Islamist insurgencies in West Africa have become a predominant feature of life, with frightful effects on the populace.[1] The conflicts in Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger are all worsening and spreading to other countries within the region, due to inadequate responses from concerned states.[2] The insurgencies are spreading from the Sahel region of West Africa, with a predominantly Muslim population, outwards to the coastal countries, who have larger populations of Christians and other religious groups.[3] While Ghana is one of the region’s relatively peaceful countries—and is not currently facing an insurgency—it is facing similar internal security issues that have led to regional insurgencies. These conditions include conflict among Islamic sects, ethnic/chieftaincy conflicts, and socioeconomic development challenges. Additionally, countries bordering Ghana are either actively fighting an insurgency or facing political tensions. The overall situation puts Ghana in a volatile position, as instability threatens to spread across its borders.

The affiliation of insurgent groups in West Africa with terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the Islamic State (IS) indicates the groups’ ambition to form a caliphate in the region.[4] The terrorist organizations’ end state is also evident in statements and propaganda materials that articulate this ideological objective. Groups such as Ansaru and Boko Haram have embraced symbols, flags, and emblems linked to the notion of a caliphate, incorporating specific colors, logos, or designs symbolizing the concept of a cohesive Islamic state.

These groups also strategically select areas over which to acquire control, rejecting the legitimacy of national borders, with the intent to establish a unified Islamic state that transcends these geopolitical boundaries.

The successful creation of the Islamic caliphate would offer a favorable location for terrorist groups’ operation. This article assesses the possibility for an Islamist insurgency in West Africa to spread to Ghana’s territory and suggests how the Ghanaian government could most effectively enhance its strategy for preventing this outcome. An effective approach to preventing the spread of the Islamist insurgency to Ghana could become a model for other countries in the region that are dealing with similar conditions and facing comparable threats.[5]

Background: Rise of West African Islamist Insurgencies

The Sahel region of West Africa became the new epicenter for Islamist insurgency after the military defeat of IS in Iraq and Syria between 2014 and roughly 2017. As noted above, extremist Islamist groups took advantage of recurring conflicts in West Africa to infiltrate the region, and most of these groups have consequently affiliated themselves with these terrorist organizations, including IS and al-Qaeda (AQ), for support. The insurgent groups’ initial goals differ from one another. Whereas the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) seeks to establish an independent state for the Tuareg populace, Boko Haram has campaigned against Western-style education and pursued the establishment of a caliphate.[6] Ansarul Islam, by contrast, is less critical of modernity issues and rejects traditions it believes are archaic, but it also preaches unethical practices and deviant Islamic traditions among the social classes.[7]

For decades, the largely Islamic population in the northern part of Nigeria has felt neglected by successive governments and, as a result, facilitated the rise of the violent Islamist insurgent group Boko Haram. From its inception in 2002, Boko Haram was able to tap into the populace’s grievances of disenfranchisement, poverty, unemployment, and frustration with the lack of government services.[8] In 2009, the Islamist group launched insurgent operations in pursuit of an Islamic state,[9] and recent years have seen the group graduating from more rudimentary attacks to full-scale assaults.[10] In 2015, the group pledged allegiance to IS and rebranded itself as the Islamist State’s West Africa Province.[11] Boko Haram’s actions have become central to a larger crisis affecting the West Africa region.

The spread of Islamist insurgencies across international borders in West Africa is an extension of existing conflicts within the region, incited with support from international terrorist organizations.

In Burkina Faso, the contrast between the northern part’s economic potential and its lack of infrastructure feeds a sense of abandonment among its population. Similarly, some local communities in Mali feel marginalized and think the government does not care about their plight.[12] Brutalities carried out by state forces have further reinforced the feeling of marginalization in some local communities, which have subsequently become reluctant to cooperate with state officials.[13] This hostile relationship between states’ security services and their populations helps fuel the insurgency of Ansarul Islam, a militant Islamist group that, like Boko Haram, capitalizes on social issues, including poverty, unemployment, lack of health facilities and other infrastructural needs, and political grievances in both Mali and northern Burkina Faso.[14] Ibrahim Malam Dicko, who founded Ansarul Islam in 2016, preached equality among the social classes for years, questioning traditional elites’ dominance and the corrupt religious leaders who monopolized religious authority.[15] The militant group appropriated the grievances of the populace, who did not hold political power or religious authority, and used Islam to frame its opposition to the established social order.

