Policing the Tribal Areas of Pakistan: The Influence of Tribal Traditions and the Need for Police Reforms - Global ECCO
Policing the Tribal Areas of Pakistan: The Influence of Tribal Traditions and the Need for Police Reforms
Manzar Zaidi
1/10/25
The merger of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATAs) into the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) province marked a significant milestone in Pakistan’s administrative landscape.[1] This historic move, formalized through the 25th Constitutional Amendment in May 2018, aimed to integrate the region into the national framework, promoting development and governance. The FATAs, once called the most dangerous place on earth for providing sanctuary to terrorist groups, [2] now came under the jurisdiction of KP, with a focus on implementing uniform legal and administrative systems in what are now referred to as the Newly Merged Districts (NMDs).
However, progress has been slow to materialize. Although Pakistani military operations have largely displaced terrorist groups from the area, episodes of tribal violence reveal that simply renaming areas without thoroughly revamping administrative systems does not result in improved law and order. New policing duties must meet new government and public expectations in these districts, but most police officers are unprepared to face these challenges. The persistence of tribal traditions, coupled with a lack of training and resources, has left the rebranded police force ill-prepared for the multifaceted challenges it faces.
Before and After the Merger
Before the merger of the FATAs into the KP province, and the creation of regular districts out of the former frontier regions and tribal agencies, the area was administered under the Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR). Under the FCR, the collective responsibility and collective punishment of individuals’ crimes was the norm, per tribal traditions.[3] There was no separation between executive and judiciary powers. Every individual was treated as an integral part of the tribal community and understood that his actions would also affect his tribe. Jirga (an informal tribal dispute resolution body) dispensed justice. There were no formal processes of investigation, prosecution, and trial as modern-day criminal justice system defines these terms. The coercive force of the police was rarely used to pursue and arrest suspects. Under the spirit of tribal responsibility, the tribes themselves were expected to bring the offenders before the jirga.[4]
Before the merger, there were no formal processes of investigation, prosecution, and trial as these terms are defined within the modern-day criminal justice system.
The police of these areas were largely semi-formal and honorary. They were generally divided into the Levies, the semi-formal police organization under the political agent (PA)—the administrative head of an agency, who held combined executive, judicial, and revenue powers under the FCR—and the Khasadars, the honorary police officers, serving on behalf of their tribes. The nomenclature and rank structures of Levies, of British colonial legacy, were based on military organizations; Levies were appointed by the political administration and given arms and ammunition by the government.[5] For the Khasadars, there was no requirement for recruitment except their tribal origin, and they were greater in number than the Levies. Khasadars were armed and performed tasks including “phatak” (barrier and checkpoint duty) and “badarga” (security, escort, or arrest duty), but knew little about civilian police duties under a formal legal and judicial system.
After the FATAs merged with KP in 2018, the PA position, with its responsibilities of maintaining law and order, resolving tribal disputes, implementing development projects, and acting as a bridge between tribal elders and the state, was abolished. The KP provincial government transferred the PA’s administrative powers to deputy commissioners and shifted judicial authority to regular courts, replacing the FCR with Pakistan’s standard legal system and aligning the court system with the laws already in force in the settled districts of KP. [6]
Weapons Found in Kurram
The new laws that have replaced the FCR guarantee all the fundamental rights under the constitution—individual criminal liability, investigation and prosecution as provided under the Criminal Procedure Code, and punishments as provided in the Pakistan Penal Code. Application of Pakistan’s Police Rules and Police Efficiency and Discipline Rules require development of new attitudes, policing practices, behavior, code of conduct, discipline, and accountability. However, this training has not been provided. Furthermore, the social and political dynamics police forces must navigate in the NMDs remain considerable, as evidenced by the situation in the district of Kurram.
