Steven Debich, Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy

Thesis, Master of Science in Network Operations and Technology, March 2015

Advisor: Don Brutzman, Department of Information Sciences.  Co-Advisor: Scot Miller, Department of Information Sciences.  Second Reader: Don McGregor, MOVES Institute.

Abstract.  Navy afloat units become disadvantaged users, once disconnected from the pier, due in part to the high latency associated with SATCOM. Unfortunately recent gains in SATCOM capacity alone do not overcome throughput limitations that result from latency’s effect on connection-oriented protocols. To mitigate the effect of latency and other performance inhibiting factors, the Navy is improving its current WAN optimization capabilities by implementing Riverbed Steelhead WOCs. At-sea testing has shown Steelhead increases effective SATCOM capacity by 50%. Laboratory testing demonstrates that by encoding structured and semi-structured data as EXI rather than XML, compression ratios can be further improved, up to 19 times greater than Steelhead’s compression capability alone. Combining EXI with Steelhead will further improve the efficient use of existing SATCOM capacity and enable greater operational capabilities, when operating in a communications constrained environment. Not only does EXI improve compactness of traffic traveling over relatively high capacity SATCOM channels, it also expands net-centric capabilities to devices operating at the edge of the network that are restricted to lower capacity transmission methods. In order to achieve these substantial improvements the Navy must incorporate the already mandated DISR standard, EXI, as the single standard for all systems transferring structured and semi-structured data.

Received Outstanding Thesis Award from NPS Information Sciences Department.

Keywords: EXI, Efficient Xml Interchange, EFX, efficient XML, Riverbed, Steelhead, WAN optimization, compression, long fat network LFN.

Links: catalog, slideset (ppt), (.pdf), thesis.

Point of Contact: Professor Dan Boger, dboger@nps.edu, 831.656.3671

CC4913 Policies and Problems in C2 is a capstone course for NPS Command and Control students. Study of the fundamental role C2 systems fulfill in operational military situations, including the full range of military operations. Topics include analysis of the changing role of organizational structures and processes, as well as technologies and impacts on C2 systems requirements and designs. Considerations include the complexities imposed on C2 systems as the force structure becomes more heterogeneous. Case study of selected incidents and systems provide a focus on current problems.

This year’s class was divided into RF and non-RF groups and asked to explore C2 issues in a scenario where we were trying to prevent conflict by “holding at risk” aggressors in a complex political and geographic situation described above. In last year’s scenario, high power jamming only originated from the mainland. Developments in the past few months caused a change in that assumption: all SATCOM uplinks are at risk within 300 miles of fixed bases and large surface ships. This was how our simple communications wargame transpired: Aggressive action by nation X; Send in UAV to support ROL (Predator-Global Hawk); Lose UAV SATCOM link; Send in missile boats; Missile Boats tracked via omni-MF and VHF; Send in UAV (Shadow-Scan Eagle); Lose UAV CDL; Patrol boats to visual range – all RF comm jammed; Patrol boats exfil to establish link; Picture gone. This led us to consider a combined RF/non-RF solution.

Network Optional Communications (NOW) is comprised of the following potential methods: lasers, flashing light in various bands, underwater/acoustic, QR codes, and data muling. What we rediscovered was this is not a question of RF vs non-RF. There is a spectrum of options, and we may decide to operate at some level of EMCON to avoid detection. Or the enemy and weather may conspire to reduce the availability of our network. We found situations where there did not appear to be a viable and elegant RF solution but a hybrid combination of techniques could meet user requirements. We refer to this as Mission Agile EMCON and is shown on slide 32 of the accompanying presentation. Slide 34 presents our recommendations.

Attached. Class Project Report and Class Project Briefing.  

This work was presented at the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Wargame Planning and Innovation Workshop hosted by the NPS Littoral Operations Center (LOC), 23-24 April 2015.

Disclaimer.  These sources represent unclassified, open-source work performed in an academic environment for the purpose of educating graduate students. The views in this document are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.

Submitted to IEEE Journal of Oceanic Engineering for forthcoming special issue on Cutting Edge AUV Technology, planned publication early 2018.