Unabated insurgencies in the Chad Basin and a lack of state control in Burkina Faso have led to the spread of instability and militancy. In Mali, the Tuareg people, who are estimated to be about 10 percent of the Malian population, formed the MNLA in 2011. The group pursued an autonomous state in northern Mali by affiliating itself with several known terrorist groups, including the “Movement for Oneness and Jihad” in West Africa, AQIM, and Ansar Dine, to push government forces out of the north.[16] The MNLA subsequently declared independence for their aspirational state of Azawad in northern Mali and, with the help of affiliates, expanded its control by capturing Konna in central Mali and subsequently spreading to neighboring Burkina Faso and Niger.[17]

The spread of Islamist insurgencies across international borders in West Africa is an extension of existing conflicts within the region, incited with support from international terrorist organizations. The situation demonstrates that West African countries’ sociopolitical, geographical, and historical makeup are not immune from the conditions that give rise to insurgency. Encouraged by their regional successes, these militant groups seek new grounds in their expansionist agenda. Therefore, countries not yet affected by the phenomenon need to put in place stringent measures to prevent it from spreading to their territory.

West African Insurgencies and State Security

Islamist insurgents in the Sahel region, such as AQIM, have successfully conquered and taken control of large territories despite states’ efforts to prevent their spread.[18] The violence has killed thousands and displaced at least three million across the Sahel.[19] Since March 2022, insurgent groups aligned with IS have continuously launched attacks in Ménaka and Gao in northern Mali, killing hundreds of people and causing thousands to flee.[20] The situation in Burkina Faso is no different. Approximately one million people live in areas under blockade, facing dire humanitarian conditions and daily threats of violence. The town of Djibo, in Soum Province, has been facing a dreadful situation since February 2022, when an AQ-affiliated armed group “imposed a blockade to isolate an estimated 300,000 residents.”[21] Similarly, in Niger, thousands of people were forcibly displaced following threats by armed Islamist groups in Tilláberi.[22]

Populations in the insurgent-controlled areas are constantly targeted and persecuted because of their ethnicity or religious identity. Even though each country in the region faces its own distinct challenges, they all likewise share a legacy of structural vulnerabilities, including weak governance, limited state presence, and porous borders. The governments of the West African states must continue to manage the situation and find a way forward through practical cooperation to counter the spread of militancy and through addressing the root causes of insurgency.

Mitigating West African Insurgencies

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has developed diverse strategies and mechanisms to control the expanding threat of insurgency in West Africa.[23] The Protocol for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping, and Security (1999) is one of the initiatives it has in place to curb the spread of violent extremist groups.[24] Article 3(d) of the Protocol calls for strengthening cooperation in early warning, and countering cross-border crime and international terrorism. However, member states have left the coordination of counter insurgency (COIN) measures to states actively fighting insurgency in the region. The situation led five states—Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Chad—to create the G5 Sahel Joint Force in 2014.[25] The Joint Force, with backing from global allies, operated as a collaborative effort by its member states to tackle security issues in the Sahel area through counterterrorism, improving border security, enhancing military capability, and promoting international cooperation.[26] Financial and logistical assistance for the organization, whose member states are among the world’s poorest countries, came primarily from donor countries and other international organizations.[27]

 

In 2013, ECOWAS members adopted a counterterrorism strategy and implementation plan that uses a three-pillar approach of prevention, pursuance, and reconstruction.[28] The strategy and implementation plan contains important principles that could restrain the spread of Islamist insurgency in West Africa, but it lacks the requisite resources and financial support. Most of the states in the region are poor and cannot support the strategy’s implementation.

In 2013, France set up a 3,000 troop-strong force to root out violent extremist organizations in Mali. Dioncounda Traoré, the interim president of Mali, initially requested Operation Serval, France’s intervention.[29] In January 2014, Operation Serval transformed into Operation Barkhane. With the inclusion of Nigeria in the COIN effort, France expanded the force’s mandate to include the fight against Boko Haram. It advanced its security agenda mainly through capacity building by training, sharing information, and providing equipment to support G5 Sahel Joint Force and Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) COIN operations, which the countries of the Lake Chad Basin established to confront Boko Haram.[30] The G5 countries contributed a 5,000-man counterterrorism force with a mandate to cross international borders in their operations.[31] Establishing the MNJTF was another essential step toward greater regional cooperation in addressing the threat’s escalation. While member states’ sustained and proper coordination might have addressed the challenge of insurgents evading pursuit by slipping across international borders, unfortunately, the dissolution of the G5 Sahel Joint Force has undermined such efforts.