Kurram
Kurram conflict map
The district of Kurram, previously designated a tribal agency, exemplifies the complexity the police force faces in its transition. Geographically, Kurram is bordered by Afghanistan to the north, and is nearly encircled by the former tribal agencies, now districts, of North Waziristan, Orakzai, Hangu, and Khyber. The region is mountainous and heavily forested, making it a difficult area for police to monitor. The lack of infrastructure and limited road access make it challenging for security forces to reach various parts of the district. The Peshawar-Thall-Parachinar Road is the only way into and out of Kurram. The Taliban maintain a palpable presence in the area, and locals have tended to avoid this dangerous route in times of militancy, preferring to use alternate routes in Afghanistan.[7] The nascent criminal justice system is not developed enough to meet the challenges in these rugged areas inhabited by hardened tribes and infiltrated by trained terrorists from across the border.[8]
The nascent criminal justice system is not developed enough to meet the challenges in these rugged areas inhabited by hardened tribes and infiltrated by trained terrorists from across the border.
The Shia Bangash tribe mainly inhabits the area, which makes it anti-Taliban by default. The other primary tribe, Turi, of Turkic origin, has also constantly been in conflict with pro-Taliban, Deobandi elements in the neighboring areas. The Shia Hazara tribes have a long history as well of being targeted by the Taliban in the area and are vehemently anti-Taliban. Nevertheless, these dynamics complicate policing in the area, as militants often seek to co-opt or intimidate local populations, which can undermine police authority. Furthermore, the concern with terrorist activity and counterinsurgency efforts complicates local law enforcement’s focus on maintaining civil order. Police forces in the NMDs attempt to play a role in security, but they are not as effective as they could be, and, as this overview suggests, the challenges are complex.
Kurram has a longstanding history of sectarian feuds between Shia and Sunni tribes, starting in the 1960s, and erupting sporadically, to the present moment.[9] Clashes between Sunni and Shia tribes occurred in Kurram in August 2024, along Pakistan’s northwestern border with Afghanistan, resulting in at least 46 deaths and nearly 200 injuries.[10] The violence erupted due to a land dispute between the Shia-majority Maleekhel tribe and the Sunni-majority Madgi Kalay tribe, prompting a “lashkarkashi,” or armed tribal mobilization. Shia and Sunni tribes reached a ceasefire after an extensive grand jirga involving tribal elders and civilian and security officials. Despite a temporary halt to the fighting, the region remains tense, with disrupted daily life and ongoing efforts to resolve the land dispute permanently.[11]
The lashkarkashi highlights an important challenge of policing in the NMDs, now ostensibly integrated into the national mainstream. The police in these areas face challenges not just from terrorism, but from tribal mobilizations and internal feuds. Locals do not view the police as marginal players in these disputes, nor do they see them as primary actors, as the situation in Kurram demonstrates, where tribal elders participated to bring it to a temporary halt. The persistence of tribal traditions remains a key challenge for police forces in Kurram and across the former FATAs.
The police in these areas face challenges not just from terrorism, but from tribal mobilizations and internal feuds.
Loya Girga Leaders
The temporary resolution of the situation in Kurram implies that the jirga, the tribal body that regulated affairs in the former FATAs, remains the most effective entity capable of restoring law and order, regardless of the administrative merger. This system is deeply rooted in the tradition of tribal dispute resolution, and it is likely to persist even as the district gradually transitions into the more individualized, constitutionally-mandated rule of law.[12] Police forces in the NMDs face resource constraints and challenges in capacity mobilization. Due to a lack of knowledge, legal skills, and understanding of local systems, police officers often find themselves participating in a jirga instead of enforcing individual accountability.
The tribal system complicates police efforts throughout the NMDs as it operates on the idea of collective responsibility rather than holding individuals accountable for offenses. Tribes live communally and often act collectively, which influences patterns of criminal offenses and governance. The system of collective responsibility, wherein an entire group is held responsible for a crime or offense, is a feature of tribal actions. Thus, when the police attempt to arrest individuals for crimes, they face resistance from the tribe. This longstanding system makes the transition to individual responsibility as recognized under the constitutional amendment a slow process.
Bringing Law and Order to Tribal Areas
The NMDs now have a force of approximately 25,000 officers, comprising both former Levies and Khasadars, but both groups lack the regimentation and discipline associated with regular police forces. There are no strict recruitment criteria, training regimens, or career progression rules, and rank assignments are often arbitrary. Many Khasadars hold honorary ranks and are not even present in the country, having provided “replacements” or “Iwzis” to work in their place.[13]
Although former Levies and Khasadars have been assigned police ranks, these designations have not transformed their skills. They wear uniforms, participate in physical drills, and have received basic training in police operations, but they remain unprepared for complex law enforcement duties under the constitutional amendment in the NMDs. Their service structure and promotion system remain significant challenges. Many Khasadars, due to their tribal status, hold ranks as high as Deputy Superintendent of Police (DSP), while others recruited at the same time remain constables. Promotions were previously granted without standardized rules, but now, following the merger, Khasadars are required to qualify through completion of courses, which is problematic given the inconsistent levels of education among many. Some Levies have received formal police training, but some have not.
