Wayne Hughes has written a short essay regarding an influential 1995 article which describes the hazards of operating on the surface in littoral waters. The message from Admiral Ya'ari is that ships fighting in littoral waters must expect to suffer attacks and casualties.

• Wayne P. Hughes Jr., Captain USN (Ret.), "A Prophet for Our Times," Naval War College (NWC) Review, Newport Rhode Island, Summer 2014.
• Yedidia "Didi" Ya'ari, Rear Admiral Israel Navy, "The Littoral Arena: A Word of Caution," Naval War College (NWC) Review, Newport Rhode Island, Spring 1995, vol. XLVIII no. 2. (full issue)

Captain Hughes' analysis specifically calls out Network Optional Warfare (NOW) as relevant to this arena.  Introduction excerpt:

It is appropriate for the Naval War College Review to reprint the superb essay by Admiral Ya’ari, because the things he foresaw nearly twenty years ago are all coming to pass—an analytical performance worthy of any Old Testament prophet.

The growing hazards and deadliness of the littoral  seas are something all navies must take into account, but particularly the U.S. Navy, because it is only just beginning to grasp the uniqueness of the littoral environment, the need for new tactics, and the value of warships better suited to fight in its clutter. For example, with Professor Don Brutzman of the Naval Postgraduate School, I have reached the conclusion that the goal of “network centric warfare” (NCW) is appropriate only for operating an aircraft carrier battle group, an expeditionary strike group, or a surface action group, none of which can perform its function without radiating almost continuously. But NCW is ill suited for more numerous, distributable, smaller, and less expensive ships intended to fight in the demanding environment described by Admiral Ya’ari.

A better image for inshore operations is one of “network-optional warfare” (NOW) that supports tactics of stealth and surprise, so we can attack effectively first. Such tactics take advantage of the many forms of clutter and concealment. They allow vessels to operate under doctrine that greatly reduces the need to radiate. In the 1973 war at sea, the Syrians found themselves outclassed tactically by the Israeli Sa’ar boats, so their missile ships attempted to hide behind shipping off their own ports. Appropriately, they called the merchant ships “sandbags.” NOW is also well suited to exploiting the advent of unmanned and robotic systems for search, deception, and attack. (full article)

These are important challenges with historic "lessons learned," providing immediate opportunities for deeper technical, tactical, operational, and strategic thinking. 

Stand by for ongoing activity.  The ratcheting sound you hear in the background is further work under way!  Additional efforts and contributions to NOW are welcome.

CAPT Wayne P. Hughes Jr., USN (Ret.) has written his latest (and perhaps most straightforward) explanation of why the Navy needs small combatants. USS Cushing (DD-797) . Unabridged copy of article, 21 March 2014.

It looks like Professor Hughes's insights are two or three steps ahead of everyone, once again.  I think that he is right to say that NOW offers the opportunity to rethink command and control (C2) for maritime littoral warfare, which is not entrenched in current practice, and must be agile in order to impact (and also deter) future threats to freedom of the seas.  But he still gets credit (from me at least) for the term.  I still remember -- clear as a bell -- sitting in his office last fall, briefing him on our latest progress with Optical Signaling.  Suddenly he interrupted to declare, "You're not talking about Network-Centric Warfare, you're talking about Network-Optional Warfare!"  That seed crystal of an idea has been clarifying and refactoring many tactical possibilities ever since. 

Lots more work awaits, we will keep charging ahead with Network-Optional Warfare (NOW).  Thank you sir!

9 February 1993  0550. USS AQUILA (PHM-4) lurks at slow speed just south of Onslow Bay, North Carolina awaiting the blue force amphibious forces’ approach to their landings during Fleet Exercise 2-93.  As an orange force ship with two other patrol hydrofoil missile ships, AQUILA had earlier attacked two unprotected blue MCM ships with her guns and made a missile attack on the carrier battle group. She stumbled upon them at night while both groups were in total restrictive electronic emissions control. 

AQUILA survived four days of the exercise by operating close to shore at night, moving with fishing boats in the early morning, maneuvering slowly to position for attacks, and using visual and blue force electronic bearings to attack while she  remained electronically silent.   Today was the last day of orange naval force participation and the three PHMs were ordered to disrupt the “invasion” of their country.  Instead of remaining together and risking discovery by a single searcher, the senior Captain on AQUILA directed the other two PHMs to the north and east so the small force would be distributed and less vulnerable to blue force discovery.  Since the ships remained in complete electronic emission control, this made a real-time coordinated attack impossible.   Instead, AQUILA’s Captain visually passed a desired weapon “time on top” after computing time for the others to transit and obtain firing solutions. 

There was little chance of all three PHMs independently meeting the "time on top" requirement.   The primary objective, however, was  to execute any successful attack on the blue three-ship amphibious readiness group, not a necessarily a coordinated multi-axis “best attack.”  AQUILA’s Captain was willing to accept the risk of not having all 24 missiles arrive at the same time if it meant increasing the chance of at least one PHM surviving blue force defenses and conducting a successful attack.