In March 2020, the European Union (EU) responded to France’s call to increase troop deployment in West Africa with Task Force Takuba. The task force’s mandate stretched beyond training and support for the indigenous military to include accompanying the Malian Armed Forces in coordination with the G5 Sahel partners and other international actors.[32] The United States—which, since January 2013, had a status of forces arrangement enabling US troops and aircraft to operate within Niger[33]—also deployed approximately 1,500 troops to the region in addition to setting up a drone base in Niger.[34] The US forces mainly trained the partner nations to increase their capacity to stop the spread of AQ and IS into their countries.[35] The coups d’état in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso, however, sparked anti-French sentiments, prompting demands for the withdrawal of the French, and eventually American, troops from these former French colonies.[36] After the French troops officially left Mali and ended military operations in Burkina Faso and Niger, the former French colonies turned to Russia for assistance in their fight against extremists.[37]

Most West African states adjoining the Sahel region have populations with closer ties to inhabitants across national borders than to their governments in the mostly coastal capitals.

The withdrawal of French and US troops from some West African countries is likely to undermine the successes attributed to their regional COIN efforts. Multilateral partnerships are crucial in COIN strategies. Intervening actors, however, must acknowledge their partners’ various political settings and not impose a universal logic on local contexts. There are peculiarities in every insurgency situation, and each requires a tailored approach. These peculiarities include societal grievances that are harnessed to challenge the ruling order, feelings of insecurity through marginalization and political exclusion, and historical ties among ethnic groups. Most West African states adjoining the Sahel region have populations with closer ties to inhabitants across national borders than to their governments in the mostly coastal capitals. The Tuareg in Algeria, for instance, have closer ties to the Tuareg in Mali than they do to the political elite in Algiers.[38] This interconnectedness, coupled with porous borders, makes states vulnerable to spillover from conflicts in neighboring countries. Where nations are either reluctant or incapable of guaranteeing security, the peripheral populations assume these roles for themselves.[39] The combination of weak government control and strong local ties across national borders underscores the need for bilateral agreements among the West African states to combat insurgency and violent extremist groups. Defeating the Islamist insurgencies that are threatening the West African region’s populations will also require assistance from a committed and formidable partner (or partners).

Failures in Mitigating West African Insurgencies

Despite several ECOWAS protocols and multilateral partnerships among some West African countries, the African Union, EU countries, and the United States, jihadist terrorism and insurgency continue to extend deep roots in the region. Human rights violations by security forces in Mali, Chad, and Nigeria have undermined regional and national efforts to defuse insurgencies.[40] Additionally, several ECOWAS states have struggled to prioritize COIN strategies in their national security schemes. Furthermore, the youth are concerned with the limited space for local community participation in Mali and Burkina Faso’s peace and security processes.[41] Local grievances are one of the fundamental causes of political extremism. It is incumbent on the governments of West African countries not only to defeat insurgency with military force, but also to strive to resolve the conditions that produce the phenomenon.

Although US drone strikes have been instrumental in the fight against violent extremist organizations in the West African region, they have also killed civilians, forced people from their homes, and damaged local economies.[42] As a result, the operations have also driven resentment and turned the local communities against foreign military activities in the region. Since being made to withdraw from Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso, the United States’s commitment to the region is uncertain.

The challenges that confront COIN in the region are evolving and require a drastic solution. Building on existing best practices developed against violent extremist organizations and insurgency appears to be the way forward. Military campaigns against insurgency that worked in places like Iraq, however, may not necessarily be effective in the West African region. Similarly, coastal West African countries may not need the same prevention measures as Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso. It is imperative that each country in the region identify strategies that provide a more holistic means for preventing insurgency and tailor it to suit their particular challenges.

