Research tells us that personal identity undergoes changes during radicalization and is an integral part of the radicalization process. However, there is no single comprehensive explanation of the radicalization process that fully accounts for subsequent terrorist behavior.[1] For example, Marc Sageman, a psychiatrist and political scientist, explains that the appeal of a common identity, accompanied by factors such as religion or social bonds, can transform someone into a jihadist, which is invaluable knowledge when countering Islamist terrorist groups.[2]

This article presents new findings about the interaction of personal and social identity during radicalization using a meta-analysis approach, in which the findings from three social psychological theories are compared. An analysis of the appeal of violent extremist or terrorist groups to an individual from a personal identity perspective reveals how personal identity changes during radicalization. The findings reveal that personal identity is influenced by the social identity of the violent extremist group, and uncover important elements that can inform successful counterterrorism policies.

The three social psychological theories analyzed in this article, uncertainty identity theory (UIT), social identity theory (SIT), and identity fusion theory (IFT), postulate that it is the group’s identity that radicalizes the personal identities of the group members. UIT explains radicalization through individuals’ desire to reduce their uncertainty, which they accomplish by joining a group. In this context, the terms uncertainty and self-uncertainty are interchangeable and cover a broad spectrum of feelings “about or reflecting on one’s self and identity,” which can stem from a family issue; one’s professional, economic, or social status; the perceived security of one’s living situation; etc.[3] According to SIT, individuals can become radicalized when they are attempting to boost their self-esteem by joining a group. IFT asserts that group members are willing to act violently on behalf of their group, and even die for their group when they are fused with it (these ties can be emotional, psychological, social, cultural, and/or religious). This is especially true when the members of the group share certain sacred values, which is explained by the devoted actor framework. This framework states that the combination of identity fusion and sacred values can “determine who is likely to become a devoted actor,” i.e., a person who is willing to fight and die for their group.[4]

A person’s decision to join an extremist or terrorist group is primarily motivated not by the group’s ideology, but by the group’s ability to provide a social identity.

This analysis has four primary findings. First, a person’s decision to join an extremist or terrorist group is primarily motivated not by the group’s ideology, but by the group’s ability to provide a social identity for those who lack self-esteem, feel uncertain, or seek to share their experiences with people of similar characteristics, either biological (e.g., a relative, family member) or perceived (persons who are not related to each other biologically, but who perceive other group members as family or relatives). Second, a member of an extremist group is more willing to engage in violence than is an individual not associated with a group. Third, group membership provides a person with a motivation to protect the group, especially when a threat toward the group is present. Finally, in some cases, the willingness of a group member to protect the group goes beyond engaging in violent behavior, and results in self-sacrificial behavior.

Three Theories of Radicalization

This article employs a meta-analysis approach and analyzes published studies to identify pathways leading to extremist violence as explained by UIT, SIT, and IFT. UIT offers a causal claim that a lessening of self-uncertainty, attained by group membership, can increase the likelihood of radicalization.[5] Within this causal claim, the self-uncertainty is the independent variable and the type of group the individual joins is the dependent variable. UIT asserts that uncertain individuals are more prone to identify with a group that prescribes their behavior for them.[6] UIT hypothesizes that group identification “very effectively reduces self-uncertainty” and that individuals identify more strongly with “radical” groups when the individuals’ values and practices are threatened.[7] UIT offers several causal mechanisms as to both why individuals reduce their uncertainty and how they lessen uncertainty through group membership. The theory asserts that being uncertain is anxiety-provoking and stressful, and therefore, people strive to diminish it.[8] UIT also claims that self-uncertainty is reduced by the validation that comes from other group members.[9] Therefore, the first hypothesis explored in this analysis is this:

H₁: Individuals psychologically assessed as exhibiting signs of self-uncertainty are more prone to join extremist organizations than individuals who do not exhibit such characteristics.