They wear uniforms, they participate in physical drills, they have received basic training in police operations, but they remain unprepared for the complex duties of enforcing the law under the constitutional amendment in the NMDs.
Police officer is giving a speech on Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Police Martyrs Day
In short, the police force in the NMDs is largely unsure of what is expected of them or how to carry out their duties. Just as renaming an apple an orange does not make it so, renaming the administrative structure in the NMDs will not make it effective until serious thought, resources, and effort are invested in equipping the police force with the reforms it needs. Among these reforms must be an appreciation for the persisting influence of tribal traditions and an effort to balance those traditions with the need to foster socioeconomic development, improve law and order, and ensure the provision of basic services to the long-marginalized residents of these areas.
Recommendations for Reforming the Police Force in the Newly Merged Districts
The following recommendations are offered for reforming the police force in the NMDs of Pakistan.
First, comprehensive police training programs must be implemented, focused on modern law enforcement techniques, investigative skills, and legal knowledge. The transition from tribal-based collective responsibility to individual accountability requires equipping the police with formal education and professional expertise. Furthermore, specialized police academies must be established to offer continuous, standardized training for both former Levies and Khasadars, emphasizing judicial processes, human rights, and community policing.
Second, clear and transparent recruitment policies must be developed that prioritize merit, qualifications, and adherence to professional standards rather than tribal affiliations. The promotion system must be reformed to ensure fairness and uniformity, eliminating honorary ranks granted based on tribal status. Officers must progress through established benchmarks, such as exams, certifications, and field experience.
Third, the Levies and Khasadars must be merged into a unified, formal police force with standardized ranks and roles. This will help eliminate confusion over authority and improve operational efficiency. Additional training must be provided to bring everyone in line with regular police duties, including law enforcement, investigation, and community engagement.
Fourth, the policing framework must incorporate local customs and traditions without undermining the rule of law. Police officers should be trained to work alongside traditional institutions while ensuring adherence to constitutional rights and individual accountability. Additionally, policymakers must develop strategies that enable the police to engage effectively with local tribes, balancing respect for tribal customs with the enforcement of national laws.
Policymakers must develop strategies that enable the police to engage effectively with local tribes, balancing respect for tribal customs with the enforcement of national laws
Fifth, sufficient financial resources must be allocated to provide modern equipment, vehicles, and communication tools for the police. Resource constraints currently limit the effectiveness of policing in these areas. Police stations, detention centers, and judicial facilities must be built or upgraded to reflect the new legal framework and provide a more formalized space for enforcing the rule of law.
Sixth, more empathetic leadership must be promoted. Experienced senior officers with strong leadership qualities should be assigned to oversee the reform process. Leaders should understand the unique challenges of policing in tribal areas and promote inclusivity and collaboration in decision-making. Local police officers should be involved in policy discussions and decision-making processes, allowing them to contribute to reform measures reflective of realities on the ground.
Seventh, authorities must emphasize accountability and introduce oversight mechanisms. They must establish independent oversight bodies to monitor police performance and ensure accountability. Such bodies should investigate misconduct and corruption, ensuring that police uphold professional standards and maintain public trust. It should be a goal to encourage community involvement in policing through citizen-police liaison committees, where civilians can voice their concerns, provide feedback, and participate in crime prevention efforts.
Eighth, government bodies must collaborate to address the root causes of conflict, such as land disputes and economic underdevelopment, which contribute to tribal violence. Broader socioeconomic development initiatives must accompany policing reforms. The police must build trust with local communities and resolve disputes through legal means, rather than allowing them to escalate into violent confrontations.
Finally, both the federal and provincial governments must secure ongoing logistical, financial, and political support to ensure the sustainability of reforms. This support includes guaranteeing that local influential figures and tribal leaders adequately fund and support the police force, including them in reform discussions and gaining their backing for integrating modern policing methods.