Conditions Indicating Ghana’s Vulnerability to Insurgency

Studies have revealed inequalities in economic strength, infrastructure development, literacy rates, and quality of life between Ghana’s northern and southern sectors. The poverty rate in the northern sector is vast compared to the southern sector: the population of the north is estimated to be 17 percent of the total Ghanaian population but constitutes 40 percent of the poorest people in Ghana.[43] The instability of the Ghanaian economy has further worsened development and growth in the northern sector, where high unemployment has pushed people to migrate south in search of greener pastures.[44]

Although Muslims are not discriminated against and have equal access to social amenities and economic opportunities, northern Ghana, where most of the populace are Muslims, is one of the more economically depressed areas in the country. These societal issues often promote grievances among the northern communities, which jihadists try to weaponize to attract recruits. This underscores the need for proactive measures to tackle societal grievances that could lead to insurgency. Underprivileged and susceptible people in Ghana’s societies must have equal access to financial resources and basic facilities, such as schools, hospitals, potable water, and electricity.

For various reasons, hostilities have increased among the Muslim communities in Ghana, which include Sunnis, Ahmadiyyas, Shi’as, and Sufis (al-Tijāniyyah and Qadiriyya orders). Each Islamic sect in Ghana holds firmly to its theological views and interpretations. The Ahlus Sunnah Wal Jama’ah (Sunni) sect revives traditional Islamic belief and practice.[45] In contrast, the al-Tijāniyyah sect sees Wahhābiyyah (Sunni) as a deviant Islamic sect that has bred heretical movements since early Islam. The Ahlus Sunnah Wal Jama’ah and al-Tijāniyyah sects have also criticized the Ahmadiyya sect as being non-Muslim because its followers consider Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, the founder of the Ahmadiyya movement, to be the promised Mahdi and Messiah awaited by Muslims.[46]

The different sects have established Islamic schools and vocational institutions with the support of some foreign Islamic states and include religious teachings as part of the academic and vocational training they offer to youth. There is a danger that insurgent recruiters could capitalize on the conflicts between the sects to frame an Islamic identity of marginalization within the Ghanaian communities, and thus provide the motivation to drive the marginalized population toward insurgency.

The Ghanaian government may be tempted to monitor Islamic institutions to prevent the Muslim population from being radicalized. Doing so, however, may pose human rights and equality issues, and further marginalize Ghana’s Muslim society. The Sufi orders in the country, however, are less likely to support IS or AQ due to deep theological differences, which also make Sufis less welcome in such extremist circles.

The Ministry of National Security (MNS) must therefore sensitize youth on the implications of radicalization and violent extremism for Ghana’s national security. Seminars aimed at educating youth about the dangers of joining violent groups could be organized for students at secondary and higher institutions. Heads of religious organizations could also become partners in the sensitization program, while the Ghana National Commission for Civic Education could intensify its anti-extremist outreach program to the broader population.[47]

Ghana’s proximity to Islamist insurgent groups in the Sahel region makes it vulnerable to their expansionist activities. Studies have shown that violent extremist groups do not observe boundaries, and the adverse consequences stemming from political instabilities, civil unrest, and civil wars in nearby or proximate states have the potential to spread to other states.[48] Ghana’s porous border with Burkina Faso, a country where groups such as IS in the Greater Sahel and Ansarul Islam have established a foothold, has more than 189 unofficial entry points.[49] The situation has raised concerns about insurgent groups’ possible cross-border incursions.

Ghana could draw from Mauritania’s successful experience in driving away Islamist insurgents from its territory despite being in close proximity to the region’s major Islamist organizations.

The propensity for armed conflict to extend from one nation to another is evident. The spillover of civil wars and broader insurgencies across borders could be in the form of terrorism, especially when IS and AQ, which have regional ambitions, are involved. Islamist groups operating in West Africa could also provide a safe haven for recruiting and training rebels to invade Ghana; these organizations support affiliated groups’ activities in neighboring countries for political interests, especially when ethnicity and culture are involved.[50] The ethnic ties between Ghana and Burkina Faso also make Ghana susceptible to Islamist insurgent groups, because the sanctuary a neighboring state provides to insurgent organizations supports guerrilla tactics and ultimately aids their growth with time.[51] This highlights the need for Ghana to collaborate with its neighboring countries in the fight against insurgency, including the sharing of intelligence, joint operations, and training. Mauritania, a Muslim country, is on record as having produced numerous jihadists and senior-level terrorist operatives.[52] The government has, however shown commitment and leadership in driving away some of the hardened jihadists, while others have left the country on their own.[53] This success story has drawn a lot of donor countries to partner with the government’s efforts to protect its borders.[54] Ghana could draw from Mauritania’s successful experience in driving away Islamist insurgents from its territory despite being in close proximity to the region’s major Islamist organizations.

