asia,” Mongolian Geopolitics, no. 19, p. 115, 2022: https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/mongolei/19359.pdf
[12] Vladislav Zubok, “The Soviet Union and China in the 1980s: Reconciliation and divorce,” Cold War History, p. 1-21, 2017: https://eprints.lse.ac.uk/79133/1/Zubok_Soviet%20Union%20and%20China_2017.pdf
[13] Oyuntsetseg Densmaa, Gerelchimeg Kaliinaa, Norovsuren Nanzad, and Tsogzolboo Otgonbayar, “Mongolia’s ‘Third Neighbor Policy,’ RS Global, pp. 71-80, January 2021: https://conferences.rsglobal.pl/index.php/conf/catalog/download/7/11/273-1?inline=1