And so AQUILA waited.  At 0630 she began receiving passive lines of bearing from the approaching LHD’s SPS-48 radar.  Her Harpoon missile fire control team began to plot these bearings and their rate change to estimate the blue ship’s minimum and maximum range.  A rough firing solution was created by 0710 but the agreed-upon orange force "time on top" had not been reached.  At 0750 AQUILA’s Captain ordered the missiles released and her MK92 Fire Control System energized to indicate an orange force attack.  She also transitioned to foils and egressed from the operating area at high speed. Within a half-hour she was targeted by blue forces and “sunk” by a U.S. Navy A-6.

Post-exercise summaries indicated umpires recognized eight orange missiles attacking the amphibious force, who had to make approach in mined waters because of their loss of the MCMs earlier in the exercise.  The other PHMs had either been discovered and destroyed while approaching the target at high speed, or not been able to make a fire control solution.

AQUILA’s lessons from the five-day fleet exercise were simple.  Use the littoral to go slow, covert, concealed and quiet into an attack.  Attack the undefended first.  Target by “listening.”  And, when possible, use pre-plans to allow dispersion to achieve increased force resilience, coordinated action where possible, and empower individual initiative to better the likelihood of mission success.

Jeff Kline, CAPT USN (Ret.), Professor of Practice
Operations Research (OR) Department, Naval Postgraduate School (NPS)

Abstract.  The destroyer originated as a torpedo boat destroyer, which stemmed from the need to defend large heavy warships from motor torpedo boats. They were small (400 tons), fast, and maneuverable.  Today  the primary warship of the Fleet is the destroyer, and a significant threat comes from small boats. The need for a small boat destroyer is real, relevant, and can be accomplished through small, fast, and well-armed missile boats.

The U.S. Navy’s current Fleet consists of “blue water” multi-mission platforms capable of conducting strike, air, antisubmarine, and surface warfare.  The Arleigh Burke–class guided-missile destroyer, for example, is a valuable asset prepared for an open-ocean fight against a large conventional force, such as the former Soviet Navy. However, in recent years, there has been a shift in emphasis toward the Asia-Pacific region.  The fight is no longer in the open; it is in littoral, shallow sea, anti-area access denial (A2/AD) environments where the Navy’s main power-projection capability, the aircraft carrier, can be threatened and the means to conduct anti-surface warfare through aircraft rendered impotent.  Because of this, the Navy must develop a small, agile, and well-armed combatant that uses irregular-warfare tactics to project U.S. interests throughout the world.  [...]

Abilities.  Another major step would be empowering boat or boat-group commanders to operate independently from a higher command. In the era of communication inundation, naval leadership must continuously deny itself the tendency to drive the ships for the commanding officers, and instead issue parameters and lateral limits as opposed to specific commands. These boats would operate in an emission-controlled environment to improve the likelihood of remaining undetected. Again, this would require trust and dependency on sound decision-making by ship captains and squadron commanders.

The missile boats, operating in groups, would use network-optional warfare to communicate between one another to coordinate attacks. The reduction in the “conventional” communication capability would mean a reduction in communication equipment. This in turn would reduce the size and profile of the missile boat as well as the crew size. Some examples would be as simple as semaphore (flags, hand signals, lights), low-power voice communication, bullhorns, etc. Future ship-to-ship communication possibilities could include advanced techniques such as QR codes and laser communications. Ships would receive all Fleet Commander Guidance via a passive communications path and only burst communications would be transmitted from the missile boat. What must be fully realized is a required paradigm shift away from how ships and shipboard operations are currently conducted in order to ensure successful missile boat employment in the future.

The future of the U.S. Navy (and the military in general) may lie in large measure in its ability to fight—and win—small asymmetrical sea battles in the littorals. These conflicts may be against large state adversaries such as Iran, China, or North Korea. However, other antagonists could include non-state actors with groups such as al Qaeda, pirates, Hamas, or Hezbollah. The U.S. Navy has been accused of preparing to fight the last war by creating and maintaining a large conventional blue-water force, which was initially constructed to defeat the Soviet threat. To have success in the future, the military must enter the hybrid realm.

Reference:

Goff, John, "Wanted: An Agile, Low-Cost, Irregular-Warfare Surface Combatant," Operations Research Department, Naval Postgraduate School, 8 September 2014.  Accepted for publication under Professional Notes, U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, vol. 140 no. 10, October 2014.

Professor Wayne Hughes, Department of Operations Research, Naval Postgraduate School, 28 July 2014

Abstract.  We don’t need to predict the future to know the actions the U. S. Navy needs to take now. The past and present provide enough clues.