SIT, or the theory of intergroup conflict, offers a causal claim that individuals seek to boost their self-esteem through ingroup favoritism and outgroup discrimination, which can lead to conflict when the groups view each other as a threat.[10] Within the causal claim, the independent variable is the disparity between the groups, while the level of the perceived threat is the dependent variable.[11] SIT asserts that there are two causal mechanisms that lead to conflict between groups: first, the group models the behavior, thinking, and feelings of its members;[12] and second, the value and significance of the group is determined through social comparison with other groups.[13] When the causal mechanisms are connected to a perceived threat from another group, “social identities can be responsible for conflict between groups.”[14] Therefore, a second hypothesis is explored:

H₂: Individuals exhibiting a strong ingroup identity and outgroup bias, seeing the outgroup as a threat, are more prone to engage in violence than individuals who do not exhibit such ingroup-outgroup dichotomies.

IFT claims that individuals can engage in self-sacrificial and even suicidal behavior when their identity fuses with a group identity.[15] Identity fusion is often described as a “visceral sense of oneness with the group.”[16] IFT asserts that the individual believes that any threat towards the group equates to a threat to that individual. Within this causal claim, the identity fusion of the individual with the group is the independent variable, while the behavior of the individual is the dependent variable. IFT offers two causal mechanisms to explain why individuals join groups and how their individual identities fuse with the group’s identity: through sharing intense collective experiences, or through feeling a common “shared essence.”[17] Researchers of identity fusion claim that intense collective experiences (usually negative), such as grievances,[18] pain, and fear,[19] can impel an individual to fuse their identity with a group. The causal mechanism of a “shared essence” or “perceived biological traits” stems from the perception of biological kinship with other members of the group, whether they are actually biological kin or not.[20] Consequently, the third hypothesis explored is as follows:

H₃: Individuals who exhibit intense identification with a violent extremist group are more likely to engage in violence, including suicide attacks, than individuals who are on the periphery of violent extremist groups.

Uncertainty Identity Theory

While uncertainty is a condition everyone experiences, in some situations it can lead to radicalization and cause certain individuals to engage in violent and extremist behavior. UIT, which was developed by Michael Hogg in the mid-2000s, rests on a key principle: feelings of uncertainty are unpleasant and unwanted.[21] UIT makes three assumptions: first, uncertainty incentivizes identification with a group; second, the higher the level of uncertainty, the higher the identification with the group; and third, identification with the group reduces uncertainty. Hogg claims that UIT can “explain the conditions under which radicalization and extremism arise and the various forms they can take.”^[22] Hogg also explains that individuals, when feeling uncertain, are more prone to identify with a group that is “distinctive, unambiguous, all-encompassing, explanatory, and behaviorally prescriptive.”^[23] Because extremist groups often have such attributes, Hogg suggests that identity uncertainty can be a pathway to radicalization. While personal uncertainty can lead to the adoption of radical ideas, it does not predict radical behavior, such as violence. Thus, UIT can be considered as a pertinent theory for studying radicalization.

Several researchers claim that when an individual identifies with a fundamentalist religious group, such groups are effective in reducing uncertainty. Studies by one group of psychologists showed that people turn to religion when feeling uncertain, and that religion can decrease their feelings of uncertainty.[24] Most religious groups are not extremist in their beliefs, the values they propagate, or their structure, but they can become extremist when their followers are feeling uncertain and when their crucial, religious identity is threatened.[25] This is because, as the uncertainty which caused the members to join a group can be reduced when they become identified with the group, these members can become extremely willing to protect the group (the group identity), which they have come to view as their own identity.

Political Rally In Asheville, TN, 12 Sept 2016.

