China’s recent advances in cislunar space have spurred US fears. As a report by an influential defense think tank argues, “The contest over cislunar space could dominate the course and outcome of terrestrial conflict as well as control of the Earth-Moon system.” Analysts in influential US military journals have argued that China is “racing ahead” and point to China’s ambitious (and seemingly inevitable) plans to be the first to mine the Moon’s regolith for water ice and rare helium-3, while establishing a so-called International Lunar Research Station (ILRS) by 2035. With slipping deadlines for certain missions and technologies critical to the US-led Artemis Program, many experts and even some officials seem to believe that the United States is losing this important race for 21st-century space power.

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The study of cyber strategy and its implications for international security has become increasingly crucial, necessitating an examination of the unique challenges posed by the dynamic and stealthy nature of the cyber domain. This paper addresses whether offensive or defensive strategies prevail in cyberspace, especially in light of evolving technological landscapes and debates over cyber threats. By applying offense-defense theory from international relations, the research explores the nuanced relationship between offensive and defensive operations in cyberspace. Despite prevalent views favoring offense dominance, recent skepticism questions the severity of cyber threats and suggests a possible overemphasis on offensive operations. This paper systematically examines the core concepts, findings, and operational variables of offense-defense theory, providing clarity to the conceptual debates surrounding cyber conflict. Recognizing the unique characteristics of the cyber domain, it urges a careful consideration of biases that may distort judgments about offense dominance. The evolving nature of cyberspace and its potential for redesign introduces caution and underscores the need for a nuanced understanding of the offense-defense balance. The preliminary assessment concludes that the question of whether offense or defense "dominates" in cyberspace is overly simplistic. Given the intricate interactions of cyber capabilities, other coercive means available to states, and the dynamic evolution of cyber technology, this question can only be answered within specific contextual and chronological boundaries. Within such conditions, the state of the offense-defense balance is crucial to tactical and operational decision-making. At the strategic policymaking level, the more coherent question is how cyber technologies are shifting the balance of advantages between offense and defense in the overall military posture of states. In essence, this paper provides valuable insights into the ongoing discourse on cyber strategy, theoretical frameworks, and nuanced analyses to inform policy and strategic decision-making in the face of evolving cyber threats.

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As the changes wrought by the Information Revolution and the rise of great power competition play out in global affairs, theorists are revisiting accepted wisdom about deterrence as an explanation for ongoing events and as a guide for strategy. In this theoretically sophisticated and empirically rich foray into today’s strategic milieu, Dima Adamsky explains how scholars have come to reassess the interaction between strategic culture, dominant conceptions of deterrence, and various deterrent strategies. The concept of “tailored deterrence,” whereby deterrent policies are matched to the cultural idiosyncrasies of the opponent, and “cross-domain” deterrence, whereby scholars ponder the potential interaction among traditional (air, sea, land) and emergent (space, cyberspace, artificial intelligence) warfare domains, are some recent Western examples of the effort to adapt deterrence theory and strategy to today’s international setting. Integrated deterrence, a concept introduced in the 2022 US National Defense Strategy, is another effort to synchronize activities across warfare domains in a deliberate whole-of-government, whole-of-alliance approach to deterrence.

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A year after the Eisenhower Administration came into office, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles announced that the United States intended to protect its allies and indirectly project military power through, as Dulles called it, the “deterrent of massive military power.” Dulles’s speech to Council of Foreign Relations on 12 January 1954 is seen as the dawn of the era of what became known as “massive retaliation,” which sought to apply America’s nuclear arsenal as a political and military instrument to serve the nation’s strategic interests around the globe.

Importantly, however, it wasn’t just that Dulles gave the speech proclaiming the new era. President Eisenhower directed that the newly created United States Air Force receive a larger share of the Defense Department’s budget to operationalise the new strategy. Leaders like Air Force General Curtis LeMay had been preparing for such a day for his entire career. He set about building up the Strategic Air Command to implement the new strategy with plans, programmes, policies, training, manpower, and procurement. LeMay and his colleagues did not need an engraved invitation from their political masters on what to do once Eisenhower’s directive landed on their desks.

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What explains variations in how African countries respond to security threats? How can we explain situations in which countries face a similar regional threat environment and yet respond very differently? In this article we take advantage of a natural experiment offered by instability in Somalia, which has given rise to terrorist threats to neighbours Ethiopia and Kenya. Analysing Ethiopian and Kenyan responses to instability coming from Somalia since 2000 shows that these countries differ in both the nature and timing of their responses to a common set of Somali challenges. The key to understanding their varied responses, we argue, lies not in the objective threat itself, but in how the threat affects the political calculations of the state. These calculations are shaped by fundamental political and economic dynamics such as the presence or absence of a founding myth, the ways that elites access and maintain their hold on power, and the political economy underpinning the state.

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