Conclusion
The issue of integrating the former Khasadar and Levies forces into the formal policing system in Pakistan’s NMDs epitomizes the challenges of transitioning from traditional tribal governance to modern rule of law. Despite legislative reforms, these forces remain trapped in a system marred by systemic inefficiencies that undermine the effectiveness of policing and hinder the establishment of accountability and justice in these regions.
True reform requires more than legislative integration; it demands a paradigm shift in mindset, operational practices, and resource allocation. Without addressing these foundational issues, the transformation of the policing framework risks becoming a cosmetic exercise. To bridge the gap between tradition and modernity, Pakistan must invest in comprehensive training, equitable promotion systems, and the development of infrastructure that respects both local customs and constitutional mandates. Only then can these reforms achieve their intended goal: ensuring justice, security, and governance for all citizens.
About the Author
Manzar Zaidi is a former senior police officer and Rule of Law academic and practitioner.
This is a work of the US federal government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. Foreign copyrights may apply.
Image Credits
1. Photo by: Wikimedia Commons
2. Photo by: Inter Service Public Relations (ISPR), Attribution, via Wikimedia Commons
3. Photo by: Bangsh5, CC BY-SA 4.0 via Wikimedia Commons
4. Photo by: Shutterstock
5. Photo by: Shutterstock
ENDNOTES
[1] Zahid Ali Khan, “Merger of FATA: The Unreasonable Taliban Demand to Reverse the Area’s Present Status,” The Friday Times, 18 June 2022: https://thefridaytimes.com/18-Jun-2022/merger-of-fata-the-unreasonable-taliban-demand-to-reverse-the-area-s-present-status
[2] Arnaud de Borchgrave and Shuja Nawaz, “FATA—A Most Dangerous Place: Meeting the Challenge of Militancy and Terror in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 7 January 2009: https://www.csis.org/analysis/fata-most-dangerous-place
[3] Zuha Siddiqui, “Frontier Crimes Regulation: A Past that Never Ends,” Dawn, 15 May 2018: https://www.dawn.com/news/1407020
[4] Naveed Ahmad Shinwari, “Understanding Jirga: Legality and Legitimacy in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas,” Community and Motivation Programme (CAMP), 2011: https://fid4sa-repository.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/3124/1/Understanding-Jirga-07-2011.pdf
[5] “What is the Levies Force?” The Express Tribune, 20 December 2024: https://tribune.com.pk/story/486847/what-is
[6] Dr. Shakeel Azam Awan, “A Step Towards ‘Rule of Law’ in 7 Districts Merged into Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, erstwhile FATA: District Judiciary Posted for Administration of Justice,” KP Judicial Academy, n.d.: https://www.kpja.edu.pk/content/step-towards-rule-law-7-districts-merged-khyber-pakhtunkhwa-erstwhile-fata-district
[7] Naveed Hussain, “Defying Taliban in Kurram: Under Siege and Forgotten,” The Express Tribune, 5 July 2011: https://tribune.com.pk/story/202719/defying-taliban-in-kurram-under-siege-and-forgotten
[8] Amin Ahmed, “Newly Merged KP Districts Get First-Ever Policing Plans,” Dawn, 23 July 2022: https://www.dawn.com/news/1701086
[9] Jeffrey Dressler, “Haqqani Network Influence in Kurram and Its Implications for Afghanistan,” Combating Terrorism Center Sentinel, February 2011: https://ctc.westpoint.edu/haqqani-network-influence-in-kurram-and-its-implications-for-afghanistan/.
[10] Abid Hussain, “Why Sectarian Tensions Continue to Simmer in Pakistan’s Kurram District,” Al Jazeera, 12 November 2024: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/11/12/why-sectarian-tensions-continue-to-simmer-in-pakistans-kurram-district
[11] Abid Hussain, “Kurram Clashes: How a Pakistani Land Dispute Led to a Deadly Tribal Battle,” Al Jazeera, 2 August 2024: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/8/2/kurram-clashes-how-a-pakistani-land-dispute-led-to-a-deadly-tribal-battle
[12] Dr. Shakeel Azam Awan, “A Step Towards ‘Rule of Law.’”
[13] Anonymous senior police officer, author interview, 18 October 2023.