UIT and Support for Extremist Behavior

After conducting a two-year field study that included over 1600 Israeli and Palestinian participants, Hogg and Janice Adelman concluded that uncertainty and membership in a homogenous group can result in support for extremist and violent behavior.[26] Their study tested and confirmed the hypothesis that the highest level of support for extremist behavior would occur when uncertainty was high and national identity strong. One of the findings was that “among Palestinian Muslims support for the use of suicide bombs was … notably stronger among those who identified strongly as Palestinian and reported higher levels of uncertainty.”[27] Palestinians in the study indicated they felt self-uncertain due to their social and political living conditions.[28] Israelis who closely identified with the state of Israel, and were primed to feel self-uncertain about their future due to the conflict with the Palestinians, similarly reported a higher level of support for the overall use of military tactics in the conflict (as opposed to other, more moderate options).[29] The authors explain that the level of self-uncertainty in all studies was primed by asking questions about the conflict between the Israelis and Palestinians and the subsequent social and political uncertainty that resulted from it.[30] (Unfortunately, they did not provide more details about the way priming was conducted and measured.)

Psychologists Hogg, Christie Meehan, and Jayne Farquharson conducted a study with 82 students from the University of Queensland, Austraila, in which they tested the propensity of uncertain individuals to radicalize through group membership.[31] Before conducting the study, the researchers established that the students who took part generally preferred moderate over radical groups.[32] The students’ uncertainty was then manipulated by showing them a video of other students expressing uncertainty about their ability to pay tuition. The researchers found that when the students in the study were primed to feel highly uncertain and that their values and interests were under threat, they identified more strongly with a radical group, as opposed to a moderate one (the only two options offered to the students).[33]

Research by psychologists has also established that there is a causal link between radicalization and uncertainty. Through a study involving 131 young nonradical Dutch Muslims, a group of psychologists identified personal uncertainty as one of three driving factors of radicalization, alongside perceived injustice and perceived intergroup threat.[34] The study participants’ personal uncertainty was measured through the levels of their “subjective sense of doubt or instability in self-views, world-views, or the interrelation between the two.”[35] The study’s authors defined “radical belief” as consisting of four elements, as perceived by the people who took part in the study: the perceived illegitimacy of authorities, which is signified by mistrust in those authorities; ingroup superiority, by which other groups are perceived as inferior; distance from other people or a feeling of disconnectedness with others who do not hold the same type of radical belief; and societal disconnectedness, or a feeling of not belonging to society.[36] The combination of the four elements is a predictor of an individual’s willingness to engage in violence.[37] Additionally, the study showed that when the three driving factors of radicalization—uncertainty, perceived injustice, and perceived threat—are combined, they can predict the adoption of a radical belief system; in other words, even though the participants of the study did not become radicalized, they did perceive more intergroup threat and injustice when they were feeling more uncertain.[38] The researchers explain that the drivers of radicalization make it more likely that an individual will embrace a radical belief system, but cannot predict anyone’s propensity to act upon that radical belief, including by engaging in terrorism.[39]

Those who join a group to reduce personal uncertainty are more willing to engage in behavior that protects the group.

Findings about UIT

UIT provides a relevant theoretical structure through which radicalization can be studied. It indicates that while personal uncertainty alone is not a predictor of radical behavior, it is one of the motivational factors that can lead to radicalization. Personal uncertainty can lead an individual to join a structured group in which the rules and goals are clear, giving members a sense of direction that reduces their uncertainty.[40] Furthermore, those who join a group to reduce personal uncertainty are more willing to engage in behavior that protects the group, i.e., they are more willing to engage in violent behavior.[41] In the study described above, the psychologists ascertained that uncertainty results in radicalization when combined with other factors, such as a radical belief system.[42] Studies have also shown that the combination of a threat and a general feeling of uncertainty can result in violent behavior, as opposed to uncertainty alone.[43] Hypothesis H₁, which postulates that individuals psychologically assessed as exhibiting signs of self-uncertainty are more prone to join extremist organizations than individuals who do not exhibit such characteristics, has been confirmed.[44]