Abstract.  Experts and practitioners have worked long and hard towards achieving functionally capable robots. While numerous areas of progress have been achieved, ethical control of unmanned systems meeting legal requirements has been elusive and problematic.  Common conclusions that treat ethical robots as an always-amoral philosophical conundrum requiring undemonstrated morality-based artificial intelligence (AI) are simply not sensible or repeatable. Patterning after successful practice by human teams shows that precise mission definition and task execution using well-defined, syntactically valid vocabularies is a necessary first step.  Addition of operational constraints enables humans to place limits on robot activities, even when operating at a distance under gapped communications.  Semantic validation can then be provided by a Mission Execution Ontology (MEO) to confirm that no logical or legal contradictions are present in mission orders.  Thorough simulation, testing and certification of qualified robot responses are necessary to build human authority and trust when directing ethical robot operations at a distance.  Together these capabilities can provide safeguards for autonomous robots possessing the potential for lethal force. This approach appears to have broad usefulness for both civil and military application of unmanned systems at sea.

Index Terms — autonomous vehicles, robot ethics, Mission Execution Automata (MEA), Mission Execution Ontology (MEO)

Available: publication draft paper and summary flyer.

“Ethical constraints on robot mission execution are possible today.  There is no need to wait for future developments in Artificial Intelligence (AI). It is a moral imperative that ethical constraints in some form be introduced immediately into the software of all robots that are capable of inflicting unintended or deliberate harm to humans or property.”  Robert B. McGhee, April 2016.

Consideration and feedback are welcome. Contact: brutzman@nps.edu

The Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) is dedicated to Advancing Computing as a Science & Profession.  "We see a world where computing helps solve tomorrow’s problems – where we use our knowledge and skills to advance the profession and make a positive impact."

The ACM Committee on Professional Ethics (COPE) is responsible for promoting ethical conduct among computing professionals, and the ACM Code of Ethics and Professional Conduct is undergoing a comprehensive review. We have offered the the following recommendation.

We have reviewed "ACM Code of Ethics and Professional Conduct" (Draft 3) and applaud this important guidance for computing professionals [1].

A significant area of ongoing activity is not yet addressed: remote and autonomous systems.  While several aspects of the draft Code pertain, the design and deployment of such systems pose special challenges that computing professionals must specifically consider.  As noted in the Turing Award Lecture of fifty years ago: ethics, professional behavior, and social responsibility cannot be separated from the diverse fields in which computer science is applied [2].

Many robotic systems are being deployed with high degrees of autonomy, long operational endurance, and independence from direct human supervision.  Examples include self-driving cars, unmanned air vehicles (drones), military sentry vehicles, and many others.  Whether manned, unmanned, civil or military, such systems have significant potential for applying indiscriminate lethal force at a distance.  Complex situations, unforeseen interactions, and emergent behaviors often occur that are beyond the original scope or intent of designers and engineers.

Special considerations are necessary for such machines, since preprogrammed machine responses remain inadequate in isolation.  Protections for human life must be considered and engineered into systems capable of prolonged operations beyond the range of direct remote control.  A critical enabler is available to help: the combination of human judgement and artificial intelligence can yield more effective systems than is possible by either alone [3].  Thus sufficient human supervisory guidance, and permission checks for recognizably dangerous situations, must be available for systems that are allowed to operate autonomously. Simply put: if a human is not in charge, then no one is in charge.

Constraints on action (such as limits of authority, and conditions requiring explicit human approval) can be achieved for remote systems presenting potential hazard to life. For example, recent work has shown that human ethical considerations can be expressed using validatable syntax and logical semantics when defining executable robot missions [4].  Indeed, if ethical approaches combining machine and human capabilities can better ensure human safety, it is unethical to not consider them.  Understanding such issues when engineering systems with autonomy requires the technical expertise and moral judgement of computer-science professionals.

We recommend adding a section to the ACM Code that articulates these vital concerns.  Suggested draft Professional Responsibilities paragraph 2.10 follow.