Recurring Ethnic and Chieftaincy Conflicts

The northern sector of Ghana is overwhelmed with recurring ethnic and chieftaincy conflicts that harm the population. These conflicts include chieftaincy disputes in Bawku, Bolga, Bimbilla, and Bole, which are largely based on historical and ethnic rivalries. Groups seek dominance, the right to install a chief, land ownership, and control of areas with economic opportunities.[55] The intensity of violence in these conflicts varies. The Bawku conflict between the Kusasi and Mamprusi people, which led to the death of more than 30 people between December 2022 and April 2023, highlights the role politics and external intrigues play in fueling the conflicts and making it difficult for successive governments to find a lasting solution.[56] The Kusasi people have received backing from the National Democratic Congress, and key Kusasi members remain aligned with that party. Meanwhile, prominent politicians from the Mamprusi community, associated with the New Patriotic Party, have provided financial support and wielded state influence in support of their people.[57] Investigations have revealed the involvement of Burkinabe combatants in local conflicts.[58] Reports also indicate some youth from Bawku are being recruited to fight alongside jihadists in Burkina Faso.[59]

Although some militants from Ghana are departing the country, this does not imply that Ghana is unappealing for violent extremist groups. Instead, it highlights the transnational dynamics of conflicts in West Africa. The situation in Bawku brings issues of national security to the fore as jihadist insurgents in Burkina Faso and other West African countries, who appear to be moving south toward Ghana, could exploit these local divisions. The government of Ghana must find a lasting solution to the conflict, devoid of political biases, before jihadists infiltrate and take advantage of the situation. One possibility is that the state could use traditional leaders and youth groups to find an amicable solution to the disputes. This approach would prevent violence after a settlement is reached and help secure harmonious, peaceful living conditions and community resilience.

The national security agencies (NSAs)—to include the Ghana Police Service (GPS), Ghana Immigration Service, Ghana Armed Forces, and the National Bureau of Investigation—in the northern sector of Ghana are chronically inadequate. A 2021 survey on the availability of GPS stations in Ghana indicated that 38.4 percent of urban localities had police stations as of 2021, compared to only 3.5 percent of rural communities, with the fewest located in the country’s north.[60] Additionally, logistics support has been a major challenge, making it difficult for the police units to dominate the area in which they are located.[61] They frequently lack adequate communication equipment (or any at all), bulletproof vests, weapons and ammunitions, and sufficient vehicles for effective policing duties.[62] The condition of other security agencies in the north is similar to that of the GPS.

The lack of police control and, to some extent, the state’s inability to monitor events in remote communities—or the complete nonexistence of a state presence in some areas—provide openings for Islamist insurgent groups to recruit people and spread jihadist narratives for their mission. The MNS needs to beef up the presence of the NSAs in rural communities. Interagency coordination should also be encouraged to facilitate the development of a productive collaborative process among state agencies and administrations with competing goals. These measures will do a great deal to bridge the gap in security agencies’ presence in rural areas.

Measures in Place to Prevent Islamist Insurgency in Ghana

COIN campaigns are frequently long and challenging endeavors. Assessing progress can be a formidable task, and the adversary may seem to possess numerous advantages. Ghana has undertaken some COIN measures, both independently and with partner nations, including supporting the Accra Initiative, a counter-violent extremism/terrorism framework and action plan; deepening engagement with the Ghanaian public; equipping the security services and disaster response agencies; and training jointly with partner states.

The Accra Initiative

Ghana has intensified its efforts toward combating the threat of violent extremist groups, which come mainly from the Sahel. The Accra Initiative is a cooperation and collaborative security mechanism between Ghana, Togo, Burkina Faso, and Côte d’Ivoire, which aims to prevent the spillover of Islamist insurgency from the Sahel to the four member states.[63] Ghana has also hosted several follow-up conferences to deliberate on the threat, such as conferences among heads of state, meetings at the ministerial level, and conferences for the chiefs of intelligence agencies from concerned states. The Accra Initiative focuses on training security and intelligence personnel, information and intelligence sharing, and joint cross-border military operations.[64]

The Accra Initiative favors military-oriented responses to the threat of an Islamist insurgency. Ghana’s focus on military means is evident in the recent establishment of new army units in the northern sector to ward off the threat coming from the Sahel region. Lessons from countries affected by Islamist insurgency, however, have shown that the threat does not spread through conventional warfare. Additionally, military operations only temporarily stop the activities and movements of violent extremist groups and do not ensure a long-term solution. Unstable conditions can reemerge between operations, and member states have limited intelligence-gathering capabilities to monitor developments.