Social Identity Theory

SIT explains the formation of discrimination between the ingroup and the outgroup, which can lead to radicalization when the group members are strongly driven to preserve their personal and group identities. Research by social psychologists states that SIT rests on a “basic hypothesis … that pressures to evaluate one’s own group positively through in-group/out-group comparisons lead social groups to attempt to differentiate themselves from each other.”[45] SIT also asserts that the members of the group seek to defend and boost what they consider to be the group’s positive nature so that their self-esteem is also boosted.[46] The group’s identity and behavior become the norm for the ingroup, and are formed in contrast to the outgroup; therefore, the outgroup members are discriminated against and seen as competitors.[47] In other words, competitive behavior results from the group members’ high level of motivation to maintain or enhance the salience of their group, as that, in turn, increases the salience of their own personal identities.[48] Cass R. Sunstein, a legal scholar, states that “when people find themselves in groups of like-minded types, they are especially likely to move to extremes,” which adds to SIT’s concept of group polarization, and can be interpreted as a mechanism for increasing the salience of the group, as perceived by the group itself.[49]

SIT is used to explain the relationship of violence to individual and group behavior, terrorism included. One study asserts that “terrorism is most likely to occur in groups and societies that draw sharp distinctions between the ingroup and the outgroup(s) and where outgroup members are dehumanized.”^[50] It supports its conclusion with three examples of dehumanization as defined in a separate study: Armenians living under Ottoman Empire rule; Tutsis in Rwanda, who “were portrayed as being in league with hostile, invading enemies thus representing ‘alien’ intruders needing of elimination”; and Jews in Nazi Germany, who were labeled as “parasitic.”^[51] However, the examples used in these studies involved genocide, not terrorism, which should be taken into account when considering the strength of the authors’ connection between dehumanization and propensity for terrorism.

That membership in a group led to higher self-esteem was confirmed by another social psychologist in a series of interviews with 13 former right-wing extremists, in which he ascertained the self-esteem levels of the interviewees prior to their joining a right-wing group, during their membership, and after they left.[52] The series of interviews indicated that both before and after being in the right-wing group, the levels of self-esteem of the group members “were generally low; [while] during membership self-esteem was high.”[53] Former right-wing extremists described how they reached a very low point in their lives after they left the group.[54] As SIT postulates, the high self-esteem level the right-wing extremists attained through the group was a motivational force that caused them to remain in the group.

Cass R. Sunstein, a legal scholar, adds to SIT’s previous notions a possible explanation for the polarization of groups: when groups engage in continuous social comparison with each other, the views of the group’s members may become more extreme as individual members shift their beliefs to be more compatible with the general attitude in the group.[55] While SIT does not specifically designate group polarization as one of the mechanisms by which the ingroup and outgroup function with respect to one another, or as an influence on how members of any group interact with one another, Sunstein’s explanation can elucidate why certain groups tend to take a more extremist path.

SIT and Religious Social Identity

The interplay of personal and social/religious identity was used in one study to explain the radicalization process of the members of Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT), a radical Islamist group with branches around the world, including in the United Kingdom.[56] The 12-month study, done with four members of HT and 22 novices, included having researchers attend three of the group’s halaqahs (private study circles), and conduct interviews with two founders of HT’s UK affiliate, which was established in the 1980s.[57] The study found that HT’s radicalization process is centered around the restructuring of the members’ identities “into a single religious perspective, one that appeared to be inspired by a collective group identity.”[58] The study further defines this radicalization as a three-phase process, where the last step is the creation of that collective identity.[59]

Another sociological study supports claims that SIT can help explain the violent Islamist group Boko Haram’s success in recruiting new adherents and the Nigerian government’s lack of success in countering its actions.[60] The group’s success, according to this study, is connected with its religious and ethnic social identity (the marginalized Muslim communities of the country’s northern sectors) and the various religious and ethnic social identities of the people of Nigeria and neighboring countries.[61] As “religious identity overrides citizenship” in Nigeria, ingroup-outgroup competition between the Muslim and Christian communities fuels violence between them.[62] Boko Haram exploits this competition and violence by preaching a “pure” form of Islam, according to which all who do not share the same beliefs should be converted or killed.[63]