The top priority for U. S. shipbuilders is to anticipate the Navy’s most important need, design small, affordable vessels for littoral operations, and be ready when the Navy accepts the existing strategy, operations, technology, and affordability evidence that compel a new fleet composition. There are two reasons: (a) Such ships are simpler to design on contractor dollars, and (b) There are plenty of examples to draw on, from Chinese Type 022 Houbeis and Type 056 Jiangdongs, to many MCM vessel designs, to Swedish Visbys, to Israel Sa’ar ships of many generations, to a plethora of vessels of all sizes around the world.

Full-length version available as HughesMaritimeBusinessStrategy2014July28.pdf

Observation:  Yogi Berra said "In theory, theory and practice are the same.  In practice, they're not."  Network Optional Warfare (NOW) is best suited to mobile groups of small stealthy vessels and aircraft.  If we are going to achieve a force mix that can take advantage of asymmetric operational concepts favoring the United States, some variations in our long-standing business strategies are necessary.

Related links:

• Hughes, Wayne P., "A Business Strategy for Shipbuilders," Sea Power magazine, vol. 57 no. 9, pp. 6-7, November 2014.
• Stew Magnuson, "Navy Ship Numbers for Asia-Pacific Shift Don’t Add Up," National Defense magazine, April 2014.  Excerpts:

  • Retired Navy Capt. Wayne Hughes, professor of practice at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, Calif., said, “If the surface Navy is going to be a player, it has to be in a position to sail there in crisis situations.”

  • China is building and modernizing its navy and bullying its neighbors, some of which are U.S. allies, he said. There’s no talk of bombing mainland China or a ground invasion, so that leaves the U.S. Navy to act as a deterrent, he said. “We don’t want to fight China. We want to influence China and persuade them to back off. And influence our allies by saying, ‘We are sturdy soldiers, and we don’t want to abandon you,’” Hughes said.

  • If China is going to deny access to the South China Sea, then the United States can demonstrate to the nation that it can deny access to the same waters. “And submarines are an impressive way to do that,” Hughes said.

  • Aircraft carriers are too valuable to lose, he said. “We can’t send a carrier in and have it put out of action, or a $2 billion destroyer,” he said.

  • The Chinese navy in March blocked two Philippine ships from delivering supplies to a disputed island in the Spratley chain, which sparked a diplomatic rebuke from the United States. The Philippines by treaty is an ally of the United States.

  • Hughes said if friends and allies such as the Philippines, Japan and Australia want the United States to be in the Pacific, one way to boost ship numbers is to lean on them to supply more vessels. This was once called the “1,000-ship Navy” concept, although that term has not been heard in a while, he added.

  • “We can tell China, ‘If you interdict our friend’s shipping in the South China Sea, then we will interdict your shipping.’ That is a calibrated capability,” Hughes said. It would be difficult for China to react far from its shores in the areas such as the Singapore Strait or Sunda Strait in Indonesia, he said. Almost all the ships in the U.S. inventory can be used for interdiction missions, including the new littoral combat ship, he said.

• Stew Magnuson, "When It Comes to the Navy’s Destroyers, It’s a Numbers Game," National Defense magazine, April 2013.  Excerpts:
  • Retired Navy Capt. Wayne Hughes, professor of practice at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, Calif., said numbers matter.  “Not mathematically, but logically. If one ship is sunk, it loses its offensive capability, its defense capability, and is no longer there to serve as a target, which is part of its role,” he said. 
  • The shift to Asia-Pacific is appropriate, he said. “But we aren’t actually moving very quick in that direction. We need a maritime strategy.” If the Navy doesn’t have the necessary number of ships to cover the region, then they simply don’t. There isn’t anything it can do to make up for the shortfall. “That means we are going to really struggle to have an appropriate presence in places around the world,” he said.

  • Hughes advocated simpler, less expensive destroyers. Modern destroyers have moved beyond their first roles in World War II when they were primarily escorts for aircraft carriers, convoys in the Atlantic and amphibious assault missions. They evolved at the tail end of the war into small, lethal night combatants during the Solomon Island campaign. Over the years, they have taken on more roles, he noted. The Navy now uses them for anti-air warfare employing the Aegis system, open ocean anti-submarine warfare, and, lately, ballistic missile defense.

  • Although there hasn’t been a sea battle since World War II, Hughes doesn’t rule one out. “We have gotten in the habit of not being attacked,” he said. The rise of China and Iran makes this a possibility, which is why he believes the destroyers should be simplified, and their numbers boosted, he said. “If my ship is three times more potent and three times as sturdy, [and] if you have three times as many of the cheaper ships, you have parity with me. If the two fleets fight, it will be a draw,” he said.

  • “The more single purpose destroyers the better … if you lose one capability, you don’t lose it for all missions,” he added.  Meanwhile, destroyers are being used for anti-piracy missions, he said. “We should be using Coast Guard ships. But the Coast Guard is too busy doing what it is supposed to be doing.”