The government of Ghana has deepened its engagement with the public to increase awareness of the threat through such programs as the “See Something, Say Something” campaign.

Ghana’s Counter-Violent Extremism/Terrorism Framework and Action Plan

Ghana’s MNS has instituted a framework and action plan to prevent and counter violent extremism: the National Framework for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism and Terrorism (NAFPCVET). This initiative hinges on four main pillars—Prevent, Pre-empt, Protect, and Respond—which are mutually reinforcing.[65] The Prevent pillar seeks to address the root causes of violent extremism by minimizing vulnerability and building resilience among susceptible populations; the Pre-empt pillar proposes measures to detect and deter the threat of violent extremism; the Protect pillar encompasses activities to protect vulnerable infrastructure and spaces; and the Respond pillar supports activities that mitigate the impact of and support recovery from terrorist incidents.[66]

Unfortunately, some of the measures outlined in the NAFPCVET face implementation challenges and do not reflect the practices on the ground. Efforts to tackle the root causes of violent extremism have been slow, particularly in the northern sector of Ghana, as mentioned earlier. The MNS must review and enforce measures outlined under the framework to counter the escalation of Islamist insurgency.

Deepening Engagement with the Ghanaian Public

Intelligence agencies are increasingly reporting Ghanaians’ involvement in jihadism in the Sahel region.[67] The recruitment of Ghanaians by jihadist groups indicates the possibility of the Islamist insurgency’s spread into Ghana. The government of Ghana has deepened its engagement with the public to increase awareness of the threat through such programs as the “See Something, Say Something” campaign, a collaborative effort by the MNS and the Ministry of Information.[68] Citizens are empowered through further education that emphasizes the effects of violent extremism on the country’s security, and are encouraged to report suspicious activities in their communities.[69] The MNS has consequently provided a hotline for reporting suspicious activities.

Community engagement is crucial in addressing local vulnerabilities that trigger extremist threats. Aggrieved people in the most deprived communities, whom the insurgent organizations might try to recruit, are not likely to report suspicious activities. The Ghanaian government’s sensitization campaign may face obstacles if officials fail to provide some basic infrastructural needs for local populations. For instance, the electricity supply in northern Ghana, especially in rural areas, is inadequate and fails to meet the necessary standards.. Less than 20 percent of supposedly electrified communities are connected to the power grid.[70] A lack of basic infrastructure is one of the underlying causes of radicalization. This highlights the need for the government of Ghana to provide equal infrastructural development across the country to give fair opportunities to the citizens and reduce the incentive for radicalization.

Equipping the Security Services and Disaster Response Agencies

Ghana is expanding its armed forces and retooling the various security services to enable them to counter the threat of violent extremist and insurgent groups. About fifteen new Forward Operating Bases are being constructed in the northern part of the country and are at various stages of completion, while the Ghanaian Navy has received additional vessels to secure the country’s maritime domain. There are also plans to procure air platforms to support Special Forces operations.[71] The GPS has also received a substantial amount of equipment, including armored personnel carriers and helicopters, for countering violent extremism and terrorism.[72]

The expansion and retooling of the security services is a step in the right direction. This shows Ghana’s preparedness to counter violent extremist organizations and terrorist groups. The equipment will enable the security services to dominate remote areas, where insurgency mostly starts, and will boost the morale and confidence of the security personnel as they carry out their duties. A proactive strategy that can effectively address the evolving threat could help guide the expansion and retooling of the security services.

Joint Training with Partner States

The security agencies in Ghana have been conducting periodic joint training and exercises with some foreign partner states, such as exercises Flintlock and African Lion, to boost the technical capabilities of the security services and agencies and enhance their terrorist attack response mechanisms.[73] These partnerships are mainly with the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Israel, and draw on the partners’ doctrines and experiences. The exercises are valuable for promoting cooperation, understanding, and interoperability among African partner nations.[74]

These partnerships and exercises provide Ghana with guidance and mentorship in countering the threat of violent extremism approaching its doorstep. However, the MNS could do more to appropriately coordinate foreign partners’ assistance to avoid duplication of effort and focus the exercises on Ghana’s specific needs to sustain interagency collaboration across the crime-terror nexus.