Additionally, the research finds that the common identity of belonging to the large Kanuri ethnic group, which is spread across parts of Nigeria, Niger, Chad, and Camaroon, provides Boko Haram with a cross-national reach that supports recruitment. The same fact is undercutting the Nigerian military’s efforts against Boko Haram, because military personnel who are of Kanuri ethnicity are reluctant to fight against Boko Haram, viewing it to be fratricide.[64]

Findings about SIT

SIT mechanisms, like ingroup-outgroup distinction, depersonalization, and common threat perception, are useful for radicalization research. The SIT-based explanation of radicalization is connected to the concept of depersonalization, or “viewing yourself as a category representative rather than a unique individual and is associated with a change in identity.”[65] Most SIT studies concentrate on explaining the emergence of biases between different groups, not why groups become violent.[66] Several researchers indicate that the group identity that members adopt after entering a group is not enough to predict their engagement in violence, and that other factors, like perceived injustices and threat perception, need to be present.[67] When social identity, derived from group membership, is combined with a threat towards the group, SIT can explain ingroup-outgroup hostilities and the adoption of extremist behavior.[68] Furthermore, SIT finds that the interplay of religious identity (zealotry) and group membership can lead to violence between groups.[69] Therefore, H_2, the hypothesis tested for SIT, has been supported: individuals who exhibit a strong ingroup identity and outgroup bias, and see the outgroup as a threat, are more prone to engage in violence than individuals who do not perceive such ingroup-outgroup dichotomies.

SIT finds that the interplay of religious identity (zealotry) and group membership can lead to violence between groups.

Thousands of devotees pray and light candles at a temple during the Rakher Upobash, a Hindu religious fasting festival in Narayanganj, Bangladesh. 12 November 2022.
 

Identity Fusion Theory

IFT is relevant to extremism and terrorism studies because it claims that, under certain conditions, identity fusion can result in extreme violence towards oneself and others.[70] IFT was formulated in the late 2000s by social psychologist William B. Swann, Jr., who describes identity fusion as “a visceral feeling of oneness with a group.”[71] IFT rests on two hypotheses: the fusion of personal and social identities increases the willingness of group members to support extreme behaviors on behalf of the group, and personal and social identity may become interdependent, resulting in especially high levels of extreme behavior.[72] Some researchers have labelled IFT as a theory of self-sacrifice on behalf of a group.[73] When individuals are highly fused with a group, an attack on the group is considered an attack on the individual.[74] Therefore, fused individuals have a desire to protect the group, which they view as a form of self-defense.[75]

A more potent cause for engaging in violence, both towards others and self, is a combination of a high level of fusion with the group and the sharing of sacred values with other group members; this integration has been termed the “devoted actor” framework.[76] It can help explain why people are willing to engage in harmful sacrifice and radical actions, including the willingness to kill and die.[77] Scott Atran, the anthropologist who coined the term, claims that “studies in real-world conflicts show ways that devoted actors, who are unconditionally committed to sacred values and whose personal identities are fused with a unique collective identity, willingly make costly sacrifices.”[78]

In opposition to SIT, IFT explains that the fusion between a personal and social identity does not result in depersonalization, an interchangeable view of the self and the group. To the contrary, a fused individual retains “a strong sense of personal identity” that merges with the group, and as a result, this increases the individual’s propensity for engaging in violence and self-sacrificial behavior for the group.[79] This notion challenges SIT’s claim that it is the group’s social identity that prescribes the behavior of the group member, and not the group member himself. As Swann and his colleagues explain, based on five preliminary IFT studies, extreme behavior does “not stem from a lack of self-knowledge,” but from people’s desire to validate their personal identities.[80] Nevertheless, SIT and IFT do agree that both personal and social identities play a role in radicalization.[81]

