A Short BIG History of SMALL Warships 

“With Adolf Hitler’s clenched fist extolling the supremacy of his undersea marauders of 1938, the Royal Navy came to a stark realization--it was a woefully unprepared to fight a submarine war. 

Though Great Britain possessed the world's greatest Naval fleet, the Lords of the Admiralty overlooked the fact that spread as its responsibilities were across the globe, it now had to defend its far-flung dominions against enemies technologically advanced over any ever fought before. By 1938 it was readily apparent that the flimsy aircraft and vulnerable submarines of the Great War of 1914-18 had developed into formidable long-range weapons now able to decimate entire cities and fleets. The era when proud warships and sword-wielding cavalry could dominate world politics had come to an end. Not without reluctance, the British Admiralty admitted the war of the future would be fought in the sky and beneath, as well as on the sea. 

So it was, late in 1938 that Royal Navy planners came to the conclusion the British fleet seriously lacked ships able to wage coastal or ocean warfare against Hitler's growing Armada of more than 600 swift, deadly, long-ranged U-boats. Despite the Royal Navy's awesome number of destroyers with suitable anti-submarine weaponry, these fleet-footed greyhounds were needed to protect the equally awesome numbers of capital surface warships. The dismal truth was that no single, capable, coastal, or ocean-going anti-submarine escort vessel existed in suitable numbers within the Royal Navy. 

While several new types of ocean escorts were being experimented with, namely what came to be known as the Black-Swan class sloops and Hunt class frigates, these were large complex vessels unsuitable for fast economic mass production. The need, as anticipated in 1938, was strictly for coastal patrol escorts to protect England and its distant dominions shorelines.” (Owen Gault; Corvettes at War. Sea Classics; Feb 2007; 40, 2; ProQuest pg. 34) 

Eventually another mission became even more critical—escorting and protecting the convoys crossing the deadly Atlantic bound for England and other theaters of the war.  The FLOWER class corvette (small frigate) was borne from of a well-known oceangoing trawler hull but outfitted for war.  At just over 1,000 tons, 33-foot beam and 12-foot draft, this vessel carried 89 men and 7 officers plus an array of modern sensors and anti-submarine weapons.  Most amazingly, 286 were built in a 4-year period.  They could be built in smaller yards, each within an 8 month build period.  After the war, U-boat captains credited these vessels as the most effective at preventing even heavier losses of shipping across the Atlantic.  

There were other patrol craft variants built through WW2, such as the U.S. Navy PT-boats, the German S-boats, and other small warships such as the U.S. Navy’s destroyer escorts (DE). Of particular note is the role of the USS Samuel E. Roberts (DE 413) in the Battle of Samar in which it has been called "the DE that fought like a battleship." Roberts, the other DDs and DEs and aircraft of "Taffy 3" were pivotal in the Battle of Leyte Gulf and arguably changed the tide of war.  Post war, the need for small warships continued into Vietnam, and the cold war era.  The U.S. Navy saw the need to develop the Guided Missile Patrol Hydrofoils (PGHM) to protect specific chokepoints in the Mediterranean. Even more recently the CYCLONE class PC's developed for the Naval Special Warfare units were sold to the U.S. Coast Guard, then reacquired by the USN and served way past their intended life span in the Persian Gulf. These very successful warships were recently decommissioned with at least two sold to other navies.  There is no current plan to replace these warships.

The quote from Owen Gault’s article is important in today’s context.  You could well substitute the context and lack of capability to today’s U.S. Naval force structure viz. our near-peer competitors and rising tensions in the Indo-Pacific.  Again, we find ourselves (much like Britain) facing potential long range adversaries with inadequate numbers of vessels, missiles, mines, anti-air, and anti-submarine capabilities.  Our capital ships are mainly in defense of the carrier battle groups and are very vulnerable to massed attack.  Even submarine warfare is largely missing with the demise of ASW aircraft as part of the organic carrier battle group capability.  Further, mining capabilities are nearly non-existent. The focus above sounds primarily defensive in nature, as deterrence often is, but must also carry an offensive “first to fire effectively” (Professor Wayne Hughes Fleet Tactics) capability. 

This website is dedicated to emerging capabilities in third-offset thinking where use of a mix of autonomy, human-machine partnerships, artificial intelligence and machine learning come together into a sensible, very near term capability that the U.S. Navy can have TODAY.  All that is needed is a sense of urgency and willingness to think differently. 

The Lightly Manned Autonomous Combat Capability (LMACC) has gone from an idea, to drawings originally based on the CYCLONE class, then re-imagined using latest innovations.  It is important to note that it is also based on Professor of Practice Jeff Kline (Captain, USN, ret.) and the late Professor of Practice Wayne Hughes (Captain, USN ret.) in their Street Fighter concept.  Professors Kline and Hughes provide much of the insight on needs for greater number of small, lethal ships that can operate forward.  What is added in LMACC is the concept (Denning and Arquilla) that "the Network IS the platform," meaning that these small warships in a mix of sensor types, unmanned surface vessels, undersea and seabed capabilities create a sensor grid in which all participate.  The following sections highlight various aspects of the LMACC and links to reports, theses and journal articles are included in each section.

Documents

Between Peace and Air-Sea Battle: A War at Sea Strategy

Document #2