Strategies and Models to Reinforce Existing COIN Measures

Ghana’s strategies for preventing the spread of Islamist insurgency to its territory have gaps that insurgents could exploit if they are not addressed. There are several strategies and models Ghana could adopt to tackle those gaps.

Surveillance and Intelligence Gathering

The central piece in COIN warfare is the information front. Intelligence organizations must monitor threats, forces, occurrences, and developments that potentially jeopardize a nation’s survival, and act to prevent strategic surprises that could compromise national security.[75] Ghana’s Criminal Investigation Department, National Investigation Bureau, and Defense Intelligence agencies are mandated to gather intelligence on potential enemies. Despite the existence of these agencies, however, Ghana’s surveillance and intelligence-gathering effectiveness continue to decline due to limited human resources, technological capabilities, and the diversity of the intended targets.[76]

Strong intelligence capabilities allow the NSAs to understand the nature of the threat facing the state and help the agencies to prevent, mitigate, and better respond to attacks, and better recover from them when they occur. The MNS could employ emerging technologies and techniques to improve understanding of COIN and terrorism environments and help improve information gathering and analysis. The services could also use internal research and development capabilities to engage the NSAs, the private sector, and academia to better understand emerging threats. They should partner with the technology sector to develop modern technology to help the state avoid technological surprises related to terrorist techniques and means of attack.[77]

Cooperation among the Security Agencies

Many security analysts have argued that interagency rivalries have hindered the smooth operationalization of the current COIN policy and strategies. The limited resource allocations in COIN operations have fueled turf wars among the agencies, which have led to cases of interagency infractions during operations.[78] The situation has rendered the security agencies less effective in their operations and presents them as being disorganized, which is an embarrassment to the nation.

The key to success in the COIN strategy is organizational cooperation and coordination. Translating interagency strategies and policies into operational practice requires transparency, trust, and a high degree of institutional dedication. This will change the agencies from bureaucratic coordination to collaboration around joint actions and coherent response mechanisms. The MNS needs to continue joint training and exercises among the security agencies to ensure reciprocity in capacity building. Such events will enhance mutual understanding of the procedural processes in COIN strategies, help the agencies to streamline overlapping responsibilities among themselves, and focus them on individual agency responsibilities to eliminate rivalry.

McCormick’s “Magic Diamond Model”

The rise of Islamist insurgencies across West Africa reveals a pattern rooted in internal mobilization as the initial driving force behind the movement. This pattern has been evident in the insurgencies within Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. Dr. Gordon McCormick’s “Magic Diamond Model” establishes a four-corner framework that elucidates interactions among governments, insurgents, the local populace, and international actors or sponsors.[79] On the one hand, the state has the advantage of controlling well-armed security agencies that act against the insurgents, but the agencies typically do not have enough information to distinguish the insurgents from the rest of the population. On the other hand, the insurgents have the information advantage of being dispersed among the populace, from where they can observe and track the activities of the security agencies. However, they are unable to match the state's resources, firepower, and logistical capabilities.

In the first phase of an effective COIN strategy, according to McCormick’s “Magic Diamond Model,” the state must strive to influence and control the populace, which will enable the NSAs to see things in the operational area that might indicate a threat to security.[80] The intelligence gathered in this initial phase will propel the NSAs’ activities in the second phase, which involves operations to identify, locate, and cut off the insurgents from their bases. In the third phase, the model proposes actions to destroy or capture the insurgents. The fourth phase of the strategy is activated only when an external sponsor is known to be supporting the insurgent side in the conflict. In this case, the NSAs target any financial and other resource supply lines from outside sources to the insurgents. The final phase of the strategy recommends the involvement of international bodies to increase support and resources for COIN operations.[81]

The model’s initial strategy for preventing insurgents from getting access to the local population for influence and recruitment is in line with Ghana’s national security objective of preventing Islamist insurgency in its territory. Having control of the security environment will help the NSAs to get feedback on insurgent activities from the people, leading to the early apprehension of dangerous actors. The model is not overly reliant on a military approach to preventing insurgency, as Ghana’s current strategy tends to be. Because the various security agencies play different roles in each phase of the insurgency phenomenon, the Magic Diamond Model can help resolve the overlapping functions among the different security agencies, and thus reduce the tendency to engage in interagency rivalry and bureaucratic obstacles. The other phases of the model will be applicable if the situation goes beyond the influence and control phase.