Research about IFT has found that fusion is a reliable predictor of a group member’s willingness to fight and die for a terrorist group.[82] One study, based on several large bodies of research, states that “strongly fused persons are more likely to support fighting and dying for their ingroup.”[83] Two main mechanisms have been found by which individuals fuse with a group and further enhance their fusion: through sharing experiences with others in the group and sharing values.[84] Decades of research by one noted anthropologist confirm the pertinence of shared experiences and shared values for fusion, and asserts that identity fusion causes threats to the group to be recognized as threats to the self.[85]

In this way, sharing core characteristics or values with group members and being fused with a group can enhance an individual’s propensity for violence in order to defend the group, which is seen as a kind of self-defense.[86] Two studies, involving a total of 415 Indonesian Muslims, tested their support for either peaceful or violent collective action, and found that “identity fusion was consistently related to support for more violent action.”[87] One of these studies measured the willingness of 239 participants to engage in peaceful and violent collective action, and found that religious identity fusion had a positive correlation with supporting violent action.[88] It explored the willingness of university students to protest “against the Christian former governor of Jakarta who was accused of blasphemy,” and determined that identity fusion has a positive correlation with the willingness to commit collective violent acts, as opposed to engaging in peaceful collective action.[89]

IFT and Self-Sacrificial Behavior

The devoted actor model, as explained by Scott Atran, states that people are willing to engage in self-sacrificial behavior when “sacred values” interact with identity fusion and produce a propensity for violent self-sacrificial action. In this case, “sacred values” are described as non-negotiable preferences that are defended regardless of the cost. The usage of the word “sacred” implies that the values are anchored in religion, but Atran explains that the sacred values in question can equally be “preferences regarding objects, beliefs, or practices that people treat as both incompatible or nonfungible with profane issues or economic goods.”^[90]

Atran uses the results from a study with 179 Libyan revolutionaries to elaborate how a combination of a strong sense of belonging to a military unit (sacred value) and identity fusion can explain a person’s willingness to commit self-sacrifice.[91]  The surveyed Libyan fighters formed “highly cohesive fighting units … [and] reported high levels of ‘identity fusion’—visceral, family-like bonds between fighters and their battalions.”[92] The frontline fighters reported an exceptionally high level of fusion with their units, which matched the level of fusion with their own families.[93] In comparison, only 1 percent of the combatants stated that they were fused with Libyans who were not actively participating in the military revolution against Muammar Gaddafi. The shared experiences of daily fighting and risking their lives for each other fused the revolutionaries with one another, while the shared cause for which they were fighting posed a sacred value for them.[94]

When the connections with a smaller group are projected onto a larger group, IFT claims that people will be more willing to die and fight for that large, extended group. A set of studies involving people from China, India, the United States, and Spain found that people are more willing to die for their country if they perceive themselves as having familial ties with their fellow countrymen.[95] While participants in the studies “endorsed fighting and dying for their country” if they were emotionally fused with it, when given a choice of which group they would sacrifice themselves for, they indicated the smaller, tighter-knit groups.[96] However, when the participants were primed to feel either biological or psychological connections with their countries, their willingness to die for their country increased.[97]

Empirical studies show that identity fusion with an idea or a social group is a good predictor for engaging in violent behavior, and even self-sacrificial behavior.

Muslim demonstrators carry signs reading "Islam will dominate the world" and "To hell with democracy" in Maldives, September 2014. 

Findings about IFT

Empirical studies show that identity fusion with an idea or a social group is a good predictor for engaging in violent behavior, and even self-sacrificial behavior.[98] The more emotionally fused group members are with the group or concept in which they believe, the more willing they are to defend it, and even sacrifice themselves.[99] In this respect, IFT is unique among the theories analyzed in this article, as it is the only one that offers an explanation and empirical support for why group members are willing to become martyrs. In connection to martyrdom, IFT’s “extension,” i.e., the devoted actor framework, explicates that group members can be especially prone to engage in self-sacrificial behavior if they also share sacred values with the group.[100] The hypothesis posed for IFT, H₃, is confirmed: individuals who exhibit intense identification with a violent extremist group are more likely to engage in violence, including suicide attacks, than individuals who are on the periphery of violent extremist groups.

Conclusion

UIT, SIT, and IFT are not theories about radicalization, and do not offer an all-encompassing causal explanation of an individual’s pathway to violence, but they do debunk the common perception that an individual is drawn to an extremist or terrorist group because of the ideology the group espouses. It is primarily the identity of the group, and not its ideology, that attracts the individual to the group.

The three theories show that a person’s own identity changes when he or she joins a group, and they offer an intersecting conclusion that the group’s identity can make the personal identity more extreme and violent. SIT and UIT explain this through depersonalization, while IFT rejects depersonalization in favor of identity.[101] UIT, SIT, and IFT do share the commonality of threat perception as a motivational pathway toward engaging in violent behavior on behalf of the group. Perhaps the most important and surprising finding of this meta-analysis is that it does not matter which values and interests bind the group—national, religious, ethnic, or military—or which of the three theories is applied to study the interaction between personal and social identity; the key catalyst for an individual to be more willing to commit violence is group membership.^[102] These findings suggest that counterterrorism strategies should focus on individual-group social psychological dynamics and the formation of group identity, and not on the ideological aspect in radicalization.

UIT shows that personal uncertainty is a trigger for joining a relatively rigid, behavior-prescriptive, group. The higher the level of uncertainty the individual is experiencing, the more willing he is to “become extreme” to defend himself and the group. Therefore, a sound policy toward preventing radicalization would be to ensure that people feel safe within their society. SIT elaborates that the relationship between ingroup-outgroup dynamics and group polarization sits at the core of discrimination toward anybody who is perceived as different, and that feelings of discrimination and threat can lead to violence. Given this finding, public policies should be aimed at fostering inclusive societies that perceive differences as positive dynamisms. The IFT’s devoted actor framework challenges the notion that people display the strongest willingness to fight for the people they feel are closest to them, and offers an alternative: that people are more willing to engage in violence and make costly sacrifices when they hold some values to be sacred to them while they are fused with their group. Additionally, counter-radicalization strategies should aim to reduce the level of cohesiveness within extremist groups, as a loosely structured group is less effective at providing a strong social identity for its group members. Social identity will therefore be less likely to completely overtake the members’ personal identities.

UIT, SIT, and IFT demonstrate that counterterrorism and deradicalization policies should start long before extremist behavior and terrorism find their way into any society. Continuous engagement with the most vulnerable parts of society, i.e., the groups that are being formed or are in existence already, should lead to an understanding of the group’s foundational ideas. Since all three theories indicate that group members hold the idea behind the group’s existence to be less important than the satisfaction of belonging to a group, counterterrorism policies should aim at offering alternative narratives to extremist views.[103] However, even though certain psychological mechanisms can be used for analyzing the group’s behavior, counterterrorism policies cannot lose sight of the fact that all groups are specifically different in their composition, as well as in their wider social, cultural, economic, and religious contexts. Some narratives, such as multiethnicity as a positive factor in a society, will certainly be received differently in an already multiethnic society, as opposed to a more homogenous one.

About the Author

Maja Čavlović is currently employed in the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Croatia. She was educated in Croatia at the Faculty of Political Science, in Cuba at the University of Havana, and in the United States at the Virginia Military Institute, George Washington University, and Naval Postgraduate School, where she earned an MS in Defense Analysis. Ms. Čavlović served in three deployments to Afghanistan as a member of the Croatian Military Police Regiment and served as a civil servant in various positions within the state structure of the Republic of Croatia.

This is a work of the US federal government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. Foreign copyrights may apply.

Image Credits

1. Photo by: Dmitrii Sadovnikov, via Wikimedia Commons

2. Photo by: Will Thomas, via Wikimedia Commons

3. Photo by: Md Shameem Ul Islam, via Wikimedia Commons

4. Photo by: Dying Regime from Maldives, via Wikimedia Commons