The involvement of the whole society in the comprehensive defense strategy will prepare Ghana for any type of warfare that the insurgents may want to wage against the nation.

A Comprehensive Defense Strategy

NATO’s Comprehensive Defence Handbook provides a versatile approach to a broad spectrum of potential threats and challenges.[82] It combines defense, security, deterrence, and resilience measures to safeguard national interests, infrastructure, and citizens.[83] Ghana’s strategies for countering the spread of Islamist insurgencies focus on terrorism and violent extremism. Terrorism is a tool or means that individuals, states, and non-state agents can use as a tactic in conflict.[84] Islamist insurgents may launch direct attacks from their host countries and promote internal mobilization as tactics to destabilize the state. A strategy capable of deterring, defending against, and resisting the insurgents is needed to successfully counter the spread of violent extremism to Ghana. A comprehensive defense strategy centers on enabling an entire country, through a whole-of-society, whole-of-country deterrent and defensive approach, to resist and dilute the threat from cross-border insurgent groups.[85] The concept includes developing a “neighborhood watch” network that will improve domestic response and reporting of dangerous actors and activities to government agencies. 

The numerous insurgent groups’ differing ideologies, tactics, and territorial ambitions make it challenging to develop a unified approach to the threat. Using the Comprehensive Defence Strategy alongside Ghana’s existing COIN strategies will fill in loopholes the insurgent groups may want to exploit. The strategy covers some critical areas that Ghana’s NAFPCVET does not address, such as a deradicalization program for former combatants and a program to prevent the online recruitment of citizens. The involvement of the whole society in the comprehensive defense strategy will prepare Ghana for any type of warfare that the insurgents may want to wage against the nation.

Conclusions

So far, Ghana has managed to prevent the spread of Islamist insurgencies in West Africa across its borders. External support received from international partners in the form of joint training, exercises, and intelligence sharing has been of immense help in this endeavor. The persistence and determination of the Islamist insurgents, however, require states at risk of insurgency to strengthen their COIN strategies. Ghana’s COIN strategies have some flaws that insurgents could exploit. The overlapping functions among agencies, mistrust among agencies, and politicization of intelligence hamper smooth collaboration among the NSAs. Additionally, COIN strategies are geared toward military solutions to the threat, while ignoring its root causes. A review of the NAFPCVET to address these flaws will make it more effective in preventing the spread of existing Islamist insurgencies to Ghana.

Recommendations

The following recommendations will improve existing COIN strategies and operational options:

• The government of Ghana should provide equal access to economic and infrastructural development across the country, regardless of religious affiliation, socioeconomic status, etc. These measures will give fair opportunities to all citizens and keep them from harboring grievances that insurgent groups could exploit.
• The MNS should conduct a comprehensive deradicalization program for former combatants and citizens exposed to jihadism. A well-funded and -planned process will help them to abandon extremist views and rehabilitate back into society.
• The MNS should sensitize Ghana’s youth on the implications of radicalization and violent extremism for Ghana’s national security, but in a way that does not further marginalize the Muslim communities.
• The MNS should prioritize available resources for preventive efforts. Prioritizing capacity building within intelligence-led policing will enhance COIN strategy.
• The MNS should use models and strategies such as McCormick’s “Magic Diamond Model” and a comprehensive defense strategy (a formal strategy), alongside the NAFPCVET, to bridge existing gaps in the current strategies.

About the Author

Lieutenant Colonel Ernest Bosompem Darkwah, an officer in the Ghana Armed Forces, has a background in instructing on and researching terrorism, insurgency, and internal security at the prestigious Jungle Warfare School of the Ghana Army. He earned an MS in Defense Analysis from the US Naval Postgraduate School and an MS in Defense and International Politics from the Ghana Institute of Management and Public Administration. Notably, LTC Darkwah has been involved in six distinct UN peacekeeping missions. His published works include “Contemporary Need for Special Forces in United Nations Peace Operations” (Small Wars Journal, 5 January 2023).

This is a work of the US federal government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. Foreign copyrights may apply.

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Image Credits

1. Photo by: Ntabliba1, via Wikimedia Commons

2. Photo by: Will Thomas, via Wikimedia Commons

3. Photo by: 햄방이, via Wikimedia Commons

4. Photo by: Slashme, via Wikimedia Commons

5. Photo by: Dr. Ondřej Havelka (cestovatel), via Wikimedia Commons

Afa Ajura Mosque in northern Ghana